Acta Juridica by unknown
ACTA 
JURIDICA 
HUNGARICA 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Editor in Chief Vilmos Peschka 
Akadémiai Kiadó 
Budapest 
Kluwer Academic Publishers 
Dordrecht / Boston / London 
H U N G A R I A N A C A D E M Y O F S C I E N C E S 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Editor in Chief VILMOS PESCHKA 
Board of Editors GÉZA HERCZEGH, ISTVÁN KERTÉSZ, 
TIBOR KIRÁLY, FERENC MÁDL, ATTILA RÁCZ, 
ANDRÁS SAJÓ, TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
Editor VANDA LAMM 
Acta Juridiea Hungarica presents the achievements of the legal sciences and legal scholars 
in Hungary and details the Hungarian legislation and legal literature. The journal accepts articles 
from every field of the legal sciences. 
Recently, the editors have encouraged countributions from outside Hungary, with the aim of 
covering the legal sciences in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be addressed to 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
H-1250 Budapest, P.O. Box 25 
Tel.: (36 I) 355 7383 Fax: (36 1) 375 7858 
Distributors 
for Hungary 
AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ 
P.O. Box 245, H-I519 Budapest, Hungary 
Fax: (36 1)464 8231 
for all other countries 
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS 
P.O. Box 17, 3300 Dordrecht, The Netherlands 
Fax: (31) 78 639 2254 
Publication programme, 1998: Volume 39 (in 4 issues). 
Subscription price: NLG 380.00 (USD 195.00) per annum including postage & handling. 
© Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 199H 
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
309789 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Vol. 39. Nos 1-2. 1998 
CONTENTS 
STUDIES 
András BRAGYOVA The Concept and Nature of Contractual Obligation 1 
Balázs József GELLER Laws Penalising Bias Speech and their Constitu-
tionality in the United States 25 
Katalin LIGETI European Community Criminal Law 55 
Lajos RACZ Cardinal Serédi and Relations between Hungarian 
State and the Catholic Church 93 
Csaba VARGA Measuring through Patterning in Law 107 
KALEIDOSCOPE 
Ágnes DÓSA New Legislation on Health Care in Hungary 131 
MAGYAR 
rWÖÖMÁWYOS AKADÉMIA 
KÖNYVTÁRA 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA ACKNOWLEDGES WITH THANKS 
THE SUPPORT OF SOROS FOUNDATION, BUDAPEST 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
1998 39 Nos 1-2, pp. 1-24 
1216-2574 / 98 / U S D 5.00 
© 1998 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
STUDIES 
András BRAGYOVA The Concept and Nature of 
Contractual Obligation 
1. Introductory definitions: contract and contractual relation 
'Contract' and 'contractual obligation' are concepts recurrent in political, moral 
and legal theory in many different contexts. Quite often it is not at all clear 
how to distinguish the concept of contract from other related notions like 
agreement, promise, consent, duty and the like. In this essay I attempt to clarify 
some of these concepts and their interrelations, but first I wish to investigate 
of the concept of contractual obligation. My analysis intends to examine the 
general concepts of contract and that of contractual obligation; in other words, 
it tries to clarify a general concept of contract, that is to discover the common 
elements in the use of 'contract' and 'contractual obligation' in different fields, 
such as moral, political theory and law, including the diverse application of 
these concepts in various fields of law, e.g. in private law, labour law, 
administrative law and international law. 
I will argue that it is necessary and useful to distinguish between 'contract' 
and 'contractual relation'. 'Contract' is the act of agreement (the basis of the 
obligation) while the contractual relation is the set of normative relations 
(claims, rights, immunities etc.) resulting from the contract,1 in the sense that 
1 HOLLAND, Th. E.: Jurisprudence, 13, ed., Oxford, 1924, 25 1. 
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their existence in law or morals is due exclusively to the legal or moral 
existence (validity) of the contract. By the term 'contractual obligation' 
therefore I intend to embrace both the contract in the narrow sense and the 
contractual relation itself. In the political and social theory most authors use the 
term 'social contract' and other terms to that effect in this broader sense, the 
contract construed as a basis of various obligations of political or moral 
character. A 'contract' is a state of affairs—an act or a conduct and their 
context—to which legal (or moral, political) norms attach certain normative 
consequences, above all the existence of rights and obligations (and their 
modalities): they make up the contractual relation. Thus by 'contractual 
obligation' I shall designate any Ought—legal, moral, political, or other-based 
on, or derived from, a contract or quasi contract; that is, an obligation the 
validity of which is assumed to depend on the cooperation of the person bound 
by it. 'Ought' is used here as a substitute for Sollen i.e. describing any deontic 
qualification of an action (or conduct) of an agent.2 Later I will suggest a 
distinction between 'obligation' and 'duty' as two different kinds of Ought. I 
attempt to explore, as said before, the concept of contract (together with 
'contractual obligation') as a general concept covering its legal, moral and 
political uses, although I will treat the legal concept of the contract (and that 
of contractual obligation) as the core or paradigmatic case of the meaning of 
the term. This move is sufficiently justified, I think, by the undeniable 
(historical) fact that the concept of social contract was borrowed from the legal 
usage, albeit obviously not strictly following its technical meaning in law or 
legal theory.3 
Two other related concepts should be briefly elucidated: the concepts of 
'obligation' and 'norm'. On the concept of obligation I will have to say more 
at a later stage. Nevertheless, it is important to state at the beginning that I 
mean by obligation generally any situation in which certain acts of a person are 
defined by a norm so that nonconformity with the norm is regarded as incorrect 
and usually followed by some kind of critical reaction. The idea of the norm is 
thus more general (more extensive) than that of the obligation: there are norms 
not imposing obligations but giving and protecting rights, conferring powers, 
giving permissions, or determining the conditions of validity of certain acts. All 
norms—or normative propositions—claim to guide human behaviour by describing 
2 The term 'agent' designates any person in law or morals, not only human beings, treated 
as a distinct entity, such as firms, associations, States and the like capable to have rights and 
obligations. 
3 See, for instance, LESNOFF, M.: Social Contract, London, 1986, 2 ff. 
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what persons ought to do (or not to do) in certain situations. It is important to 
add another remark too. The term 'obligation' (and the corresponding term 
'right') is used rather confusingly in two different but interrelated senses: in one 
sense speaking of an 'obligation' or a 'right' signifies a norm conferring a right 
or imposing a general obligation; on the other hand, the term 'obligation' is used 
almost as often to refer to an individual obligation, or a right, of a person. An 
individual obligation is normally seen as a general obligation applicable in a 
certain state of affairs. Accordingly, if there is a general obligation or duty—a 
general norm prescribing to any person with certain properties—to send the tax 
return in a certain moment to a certain address and there is an individualised 
one that of an individual A to return it.4 In other words, norms contain generic 
terms in describing the action required (or prohibited, permitted) by them, 
while obligations and rights concern the acts required from individuals, there-
fore they can be described using individual names. For this reason certain legal 
philosophers, most notably Kelsen,5 prefer to speak of 'general' and 'indi-
vidual' norms, the latter including judicial and administrative decisions. 
Another category, 'legal relationship' (Rechtsverhältnis in German) is used to 
describe any human relationship regulated by legal norms. The importance of 
this distinction will be clarified later in this paper. 
2. The concept of contract 
The concept of contract as an act creating—being a source or basis of—\egal, 
moral or political obligations is not so simple as one might suppose. The core 
of the concept of contract is expressed in the name of the old common law 
writ: assumpsit;6 i.e. an obligation created by the 'free' act of the obligee. 
Thus, a contract is an archetype, as it were, of the obligation (or duty) based on 
the autonomy of the person obliged or in other words an obligation—a restriction 
of the freedom of action of a person—based on the liberty of the person the 
4 I relied here in substance on HART, H. L. A.: The Concept of Law, 2. ed. Oxford, 1994, 
82 ff. 
5 See e.g. General Theory of Law and State, transi. A. Wedberg, Cambridge, Mass. 1946, 
and Reine Rechtslehre, Vienna, I960; see also his posthumous work, Allgemeine Theorie der 
Normen, ed. R. Walter Vienna, 1979. 
6 See for example SIMPSON, A. W. В.: History of Contract in Common Law, Oxford, 
1975 see also HOLMES, O. W.: The Common Law, 2. ed. by M. DeW. Howe, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1963, 195. 
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whose liberty is restrained. Thus contracting is, generally speaking, the practice 
of self-binding, self-obligation. For this reason, certain anarchist thinkers, such 
as Proudhon,7 do not recognize as binding but contractual obligation. In sum, 
the idea of contract is closely, indeed inextricably, linked to the notion of 
'voluntary obligation'.8 
In the following I attempt to define the concept of contract. By 'contract' I 
suggest to mean a specific set of facts—operative facts—capable to create (or 
generate) contractual obligations. Therefore, it includes not only the most 
obvious cases of contracting but other acts capable to generate obligation of the 
actor of the same type as an obligation existing within a contractual relation. 
The operative facts creating contractual obligation are defined by certain 
norms, since it is easy to see that no fact—like the fact of having uttered 
specific words such as 'spondeo'—is in itself capable to create an obligation, 
that is to become a contract. The obligation-creating effects of certain facts 
depend on non-contractual norms defining the moral, legal etc. effects of 
certain human acts as creating obligation, e.g. through defining the conditions 
of validity of agreements, promises etc. Thus, the 'source' of an obligation is 
not the voluntary act of a person (a State, an agent etc.) as such, but rather the 
voluntary act and the norms endowing them with the effect of creating an 
obligation. Consequently it is well-founded to say that an obligation resulting 
from a contractual situation is only partly 'based' on voluntary acts (promise, 
agreement, consent and the like); the other component in the basis of the 
contractual obligation is the set of rules constituting the obligation-making as 
a 'practice'.9 In other words, any contractual obligation presupposes the 
independent existence of the rules constituting the obligation-making. I must add 
that the view just set out depends on the acceptance of the separation between 
7 PROUDHON, P-J.: Du principe fédératif, Oeuvres complètes, Paris, 1868, tome VIII., 
44.: '...le régime libéral est contractuel'. Proudhon argues in this book for a 'contrat politique' 
which he equates with the federation principle he vindicates. For an influential modern view 
to similar effect see WOLFF, R. P.: In Defence of Anarchism, 2. ed. Berkeley, 1998, 15.: 'For 
the autonomous man, there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as a command.' (Original 
italics.) 
8 MACCORMICK, N. D.: 'Voluntary Obligations' repr. in his Legal Right and Social 
Democracy, Oxford, 1982, 190. 
9 I use the concept of 'practice' in the sense defined by John RAWLS in his 'Two Concepts 
of Rules' 64 Philosophical Review 1 (1955) reprinted many times e.g. in FOOT, Ph. (ed.): 
Theories of Ethics, Oxford, 1967. A 'practice theory' of obligation is exposed by Hart in 
'Legal and Moral Obligation' in MELDEN, A. I. (ed.): Essays in Moral Philosophy, Seattle 
and London, 1958. 
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Is and Ought, at least in its moderate (and in my view logically certainly 
correct) version, which asserts that it is logically impossible to deduce from a 
set of 'Is' propositions an 'Ought' proposition. It does not claim in particular 
that it is impossible to deduce from a set of Is and Ought propositions an Ought 
proposition.10 
Consequently, the definition of the basis of the contractual obligation is the 
description of the content of norms (or rules) constituting the contractual 
obligation. If there were no such norms, it would be simply meaningless to 
distinguish between valid and invalid contracts (or obligations based on 
contracts). These norms, let me mention it in passing, are constitutive in the 
sense that they do not impose obligations (and still less duties): they simply 
define the conditions of validity—or normative existence—of obligations; they do 
not prescribe anything but only describe the 'felicity conditions'11 of an act 
(or acts) intending to create obligations. They are similar to the rules of a 
game, such as the rules of football defining the conditions of a 'goal'; so I 
prefer to call them 'rules' rather than 'norms'. The rules constituting the basis 
of contractual obligations are of two kinds: one type of these rules defines, 
albeit indirectly (or negatively) the content of the contractual obligation by 
determining what may not be the content of a contractual obligation. (For 
example, the statement that nobody may oblige herself to slavery is such a 
rule.) These rules are said to be 'power-conferring rules'1"1 because they 
determine the powers—that is, competences to oblige themselves validly—of the 
participants of a contractual obligation. Second, there are rules of procedure (in 
the strict sense) describing the ways obligations are created: these rules, in 
particular, designate the acts that count as an expression of the 'will' or 
intention to be bound, or the acts that are regarded, irrespective of actual the 
intention of the person to be bound, as a basis of an obligation. Rules of the 
latter type are, e.g. the rules defining the conditions of validity of tacit consent. 
(The famous argument of Locke on the expression of tacit consent by using a 
10 The question of the relationship between is and Ought (Sein and Sollen) or Facts and 
Values is, of course, much more complicated, but I shall not pursue this problem here further. 
For a general overview see: MACKIE, J. L.: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London, 
1977, 64 ff. 
11 This term is borrowed from AUSTIN, J. L.: How To Do Things With Words, Oxford, 
1962. 
12 HART: The Concept of Law, esp. 26 ff. and RAZ, J.: The Concept of a Legal System, 
Oxford, 1970, 156 ff. 
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highway13 is, from this point of view a definition of a rule determining the 
acts counting as consent.) 
Thus, in defining the concept of 'contract' as a basis of contractual obliga-
tions, I shall try to define the acts or situations capable to create contractual 
relations; this is equivalent to the description of the content of the rules 
constituting contractual obligations: I shall call it contractual situation. A 
contractual situation is characterized by certain rules that are capable to 
distinguish the contractual situation from other social practices and acts (or 
facts) creating obligations or (as we shall see, duties). These rules are either 
substantive or procedural. The two fundamental substantive rules of the 
contractual situation—which determine indirectly the permitted content of 
obligations—are equality and freedom of the actors. The rules of procedure of 
the contract situation are the exclusion of coercion from the relationship and 
the rule of unanimity. They are the characteristic features of any contractual 
situation whatever, thus covering a wide range of situations from commercial 
transactions or everyday promises to international conventions. The state of 
nature as assumed to have existed in certain social contract theories is also a 
case of a contractual situation. I will now examine these rules in detail. 
By the freedom of the actors in the contractual situation I mean what might 
be justly regarded as the most decisive characteristics of a 'contractual 
situation'. The concept of freedom is too complicated to be discussed here; 
fortunately it is not necessary either, since the freedom I have in mind means 
simply two things. First it signifies the absence of duties (or other conflicting 
obligations) binding the actors (or subjects) of the contractual situation; second 
it denotes the rule that the actors are deciding without external constraints the 
creation of an obligation binding them. The concept of 'external constraint' 
includes not only duress or undue influence but also fraud and other improper 
influences to that effect.14 It includes, of course, freedom from direct coercion, 
but this point I shall examine separately below. A contractual engagement is 
the use of the legal or moral freedoms—in normative terms: powers or compe-
tences—actually possessed by the actors. Thus the famous constitutional or 
general legal principle of the freedom of contract15 might rightly be thought 
13 Two Treatises of Government, Second Treatise, para 119. 
14 See in general WERTHEIMER, A.: Coercion, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1987, 19 ff. 
15 See ATIYAH, P. S.: The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract, Oxford, 1977 for the 
English law; and GILMORE, F.: The Death of Contract, Columbus, 1974, for the American. 
In continental Europe an influential work was RIPERT, G.: Le régime démocratique et le 
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of as a specific case of the general, all-encompassing freedom of action: the 
content of a contractual obligation may be anything the person is free to do not 
to do. The restrictions on the freedom of contract imposed by moral or legal 
duties or prohibitions should be judged accordingly as justified or unjustified 
restrictions on personal liberty. 
The equality of the normative powers of the actors (or participants, 
contractors) in the contractual situation means that they possess the same 
general normative powers to oblige themselves. This, of course, presupposes 
that any actor of the contractual situation has certain powers or 'rights' (or, 
more exactly, 'liberties') which he or she disposes of freely (in Ute sense 
described above). Examples of such powers in various contractual situations are 
the right to property, the personal liberty, the sovereignty of the State or the 
unlimited freedom of those being in the state of nature. The requirement of 
equality concerns only, as mentioned before, the general powers of the actors, 
not their particular features; so, in international law a State is sovereign if it 
has certain general powers which does not exclude that legal restrictions are put 
on their exercise (e.g. neutrality or membership in supranational organisations). 
The two other principles are not tautologies, as one might think they are, 
on the ground for example that coercion by definition excludes freedom. The 
two other constituent characteristics of contracting are—in contradistinction to 
the two features just discussed—procedural, while the first two are, as 
mentioned above, substantive. The exclusion of coercion and unanimity define 
the procedure of contracting and not its substantive preconditions, not the 
permitted range of contents of contractual obligations, but the actions capable 
to create them. They are the procedural expression of the freedom and equality 
of the virtual contractors. The 'procedural' nature of these features of the 
contractual situation means that the two twin principles—I call them principles, 
because they are condensed expressions of a class of more detailed rules—exclu-
sively the acts leading to the creation of an obligation (including its conditions 
of validity). An appropriate example of this kind of rules is the law of inter-
national treaties, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
of 1969.16 The law of treaties is the set of rules determining the procedure of 
making international obligations of contractual nature (in the sense it is used 
droit civil moderne, Paris, 1936, Ch. V.: 'Le déclin du contrat' 269: '...la liberté contractuelle 
est le corollaire de la liberté individuelle'. 
16 See SINCLAIR, I.: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2. ed. Manchester, 
1984. 
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here) that is, the acts capable to create obligation.17 Here too, technical 
details aside, the main procedural rules are the exclusion of coercion and 
unanimity: no international treaty is valid if the State purported to be bound by 
it expressed its consent under the influence of force, and no treaty bounds a 
State if it did not duly consent to it. Now, of course, the definition of coercion 
is not easy, although its meaning is rather clear: an obligation is valid only if 
the contractor agreed to it upon his own 'will', i.e. a decision is based on a 
relatively unconstrained choice. The range of acts counting as 'coercion' is 
rather wide: there is, generally speaking, a narrow interpretation and a broader 
one as for the acts or situations where the choice of the person is considered 
to be 'coerced' and thus invalid, i.e. non-free. It is impossible here to discuss 
in detail what coercion actually is or might be; the sole point is to note that 
this definition is always a rule (or norm). In each contracting practice there can 
be, and in fact are, different standards of what counts as coercion; the point is 
that the determination of the cases of coercion is definitely normative. From 
this contention it follows that there are no a priori cases of coercion 
independently of the rules of the contracting practice. In international law, for 
example, peace treaties where the coercion in the conclusion of the treaty for 
the common sense seems to be sufficiently clear, are definitely not regarded as 
'coercion'.18 
The unanimity rule excludes the imposition of an obligation to any contractor 
without its consent. Thus the unanimity rule defines the conditions of tire 
conclusion of a treaty or a contract: its significance is that it states the 
requirements that count as an agreement between the contracting parties. Un-
animity requires that each contracting party accept as binding a set of mutual 
rights and obligations: if there is no agreement of each of the contractors, the 
agreement does not exist. In other words, tire unanimity rule gives a veto power 
to any contracting party. Another aspect of the unanimity rule is that it restricts 
17 This remark is important, because the Vienna Convention, and indeed most publicists, 
carefully avoid the use of the 'contract ' or 'contactual' in respect of international 
agreements; one could perhaps say that 'contract ' is under anathema in public inter-
national law. The underlying reason is, most probably, the intention to stress the 
independence of international law against undue private law influences, considered 
dangerous for the effectiveness of the international legal order. See LAUTERPACHT, H.: 
Private Law Sources and Analogies in International Law, London, 1927, 155 ('Treaties 
as Contracts'). 
18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Arts. 52. and 62. See SADURSKA, R.: 
'Threats of Force' 82 American Journal of International Law, 239 (1988) for an extensive 
treatment of the concept of force and related concepts in international law. 
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the personal validity of the contractual obligation (and, of course, that of the 
rights) created by the accomplished contract to those who accepted the ob-
ligation. 
It is worthwhile to add that the rules of procedure of contracting do not 
exclude the influence of the contracting parties upon each other. The contrary 
is true: a contract is typically the result of negotiation (or bargaining).19 
Generally, a contractual situation is a (more or less pure) case of a negotiating 
or bargaining situation and the rules of procedure applicable for the creation 
of a contractual obligation could be regarded as rules constituting the pre-
conditions of negotiation or bargaining. Thus, some sort of argumentation is 
constitutive to any contractual obligation: the agreement as an obligation-
creating (operative) fact in contract is achieved by argumentation. I prefer to use 
the term 'argumentation' for its generality, since negotiation and bargaining are 
varieties of argumentation. Even some cases of a 'debate' can be appropriately 
regarded as a kind of contractual situation of argumentation, since a debate is 
intended to achieve agreement among its participants; though not conceptually 
inevitable, it is still possible that an agreement achieved in a debate is regarded 
as binding by those who agreed to it. 
By 'negotiation' or 'bargaining' 1 mean a particular kind of argumentation: 
an exchange of offers on the terms of a possible agreement (contract) which are 
binding conditionally, i.e. upon the acceptance by the other party. 'Offers' are 
arguments since their purpose is to convince—to persuade, or induce to agree—the 
other party to accept (or consent to) the obligation preferred by the offeror. Ex 
hypothesi she has no other means than to make an offer capable to convince the 
other or to induce him to make a counteroffer. Later I will suggest a distinction 
between 'bargaining' and 'negotiation'; at the moment it is sufficient to say 
that bargaining is a kind of argumentation in which the force of an argument 
depends on the obligation (which is a future action) offered in exchange for 
another obligation or action. Thus, to anticipate what I am to say later on, 
bargaining is a case of argumentation which could be regarded as the archetype 
of an 'instrumental discourse' in the sense given to it by Jürgen Habermas:20  
it is an argumentation procedure in which the only criterion for the acceptance 
of an argument is the (subjective) utility of the offer. A typical bargaining is 
19 See FRIED, Ch.: Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1981, 28 ff. 
20 See e.g HABERMAS, J.: Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Frankfurt a. M., 1981, 
Vol. I, 384 ff. 
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a game in which the participants try to achieve an equilibrium (or equivalence) 
between (the value of) their mutual rights and obligations.21 
The core case of the contractual situation is, obviously, the contract, or 
agreement achieved by argumentation, although, as we shall see, other important 
cases are falling within it too. The legal concept of the contract in itself is not 
so simple however. In the Anglo-American tradition the contract is conceived 
mostly as a promise or exchange of promises,22 while another school of 
thought defines contract as a legally enforceable agreement.23 It seems to me 
that the agreement theory fits much better the idea (and the reality) of 
contractual situation than the promise theory. A promise is a unilateral act—or 
so it appears. In fact, a promise is binding on the promisor only if there is 
somebody else who accepted it or relied upon it; thus a promise is similar to 
an offer which usually binds temporarily the offeror but its obligatory force 
depends on the acceptance of the offer. A promise is, as it were, but a half of 
a contract; it is capable to create an obligation only if accepted by somebody 
else either expressly or tacitly by relying upon it. A unilateral promise—a 
promise made without the expectation of a return, in Anglo-American legal 
terminology 'consideration'24—might well bind the person pro foro interno but 
hardly as a matter of legal or moral obligation, unless someone accepted it or 
relied upon it. The latter case (reliance upon the other's promise by acting upon 
it) is a borderline case between contract proper and quasi-contract or contract-like 
cases which will be examined below. Still, reliance is inherently contractual since 
the action of the other party is a precondition of the binding force of the promise 
at any rate against anybody else but herself. (An obligation toward oneself is not 
a genuine obligation, for it is impossible to speak of an obligation one owes to 
oneself except metaphorically.) A suitable example to illustrate this contention 
is the well-known Nuclear Tests Case decided by the International Court of 
Justice:25 the Court held that a declaration (interpreted as a promise) by the 
French government to terminate atmospheric nuclear tests on the Mururoa atoll 
21 This is, of course, not a technical description of bargaining as used in bargaining theory, 
but sufficiently clear in the present context, I hope. 
22 ATIYAH, P. S.: Promises, Morals and Law, Oxford, 1981. 
23 CORBIN, A. L.: Corbin on Contracts, St. Paul, 1952, 4 ff, 5 -6 quoting the (American) 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, and UCC 1-201. 
24 In 'civil law' , i.e. continental European, private law it is called a cause or causa. See 
GORDLEY, J.: The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine, Oxford, 1991, 
137 ff. 
25 1С J Reports, 1974, 253, 267 ff. 
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was legally binding France. This statement of the Court is often interpreted as 
an authority establishing the binding force of unilateral promises in inter-
national law. A closer analysis does not, however, support this view, because 
the declaration was made (if it was intended to be obligatory at all) in response 
to the demands of other governments (Australia and New Zealand); thus the 
French government at most accepted these demands. Consequently the French 
declaration was a unilateral promise only if regarded in itself; in context it was 
a contractual engagement. 
The standard case of contractual situation, as I have argued, is an agreement 
achieved through argumentation. But, admittedly, the scope of the 'contractual 
situation' is considerably wider than the case of explicit contracting. There are 
other acts of self-obliging equally capable to create obligations by the acts of 
the participants. These are frequently used in political, moral and legal theory 
to denote contract-type facts creating obligations, like 'consent', 'acceptance', 
'acquiescence', 'recognition' or 'consensus'. These are indeed obligation-creat-
ing facts which differ from contracts proper in one essential respect: they are (in 
a sense) voluntary but the agent did not—or could not—influence the content of 
the obligation, since it is already given. In the case of 'consent' and similar 
obligation-creating facts consent is given to some claim, or proposed to a person 
or a State (generally, to an agent) for acceptance. On the ground of the distinc-
tion suggested earlier it is reasonable to say that the rules relating to consent 
and similar acts are procedural, they determine the instances that count as a 
'consent', i.e. capable to create an obligation.26 
In all these situations, one can observe the important difference between 
consent ex post and ex ante", in the case of ex-post consent, the consenting party 
assumes an obligation the content of which is predetermined: she has no choice 
but either to accept or to reject. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between two 
components of the obligation: first, the description of the obligatory conduct, 
which is the content of the obligation; and second the acceptance of its 
obligatoriness. The two are conceptually different in the pure contracting too; 
but in the case of acceptance, consent and the like they are separate: the 
consent, or the acceptance creates the obligation but not its content. Consider 
for example the case of a State willing to join a treaty already in force (say the 
Treaty of Rome founding what later became the EC and the EU): it has no legal 
26 Another meaning of 'consent ' in moral and legal language is to render lawful what 
would have been unlawful without consent, thus converting by agreement an unlawful or 
immoral act into a permitted one. Thus, in these cases 'consent ' means 'permission', and 
lies outside the practice of contracting, although some similarity is undeniable. 
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possibility to influence the content of the obligations under the Treaty, but to 
accept or not to accept its given content, called acquis communautaire. The 
same applies even more emphatically to the use of the concept of 'acceptance' 
or 'consent' in political and philosophical theory: the 'acceptance' of a legal 
system or the political authority of the State amounts to assume, as it were, a 
blank obligation. It accepts the given rules of the legal system relating roughly 
speaking to the formation (or validity conditions) of laws,27 that is their rule(s) 
of recognition.28 The rules of recognition have nothing to do directly with the 
content of the norms of the legal order: they serve to identify the valid norms 
in the system.29 
Thus, it is reasonable to say with Joseph Raz30 that consent changes the 
normative situation of the consenting person (agent); but it does only (or 
primarily) as regards the relationship of the consenting person to the norm—but 
not the norm or the obligation. One consents to something—a norm, an obliga-
tion, a claim, a proposal, an offer—which is already valid or at least already 
formulated, as the case may be. Consent is a significant act, because it indeed 
creates normative effects but not the (normative) content of the norm or 
obligation. In the case of the political obligation this seems to be clear: consent 
as the basis of political obligation31 expresses an attitude (a Hartian internal 
attitude) to the political institutions of a community and to its legal order but 
it does not change the contents of the norms. They actually remain the same; 
the change distinguishing the pre-consent situation from the post-consent one 
is obviously not the content of the norms—although the content of a legal system 
(e.g. its respect of human rights) might very much influence a person's consent 
to a political regime or to a constitutional system. 
Furthermore, consent might be validly construed from non-objection to a 
norm, rule or institution: this is the case of tacit consent (or acquiescence). This 
time I use an illustration from international law. Customary international law is 
a source of international law based on the 'consent' of States,32 thus a rather 
27 See MACBRIDE, W. L.: 'The Acceptance of a Legal System' The Monist 49 (1965) 377. 
28 HART: The Concept of Law, 94 ff. 
29 Of course, rules of recognition can contain content-dependent criteria of validity too; even 
so, they do not change the content of norms, but their binding force. For this see HART: The 
Concept of Law, 250 ff. 
30 RAZ, J.: The Morality of Freedom, Oxford, 1986, 82. 
31 PLAMENATZ, J. P.: Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation, 2. ed., Oxford, 
1968. 
32 See generally WOLFKE, K.: Custom in Present International Law, Cracow, 1964 and 
A. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law, Ithaca, 1971. 
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clear case of a tacit contractual obligation. Here again, 'consent' means 
agreement to norms (and normative facts, obligations) already 'given': the best 
example of it is the case of a new State which is held to be obliged by the 
customary norms of international law, although it could not have consented to 
them.33 Nevertheless a newly independent State is deemed to have consented 
to the binding force of the norms of customary international law that are valid 
at the moment of its independence—that is, when it become a subject of inter-
national law—on the ground that it could not be a member of the community 
States only by accepting the general, mostly customary norms of international 
law. This argument is in fact a variant of the Lockean theory of consent applied 
to States instead of members of a political community. Indeed in international 
law, acquiescence, i.e. consent by non-protesting is the most important ground 
of the binding force of customary norms (which still form the basis of 
international law); on the other hand, a 'persistent objector'—a State consistently 
protesting against a customary rule, or more exactly against the binding force 
in its respect of this valid rule—may not be held bound (that is consented) to this 
norm.34 Conversely, if a State does not protest for a sufficiently long time 
against a norm, it will be held having consented and has no power to revoke 
this (construed) consent.35 By the way, this construction resembles to the 
Roman theory of customary law according to which customary law was based 
on tacitus consensus populi, since people did not revolt against it.36 
In the case of consent and acceptance it is necessary to distinguish between 
the validity of a norm (or an obligation) and its binding force. Consent applies, 
at least in most cases, to valid norms or obligations: they already exist validly 
(according to certain validity criteria) when consent is solicited or sought to 
them. Consent (and acquiescence, acceptance) thus extends or reinforces the 
binding force of the norm or obligation by expressly recognizing their 
obligatory force. An example might illustrate this point: the oath of a soldier 
or an official does not add anything to his or her obligations (or, rather, duties) 
as defined in the valid laws relating to their services. The making of an oath 
might surely be interpreted as a solemn consent or recognition (reaffirmation) 
33 This case is discussed with his usual lucidity by KELSEN. See Principles of 
International Law, New York, 1952, 311. 
34 The leading case is the North Sea Continental Shelf case, ICJ Reports, 1969, 1 ff. 
35 So the International Court in the Anglo Norwegian Fisheries case, ICJ Reports, 
1951. 
36 See e.g. D. 1.3.32.1. 
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of their duties adding nothing to the content, but much to the binding force of 
their duties or obligations. 
3. Obligation and duty 
The distinction between the concepts of 'obligation' and 'duty' seems to me 
fundamental, although normally neglected in theory. The two terms are usually 
used interchangeably and thus usually treated as synonyms, although 'obliga-
tion' is more often used in the sense of 'voluntary obligation'.37 
The core of the distinction proposed here is the idea that the term 
'obligation'—in its moral, legal, political, or even religious use—in fact refers to 
two different kinds of situations of 'being bound by a norm' or 'action 
determined by a norm'. The essential difference between them is that in certain 
cases the validity of the norm (but not necessarily its content) depends on the 
agreement of the person bound by the norm; in other cases, on the contrary, the 
norm imposes the requirement to act—or not to act—in a certain way irrespective 
of the agreement, consent etc. of the person bound by it. I will call the first 
case 'obligation' and the other case 'duty'. Contractual obligations belong, of 
course, to the first category; for this reason I believe that the contrast between 
'obligation' and 'duty' will contribute to the elucidation of the nature of the 
contractual obligation. It is important to emphasize that the ground of the 
distinction is not the content (the act required) but the basis of its binding 
force. 
I begin with the examination of the 'duty'. A 'duty' is a requirement to act 
in a certain way, so to speak, imposed from outside; its sources may be 
various, for example command, prescription, the status of a person (like in the 
case of 'natural duties'). Duties are valid and binding independently of the 
consent of the person bound by them; instead, a 'duty' presupposes a relation-
ship of subjection between the norm-giving authority and the obligee.38 
37 See BRANDT, R. В.: 'The Concepts of Obligation and Duty' Mind 65 (1964) 374. See 
also SMITH, J. C.: Legal Obligation, London, 1976, esp. 34 ff. For an earlier treatment 
of the topic see LAMONT, W.: The Principles of Moral Judgement, Oxford, 1946, 78 
(note). 
38 Jean Bodin seems to have observed clearly the difference between the two types of 
obligations: Me point principal de la maiesté souveraine, et puissence absolue, gist 
principalement à donner loy aux subjects en general sans leur consentement'. Les Six Livres 
de la République, 1, 8. (1576). 
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Moreover, the very existence of a 'duty' also presupposes that the norm-giving 
authority has a coercive power over the nom-subject: it has the power to punish 
or simply to coerce anybody acting contrary to the duty-norm. A 'duty'-type 
obligation demands obedience from the subject of the norm who is indeed 
subjected to the norm. Duty-type norms, are mandatory or imperative: they 
could not be set aside normally even by the consent of the beneficiary (if any) 
of it. A typical duty is a relationship between the norm-authority and the 
person obliged: obedience is owed to the authority; therefore, duties normally 
do not allow 'rights', except as a side-effect of the obedience to the norm.39 
For this reason the typical guarantee of a 'duty' is a punishment: a coercive 
imposition of an evil on the perpetrator of a breach of a duty by the authority 
imposing the 'duty'. A punishment is a threat of coercion or an actual infliction 
of an evil for the violation of the duty imposed; thus for the existence (validity) 
of the duty the reality or effectiveness, if not that of the coercion, but at least 
that of the threat is definitely a necessary condition. If the threat is not 
effective any more, the duty extincts, although its content can survive as an 
obligation. So, for a believer the wrath of God is a threat backing the religious 
duties; if he loses his faith (so that the threat ends) the duty is not a duty any 
more. 
'Obligations' are in many respect different. Most importantly, an 
'obligation' is valid (or binding) or only if the obligee consented or agreed to 
the creation of the obligation. This means in other terms that the validity and 
the binding force of an 'obligation' is conditional upon the consent given by 
the obligee; if this is invalid the obligation ceases to bind the obligee. An 
obligation is born out of a contractual situation and therefore, reflecting its 
structure somehow, consists typically of an exchange of rights and corre-
sponding obligations between the subjects of the obligation. In an obligation-
relationship any obligation of a person corresponds to a right of another; 
conversely, a right in those relationships coincides with the obligation of 
another. If an illustration is needed at all, a good one will be to point out that 
39 On the reflex theory of rights formulated (as it appears, independently) by Bentham and 
Jhering as a consequence of their command or duty theories of law see e.g. HART: 'Bentham 
on Legal Rights' repr. In his Essays on Bentham, Oxford, 1982 and JHERING, R.: Geist 
des römischen Rechts, Vol II. Leipzig, 1877. A pure command theory, like that of the 
German legal positivism in the 19th century could not allow, quite coherently f rom its own 
point of view, rights against the sovereign, just like Austin could not. For this reason is, 
among others, the work of Georg Jellinek so important, since he argued powerfully for the 
possibility of rights against the State (or sovereign) in public law; see his main work on the 
subject: System der subjectiven öffentlichen Rechte, Freiburg i. Br., 1887. 
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if I have a right against A to return me the book he borrowed, it implies that A 
is obliged to return the book within a reasonable time. 
Furthermore, an obligation is not 'obeyed': it is performed or fulfilled. The 
consequence of its non-fulfilment is not a 'punishment' but rather the loss of 
rights: the violation of an obligation empowers the person, agent etc. whose 
rights were violated—and rights are coextensive with obligations—to suspend or 
not to fulfil her obligations. Obligations are not simply coextensive with the 
rights of others, but they are in an equilibrium with each other; therefore the 
claim to the fulfilment of an obligation is always dependent on the fulfilment 
of the obligations incumbent upon the person demanding its fulfilment. A 
contractual relationship consists of mutually dependent obligations binding the 
participants of the relationship: the binding force of them depends on the 
recognition of their binding force by the contractor. This is a corollary of the 
equality of the participants of the contractual situation and the rule of the 
exclusion of coercion which extends to the contractual relationship. 
In obligation-relationships, the consequence of the violation of the obli-
gation is typically—curious as it may appear—the invalidation for the future (i.e. 
termination) of the mutual rights and obligations based on the contract or 
quasi-contract. The violation of an obligation destroys the binding force of the 
contract: indeed it is at least an implicit repudiation or annulment of the 
contract as the ground of the obligation. Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that 
in obligation-relationships the sanctions are positive sanctions, or, in other 
words, rewards. The positive sanction—or 'reward'—is conceptually the moral 
or legal consequence of the fulfilment of the obligation: it is a right or a claim, 
conditional on the performance of an obligation. The non-violation, or even 
more the fulfilment, of the contractual obligation confirms and corroborates its 
validity and binding force: the 'reward' in this case is the continuing existence 
of the contractual relationship as a set of rights and correlative obligations. In 
an alternative but equivalent formulation, the binding force of the contractual 
obligation depends on reciprocity; consequently, the sanction of the violation 
is the non-obligation of the other contractor (or contractors) to perform their 
obligation towards the violator.40 In a way, it is possible to contend that the 
sanction of an obligation is 'immanent' in the relationship. 
The enforcement of contractual obligations by the courts is, strictly 
speaking, not the enforcement of the 'obligation': it is the transformation of an 
obligation into a duty, sanctioned by force. But even in these cases the 
40 Incidentally, this principle is clearly fixed in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. 
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enforcement is limited only to replacement services: in fact, the obligation as 
such is almost never enforced by the courts in its original (obligation) content. 
This illuminates perhaps the rationale of the view propounded by Oliver W. 
Holmes, claiming that there is no general legal obligation in common law to 
fulfil a contract, but everybody has the right not to fulfil his contractual 
obligation, provided he is prepared to pay the damages caused.41 
As the example just mentioned demonstrates, it is perfectly possible that the 
same act or conduct be at the same time, or independently, object of an obliga-
tion or a duty. In such cases, however, the basis of the two obligations42 should 
be clearly separated. For example, the obligation to obey the laws of the State 
is a legal duty, on the other hand, there could be, typically but not necessarily, 
independent grounds to obey the same laws as an obligation. This obligation 
might be based on consent to the law making procedures, or given in advance 
by voting and so forth.43 But whatever the grounds of this obligation are, they 
are at least in part independent from the legal duty to obey; they must be some-
how interrelated, but their validity may not depend on each other. 
A final remark. The prominent theories of law—which are also theories on 
the nature of legal obligation—can be classified into 'obligation' and 'duty' 
theories; the same can be said of moral and political theories. Remaining in the 
domain of law, the command theory of Austin or the sanction theories of 
Kelsen, or that of the American realists, are 'duty' theories, since for them the 
paradigmatic case of the legal obligation is what I call 'duty'. Other theories, 
and most conspicuously the contractarian and a part the natural law theories, 
including consent or recognition theories, on the contrary consider 'obligation' 
as the paradigmatic case of legal obligation. This distinction applies only to 
their view on the ultimate basis of the obligatory force or validity of the law; 
it is not excluded that they allow the existence of obligations of the other type, 
provided they are subordinated to the other. For instance, in Hart's theory of 
law (and in particular that of the legal obligation) the 'rule of recognition' as 
the ultimate basis of the validity of law is 'obligation'-like, while he accepts 
41 The Common Law, 234. 
42 I am aware of the fact that I use here and elsewhere faute de mieux the term 'obligation' 
in two different senses, first denoting 'voluntary obligation' and second, like in this case, as 
a more general term including both obligation stricto sensu and duty. 
43 See e.g. SINGER, P.: Democracy and Disobedience, Oxford, 1973 and RAZ, J.: 'The 
Obligation to Obey the Law' in his The Authority of the Law, Oxford, 1979, 233., and 
SIMMONS, A. J.: Moral Principles and Political Obligation, Princeton, 1979. For a more 
recent comprehensive treatment see GANS, Ch.: Philosophical Anarchism and Political 
Disobedience, Cambridge, 1992. 
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that legal obligations are usually backed by force and sanctions, that is, they 
belong to the 'duty'-type. 
4. Two types of contractual obligations: contract and convention 
In this section I will argue to distinguish between two fundamentally different 
types of contracts and contractual obligations; I call them contract and 
convention. The difference between the two, I guess, is rather clear intuitively 
and certainly not new. A 'contract' is an exchange of actions—contents of rights 
and the corresponding obligations—based on a bargain, while a convention is 
an act creating general norms; a contract creates rights, claims, obligations (in 
the narrower sense) while a 'convention' is a source of (general) norms. The 
more relevant meaning for political and constitutional theory is certainly the 
contract as a 'convention', although in the legal usage mostly but not 
exclusively the first dominates. There are, however, norm-making contracts (or 
'conventions'). The term 'convention' can be misleading, since it is used in 
other related meanings too; but I was unable to find a better one, and my 
choice is supported by the use of this term in international law, since the great 
law-making treaties are usually called there 'conventions'. 
In the case of a contract sensu stricto, the agreement, consent etc. is the 
normative basis of certain obligations and rights while in the case of a 
convention the agreement, consent recognition is the basis of the validity (and 
binding force) of a norm. The value of the distinction between the two classes 
of contracts (and contractual relations) is often doubted if taken seriously at all. 
Nevertheless a distinction between the two types of contracts (or contractual 
relationships) was proposed by some thinkers, especially lawyers. An early 
exposition of the distinction between Vertrag (contract) and Vereinbarung 
(agreement) is due to German scholars, in particular to Bergbohm and Triepel.44 
I wish to argue that the distinction they proposed should be retained. Roughly, 
they saw the difference between a Vertrag and a Vereinbarung in the fact that 
in the case of a Vertrag the will of the contracting parties is directed to different 
44 BERGBOHM, K.: Staatsverträge und Gesetze als Quellen des Völkerrechts, Dorpat, 
1877, TRIEPEL, H.: Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, Leipzig, 1899 and Droit international 
et droit interne, Paris, 1920. Triepel was inspired by H. Gierke's so-called Genossenschaft 
theory. See GIERKE, H.: The Political Theories of the Middle Ages, transi. F. W. 
M ai tl and, London, 1937. See also McNAIR, A. D.: The Law of Treaties, Oxford, 1961, 
739. ff, 743, 
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objects. For instance, A wants money, В a house, so they conclude a contract in 
which A sells and В buys the house, but this contract does not involve the same 
will. Unlike a Vertrag, a Vereinbarung is the union of the will of the parties: 
they agree to act together or crudely speaking their 'will' is united in the 
contractual agreement, so that they merge in a new common will (Gemeinwille). 
More importantly, according to Triepel in particular, a Vereinbarung is a 
contract to create norms: a Vereinbarung is a source of norms of law, while 
an ordinary contract (Vetrag) is not capable to create norms. Triepel adds that 
the Vereinbarung (convention) is, contrary to contracts which are normally 
concluded between two parties, made among several parties or at any rate their 
content does not exclude, on the contrary, the extension of their application to 
third parties who are not original contractors. 
A contract is an exchange of obligations and rights, deemed to be the 
equivalent of each other (or at least the best possible agreement, given the 
circumstances). Here 'agreement' means, in fact, 'terms of exchange': the 
contractors agree in the exchange of well-defined goods, acts, services etc. 
They are not obliging themselves to do the same: just the contrary, since 
'exchange' by definition excludes that the same good, service, etc. be 
exchanged. For this reason, the 'contract' is a bargain: its content is a quid pro 
quo, an undertaking to do (or sometimes not to do) something in return for 
somebody else's services (do ut des, facio ut des, facio ut facias). 
A 'convention' is different in many significant respects. The most important 
difference appears to be that a convention is not a transaction, not a bargain, 
or exchange between the contractors. The essence of a convention is an 
agreement among the parties to do the same in the same case, or an agreement 
to observe the same norm (or norms). Here, by the way, the similarity with 
other meanings of the term 'convention' is rather clear.45 Conventions oblige 
the participants to follow a norm as agreed. A convention is therefore the basis 
of the validity of a norm; the contractual obligation is to follow a norm, or 
more exactly the same norm. The consequence of this obligation might well be 
that the contractors acquire rights (and corresponding obligations) vis-à-vis each 
other; even so, these obligations and rights are contractual only indirectly, since 
directly they are based on the norm agreed upon to be observed by the 
contracting parties. To give an obvious example: the States parties to a law-
making convention in international law, such as the conventions governing the 
law of diplomatic or consular relations of States or establishing a highly 
intricate system of interrelated norms as in the case of the law of the sea, do 
45 See LEWIS, D.: Conventions: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, Mass. 1969. 
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agree to observe the same rules for the status of their diplomatic represen-
tatives, consuls or agree to establish according to the same rules, say, an 
exclusive economic zone. An even more interesting example is the case of 
international conventions on the protection of human rights: in these 
conventions States are obliging themselves to protect certain rights of their 
citizens (or persons within their jurisdiction): that is, to observe certain norms 
which have prima facie nothing to do with other States at all. There is plainly 
a reciprocity even in the latter cases, but hardly an exchange: they oblige 
themselves to do in the same conditions the same thing (e.g. not to violate the 
immunities of the diplomats). This is of course not to say that the observance 
of the same norms does effect indistinctly and equally all the participants or 
contractors. This certainly does not hold: in international relations, most 
conspicuously. States are quite naturally endeavouring to agree with other 
States in the creation of norms that will best promote their interests or the 
values they prefer. But even this circumstance does not alter the fact that all 
these norms are binding all States to observe same norm.46 
Conventions are, as remarked above, not bargains: the argumentation 
leading to their conclusion is a negotiation rather than a bargaining. The 
difference between the two concepts is not very clear and they are often treated 
as synonyms. I suggest a distinction between 'bargain' and 'negotiation' 
suitable to substantiate the difference between contract and convention. 
'Bargain' is an argumentation process leading to an agreement based 
exclusively on the utility considerations of the participants. The term 'utility' 
borrowed from rational choice and bargaining theory shows clearly, I think, 
what I have in mind: a bargain is an agreement based on the perceived mutual 
interest of the contractors. Negotiation is, I suggest, different: it can involve 
some kind of interest or utility consideration, but it is essentially an 
argumentation process leading to (or intended to create) an agreement in 
normative claims, predominantly norms, or rights and obligations. The subject 
matter of the intended agreement in a negotiation is different: primarily it is 
46 It is a sociological observation that conventions are adopted (and in fact needed) in 
long-term, ongoing relationships, where the contracting parties are interdependent or 
otherwise closely and complexly connected: the community of States is an obvious example, 
but there are many others, such as labour relationships, universities, units composing a 
federal state; even firms or marriages can be regarded as 'sets of treaties'. Ian MacNeil calls 
this type of contract, or contractual relationship, 'relational', and speaks of 'relational 
contracts'; the contracts I call simply contracts he designates as 'discrete' contracts. See 
MACNEIL, I.: The Modern Social Contract, New Haven, 1981. 
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about normative claims; this involves that the negotiators use arguments 
capable to justify and convince others to accept a normative claim. For 
instance, in international law a negotiation may lead to a convention (in the 
sense used here) or, quite often, it is used as a means to decide the correctness 
of mutual legal (or political) claims. In both kinds of negotiations the 
agreement settles normative claims: the norm to be followed, or the rights of 
the parties in the case an alleged violation of the rights of others. In the second 
case, by the way, the subject-matter of discussion is the retrospective 
recognition of the validity of a norm—indirectly, by accepting the contention 
that it was violated. 
5. Concluding remarks: contractual obligation and 
contractual justification 
In conclusion I would like to suggest a last important distinction between the 
contractual obligation on the one hand, and the contractual justification of an 
obligation on the other. In this essay I attempted to analyze only the nature of 
the contractual obligation; I did not discuss the contractual justification of 
obligations of duties. At the end of, however, I would like make a few remarks 
on the latter. 
The importance of these observations is due the peculiarity of contractual 
justification. Its attraction is explained probably by the fact that an agreement 
in a contractual situation has a content-independent and in a way conclusive 
justificatory force. The content of the agreement is justified simply by virtue 
of the fact that it was accepted freely by those who are bound by it. If the 
agreement (contract) is valid, there is no need for additional justification. Thus, 
its content might be regarded as the best available under the circumstances: if 
it were not so, the participants would have decided otherwise. In other words, 
there is no way verify the correctness of an agreement arrived at in a cont-
ractual situation, except its procedural validity (including the limitations, if 
any, of their content). This is the force, for instance, in the argument for sexual 
freedom between 'consenting adults': a valid agreement was been made, and 
it justifies itself. Hobbes is of the same view: '...it is in the laws of the 
Commonwealth as in the gaming: whatsoever the gamesters all agree is in-
justice to none of them'.47 The justificatory force, it should be added, depends 
47 HOBBES, Th.: leviathan. Part 2, Ch. 30. 
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very much upon the circumstances (or upon the context, the rules) of the 
contractual situation; it has unchallenged strength only if the conditions are 
ideal and diminishes with the distance from the ideal situation. By far the most 
important case of this type of justification is, of course, the market: a market 
is a set of contractual relations and (barring government regulation) it consists 
exclusively of contractual relations. If the contracts underlying the contractual 
relations thus created were regularly (validly) made, they are perfectly, i.e. un-
conditionally, justified. No other justification is needed, nor is it permitted; any 
questioning of the outcome of valid contractual arrangements from an external 
(non-contractual) point of view is not simply unjustified, but unreasonable or 
just meaningless. Contracts validly concluded create by definition but internally 
justified obligations: they are '...actions justified because they are agreed 
to'.48 
Contractual justifications do not create obligations, but justify existing ones, 
he most significant difference between creating and justifying an obligation (or 
for that matter any normative statement) is that a justification is, as it were, a 
meta-statement. Another important feature of the contractual justification of 
normative statements49 is that they are counterfactual, as the contractual 
component in them is by definition non-existent. It is an answer to a 
counterfactual question of the following type: 
if you were in the position to accept or not no accept norm N in a 
contractual situation would you accept it? 
Thus, contractual justification presupposes at the outset that there was in fact 
no contracting situation when the norm was made; it is not fictitious but rather 
counterfactual. For this reason, a contractual justification of an obligation (in 
the sense of an Ought or normative statement) is not independent. 'Non-
independence' signifies here simply that the justificatory statement has no 
reason without the social practice of creating norms and obligations: it is, in 
a sense, parasitic upon them while the contrary does not apply. 
48 COLEMAN, J. L.: 'Foundations of Constitutional Economics' in COLEMAN, J. L.: 
Markets, Morals and the Law, Cambridge, 1988, 134. 
49 See on this topic WELLMAN, C.: Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics, 
London & Amsterdam, 1971 and AJDUKIEWICZ, K. (ed.): Justification of Statements and 
Decisions, Warsaw, 1962. I have profited much from Ch. Perelman's writings; I refer here 
to his Justice et raison, Bruxelles, 1963. 
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Contractual justification is conceptually possible only for duty-type obli-
gations, since obligations are by definition contractual and thus contractually 
justified. Granted this, the counterfactual character of the contractual justificatory 
statement is clear: the duty is justified by establishing that the content—the 
conduct made obligatory, prohibited or permitted by the norm—would have been 
accepted by the obligee, if she were in a contractual situation as rational, 
reasonable or generally justified. Many, in modern times in fact most, 
contractarian theories are of this type: Rawls' Theory of Justice?0 or Buchanan's 
and Gauthier's theories" are perhaps the most appropriate examples. An equally 
pertinent example of a theory of contractual justification—as opposed to 
contractual obligation—is the theory of the 'ideal discourse situation' of Jürgen 
Habermas:52 the ideal discourse situation, as he defines it, is a contractual 
situation which could never exist in reality; it is clearly counterfactual, test-like 
justification of norms (moral, legal or any other).53 
Thus, a contractual justification of a duty or an Ought-statement is, at least 
in part, cognitive and not purely normative. Its claim can only be to help to 
ascertain the justifiability of an Ought-statement. In short, the contractual 
justification even if it is successful, has no independent normative force; to put 
it otherwise, it is not a conclusive reason of action in itself.54 Its claim is to 
provide a partly cognitive, partly normative test to facilitate the discovery of 
unjustified norms or practices. A clear formulation of this point is offered by 
Leslie Green: 
[tjhere is an important difference between regarding someone's actual 
agreement as a reason for later holding him to be bound by it and regarding 
an unmade agreement which it would have been rational to make as such a 
reason.55 
50 Cambridge, Mass., 1971. 
51 BUCHANAN, J.-TULLOCK, G.: The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor, 1962, esp. 
Appendix 1 by Buchanan, 307 ff; and BUCHANAN, J.: The Limits of Liberty, Chicago, 1975, 
and GAUTHIER, D.: Morals by Agreement, Oxford, 1986. 
52 See e.g. his Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Frankfurt a. M., 1983, esp. 
53 ff. 
53 See COLEMAN, J. L.: 'Unaminity' in COLEMAN: Markets, Morals and the Law, 276, 
281. 
54 RAZ, J.: Reasons of Action and Norms, London, 1975. 
55 GREEN, L.: The Authority of the State, Oxford, 1990, 161. (Original italics.) 
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An intermediate position was put forward by Hanna Pitkin56 in her theory of 
'hypothetical consent'. The hypothetical consent is not a 'real' consent i.e. 
consent actually given in some way, but it is not devoid of normative force 
since the hypothetical consent determines the conditions of a rationally valid ex 
post consent to the authority of the government (or perhaps to separate laws or 
institutions adopted or practised by them). It determines, in the words of Hanna 
Pitkin '...whether the government is such that you ought to consent it'.57 Thus, 
the obligation Pitkin speaks of is partly genuinely normative, since it is 
expressly an 'ought', though not a contractual ought. This hypothetical consent 
is cognitively contractual in the sense that its contractual element is 
counterfactual and serves as a criterion making possible to recognize the quality 
('worth') of the government and then decide whether one would have accepted 
it, if one were in the position to accept it in a contractual situation. Thus 
'hypothetical consent' is best regarded as a theory furnishing devices to 
ascertain whether a government is good or bad, worth of consent or not. But it 
does not, indeed cannot, replace tire actual morally binding consent. It is, at 
best, a reason to consent, but definitely not the act of consent. 
The impression that the contractual justification, including hypothetical 
consent, has (or might have) an independent normative force by virtue of its 
rationality is misleading because its real basis lies elsewhere. Contractual 
justifications are better understood as second-order justifications. Second order 
justifications are justifications of the first order justifications; full binding force 
or validity can be attributed only to the first order justifications. In our case the 
first order justification is the contractual agreement, acceptance, consent and the 
like actually made; the second order justifications are arguments justifying the 
agreement or the consent given. In the case of a 'real' (actually occurred) 
contract the second-order justifications might be the reasons of the agreement 
(or consent) of the contractor to consent or, or the reasons one would rationally 
ascribe them. Valid contracts need no substantive justification, since contractual 
obligations are justified by the regularity of the procedure of agreement or 
consent. In the case of 'hypothetical consent'—and contractarian justification in 
general—the second-order justification serves to substitute the ex hypothesi non 
existent first-order conclusive justification. 
56 PITKIN, H.: 'Obligation and Consent I-IT American Political Science Review, 59 (1965) 
990, 60 (1966). 39. 
57 'Obligation and Consent-II', 39. (Original italics.) 
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and their Constitutionality 
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A. An overview of the cases developing principles governing bias 
crime laws 
The difficulty in giving a fair account of "group intimidationcriminal laws 
and their constitutionality in the law of the United States is twofold. Firstly, the 
duality of the federal and state constitutions and jurisdictions causes differ-
entiation in the legislative and constitutional approaches. Secondly, the 
doctrinaire development of the constitutional scrutiny of ethnic intimidation 
laws, embedded in "fighting words"2 jurisprudence. Therefore both of these 
paths have to be explored. Additionally, problems are created by the fact that 
speech, in terms of the U.S. Constitution, can involve expressive conduct as 
1 I prefer to use the term "group intimidation''' laws instead of "racist speech" or "ethnic 
intimidation' laws and other forms of definition, because the expression of the criminalisation 
which I intend to look at is often not restricted to racist speech, but comprises every type of 
expression attacking minorities, so-called "outsiders". (For an attempt to define racist speech, 
see LAWRENCE, F. M.: Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias 
Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 Notre D. L. R. 673, note 3, 1993.) 
2 Infra p2ff. 
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well as pure speech? Thus it shall be attempted first to give a concise 
overview of the "fighting words" doctrine, and then to scrutinise the bias 
intimidation cases. 
The Supreme Court first formulated the "fighting words" doctrine in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,4 where a statute previously construed by the 
State Court to ban "face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the 
peace by the addressee"5 was unanimously upheld by the Supreme Court. The 
defendant's conviction was based on his statement describing the city marshal 
as a: "God damned racketeer and a damned fascist."6 
The Court argued that the expression was without communicative value, thus 
likely to provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby cause a breach 
of the peace.7 It stated per Justice Murphy that "there are certain well-defined 
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which 
has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the 
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libellous, and the insulting, or 'fighting' 
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances 
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."* 
It is important to notice that breach-of-peace convictions could therefore be 
upheld if there was merely a danger that the listener would be incited to 
violence—there was no need to prove actual violence. Thus Chaplinsky became 
the standard case for the doctrine that breach-of-peace can be upheld where 
3 SCHNEIDER, R. G.: Hate Speech in the United States: Recent Developments, 269 in 
Striking a Balance (Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination) ed. 
COLI VER, S. (Article 19) London and Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, 1992). 
See, for example, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); 
United Slates v. Eichmann, 496 U.S. 310, 110 S.Ct. 2404, 110 L.Ed.2d 287 1990). 
4 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). In this case a Jehovah's Witness 
publicly denounced organised religions. When the city marshal tried to escort him away, the 
defendant called him a "God damned racketeer and a damnedfascisf'. See HURDLE, M. L.: 
R.A.V. v. City of St Paul: The Continuing Confusion of the Fighting Words Doctrine, 47 
Vand. L.R. 1143 (1994). 
5 315 U.S. at 573. 
6 Id. at 569. 
7 Id. at 574. 
8 Id. at 571-72. 
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there is a mere danger of incitement to violence.9 The Supreme Court measured 
the likelihood of a violent reaction and considered what language would be 
likely to cause an average person to fight,10 and therefore defined the basic 
types of unprotected expression. This definition of what constitutes a "fighting" 
word can be split into two main categories: 1. words "which by their very 
utterance inflict injury";" 2. words which "tend to incite an immediate breach 
of the peace".12 
Decisions following Chaplinsky indicated an intention to limit the broad 
applicability of the doctrine which it established.13 In the light of these later 
cases, the "fighting words" doctrine seems to have been reduced to words which 
are "likely to provoke, an average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a 
breach of the peace."1* 
The doctrine was first substantially narrowed in Terminiello v. City of 
Chicago,*5 where the Court found a breach-of-peace statute overbroad and 
decided that a speech which merely causes anger or outrage is not to be 
considered as "fighting words". On the contrary, it held that creating dispute is 
a valuable function of speech. Speech, therefore, is protected unless the 
expression is likely to produce a clear and present danger36 of serious evil.17 
Subsequently, in Street v. New York,18 the Court held that burning the flag 
was constitutionally protected speech, and did not constitute "fighting words", 
as this act was not intended to incite a violent response by any individual.19 
9 NOWAK, J. E. -ROTUNDA, R. D.: Constitutional Law (4th ed. Hornbook Series, West 
Publication Co., St. Paul, 1991), 1058. 
10 Supra n5, at 573. 
11 Id. at 352. 
12 Id. For academic discussion, see GELLMAN, S.: Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, 
But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic 
Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L.R. 333, 369 (1991); HURDLE, M. L.: 47 Vand. L. R. 1143, 
1148-49; LAWRENCE: 678, 710; SHEA, T. F.: Don't Bother to Smile 1, 9; DOWNS, M. A.: 
60 Notre D. L.R. 629, 632 (1985). 
13 NOWAK-ROTUNDA: 1059. 
14 Supra n5 at 574. 
15 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949), rehearing denied 337 U.S. 934, 69 S.Ct. 
1490, 93 L.Ed. 1740 (1949). 
16 For the clear and present danger test, see infra n43. 
17 Id. 
18 394 U.S. 576; 89 S. Ct. 1354; 22 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1969). 
19 Id. at 592. 
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In Cohen v. California20 the Court similarly stated that the "fuck the draft" 
words worn by the defendant on his jacket in a County Courthouse was also 
protected speech, because they were not a directed personal insult, that is, were 
not a direct insult towards any individual, and thus did not meet the 
requirements of the "fighting words" doctrine. One year later, in Gooding v. 
Wilson21 the Court declared a Georgia statute unconstitutionally overbroad, 
because it proscribed protected as well as unprotected speech, in penalising any 
person using, without provocation, in the presence of another, opprobrious 
words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of peace to or of him.22 
It held, that words may not be banned merely because of their offensive or 
vulgar nature. It also appeared to further narrow the "fighting words" standard 
by requiring that proof be given that the specific individual addressed would 
be likely to react in an immediate, violent manner.23 
1968 saw the development of an important test as a result of one of the draft 
burning cases. In United States v. O'Brien24 the defendant and three other 
companions burned their registration certificates in front of a crowd. They were 
then subsequently charged under the Military Training and Service Act of 1948. 
The case raised the question of what conducts can be regarded as speech?5 It 
is unacceptable, the Court held, that a limitless variety of conducts be labelled 
as expressions, which thus form a title for First Amendment protection. The 
Court was willing to presume that the action had a communicative element, but 
20 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). In Cohen the 
defendant was convicted of violating a general Californian disturbing-the-peace statute, which 
prohibited malicious and wilful disturbance of the peace. The Supreme Court reversed the 
judgement, stating that the wearing of a jacket bearing an offensive expletive ("Fuck the 
Draft") in a Los Angeles courthouse was constitutionally protected speech. See SCHNEIDER: 
274. For criticism of Cohen, see BICKEL: The Morality of Consent, 72 (1975). 
21 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed. 2d 408 (1972). 
22 Id. at 519. See GELLMAN: 357. 
23 Id. at 528. 
24 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed. 2d 672 (1968). 
25 Analysis involving the expressive and non-expressive elements of a certain conduct 
becomes important with regard to statutes prohibiting the wearing of items and, for example, 
burning crosses (SCHNEIDER: 269). See cases Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); 
United States v. Eichmann, 497 U.S. 310. Both of these cases involved flag burning, the 
restriction on such activity was held to be unconstitutional. Compare with NIMMER, M.: The 
Meaning of Symbolic Speech under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L.R. 29 (1973); 
GREENAWALT, K.: O'er the Lewd of the Free: Flag Burning as Speech, UCLA L.R. 925 
(1990); ALFANGE: Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft Card Burning Case, 1968 
Sup. Ct. R. 1, 23-24. 
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the question remained of whether this was sufficient to justify constitutional 
protection. Thus O'Brien sets out a four-pronged test for establishing whether 
government regulation is sufficiently justified. This is the case if 
1) it is in the constitutional power of the government; 
2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; 
3) the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 
4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.26 
If a law has therefore failed the О 'Brien test, it must then be analysed within 
general First Amendment principles. According to the Supreme Court the 
problem in a case such as Tinker21-which involved the wearing of armbands as 
a symbol of protest-was really one of balancing the student's First Amendment 
rights against the conflicting rules of the school authorities. Another area in 
which the Supreme Court has been called upon to elaborate the test set out in 
O'Brien concerns flag desecration statutes.28 To sum up, it appears that 
symbolic speech cases do not present a different issue from pure speech cases 
once the court has determined that the activity being regulated or prohibited 
should be considered as speech. 
Looking at the emerging principles of constitutionality of ethnic intimidation 
laws, Gellman believes that "[al good starting point for understanding the roots 
of modern ethnic intimidation laws is the only Supreme Court case reviewing 
the constitutionality of a group libel statute, Beauharnais v. Illinois"}4 The 
challenged Illinois statute—typical of those adopted by several states following 
the Second World War—criminalised the public exhibition of any publication 
which portrayed "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class 
of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion " and which exposed "citizens 
26 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679. Compare with SCHNEIDER: 269, who only lists three 
elements of the test, leaving out the third point of the test. 
27 One year following O'Brien, other forms of expressive conduct were brought before the 
Court. The wearing of black armbands to show objection to the Vietnam War was the issue 
in Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed. 2d 731 (1969). 
The Supreme Court held that such an act is closely akin to pure speech (393 U.S. at 505, 89 
S.Ct. 736). 
28 The first case was Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 89 S.Ct. 1354, 22 L.Ed.2d 572 
(1969). See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405. 95 S.Ct. 2727, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974); 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United Sates v. Eichmann, 497 U.S. 310 (1990). 
29 GELLMAN: supra n l2; 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952). Gellman also 
refers to Terminiello v. Chicago. See GELLMAN: 335 n l . 
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of any race color, creed or religion to contempt, derision or obloquy", or 
which was "productive of breach of the peace or riots."30 
The Court affirmed the defendant's conviction under the statute for circulat-
ing leaflets which petitioned the Mayor and the City Council of Chicago "to 
halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of the white people, 
their property, neighborhoods and persons by the Negro." Justice Frankfurter 
in delivering the majority opinion, pointed out that ordinary libel laws were not 
subject to review under the First Amendment,31 and that the individual's 
dignity and reputation could be associated with that of the group he belonged 
to. Thus there was no justification to treat group libel laws differently from 
those concerning private libels. Justice Black dissenting, nevertheless asserted 
that such a statute is equal to "expansive state censorship".32 Justice Douglas 
also dissented, maintaining that the group libel concept could only be justified 
if it met the requirements of the "clear and present danger" test.33 
The authority of Beauharnais has been weakened by later cases, although 
it has never been overruled.34 The Court's developing protection of civil libel, 
and restriction on breach-of-peace and disorderly-conduct statutes which lacked 
reference to immediate danger of violence,35 have overshadowed the authority 
of Beauharnais.36 The most important of these decisions is the one of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Collin v. Smith,31 where an 
ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of material which promoted racial or 
religious hatred was ruled unconstitutional.38 Thus Beauharnais can be 
30 GELLMAN: supra 12 citing 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para 471 (1949) (repealed 1961); 
quoted in Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251. 
31 BARENDT, E.: Freedom of Speech (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985) 166. Also compare 
with Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 269, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) and 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
32 343 U.S. 250, 271 (Black J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 285 (Douglas J., dissenting). 
34 BARENDT: 166-167, referring to Anti-Defamation League ofB'nai B'rith v. FFC, 403 
F.2d 169, 174 (DC Cir. 1968) and Tollett v. U.S., 485 F. 2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1973), in which 
private libel was held to be covered by the First Amendment. Compare with GELLMAN: 336. 
35 See e.g. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). 
36 GREENAWALT, K.: Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language (Oxford University Press, 
1989) 294. 
37 578 F. 2d. 1197 (1978). For discussion, see infra n49. 
38 See BARENDT: 167. Discussed at infra n49. 
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regarded as implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court's decisions on private 
libel.39 
One of the most important decisions in this area was delivered in the case 
of Brandenburg v. Ohio40 in which the Court reversed the conviction of a Ku 
Klux Klan group leader, who was found guilty under an Ohio statute. This law 
punished acts advocating the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, 
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing 
industrial or political reform. The Court unanimously asserted that "decisions 
have vanished the principle that constitutional guarantees of free speech and 
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of 
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is thus likely to incite or produce such 
action".*1 
Therefore, even expressions advocating violence were protected by the First 
Amendment, except "where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action".*2 
Justices Black and Douglas in separate but concurring opinions asserted that 
the "clear and present danger" test43 was not compatible witJi the First 
Amendment. There is only "clear and present danger", they stated, when the 
advocacy is likely to produce immediate violence or insurrection. Since the 
Ohio statute did not distinguish between the advocacy of a theory and 
immediate lawless action it was held, therefore, to be unconstitutional. 
39 Consider also GELLMAN: 336 n8 and SCHNEIDER: 272. For discussion, see BETH: 
Group Libel and Free Speech, 39 Minn. L.R. 167 (1955). 
40 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969). 
41 Id. at 447. 
42 Id. 
43 The "clear and present danger" test was developed in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 
47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919) by Holmes J. in his judgement for the Court. In this 
case defendants were convicted of violating the 1917 Espionage Act by causing and 
attempting to cause insubordination in the armed forces. The Court held, however, that: "the 
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of 
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that the Congress has a right to prevent". "Clear and present danger" thus 
reflected a question of proximity and degree. The problem is whether it is up to the legislator 
to decide whether a certain expression constitutes a clear and present danger to state security, 
or whether it is for the court to decide if such danger exists (BARENDT: 149). 
3 2 Balázs József Gcllór 
Two other controversial cases are deserving of mention. In Terminiello v. 
City of Chicago44 the Supreme Court overturned an ordinance prohibiting 
breaches of the peace. The defendant here had denounced Jews and blacks. 
Whilst the Court refused to rule on the question of whether a racially 
antagonistic speech was constitutionally protected, according to the majority 
opinion delivered by Justice Douglas, a function of free speech is to invite 
dispute: "It may ... best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of 
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people 
to angerГ* 
Nevertheless in Feiner v. New York?6—a. hostile audience case—the Court 
upheld the conviction of the offender under the State's disorderly-conduct 
statute. The speaker described the American Legion as a "Nazi Gestapo" and 
urged blacks to rise up in arms and fight for equal rights. In their dissenting 
opinions Justices Douglas and Black argued that a minimal threat of violence 
was not sufficient to justify the suppression of speech. They pointed out that the 
duty of the police lay in protecting the rights of the speaker by controlling those 
who threaten him with violence.47 It is important to note that in this case 
insults were also directed against particular members of the audience, which was 
obviously not compelled to listen. However, the authority of Feiner has been 
undercut by later cases in which the Court has distinguished these on factual 
bases and has preferred to apply Terminiello,48 
Two closely connected controversial cases in the late 1970's brought up once 
again issues of ethnic intimidation and free expression.49 In Collin50 the Court, 
44 337 U.S. 1(1949). 
45 337 U.S. at 4, 69 S.Ct. at 896, 93 L.Ed, at 1134 (1949). 
46 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295 (1951). 
47 340 U.S. at 326-327, 71 S.Ct. at 309 (Black J. dissenting), and 340 U.S. at 331, 71 S.Ct. 
at 312 (Douglas J. dissenting). 
48 See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963). 
49 See LAWRENCE: 68 N. D. L.R. 673, n2 (1993). Lawrence describes the "Skokie cases", 
consisting of two cases arising from the attempt by a group of neo-Nazis to hold a march in 
the predominantly Jewish Chicago suburb of Skokie, Illinois in 1977 and 1978. The first case 
was National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); 366 N.E.2d 
347 (111. App. Ct. 1977); 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978). The more discussed second case is Collin 
v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. 111. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 
439 U.S. 916 (1978). See generally: DOWNS, M. A.: Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech 
and the First Amendment, 60 N.D.L.R. 629 (1985); KRETZMER: Freedom of Speech and 
Racism, 8 Cardozo L.R. 445 (1987); NEIER, A.: Defending My Enemy: American Nazis, The 
Skokie Case and the Risk of Freedom (1979); DOWNS, M. A.: Nazis in Skokie (1985). 
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whilst not resolving the contradiction between the Brandenburg principle and 
Feiner, invalidated ordinances51 which forbade Nazis to march through a town 
predominantly inhabited by Jews. Reasoning that the legislation was content-
based, since "any shock effect... must be attributed to the content of the ideas 
expressed",52 the Court ruled that the trauma caused to Holocaust survivors on 
seeing Nazis marching in their community could not justify the suppression of 
the symbolic expression.53 It was therefore declared that "[although there was 
some evidence that some individuals might have difficulty restraining their 
reaction to the Nazi demonstration I the Village] does not rely on a fear of 
responsive violence to justify the ordinance, and does not even suggest that there 
will be any physical violence if the march is held. This confession takes the case 
out of the scope of Brandenburg and Feiner. /It] also eliminates any argument 
based on the fighting words with a direct tendency to cause violence by the 
person to whom, individually, the words were addressed."5* 
The Court also refused to apply Beauharnais in order to uphold the 
ordinances, and rejected the second of the ordinance on the grounds of content-
based restrictions not permitted under the recognised exceptions to the First 
Amendment.55 The Court thus rejected the village's argument that the 
demonstration would inflict psychological trauma on the resident holocaust 
survivors and other Jewish residents.56 It asserted that "[w]here, as here, a 
crime is made of a silent march, attended only by symbols of and not by 
extrinsic conduct offensive in itself, we think the words of the Court in Street v. 
New York ... are very much on point: ']A]ny shock effect... must be attributed 
to the content of the ideas expressed. It is firmly settled that under our 
Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely 
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers. "'57 
50 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
51 According to the first ordinance, applicants for demonstrations had to obtain an enormous 
amount of insurance. The second ordinance prohibited the dissemination of any materials 
which "promote and incite hatred against persons by any reason of their race, national origin, 
or religion, and is intended to do so". The third ordinance prohibited military style 
demonstrations. 578 F. 2d at 1199-1200. 
52 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
53 SCHNEIDER: 276. 
54 Supra n52. 
55 Supra n52 at 1204-1205. 
56 Id. at 1205. 
57 Id. at 1206 [quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592, (1969)1- See also GELLMAN: 
339. 
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Downs observes, however, that "[had] Beauharnais passed his leaflets out 
in front of black homes or given them directly to blacks in similar settings-[the 
Nazis planned to march in the middle of the Jewish town]-the very nature of his 
speech act would have been transformed from racialist plea into an act of 
intimidation. "58 
B, Constitutionally permissible criminalisation of bias speech and 
the R. A. V. case 
At the heart of ethnic intimidation laws lies the fundamental and paradoxical 
question of how much intolerance a liberal democracy should be prepared to 
tolerate.59 In searching for a balanced answer to the increasing problem of 
racism the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) drafted a model bill comprising an 
institutional vandalism statute and an intimidation statute which enhances 
penalties for certain criminal offences, when they are committed by reason of 
the victim's actual or perceived race, sex, colour, religion, sexual orientation, 
or national origin.60 The impact of the model was significant: twenty-two states 
adopted laws resembling the ADL proposal, whilst thirteen other states used 
different means of addressing the same issue.61 Thus the past decade has 
produced a landmark legal criminal response to bias harassment and attack,62 
with thirty one states having such laws at the present, and federal bias crime 
legislation now also being proposed.63 
The basic standard which every such law must observe is defined by federal 
and state constitutional requirements, for even if a law is desirable and effective 
it cannot stand if it is contradictory to these guiding principles.64 
58 DOWNS: Nazis in Skokie, 147 (1985). 
59 LAWRENCE: 673, 675. For discussion, see BOLLINGER, L. C.: The Tolerant Society: 
Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in Society (1968). 
60 GELLMAN: 339-340 cites the ADL model bill as Civil Rights Division, ADL Legal 
Affairs department, ADL Law report: Hate Crimes Statutes: A Response to Anti-Semitism, 
Vandalism, and Violent Bigotry 1 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (hereinafter ADL Law Report). 
61 GELLMAN: 340, n31. 
62 LAWRENCE: 680. 
63 For an extensive list of state bias crime regulations, see LAWRENCE: at 680 and 681, 
notes 32 and 33. Compare with GRANNIS, E. J.: Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The 
Constitutionality of Penalty Enhancement for Bias Crimes, 93 Col. L.R. 178. 
64 GELLMAN: 343. 
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The various state intimidation statutes can be classified, with Lawrence, as 
a) pure bias crimes; b) penalty enhancement laws. Pure bias crimes are free-
standing, separately defined criminal offences, criminalising racially targeted 
violence; penalty enhancement laws authorise an increased sanction when an 
already defined crime is committed with racial motivation.65 The concept of 
pure bias crimes can be observed in the well publicised St. Paul ordinance,66 
whilst most statutes based on the ADL model work as penalty enhancement 
statutes.67 
Grannis uses a different classification: a) statutes which literally enhance 
penalties for bias motivation, like the Wisconsin or California laws,68 an 
approach which has also been taken by a number of other states;69 b) more 
commonly utilised are statutes which create a new crime of "ethnic intimida-
65 LAWRENCE: 682. Gellman works with a different typology: 1. Penalty-enhancement 
statutes. 2. Penalty-enhancement statutes as well as laws which were created because the 
legislator decided that the sum of the sanctions for the basic crime and the additional penalty 
for the bias motive is not sufficient, and thus the legal response must also be different. This 
includes penalty-enhancement laws and laws describing different behaviour. 3. These laws are 
not yet reflected in legislation, but would revise the First Amendment exceptions and create 
more far-reaching laws than currently possible (GELLMAN: 333-334). Because of their logic 
and functional clarity I will use the Lawrence-typology combined with Grannis's structure. 
66 Infra pi If and n81. 
67 The ADL model statute: "Intimidation 
A. A person commits the crime of intimidation i f , by reason of the actual or perceived 
race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another individual or group of 
individuals, he violates Section ... of the Panel Code [insert code provision for criminal 
trespass, criminal mischief, harassment, menacing, assault and/or any other appropriate 
statutorily proscribed criminal conduct]. 
B. intimidation is a ... misdemeanor/felony [the degree of criminal liability should be 
made contingent upon the severity of the injury incurred or property lost or damaged], " 
[ADL Law Report, 4 app. A. (1991)]. Quoted by GELLMAN: 344 and GRANNIS: 181. 
68 The Wisconsin law reads in part as follows: 
"1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crime are 
increased as provided in sub. (2): 
a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948 
b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is committed 
or selects the property that is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime under par. (a) in 
whole or in part because of the actor's belief or perception regarding the race, religion, 
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner 
or occupant ofthat property, whether or not the actor's belief or perception was correct. Wis: 
Stat. Ann. § 939.645 (West Supp. 1992). Quoted by GRANNIS: 180-181. 
69 See, e.g. D.C. Code Ann. §§ 22-4001, 22-4003 (Supp. 1992). See GRANNIS: 180 n9. 
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tion";70 c) although the approach is similar, many other state statutes do not 
make reference to other penal code sections; instead, these statutes create new 
bias offences incorporating existing crimes and additional bias elements;71 d) 
finally, some states add the motive of bias to a list of aggravating factors to be 
considered by the judge in sentencing.72 
Statutes such as those of Wisconsin or California only punish acts which are 
already criminal, but add an additional bias element.73 Statutes which redefine 
underlying criminal acts usually also punish conducts already criminalised, but 
extend to additional behaviour which would not be criminal but for the bias 
motive. The latter may not be considered as penalty enhancement statutes, and 
therefore, their constitutionality must be appropriately judged.74 
The constitutionality of these laws presents a highly complex and confused 
problematic; complex because of the large number of case authority and 
academic writings,75 and confused due to a lack of decisive and clear 
principles outlined therein. The validity of Chaplinsky,76 the most important 
case, has been undermined by later cases77 and it has been often suggested 
that Chaplinsky is no longer good law.78 However, Shiffrin points out that 
simply because the few "fighting words" cases before the Supreme Court have 
thus far been overruled, the standing of the Chaplinsky doctrine has not been 
affected-Chaplinsky still survives.79 More recent cases demonstrate that 
although the Court does not favour prosecution under the "fighting words" 
doctrine it has avoided an overruling of Chaplinsky, by employing vagueness 
70 GRANNIS: 181. See e.g. Iowa Code Ann. § 729.5(3)44). 
71 See Colo. Rev Stat. § 18-9-121 (Supp. 1992) ("A person commits ethnic intimidation i f , 
with the intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's race [etc....] 
he (a) Knowingly causes bodily injury to another person. ") Cited by GRANNIS: 182 nl4. 
72 See C-Cal. Penal Code § 1170. 75 (West Supp. 1992). For further examples, see 
GRANNIS: 182 nl6. 
73 GRANNIS: 183. 
74 Id. 
75 See SHIFFRIN: 44—45, note 6 listing recent literature on racist speech. 
76 Supra p2. 
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g. STROSSEN, N.: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: Modest Proposal?, 1990 
Duke L.J. 484, 510. Compare with LAWRENCE, F. M.: If He Hollers Let Him Go: 
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431. Also NOWAK-ROTUNDA: 1061 
and HURDLE: 1154. 
79 SHIFFRIN: 49 n22. 
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and overbreadth standards in order to quash convictions under different 
expression-limiting statutes.80 
Two Supreme Court decisions have scrutinised the global issue of bias laws 
and several state Supreme Court decisions provide a rich sample of perceptions 
of class speech statutes. 
In the first of these cases, R.A.V. v. United States}1 a group of teenagers 
burned a cross within the fenced portion of the yard of a black family living in 
a white neighbourhood. This act took place in June 1990, in the town of St. Paul. 
R.A.V., one of the perpetrators, was prosecuted under a hate speech ordinance,82 
which was later challenged by him on First Amendment grounds. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court rejected the challenge,83 but the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and reversed the State Supreme Court's ruling, unanimously declaring 
the ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment.84 
Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion, writing for five justices.85 
They accepted the State Court's interpretation of the ordinance that only 
"fighting words" are punishable under it.86 
We can here agree with professor Shiffrin that the St. Paul ordinance met 
most of the conditions for becoming an overbreadth statute.87 The Minnesota 
80 See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972) and Lewis 
v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 94 S.Ct. 970, 39 L.Ed2d. 214 (1974). 
81 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed. 2d 305(1992). 
82 "Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object appellation, 
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, 
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. " 
112 S.Ct. at 2541, 120 U-E.d.2d at 315 [citing Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, 
Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02. (1990)]. 
83 In re. Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991), revd 112 S. Ct. 2538 
(1992). 
84 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed. 2d 305(1992). 
85 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas, and Souter JJ. joined him. 
86 112 S.Ct. at 2541-2542, 120 L.Ed. 2d at 315-316. 
87 SHIFFRIN: 70. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 
L.Ed.2d 446 (1973), Brennan J. in his dissenting opinion asserted that the obscenity statute 
was unconstitutionally vague. The doctrines of "vagueness" and "overbreadth" are part of First 
Amendment jurisprudence and are usually closely related. In short, a statute may be regarded 
as vague if it does not fairly inform a person that what is commanded or prohibited is 
unconstitutional because it violates due process. The doctrine originates from the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Black's Law Dictionary, 1103, 1549). 
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Supreme Court, however, constructed it in such a way that it became restricted 
to "fighting words" under the Chaplinsky standard. The Minnesota Court held 
that "Unlike ... Texas v. Johnson the challenged St Paul ordinance does not 
assume that any cross burning ... is subject to prosecution; rather, the 
ordinance censors only those displays that one knows or should know will 
cause anger, alarm or resentment based on racial, ethnic, gender or religious 
bias... [T]his court narrowly construed Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (1990) 
... to refer only to 'fighting' words ... thereby preserving it in the face of an 
overbreadth attack. Similarly limited to expressive conduct that amounts to 
'fighting words'-conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate 
violence ... the ordinance in question withstands constitutional challenge,"88 
Thus whilst the U. S. Supreme Court accepted this interpretation of the 
doctrine, Justice Scalia expressed the opinion that the principal defect of the 
ordinance was that it discriminated on the basis of subject matter. It was thus 
held to be "facially unconstitutional",89 since displays containing abusive 
invective, no matter how severe, are permissible under this ordinance, unless 
they concern one of the specified topics. Therefore those who use "fighting 
words" in connection with, for example, homosexuality or HIV patients, are not 
covered by this ordinance. "The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to 
impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavoured 
subjects."90 
The majority opinion stated that "fighting words" are outside First 
Amendment protection, because they are "non-speech", unworthy of protection; 
yet the content of "fighting words" is safeguarded under the Constitution.91 
Unlike a time, place, or manner restriction, the St. Paul ordinance regulated 
particular "fighting words" based on the content of the expression. Justice 
Scalia acknowledged that the First Amendment does not place an absolute 
prohibition on content discrimination.92 He enumerated four exceptions in 
which content discrimination can be constitutional:93 
88 In re. Welfare ofR.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991). 
89 112 S.Ct. at 2542, 120 L.Ed. 2d at 314. 
90 112 S.Ct. at 2546, 120 L.Ed. 2d at 323. 
91 Id. at 2545, 320-321. 
92 Id. at 2545, 320-321 
93 Shiffrin, S. H. defines them as a) entire class of speech is proscribed, b) secondary effects, 
c) incidental effects, d) catch-all category (SHIFFRIN: 51-56). Compare also with 
LAWRENCE: 687. 
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1. If the discrimination is based on the same reason under which an entire 
category of speech is excluded from First Amendment protection.94 
2. In cases of the "secondary effect" principle the government may treat 
content-defined subclasses differently, if the government is concerned not with 
the offensiveness of the content, but with certain "secondary effects" associated 
with a particular content.95 The "R.A.V." Court held that the "secondary 
effect" doctrine, as well as the first exception, did not apply to the St. Paul 
ordinance.96 
3. The Court asserted that content-based sub-classes of unprotected speech 
can be regulated if the expression is included incidentally within the scope of 
the law aimed at conduct rather than speech.97 
4. Finally, the Court created a general exception for a selective regulation 
of unprotected speech, if the regulation reflects that no governmental 
suppression of ideas is involved.98 
The Court also gave an indication of what sort of statute would be accep-
table as constitutional: It had to 1. reflect a compelling governmental interest; 
2. the content discriminatory nature would have to be necessary to serve that 
OQ 
interest. 
Whilst Justice Scalia recognised that helping to safeguard the basic human 
rights of groups historically subject to discrimination was a compelling state 
interest,100 the Court stated that content discrimination was not the only way, 
and therefore not the necessary way, in which to act according to this interest. 
Meeting the "compelling state interest" test was not enough for the ordinance, 
Justice Scalia also argued, because the danger of censorship presented by a 
facially content-based statute required that such censorship be shown to be 
94 112 S.Ct. at 1545, 120 L.Ed. 2d 320-321. 
95 Id. at 2546, 322. See also HURDLE: 1158-59. The court referred to Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), in which Renton upheld an ordinance that zoned adult 
bookstores and theatres differently than it did other bookstores and theatres. (Id. at 44). The 
city defended its decision, asserting that it did not pass the ordinance primarily out of concern 
for the content of the films, but rather considering "secondary effects" such as the 
deterioration of the neighbourhoods, etc. As a consequence, the Court did not classify the 
ordinance as being content-based (id. at 47-50). 
96 112 S.Ct. at 2549, 120 L.Ed. 2d 325. 
97 Id. at 2546, 322. Compare with HURDLE: 1161. 
98 Id. at 2547, 322. Compare with HURDLE: 1162. 
99 Id. at 2549-2550, 325-326. Compare with HURDLE: 1162. 
100 Id. at 2549, 325. 
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necessary in order to serve this compelling end.101 This latter was not the 
case according to the Court, and thus the ordinance failed because without it 
there were enough content-neutral remedies available.102 A content-neutral 
ordinance proscribing all "fighting words" would have withstood constitutional 
challenge.103 
Justice White wrote a concurring opinion on behalf of three other 
justices.104 Shiffrin, in his critique of the decision, vents his opinion that 
Justice White made an inexplicable mistake in viewing the St. Paul ordinance 
as constitutionally overbroad.105 Justice White observed in R.A.V. that the 
Minnesota Court did not clearly identify the possible injuries that might be 
inflicted by expressions St. Paul sought to regulate.106 As Shiffrin observes, 
lurking in such an approach is the danger that lower courts may then try to 
define a required degree of injury.107 In his opinion Justice White suggests 
that a less stringent degree of injury, as required in tort for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, might already suffice for criminal liability.108 Shiffrin 
therefore concludes that injury should not be a sufficient or necessary condition 
for criminal liability.109 
It is true that in Justice White's interpretation the "fighting word" doctrine 
applies to "direct personal insults or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs"?1" 
However, he also proposed a completely different construction of "fighting 
words": they are not protected because the content of the speech does not 
contribute to the "marketplace of ideas".111 In his view "fighting words" 
comprise purely insulting language addressed directly to another person, speech 
which incites the addressee to fight, thus being worthless and of no value for 
society.112 Such an interpretation of the doctrine concurs also with Cohen, 
101 Id. at 2549, 325. 
102 Id. at 2550, 326. 
103 Id. at 2550, 326. 
104 Id. at 2551, 327. O'Connor, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ joined him. 
105 SHIFFRIN: 70. 
106 112 S.Ct. at 2559, White J. concurring. 
107 See SHIFFRIN: 77. 
108 Id. 
109 SHIFFRIN: 78. 
110 112 S.Ct. at 2553 n4, White J. concurring, quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 
(1989). 
111 Id. at 2551-2552. 
112 Id. at 2553. 
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and Goodingm making "fighting words" unprotected because inter-personal 
insults add nothing to the market place.114 Nevertheless, the majority opinion 
did not take this widely criticised direction.115 
C. The tide of Mitchell and Wyant 
Two federal court decisions striking down hate speech codes at the Universities 
of Michigan and Wisconsin for overbreadth116 and additionally the R.A.V. 
case seemed to paralyse the movement of criminal as well as institutional 
(university) response to hate speech."7 However, a more recent decision 
affirmed sentencing enhancement for racially motivated crimes.118 
The consideration of R.A.V. by the United States Supreme Court in 1992 
was the first occasion on which the constitutionality of a modern bias crime 
law was dealt with. A few months after this, the highest courts of Wisconsin 
and Ohio handed down decisions in similar cases.119 In State v. Mitchell the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down a penalty-enhancement law which in-
creased the punishment for certain crimes if committed with biased intention.120 
In State v. Wyant121 the Ohio Supreme Court held a state ethnic intimidation 
statute to be unconstitutional.122 In both cases the Courts stated that, whilst 
the bias crime laws under scrutiny were understandable and noble in purpose, 
they still violated First Amendment freedoms.123 
113 For Cohen, see supra nn20, 35; for Gooding, supra n80. 
114 HURDLE: 1172. 
115 See SHIFFRIN: 70-84; HURDLE: 1172-1173. 
116 See Doe v. University of M ichigen, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); U.M.W. Post, 
Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. Wisconsin, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (e.d. Wis. 1991). 
117 See for discussion DELGADO, R.: Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives 
in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L.R. 343 (1991); STROSSEN, N.: Regulating Free Speech on 
Campus: a Modest Proposal?, 1990; Duke, L. J. 484, 571. 
118 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. 2194 (1993). Following two Canadian Supreme Court 
decisions R. v. Butler, 89 D.L.R.4"1 (Can.) 449 (1992); and R. v. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. (Can.) 
697 (1990). See DELGADO, R.-YUN, D.: The NeoConservative Case Against Hate-Speech 
Regulation-Lively, D'Souza, Gates, and the Toughlove Crowd, 47 Vand. L.R. 1807 (1994). 
119 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W. 2d 807 (Wis. 1992); Ohio v. Wyant, 597 N. E. 2d 450 
(Ohio 1992). 
120 See the statute supra n68. 
121 Ohio v. Wyant, 597 N. E. 2d 450 (Ohio). 
122 LAWRENCE: 673-674. See the statute infra nl38. 
123 Id. at 676. 
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In Mitchell the defendant-Mitchell-was one of the a group of black youths 
who decided to assault whites. They beat a white teenager unconscious, 
leaving him with permanent brain damage. Mitchell was convicted and 
sentenced to four years instead of two because the selection of the victim was 
biased. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court then held that the state's penalty-
enhancement statute had violated the First Amendment.124 The Court found 
firstly that the statute punished thought because it punished the perpetrator for 
his "motive".125 Although it agreed that criminal statutes may require mens 
rea, the Court drew a distinction between motive, intent, and purpose, and 
concluded that only the latter two are punishable.126 Secondly, the Court 
reasoned that because speech will often be used to prove an element of bias, 
statutory regulation would "chill" speech.127 This means that speech could be 
"self-censored" for fear of civil or criminal liability. The court further stated 
that the penalty-enhancement law "punishes the defendant's biased thought... 
and thus encroaches upon First Amendment rights."m Therefore the punish-
ment of bigoted criminals because they were bigoted was, in the Court's view, 
enhanced by the hate-crime statute.129 The majority opinion, delivered by 
Chief Justice Hefferman also held that the process of selecting the victim was 
not a "conduct" but an intellectual exercise, and so part of the defendant's 
"intent".130 
Justice Abramson, dissenting, saw the statute as a restraint on conduct and 
not on belief. According to her interpretation the law required the State to show 
the close connection between the selection of the victim and the underlying 
crime.131 Justice Bablitch in his dissent stated that the disputed law was 
simply a law against discrimination, that is, discrimination in the selection 
of the victim of the crime.132 The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, and in a unanimous judgement delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
124 Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807. 
125 GRANNIS: 186. 
126 Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 812. 
127 Id. at 815-817. 
128 Id. at 812. 
129 Id. at 814. 
130 Id. at 815. 
131 Id. at 818. 
132 Id. at 819. 
Laws Penalising Bias Speech and their Constitutionality in the United States 43 
reversed the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and upheld the 
constitutionality of the penalty-enhancement statute.133 
This decision meant that the victim selection process was now accepted as 
conduct rather than speech. However, the core issue was that of the problem 
of motive. Here the Court distinguished between motive and abstract belief?34 
It stated that judges had traditionally been allowed to take several factors into 
consideration in deciding how severe should be the punishment for a particular 
offence. Motive is one such factor which could aggravate the offence. The 
opinion also noted, however, that such a discretion cannot be stretched to 
encompass abstract beliefs.135 
Chief Justice Rehnquist recalled Bablitch's dissent, stressing that the 
Wisconsin statute is similar to anti-discrimination laws, with equally un-
questionable constitutionality. It thus fits into the category of content natural 
regulation?36 
A law similar to that of Wisconsin was declared unconstitutional by the 
Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Wyant?31 The case concerned a dispute in 
which the defendant uttered these phrases: "we didn't have this problem until 
those niggers moved in next to us..." "I ought to shoot that black mother 
fucker ..." The defendant was found guilty of ethnic intimidation based on the 
predicate offence of aggravated menacing,138 but the Court invalidated the 
statute, reasoning (as did the Wisconsin Court) that punishing motives is 
equivalent to thought control, and therefore this statute punished thought.139 
133 Mitchell, 124 L.Ed. 2d 436 (1993). 
134 Id. at 445. 
135 Id. at 445-446. 
136 Id. at 446. 
137 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992). 
138 GRANNIS: 187, n50 also cites the Ohio staute: 
"Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1992): 
(A) No person shall violate section 2903.21, 2903.22, 2909.06, or 2909.07, or division 
(A) (3), (4), or (5) of section 2917.21 of the Revised Code by reason of the race, color, 
religion, or national origin of another person or group of persons. 
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of ethnic intimidation. Ethnic intimidation is 
an offence of the next higher degree than the offense the commission of which is a necessary 
element of ethnic intimidation. " 
139 Ohio v. Wyant at 454. 
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D. Elements of unconstitutionality? 
Numerous scholars have expressed the opinion that racist speech is unprotected 
by the First Amendment.140 Countering this, Gellman for example argues that 
racist speech restrictions and bias crimes are both unconstitutional interference 
with free speech141 These academic theories might be best described as 
extremist viewpoints, inevitably failing to give usable guidance. 
In seeking to find an answer to the constitutionality issue several authors have 
experimented with a distinction between bias crimes and racist speech, associated 
with the opposing pair of "conduct" and "strictly expression" respectively.142 
However, the problem with such an approach—as F. M. Lawrence analyses at 
length143—is that it is hard to define in a particular case whether certain 
behaviour qualifies only as conduct, or only as expression, or as both.144 It is 
the animus of the actor which makes expression out of mere conduct. 
Consequently, in my view, it is the mens rea element which plays a crucial 
role in defining the constitutionality of a given collection of words or deeds, 
and therefore the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the law which seeks 
to proscribe such. 
Firstly the "motive" has, therefore, to be scrutinised, as the prerequisite of 
intentional criminal behaviour; and secondly, the mens rea of these. 
1. The problem of motive 
Lying at the core of the constitutionality problem in statutes punishing bias-
crime, and thus hate-speech, is the question of motive. Amongst several other 
140 LAWRENCE makes this observation at 677. See for comparison DELGADO, R.: Words 
That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-
C.L.: R. 133 (1982); MATSUDA, M.: Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the 
Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L.R. 2320 (1989); LAWRENCE, C. R.: Ill, If He Hollers Let Him 
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431. 
141 GELLMAN; 333. 
142 See WINER, S.: The R.A.V. Case and the Distinction Between Hate Speech IMWS and 
Hate Crime Laws, 18 Wm. MITCHELL: 971 (1992). 
143 LAWRENCE: 691-694. 
144 It is extremely difficult to distinguish between conduct and speech. Emerson looked for 
the predominant character in the behaviour to establish such a distinction. See also ELY: 
1495. LAWRENCE at 694 says that "[bjurning a Draft Card ... is an undifferentiated whole, 
hundred percent action and hundred percent expression." Such a conduct is extremely similar 
to the conduct of cross burning. 
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constitutional concerns, the ADL model statute also raises this problem.145 In 
defining the mental state of the actor this model statute only says that one must 
commit the crime "by reason of ethnicity".146 
It is often maintained that by distinguishing pure bias crimes from penalty-
enhancement statutes it is possible to differentiate between constitutional and 
unconstitutional laws.147 Here the argument runs that enhancement laws are 
constitutional, because the bias motive is only a factor in sentencing and not 
an element of the crime.148 
Thus the problem of whether statutes which enhance the penalty of an 
already defined criminal offence are in breach of the Fourteenth or First 
Amendment still remains.149 In the words of Gellman, "a reoccurring first 
amendment concern is the danger that ethnic intimidation statutes directed 
towards motive criminalization penalize pure thought and opinion".150 She is, 
therefore, impelled to ask: "Can the government constitutionally punish 
motive?"l5i This approach to the question of constitutionality has been echoed 
in Mitchell and Wyant,152 which rely heavily on Gellman's article.153 
Gellman continues by proposing that "motive", "intent" and "purpose" are 
related concepts, since they refer to the thought process which precedes the 
145 GELLMAN: 355. For example, it fails to define a culpable mental state. Usually 
jurisdictions define a basic level of culpability. The Model Penal Code in Section 2.02 (3) 
states that recklessness will satisfy culpability requirements if the offence itself does not 
specify. 
146 GELLMAN: 357. 
147 Lawrence quotes the testimony before the House of Representatives, Subcommittee on 
Crime and Criminal Justice in support of the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 
1992 (H.R. 4797, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1991). 
148 Id. 
149 This question of overbreadth was thoroughly discussed in Thornhill v. Alabama, (310 
U.S. 88, 97 (1940)) where the Court stated that, "[a] law is void on its face if it 'does not 
aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of [government] control, but ... sweeps 
within its ambit other activities' that constitute an exercise of protected". See also Broadrick 
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
150 GELLMAN: 362. In Texas v. Johnson the Court, however, expressed the idea: that the 
"government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea 
itself offensive or disagreeable" (491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
151 GELLMAN: 363. 
152 State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992); State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 
1992). 
153 GRANNIS: 189. 
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commission of the crime. However, they are legally distinct in crucial 
respects.154 Motive is a "cause or reason that moves the will and induces 
action. An idea, belief or emotion that impels or incites one to act in 
accordance with his state of mind or emotion."155 Thus motive is the term 
employed for the actor's underlying, propelling force for acting, whilst 
"purpose" is "[tjhat which one sets before him to accomplish or attain; an end, 
intention, or aim, object, plan, project. Term is synonymous with ends sought, 
an object to be attained, an intention, etc."156 Purpose, therefore, connotes 
what the actor plans as a result of the conduct, leaving "intent" to refer to the 
actor's mental state as it determines culpability or volition.157 
Gellman acknowledges that some crimes are distinguished from others on 
the basis of the actor's purpose. She maintains, however, that even, should the 
actor's purpose be at issue, this does not permit a transference of this scheme 
into a punishment for motive.158 She concludes that unlike purpose or intent, 
motive cannot be an element of the criminal offence.159 As an example she 
points to the Model Penal Code, which illustratively focuses in its definition of 
theft on purpose, but not on motive.160 She also refers also to federal civil 
rights laws, which reflect well a solution by which racial or other similar animus 
is not necessary for liability.161 Conclusively for her argument, this distinction 
between why and what is fundamental in criminal law. 
Grannis and F. M. Lawrence have also developed two distinct, but never-
theless connected, theories in refuting the Gellman-doctrine. According to 
Grannis the two state Supreme Court decisions-having been founded on the 
Gellman-doctrine162—were based on an incorrect distinction between "motive" 
and "intent".163 The basic arguments of these decisions can be summarised by 
154 GELLMAN: 364. 
155 GELLMAN at 364 quotes from Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990, St. Paul, West 
Publishing Co.) at 1014. 
156 Black's, 1236. 
157 GELLMAN at 364, quoting LaFAVE, W.-SCOTT, A.: Criminal Law § 3.6 at 227 (2nd 
ed. 1986). 
158 Id. at 366. 
159 Id. at 364. 
160 MPC §§ 223.2, 223.5 (1962) in SINGER, R. G.-GARDNER, M. R.: Crimes and 
Punishment: Cases, Materials and Readings in Criminal Law (New York 1989) App. 68-69. 
161 GELLMAN at 368 refers to Title VII, Civil Rights Act, 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 
(1988). 
162 GRANNIS: 189. 
163 GRANNIS: 188. 
Laws Penalising Bias Speech and their Constitutionality in the United States 4 7 
saying that the treatment of the state of mind in the penalty-enhancement 
statutes is contrary to principles of criminal law and thus amounts to punishment 
of thought, which is in violation of the First Amendment. As the intention of 
committing the crime is already punished in the predicate statute164 the 
penalty-enhancement law therefore punishes the motive of such intent.165 
It is true, as Grannis points out, that this argument is partly based on a 
mistaken distinction between "intention" and "motive". However, LaFave and 
Scott—invoked by Gellman to give weight to this differentiation166—make it 
clear that the why can be crucial in determining whether a given crime was 
committed.167 
There is also a second argument why penalty-enhancement statutes punish 
thought. To explain this let us use an example: should a certain person assault 
a black for reasons of revenge, and another commit an assault simply because 
of the ethnicity of the victim, both offenders will have committed the same act 
but the bigoted one will be punished more severely merely because of Iiis 
thought.168 
Whether a person is guilty of a crime depends on whether he has the 
requisite state of mind with regard to all the material elements of said 
crime.169 Therefore, to be guilty under a penalty-enhancement statute one must 
have acted with purpose, with regard to the attendant circumstances170 of the 
victim's racial identity. And it is, indeed, long established practice that the trial 
judge may take into account the elements of racial hatred in sentencing.171 
There is, of course, a difference between considering racial motive in 
sentencing; making it enhance the penalty; or defining it as an element of a 
crime; nevertheless, there is no reason to distinguish between these for First 
164 Mitchell at 812; GELLMAN: 363. 
165 GELLMAN: 364. 
166 Supra 59 and n329. 
167 LAFAVE-SCOTT: Criminal Law, § 3.6, at 227-28 (2nd ed. 1986) cited by GRANNIS 
at 190. 
168 GRANNIS: 191. Compare Mitchell at 813-814. 
169 Compare GRANNIS at 192 with MPC § 2.02 (4). 
170 In the terminology of the Model Penal Code, the racial identity of the victim is an 
"attendent circumstance of the crime" [MPC § 1.13(9)). 
171 In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949 (1983) the Supreme Court held that the 
Constitution does not prohibit a trial judge from taking into account the elements of racial 
hatred in the murder. 
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Amendment purposes!172 In fact the precise reason for First Amendment pro-
tection would be lost if it was possible to circumvent it by albeit important 
technicalities.173 It is irrelevant whether somebody is punished more severely 
for his bias motive because the statute says so or because case law allows the 
consideration of such as an aggravating factor. In both instances the offender 
has been exposed to additional hardship because of his bias—and if this is in 
contradiction with the First Amendment, then it is equally so for all. 
2. The mens rea of bias speech 
Whilst trying to distinguish permissible and unconstitutional restriction on 
expression under the First Amendment, F. M. Lawrence differentiates between 
the mens rea of bias crime and racist speech.174 He defines a bias crime as 
being an offence in which, even without the actor's racial motivation, his act is 
proscribed and constitutes another offence. In the case of racial speech, 
however, the same speech would not be criminal if it lacked the racial 
motivation and content.175 
172 As TRIBE stated: "Enhancing a criminal sentence for any hate crime ... in no way creates 
'thought crime' or penalises anyone's conduct based upon a non-proscribable viewpoint ... 
the trigger for enahanced punishment laws differs completely from the constitutionally 
problematic trigger for punishment under the St Paul ordinance..." (U.R. 4797, 102d Cong., 
2d Sess. 1991, 11-12). As Lawrence points out, the problem with this viewpoint is that almost 
every civil rights crime contains within it a "parallel" crime against person or property. Also, 
whereas a bias motivation will always increase the sentence, in cases of penalty-enhancement 
statutes a pure bias crime might provide - theoretically - a lesser sentence than the parallel 
crime, making the argument for unconstitutionality ridiculous (LAWRENCE: 696-697, n98). 
173 The claim that motives do not typically bear on criminal liability is a technical point 
about the way offences are usually defined. It is true, however, that there is also a deeper 
point suggested by the claim that the actor's ultimate purpose does not bear on his or her 
culpability for the criminal conduct. See FLETCHER, G.: Rethinking Criminal Law (1978) 
452 and 453. For a general discussion of intent, see HART, H. L. A.: Punishment and 
Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, Chapter 5, 113-135. Note that the German 
law on homicide, for example, considers motive to be an aggravating factor [StGB § 212(2)], 
as does Hungarian criminal law [Penal Code § 166 (2) b)). 
174 LAWRENCE: 698. 
175 Id. Lawrence observes, in connection with the harm side of the crime, that racially 
motivated assault, in addition to the general harm attributed to assault, also causes 
psychological harm, as well as endangering the relationship between the different classes and 
thus endangering or harming public peace (LAWRENCE: 698). 
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From the viewpoint of punishment, criminal liability is linked to the actor's 
mental state.176 To establish a crime as biased, therefore, the prosecution has 
to prove two different elements on the mens rea side. Firstly, the mens rea of 
the parallel or basic crime;177 and secondly, the bias motivation.178 
In bias speech, however, the first element of mens rea is not punishable, 
since it is only a wish to express oneself. The problem, however, is that this 
observation developed by Lawrence, whilst valid and extremely useful in cases 
such as Mitchell, does not prove helpful when Robert Victoria burns a cross on 
the lawn of a black family. In the latter case, whilst the trespass and vandalism-
the parallel crimes-are undoubtedly not protected by the First Amendment, the 
Lawrence-type analysis asserts that Ely's 100% expression179 also lies outside 
the constitutional shield.180 
Thus Lawrence establishes that when a cross is burned on the lawn of a black 
family in order to terrorise them this becomes not racist speech, but a bias crime. 
Such a scrutiny could lead to a "new understanding of fighting words",ш for 
whilst bias crimes do not enjoy First Amendment protection, racist speech does. 
Thus by properly defining when a conduct qualifies as a bias crime clearer 
answers may be given in the quest to establish whether constitutional protection 
exists. 
E. Is there a new understanding? 
In "fighting words" and especially bias speech cases problems arise due to the 
lack of a coherent doctrine. By re-interpreting Chaplinsky over and over again 
176 Compare with HART: 26-27. 
177 Id. at 699. 
178 Id. at 700. 
179 ELY, J. H.: Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. R. 1481 at 1495 (1975). 
180 The Lawrence-analysis as applied to V/yant can be laid out as follows: if Wyant intended 
his abusive language to create fear in White and McGowan, or if Wyant knew that his 
language would do so, he created a parallel crime of verbal assault. Accordingly, if he did so 
with a racial motivation, he committed a bias crime, rather than racist speech. If, on the other 
hand, Wyant lacked the requisite for the first element of the mens rea, the intent for verbal 
assault, then he only expressed a racist message (id. at 705). The first conduct is not protected 
under the Constitution, whilst the latter speech should be. 
181 Id. at 706. 
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the Supreme Court has stripped the "fighting words" exception of its functional 
validity.182 
Nevertheless, the "fighting words" doctrine still remains one which could be 
put to use in dealing with bias speech and the question of the constitutionality 
of its criminalisation. Several problems arise, however, when "fighting words" 
is understood to mean those which are likely to incite violence by the addressee. 
This inevitably provides a licence for hecklers,183 and thus this interpretation 
of "fighting words" protects those who need it least. As Shiffrin observes, 
citing Shea, there is something deeply anomalous about a test which permits the 
legislator to punish a speaker insulting "a burly construction worker" who would 
undoubtedly retaliate, whilst forbidding the punishment "of the reviler of a 
wheelchair-bound quadriplegic",184 The arguments in Collins185 for refusing 
the ban on the Nazi march are basically similar. Shiffrin, however, also remarks 
that introducing the reasonable or average person into the system would not 
compensate for the test's disabilities.186 A further limitation of the Chaplinsky 
doctrine is (as developed in the subsequent case law187) that it only applies 
either to direct personal insults or to the imminent possibility of violence. 
"Racially targeted actions that are intended to create fear in the addressee 
and that in fact do so may be constitutionally treated as bias crime whether the 
behaviour is primarily by the use of words or by physical act. Racially targeted 
behaviour that vents the actor's racism is racial speech that is protected by the 
First Amendment, even if it disturbs or insults the observer greatly."1** If such 
a narrow definition of the "fighting" words doctrine is accepted, bigotry appears 
to be a protected class of expression, making the creation of a new class of 
182 Id. at 707. 
183 This argument was rejected in Terminiello (supra p7 and n44). Compare with Garner v. 
United States, 368 U.S.157 (1961), holding that the state could not prohibit sit-ins solely 
because other citizens would become angry and possibly violent. Compare also with Edwards 
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.299 (1963), holding that the state could not order dispersal of civil 
rights demonstrations because of the presence of troublemakers. 
184 SHIFFRIN at 80, n l94 quoting SHEA, T. E: Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me 
That-Fighting Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky L.J. 1, 2 (1975). 
185 Id. at 80. 
186 Id. 
187 See supra p2f. 
188 LAWRENCE: 711. 
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unprotected hate speech a widely urged and necessary option.189 For, as the 
Supreme Court has put it, "the Constitution protects expression and association 
without regard to the race, creed, or political or religious affiliation of the 
members of the group which invokes its shield, or to the truth, popularity, or 
social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered".190 
The other angle from which this problem may be approached is by looking 
at the constitutionality of the bias expression statutes through the O'Brien 
doctrine. Since ethnic intimidation statutes cover conduct additional to speech 
their constitutionality might be upheld under this doctrine.191 However, in 
Texas v. Johnson192 the Court asserted that if the governmental interest is 
related to the suppression of expression the O'Brien standards are not applicable. 
One might say that racist speech seems to have minimal marketplace value, 
which has to be balanced against the harm it causes.193 Yet it can also be 
argued that a restriction on "fighting words" cannot have within its remit the 
prohibition of distasteful insults based on race, gender, or religion, or any other 
type of bigotry. Instead, a law proscribing this type of speech would have to 
outlaw the entire category of "fighting words".194 The content contributes to 
the discovery of truth through the marketplace of ideas, and may not be 
repressed by majority preferences.195 
Looking at the R.A.V. case, one should note that it does not provide a basis 
for invalidating penalty-enhancement statutes, for it applies a doctrine which is 
only applicable to laws facially discriminating between acts on the grounds of 
their expressive content.196 It follows that whilst the government can regulate 
certain content-based categories of speech, such as obscenity, the statutes which 
do so are invalid if they in fact distinguish on the basis of content.197 
Therefore laws may regulate "fighting words" by making only one content 
distinction-that between "fighting words" and "non-fighting words". 
189 Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862 (E.D. Mich. 1989), suggests, however, 
that bias expressions may provoke retaliation. This appears to be the exception, rather than 
the rule. 
190 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963). 
191 GELLMAN: 376. 
192 Texas v. Johnson, at 403. 
193 See DELGADO, R.: Words that Wound at 144-46, and 179. 
194 HURDLE: 1171. 
195 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes J. dissenting). 
196 GRANNIS: 179. 
197 R. A. V., at 2545-2546. 
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Such a facially content-neutral statute could be a typical penalty-enhancement 
statute, which punishes for example crimes committed "against a person or a 
person's property because of such person's race (etc.)". Even though such a law 
would at face address the defendant's motive for committing the crime,198 this 
would not destroy its constitutionality. Such a statute should then be subjected 
to the O'Brien test, to scrutinise whether it unduly reaches expressive 
conducts.199 
Laws of the type outlined would be constitutional, because they advance 
interests unrelated to the suppression of speech. Nevertheless, the application of 
penalty-enhancement statutes should still be carried out so as to minimise the 
restriction on freedom of expression. 
However, concluding that a law meets the requirements of the O'Brien test 
does not say anything as regards its relation to the second prong of the 
Chaplinsky doctrine-namely, the question of proportionality. Or, when is the 
restriction not greater than that essentially necessary for the furtherance of the 
government interest?200 
According to the second type of speech described by Chaplinsky, words 
which tend to incite an immediate breach of peace do not receive constitutional 
protection.201 Thus a long-standing, unjustified, and paradoxical theory and 
practice was reflected in the "fighting words" cases, which looked at the target 
of the expression for a violent response.201 Of course such a test gives more 
protection to a drunken white pub fighter than to a pregnant HIV-positive 
lesbian black Jew in a wheelchair! Not to mention that such an analysis makes 
possible the prohibition of speech in order to prevent the violence of hecklers. 
Surely it would be more justified and useful to look at the other side - that is, 
whether the expression is likely to incite to violence AGAINST the target(s) of 
the bias expression. 
If the standard of bias-word criminalisation could therefore be defined, 
heeding these basic premises, by postulating a mere definition of violence, we 
could then slot the second condition of the Chaplinsky doctrine into the O'Brien 
test. This would be the line drawn to determine when expression becomes un-
constitutional and loses First Amendment protection. 
1 9 8 G R A N N I S : 2 1 5 . 
199 Id. at 2 1 6 . 
200 Compare with the fourth prong of the O'Brien doctrine. See supra p4. 
201 See for discussion 38-40. 
202 See, for example, Collin v. Smith, supra n49. 
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In order to construct this model it is crucial that we define "violence". It is 
suggested here that it should be accepted as meaning the intentional commission 
of criminal offences. Incitement to violence would therefore mean the instigation 
to the commission of a crime. Thus the Chaplinsky test would cover, for 
example, cross-burning (which, making use of Lawrence's analysis, is comprised 
of several offences creating a bias crime) only if somebody else apart from the 
perpetrator would be motivated by this act to commit a crime. However, a 
difficulty with this model quickly becomes apparent: unwitnessed deeds qualify 
differently from those which are committed in the midst of a lynch-mob. 
The other problem with such a model is whether incitement to violence 
should be covered by the intention of the perpetrator, thus making it a bias 
crime. Should a speech, for instance, denouncing Jews be required to be 
perpetrated with the intention of instigating violence against the targets? 
Additionally, if an objective test was to be introduced, what or who could serve 
as the standard for the level of instigation necessary? The application of the 
modified "general test of a reasonable man" (that a reasonable man would be 
incited to commit a crime), expresses within itself all the ridiculous 
characteristics of the situation. 
A solution to this paradox is thus required, and it is put forward that the test 
should be amended by using the actual offender to set the standard. Thus the 
speech incites to violence if the. speaker himself would be motivated to violence 
by the speech; if his intention was to motivate to violence; or his speech 
triggered violence against the target(s) of the expression. 
In cases of bias crimes, which as Lawrence observes are built on a basic 
crime and a bias motive,203 there is no need to prove any existence of 
incitement, since the very commission of such an offence satisfies the test: The 
bias motive triggered the mens rea of a "common" crime, the actus reus of 
which was also committed. However, if the act is plain bias speech, it is for the 
jury to decide whether the certain words used would incite the defendant who 
uttered them to a violent reaction. 
The other parts of this model speak for themselves. Unfortunately American 
hate speech law—despite its sophisticated case law theory—does not present an 
answer to the problems which were identified above, and unless the Supreme 
Court presents a black letter rule judgement in this matter there will be no light 
at the end of the tunnel in bias speech cases. 
203 LAWRENCE: nn344, 352. 
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I. Introduction 
Criminal law and criminal procedure are regarded as parts of the Member States' 
national sovereignty. Hence, the relationship between European Community law 
and national criminal law has been characterised throughout several decades by 
mutual disinterest. The general opinion was that since Member States did not 
transfer expressly sovereign rights in the field of criminal justice on the 
institutions of the Community, the latter cannot have its own system of criminal 
law. During these years international agreements, which were concluded under 
the auspices of the Council of Europe and concerned mutual assistance in 
criminal matters, constituted the decisive form of co-operation. These agreements, 
however, were not limited to the Member States of the Community. 
The era of disinterest ended with the establishment of the internal market 
and the opening of the Eastern European countries. The latter resulted in 
changed developments of crime. New main focuses of economic crime marked 
a development that with the facilitation of mobility and the lack of border 
controls in the internal market, more and more affected the European citizens. 
In some fields, organised transborder crime can already be clearly perceived, in 
particular in drug trafficking, terrorism, subsidy fraud, car theft, and large scale 
prostitution. Criminal law and policy and criminal prosecution had to, therefore, 
increase their efforts to take this development into account. 
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Legal scholarship uses the term European Community Criminal Law 
differently.1 This could lead to misunderstandings as to whether and to what 
extent there exists a criminal law valid for all Member States of the European 
Union. The aim of this paper is to examine the possibility of a supranational 
criminal law. Firstly, the legal character of sanctions imposed by the 
Commission shall be considered. This involves a brief analises of the relation-
ship between criminal law and administrative criminal law. It is followed by an 
outline of existing forms of co-operation in criminal justice. The system of 
intergovernmental co-operation provided in Title VI of the recently modified 
Treaty Establishing the European Union will be closely examined with a special 
emphasis on the possibilities of transfer of sovereignty on the Community 
institutions as regards criminal matters. Finally, the emergence of supranational 
criminal law shall be considered in relation to the alternative means for 
protecting Community interests. The intention is to show when and under what 
conditions harmonisation or unification is desirable. 
II. The concept of criminal law and that of supranationality 
As regards criminal law, all Member States have identified within their domestic 
legal systems an area that is labelled criminal law. The qualification of law as 
criminal law implies that designated public actors are allowed, or sometimes 
required, to meet certain conduct with specific procedures and sanctions 
prescribed by law. The sanctioning authority designated by law usually belongs 
to an independent judiciary. The kind of conduct subject to such a public 
response is also determined by law, even if the legislature might have delegated 
such determinations to other actors exercising public authority. The designation 
of conduct subject to criminal procedures, the specification of the procedures 
themselves, the determination of sanctions in given cases and their manner of 
enforcement—all are closely interrelated from one country to another or from one 
jurisdiction to another.2 Moreover, according to the legal systems of the 
Member States petty offences are usually regarded as belonging to the scope of 
1 TSOLKA, O.: Der Allgemeine Teil des europäischen supranationalen Strafrechts i.w.S., 
Europäische Hochschulschriften, vol. 1655, 29. 
2 SCHUTTE, J.: The European Market of 1993: Test for a Regional Model of 
Supranational Criminal Justice or of Interregional Cooperation in Criminal Law, Criminal 
Law Forum, vol. 3, 1991-92, 57. 
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criminal law, too.3 Petty offences represent an independent means of state 
action between administrative and criminal law. According to the definition 
adopted by the XIV. Congress of the AIDP in 1989 petty offences refer to a 
system "that is non penal in the legal sense, but whose philosophical foundation 
is nonetheless retributive".4 
The meaning of supranationality refers to the form of action Community 
institutions take. It is generally accepted that European Community law is 
neither national nor international law, it represents a new independent area of 
law with a dynamic nature: supranational law.5 The novel nature of the 
European Economic Community Treaty6 and the legal order it had created was 
to be understood on the basis that the states had limited their sovereign rights 
and had established new political institutions which they had endowed with 
sovereign rights. Consequently, the institutions of the Community may adopt 
measures that are legally binding upon the Member States and individuals7 and 
the Community has its own court of law. The European Court of Justice held 
that the constitutive treaties8 of the Community had created a new legal order, 
which became a part of the legal systems of Member States and the law of 
3 Petty offences are codified in statutes in Germany, Sweden, Finland, Italy and Portugal. 
See WAGFMANN, M.: Rechtfertigung und Entschuldigungsgründe im Bußgeldrecht der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 1992, 15; DANNFCKER, G.: Strafrecht der Europäische 
Gemeinschaft, in: Eser/Huber: Strafrechtsentwicklung in Europa, 1995, 2005. 
4 DELMAS-MARTY, M.: The legal and practical problems posed by the difference 
between criminal law and administrative criminal law, Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, 
1988, 29. Therefore, we can witness a tendency towards subjecting administrative sanction 
to the principles and guarantees of criminal law both in the practice of the ECJ and in that 
of the ECtHR. 
5 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, [1963] CMLR 105. The ECJ choose to 
avoid the problem of Member States' differing constitutional approaches to international 
treaties by describing the legal order created by the Member States under the EC Treaty as 
an entirely new system which was different in nature from international law. For further 
details see CRAIG, P. and BÚRCA, G. de: EC Law, Text Cases <6 Materials, 1996, 242. 
6 One of the symbolic acts of Maastricht was to rename the EEC Treaty to EC Treaty 
[hereafter referred to as Treaty]. 
7 This latter aspect of supranationality is of special importance for the criminal law. 
Although EC law may impose legally binding obligations on individuals, it is the national 
law of the Member States which enforces it. 
8 The constitutive treaties of the Community are the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community [EEC Treaty], the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community [ECSC Treaty] and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community [Euroatom Treaty], 
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which must be applied by the courts of the Member States.9 Hence, domestic 
law and Community law exist next to each other and both of them are in force 
in the Member States.10 
It follows from the above that European Community Criminal Law can only 
then be supranational, if Community institutions may adopt legally binding 
criminal provisions and sanctions.11 A pardonable initial reaction after having 
read only the text of the Treaty would be a firm negative. However, this first 
impression could be misleading after a closer examination of the practice of the 
European Court of Justice and of the Commission. It is generally accepted that 
the Community does not have the competence to set supranational criminal law 
since no such transfer of sovereign rights had taken place.12 This is the result 
of the will of the contracting Member State and it is reflected in the inter-
pretation of the Treaty.13 From the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice it has become evident that it was "the intention of the drafters of the 
Community treaties that European Community law is a community of law 
9 Case 14/68 Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt, 1969 ECR 1, [1969] CMLR 100. 
10 The relationship of the two is regulated by the principle of supremacy which requires the 
courts of the Member States to accord primacy to Community law over conflicting national 
law. For further details see WEILER, J.: The Community System: The Dual Character of 
Supranationalism, Yearbook of European Law, 1981, 267. 
11 TIEDEMANN, K : Der Allgemeine Teil des europäischen supranationalen Strafrechts, 
in: Festschrift für Jescheck zum 70. Geburtstag (ed. Vogler, T.), 1985, 1411. One should not 
forget, however, that law materialises in its enforcement, thus, if the Member States have 
differing criminal procedures, even identical provisions of substantive criminal law will tum 
out to be different in each Member State. In order, to avoid this trap, criminal procedure must 
be harmonised paralelly to substantive criminal law. Otherwise no supranational criminal law 
could exist. 
12 SIEBER, U.: Europäische Einigung und Europäisches Strafrecht, Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, vol. 103, 1991, 970; TIEDEMANN, K : Reform des 
Sanktionswesens auf dem Gebiete des Agrarmarktes der Europäischen Wirtschaftgemeinschft, 
in: Festschrift für Pfeiffer, 1988, 113; WINKLER, R.: Die Rechtsnatur der Geldbuße in 
Wettbewerbsrecht der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1971, Tübingen, 84; 
DANNECKER: op. cit., 1990; BRIDGE, J. W.: The European Communities and the Criminal 
Law, Criminal Law Review, 1976, 88; OEHLER, D.: Fragen zum Strafrecht der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, in: Festschrift für Jescheck zum 70. (ed. Vogler, T.), Geburtstag, 1985, 1403; 
ZULEEG, M.: Der Beitrag des Strafrechts zur Europäisclwn Integration, in SIEBER: op. cit., 
1993, 41. 
13 DEN BOER, M.: Europe and the Art of International Police Co-operation: Free Fall or 
measured Scenario?, in: Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (ed. O'Keeffe, D. and 
Twomey, P. M.): 1994, 285. 
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without a criminal law",14 and that "the enforcement of law through the 
criminal law, has been left exclusively to the member states".15 This constraint 
inheres in the constitutional foundations of the Community. The latter may 
exercise only those powers that can be derived from the Treaties creating it. 
Thus, the Community is not empowered to issue rules binding upon the Member 
States without an express legal basis in the constitutive treaties. While Art. 235 
of the Treaty does allow the Council to take unanimously appropriate measures 
for the realisation of Community objectives within the framework of the 
common market, even in cases where the Treaty does not otherwise provide the 
necessary authority to do so, this article is construed as addressing substantive 
issues and not formal aspects of the powers of the Community institutions.16 
Accordingly, Art. 235 cannot be invoked to side-step obligations to consult the 
European Parliament or to curtail the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice. Likewise Art. 235 cannot be invoked to extend the powers of the 
Community, a result that can be effected only by amending the Treaty as 
provided for in Art. 236.17 Such powers would include those in the area of 
criminal law. A further argument in supporting this view is that the adoption of 
criminal provisions by the Council would not be reconcilable with the so-called 
democratic deficit of the Community.18 
The fact that there is no supranational criminal law is not to say that the 
concept of European Community Criminal Law is empty. It does mean that the 
institutions of the European Community do not have jurisdiction over criminal 
matters and that European Community rules do not constitute a supranational 
criminal law in themselves. Only through enactment by the Member States as 
domestic penal legislation can the rules and principles advocated by the 
European Community enter the domain of criminal law. On the other hand, the 
Community may adopt sanctions to achieve the general protection of its interests 
14 Case 203/80 Casati (Guerrino), (Criminal Proceedings Against) [1981] ECR 2595, [1982] 
1 CMLR 365, 2618. 
15 Case 186/87 Cowan (Jan William) v Trésor Public [1989] ECR 195, [1990] 2 CMLR 613. 
16 See Case 38/69, Commission v Italy [1970] ECR 47, [1970] CMLR 77. 
17 Compare it with the procedure provided under Art. K.9 of Title VI of the TEU. 
18 TSOLKA: op. cit., 30. Democratic deficit refers to the simple fact that the body which 
has the greatest democratic claim, the European Parliament, was given the smallest part to 
play in the legislative process. The European Parliament has the claim to political legitimacy 
because it is directly elected. As opposed to the European Parliament, the Council 's 
democratic créditais are indirect: they are political appointees but not elected at a European 
level. 
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and to enforce a certain conduct.19 Moreover, Community law Regulations or 
Directives may oblige Member States to adopt adequate sanctions. Hence, we 
can conclude that a supranational sanctioning power does exist. Therefore, it has 
to be examined whether this set of rules can be regarded as criminal law. 
III. Supranational sanctioning power 
It is not always easy to discover whether a sanction is a truly criminal 
sanction or rather an administrative one. The answer to this problem is linked 
to the disputed position of petty offences and to the differentiation between 
administrative and criminal sanctions.20 The movement towards individuali-
sation within penal law leading to diversification of sanctions makes it more 
difficult to demarcate each of the systems of sanctions, for the criminal 
sanctions can no longer be identified with the deprivation of liberty. The 
philosophical foundations of the penal sanction vis-à-vis those of the ad-
ministrative sanction became equally difficult to identify.21 Is the difference 
qualitative or quantitative? The legal jargon of the European Community also 
draws a clear distinction between criminal and administrative sanctions so as 
to create the impression that these constitute two completely distinct areas of 
law, the first of which is wholly separate of European Community law whereas 
the second, at least to some extent, is not. 
1. The legal character of fines imposed by the Commission 
Community law requires the adoption of sanctions the legal character of which 
is controversial. It is disputed whether some of them should be classified as 
punishment or as clear administrative acts. The answer to this problem is 
necessary in order to decide whether the Community bears a de facto supra-
national sanctioning power. 
The XlVth Congress of the AIDP in 1989 pointed out that it was the job 
of the legislator to decide how certain conduct should be punished, i.e. by 
19 TSOLKA: op. cit., 30, 31. 
20 For further details see the national reports in the Revue International de Droit Pénal, 1988; 
CARACCIOLI: La protection de resources propres de la Communité et l'évolution de droit 
pénal fiscal en Europe, Séminaire sur la protection juridique des intérêts financiers de la 
Communité, Bruxelles, 1993. 
21 DELMAS-MARTY: The legal and practical problems..., op. cit., 21. 
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means of criminal or administrative measures. This attractive concept, however, 
does not eliminate the dilemma that big amount administrative sanctions at the 
end of the day turn out to be punishing. Furthermore, as Tiedemann pointed 
out, the labelling of some sanctions as "no punishment" could have the result 
that it would not be any longer the legislator alone who decides upon the legal 
classification of sanctions. It would also depend on criteria of substantive 
law.22 Hence, in order to classify the sanctions employed by the Community 
it is necessary to establish a European criterion.23 
The most obvious would be to carry out legal comparison between the 
national laws of the Member States. This, however, does not help since the 
latter vary a lot as to the relationship between criminal punishment and 
administrative sanctions.24 Therefore, we have to take as a starting point for 
classification the nature and gravity of the sanction. It is widely accepted that 
the main aim of a criminal sanction is both to suppress illicit conduct and to 
prevent similar violations by the same or other actor. As the XlVth Congress 
of the AIDP concluded "[t]he difference between criminal law and 
administrative penal law implies limitations on the kind and severity of 
sanctions available, as well as on the restrictions of individuals rights 
permissible in the course of administrative penal procedure".25 Consequently, 
if the sanctions have a suppressive and preventive aim and if they are more 
severe than administrative measures are usually then they cannot be regarded 
as clearly administrative sanctions.26 
The above criterion leads to further questions in the case of companies. 
Namely, if the legal subject of a measure is a company, how should the gravity 
of a sanction be assessed. In cases of fines it is easy to decide. The gravity of 
the sanction is reflected in the amount, i.e. if the sum is higher than that of the 
indemnisation and if its aim is deterrent it clearly represents a serious 
22 TIEDEMANN, K : Sanktionen gegen Wirtschaftskriminelle, in: Haesler (ed.), Politische 
Kriminalität und Wirtschaftskriminalität, 1984, p. 273. This concept is supported by the 
Strassbourg jurisprudence. The ECtHR disregards the label of a certain action in classifying 
it and considers only the type and gravity of the sanction and its preventive or suppressive 
function. See the judgement in Lutz of 25 August 1987 in: EuGRZ 1987, 399. 
23 TSOLKA: op. cit., 35. 
24 Op. cit., 43. 
25 XlVth International Congress on Penal Law, Vienna 1-7 October, 1989, Congress 
Proceedings, 251. 
26 DANNECKER, G.: Das interpolare Strafrecht, Tübingen, 1993, 252; TIEDEMANN, K.: 
Der Einfluß des Verfassungsrecht auf die Entwicklung der Rechtsordnung, 40 Jahre 
Grundgesetz, 1990, 160. 
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intervention into the property of the company. However, there are also further 
possible sanctions such as, for example, the closing down of the company. To 
measure the gravity of such a sanction it is necessary to take into consideration 
both the essential character and activity of the company. As long as the sanction 
represents a serious interference with the economic existence and development 
of the company it is very likely that it is within the scope of criminal law. 
Community law must be analysed in the light of the above considerations. 
The only provisions of the Treaty which might appear to relate to the criminal 
law are those which impose financial penalties on persons who have violated 
certain obligations of Community law.27 The best known examples of such 
penalties are contained in Art. 87 (in connection with the rules on competition); 
in Art. 9 of Commission Decision No. 2794/80/ESCS (in connection with 
establishing a system of steel production quotas)28 and in Art. 58 (4) of the 
ECSC Treaty (in connection with steel production). 
As regards Art. 87, the Community has power to impose pecuniary 
sanctions for violations of the rules on competition and of obligations to 
provide information needed to enforce these rules.29 Art. 87 of the EC Treaty 
authorises the making of Regulations to give effect to those rules and expressly 
includes provisions for "fines and periodic penalty payments". This power has 
been exercised by Reg. 17 on the basis of which the Commission can fine 
companies or association of companies that deliberately or negligently violate 
the provisions of Arts 85 and 86 regarding cartels and the abuse of economic 
powers, deliberately or negligently false or distort information, fail to produce 
27 The Council Regulation on Harmonisation of Controls and Sanctions in the Framework 
of the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policy laid down specific penalties which apply 
in the event of infringements by the beneficiary of the conditions of the aids regime. The 
sanctions typically provided are reduction in, or total loss of, the aid of which the beneficiary 
would have been entitled to, the exclusion of the beneficiary from the aid scheme for 
subsequent marketing years, or the withdrawal of the licence necessary for an operator or 
processor. The Commission has maintained that these are administrative penalties which the 
Community has the competence to lay down by virtue of Art. 43 of the EC Treaty. Germany 
initiated proceedings before the ECJ concerning the legal nature of such sanctions. Germany 
insisted that the sanctions in question are of a criminal character, but the ECJ supported the 
view of the Commission and rejected the German application. 
28 Commission Decision No. 2794/80/ESCS of 31 October 1980 Establishing a System 
of Steel Production Quotas for Undertakings in the Iron and Steel Industry, OJ L 291 of 
31 October 1980, 1. 
29 This sanctioning power is elaborated in Council Regulation 17/62 of 6 February 1962 
Implementing Arts 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 1959-1962 OJ Special Edition 87. 
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requested information in a timely manner, or refuse inspection of their business 
records. Even though the penalties may be quite substantial, the applicable 
regulation states explicitly that the decisions by which fines are imposed are 
not of a criminal character.30 Although according to general opinion, no final 
conclusion can be drawn from Art. 15 (4) of the said Regulation as to the 
character of the fines, they are administrative in the sense that they are imposed 
not by a criminal court but by an administrative organ, the Commission.31 
However, after having taken a closer look in the matter, it becomes clear that 
fines imposed pursuant to Art. 15 (4) are of a character similar to criminal law. 
One can start with the English text of the Regulation that refers to fines. 
This term is used for describing criminal and not administrative measures.32 
In order to overcome these ambiguities it is necessary to analyse the practice 
of the Commission and the European Court of Justice. 
The European Court of Justice held in Chemiefarma that the imposition of 
fines is not limited to the repetition of an offence; such an interpretation of Art. 
15 would considerably lessen the deterrent effect of the fine. Furthermore, the 
European Court of Justice made clear that the imposition of fines serves both 
the punishment of offences committed in the past and ensures the obedience to 
European Community law for the future.33 Accordingly, the European Court 
of Justice expressly recognised that fines under Art. 15 fulfil the two of the 
constitutive elements of a criminal sanction, i.e. suppression and prevention. 
The Commission follows a similar practice to that of the European Court of 
Justice. The current sanctioning policy of the Commission shows that it 
attaches great importance to the deterrent object of the fine. For the first time 
in the Pioneer proceedings the Commission has considerably increased the fine 
and thereby marked the start of a stricter policy as regards gross violations of 
competition law.34 The European Court of Justice justified the shocking 
amount of the fine by saying that one of the tasks of the Commission is the 
obligation to investigate and suppress illicit conduct. This includes the exercise 
of a general policy the objective of which is to ensure the application of 
fundamental principles of European Community law and to co-ordinate the 
conduct of companies in the light thereof. Hence, the amount of the fine must 
30 Currently the maximum possible fine is 1.000.000 ECU or 10% of the undertaking's 
previous year's turnover. 
31 BRIDGE: op. cit., 89. 
32 A dictionary of Law (ed. Martin, E.), Oxford, 3rd edition, 164. 
33 Case 41/69 of 15 February 1970, A CP Chemiefarma v Commission [1970], ECR 661. 
34 OJ L 60 of 5 March 1980, 21. 
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be adjusted to the requirements of that policy.35 Both the European Court of 
Justice and the Commission take into consideration the same criteria when 
imposing the fine. These are the followings: the gravity and duration of the 
violation, the relationship between the type of the violation and the economic 
strength of the company and the delays in the Commission's own reaction.36 
The Commission delivers its decision in a way that it compares the decision to 
the earlier ones with the aim of preventing the company from committing 
similar violations.37 
It has to be mentioned here that Advocat General Roemer made an attempt 
to classify fines according to the legal systems of the Member States. He came 
to the result that fines bear the same legal character as "financial penalties" 
[Geldbuße] which under German law belong to the scope of petty crimes, i.e. 
to criminal law.38 While, Advocat General Mayras described the fines in 
Boeringer II as "administrative sanction of a non-penal character"39 which, 
however,—due to their substantive criminal nature—cannot be separated from all 
the principles of criminal law. The opinion of Advocat General Mayras clearly 
mirrors the very fine line which is to balance between on the one hand, the 
requirement that the rule of law is upheld, i.e. substantially criminal sanctions 
are subject to the guarantees of criminal law, and on the other, that the 
Community does not interfere with the discretion of Member States as regards 
criminal law. The same act of balancing can be observed as regards Art. 9 of 
Commission Decision No. 2794/80/ESCS and Art. 58 (4) of the ECSC Treaty. 
In the court proceedings of Thyssen and in that of Estel the main issue was 
whether the application of Art. 9 requires proof of culpability.40 The 
Commission rejected the need to prove culpability by emphasising the non-
penal character of the fine. For justifying its decision the Commission under-
lined the need for an automatic system of fines41 and further made clear that 
Art. 9 does not allow to take into consideration subjective circumstances. 
35 Case 100-103/80 of 7 June 1983, Musique Difusion Francais, Pioneer, Melchers, [ 1983] 
ECR 1825; [1983] 2 CMLR 221. 
36 See Case 86/82 Hasselblad (G.B.) Ltd. v Commission [1984] ECR 883, [1984] 1 CMLR 
559; Case 19/77 Miller Infi v Commission [1978] ECR 131, [ 1978] 2 CMLR 334. 
37 TSOLKA: op. cit. 46. 
38 Case 14/68 Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt, 1969 ECR 1, [1969] 1 CMLR 100. 
39 Case 7/72 Boegringer Mannheim GmbH v Commission [1972] ECR 1281. 
40 Case 188/82 Thyssen AG v Commission [1983] ECR 3721 and Case 270/82 Estel NV v 
Commission [1984] ECR 1195. 
41 The automatic system of fines was established by Commission Decision 1831/81 of 24 
June 1981, OJ L 180 of 1 July 1981, 1. 
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Consequently, the Commission did not reject the application of culpability to 
sanctions similar to the ones in criminal law, but it simply refused the criminal 
character of the fine.42 Hereby, a decisive point of view emerges: The proof 
of culpability is a clear feature of criminal sanctions. If this view of the 
Commission is applied to Art. 87 then it establishes the criminal character of 
competition fines. 
The above opinion was expressed by Advocat General Verloren von 
Themaat in his concluding remarks in Thyssen. That puts into question the 
Commission's standpoint on the legal character of the fines. Advocat General 
Verloren von Themaat emphasised that all fines, including those in Art. 9 of 
Decision No. 2794/80/ESCS, have the same legal character, similar to that of 
criminal law. Since the need for a system of automatic fines does not exclude 
the suppressive and preventive objects thereof, we should agree to this approach 
of the Advocat General. 
Advocat General Slynn cited the concluding remarks of Advocat General 
Verloren in Estel in connection with the automatism of the imposition of fines. 
Advocat General Slynn stated that the latter does not mean that the amount will 
be imposed without having taken into account the circumstances of the 
individual case.43 The automatism simply means that they are generally 
imposed at a specific rate. Generally does not mean universally, it means 
usually.44 Although the European Court of Justice did not address this issue 
explicitly in Estel, after having considered the individual circumstances of the 
case it decided to reduce the amount of the fine. Hence we can conclude, that 
the European Court of Justice impliedly agreed to the approach of the Advocate 
General. The judgement in Thyssen and Estel demonstrates that fines pursuant 
to Art. 9 bear the same legal character as the ones under Art. 87. 
Finally, as far as Art. 58 (4) is concerned, in Bertolt45 the affected 
company argued that the Commission had disregarded the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege by the application of Art. 58 (4) ECSC Treaty, because it 
applied new criteria for the imposition of fines and by doing so disregarded the 
previous practice. The Commission replied that the principle brought up by 
42 TSOLKA: op. cit., 46-47. 
43 According to AG Slynn if automatism means that the flat rate is to be applied irrespective 
of the surrounding circumstances, it seems to contradict the plain words of Art. 12 of the 
ESCS Treaty. Case 270/82 Estel NV v Commission [1984] ECR, Opinion of the Advocat 
General, 1255. 
44 Case 270/82 Estel NV v Commission, ibid. 
45 Case 8/83 Officine Fratelli Bertoli SpA. v Commission [1984] ECR 1649. 
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Bertoli did not apply for the imposition of fines under Art. 58 (4) since the 
latter is an administrative act and as such it is not subject to the principles of 
criminal law. The European Court of Justice left open the issue of culpability 
and rejected the argument of Bertoli with the reasoning that the fine in question 
does not exceed the limit contained in Art. 64 of the ECSC Treaty. Though this 
way the European Court of Justice implicitly accepted the principle. 
In conclusion it can be established that all mentioned fines have the same 
character. This is in line with the requirement of uniform interpretation and 
application of European Community law.46 Furthermore, it follows from the 
above discussion that fines have a similar character to the ones in criminal 
law. Thus, the Commission is bound by several criminal law principles when 
imposing such sanctions.47 In summary, European Community law requires de-
liberate or negligent action for violations. Here the European Court of Justice 
requires proof of intent or culpability in the same manner as is required for 
criminal liability.48 In addition the European Court of Justice has addressed the 
question whether the right of the Commission to impose fines is restricted or 
even abrogated in cases where the same violation of anticompetition rules has 
already been fined by the national authorities of the Member State concerned.49 
This question has been answered in the negative in the same sense that national 
and Community law on competition may be applied cumulatively. Nevertheless, 
when applying sanctions under authority of Community law, the Commission 
has to take into account the sanction imposed and enforced under national law. 
Thus, there is no provision against double jeopardy but there is an obligation 
to offset Community sanctions by the amount of any domestic sanction. The 
Commission is also bound by the criminal law principle of proportionality—as 
I mentioned it earlier—embracing such considerations as the gravity of the 
violation and culpability of the actor.50 
46 WINKLER: op. cit., 18. 
47 This is in line with the Resolution adopted by the XlVth Congress of the AIDP on Penal 
Law, according to which "(a]dministrative penal law resembles criminal law in that it provides 
for the imposition of retributive sanctions. This similarity requires application of the basic 
principles of criminal law and of due process to the field of administrative penal law." XlVth 
International Congress on Penal Law, Vienna 1-7 October, 1989, Congress Proceedings, 250. 
48 Compare case 26/75 General Motors Continental v Commission, 1975 ECR 1367 ( 1976] 
1 CMLR 95; with Joined Cases 100-103/80 Musique Duffison Francais (Pioneer) v 
Commission, 1983 ECR 1825, [1983] 3 CMLR 221. 
49 Case 14/68 Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt, op. cit. 
50 The ECJ has repeatedly recognised that Community law embraces the principle of 
proportionality. For example Case 118/89 Firma Otto Lingenfelser v Bundesamt für 
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2. Human rights dimension 
The Community has announced the wish to accede, as the European Community, 
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms [hereafter referred to as ECHR] which is binding upon all member 
states of the Council of Europe and therefore also upon all Member States of 
the Community.51 Accession to this convention may impinge on the power of 
the Commission to impose fines for the violation of Arts. 85-86 of the EC 
Treaty. 
Art. 6 of the ECHR states that in the determination of an individual's civil 
rights and obligations and in the determination of a criminal charge the 
individual shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, without undue delay, 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, with judgement 
rendered publicly (anyone charged with a criminal offence has certain 
additional rights). 
The question arises whether this provision would apply to the imposition 
of fines under the Treaty and, if so, whether proceedings pursuant to the Treaty 
are compatible with Art. 6 of the ECHR. In Schutte's view, the first part of the 
question has to be answered in the affirmative; the second part, in the 
negative.52 According to him, the express statement in Regulation No. 17 that 
decisions by which cartel fines are imposed are not of a criminal character is 
to no avail. The question whether proceedings are criminal proceedings that 
tigger the full panoply of rights guaranteed by Art. 6 is answered by the 
authorities charged with interpreting the ECHR—the European Commission of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Human RightsS3—not by reference 
to the characterisation of the proceedings under the law of the contracting 
parties concerned. To decide whether a criminal charge has been made, for 
Ernährung [1991] 3 CMLR 571; Case 181/84 Regina v Intervention Bd. |1985] ECR 2889, 
[1985] 3 CMLR 759. 
51 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 
1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5. In Opinion 2/94 the ECJ concluded that the absence of specific 
powers in the Treaty, combined with the far-reaching effects of accession to the ECHR would 
be of such constitutional significance as to go beyond the scope of Art. 235 and could be 
brought about only by amending the Treaty. This has not yet taken place. Furthermore, the 
UK has a special position under the ECHR. It signed the ECHR but did not implement it into 
national law, thus, it cannot be invoked before British courts. 
52 SCHUTTE: op. cit., 61. 
53 Arts. 19-56 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4 November 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5. 
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example, these organs take into account a number of criteria, including the 
purpose of available sanctions, the class of persons subject to the norm that has 
been allegedly violated (is it a closed class of limited size or an open class of 
indeterminate size?), and the seriousness of the maximum sanction that may be 
imposed.54 If the purpose of the sanction is punitive, if the class of persons 
to whom the norm applies indeterminate, and if the magnitude of the sanction 
is considerable, then the proceedings will be regarded as procedures for the 
determination of criminal charges within the meaning of Art. 6 and the terms 
of that article has to be met. Notwithstanding that the Court has upheld 
certain administrative proceedings in a limited class of cases involving petty 
offences,55 the proceedings leading to the imposition of cartel fines by the 
Commission do not fall within this exception, given the magnitude of the 
maximum sanction available. 
These proceedings fail to satisfy Art. 6 in a variety of ways. The 
Commission is not an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning 
of Art. 6. Fines are not imposed following a fair and public hearing of the case. 
No provision is made to guarantee the presumption of innocence, as required 
by Art. 6 (2); on the contrary, even if a company is already suspected of 
having violated the anticompetition rules it can be forced (on penalty of paying 
fines) to provide self-incriminating information to the Commission.56 Finally, 
no provision has been made to guarantee the rights due to anyone subject to 
criminal charge, pursuant to Art. 6 (3). 
The underlying idea of the above consideration is to apply the criteria laid 
down in the ECHR to companies. This would mean the application of criteria 
which were developed for natural persons to legal persons. If we accept the 
viewpoint of Schutte, it would seem, that upon accession by die Community 
to the ECHR, the power to impose fines could no longer be exercised without 
breaching Art. 6 of the former instrument. However, if one starts to apply the 
54 Compare Engel v. Netherlands (No. 1 & 2), 22 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A), 1976 with Öztürk 
v Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) 1984. 
55 The European Court of Human Rights took the position in Öztürk that the cited Art. 6 
requirements need not be observed at all trials of the first instance provided that an appeal 
may be lodged to a higher tribunal complying fully with Art. 6. Accordingly the Court 
upheld summary administrative proceedings in Germany for traffic and other property 
offences. The fact that such proceedings are designated as administrative is irrelevant since 
parties to the ECHR are not allowed to circumvent their obligation undertaken in Art. 6, 
simply by labelling certain procedure administrative. 
56 Case 155/79 AM & Europe Ltd. v Commission, 1982 ECR 1575, [1982] 2 CMLR 
264. 
European Community Criminal l^v/ 6 9 
same criteria for legal persons as for natural persons the whole system of the 
ECHR could brake down. There is no unanimous solution as regards the 
possibility of legal persons to become beneficiaries of human rights. Human 
rights were developed traditionally in order to protect the individual as opposed 
to the state. How should these principles be applied to legal entities? Contrary 
to Schutte, 1 would suggest that the answer is not that clear cut. Even if one 
assumes that legal persons can have human rights it remains still unclear to 
which extent should human rights apply to legal persons. 
3. Punitive powers of the Commission 
I shall now consider whether the Community is entitled, under present 
Community law, to exercise punitive powers outside the area covered by the 
Treaty, in particular by permitting the Commission to impose pecuniary 
sanctions on individual natural or legal persons.57 The only example of such 
a right under existing law is to be found in Art. 79 (3) of the Treaty allowing 
the Council to delegate to institutions of the Community responsibility to 
ensure the abolition of discrimination with respect to freight and transport 
conditions. These provisions have been implemented by regulation authorising 
the Commission to impose pecuniary sanctions on commercial carriers for 
failing timely to provide information, for intentionally providing false 
information, or for practising prohibited discrimination.58 
The Commission, however, holds the view that its general competence to 
execute decisions of the Council implies the right to apply sanctions, on 
condition that such a right has to be made explicit in European Community 
Regulations.59 Thus, the Commission has recently submitted a proposal to the 
Council for a Regulation that would provide for controls and sanctions 
regarding the common agricultural and fisheries policy. In the explanatory note 
to this proposal, the Commission arrogated to itself authority to lay down rules 
on controls (by officials of the Commission) and to impose sanctions (by the 
57 Leaving aside any powers derived from the Art. 95 of the ECSC Treaty and the decrees 
issued under this article. 
58 Council Regulation 11/60 of 27 June 1960 Concerning the Abolition of Discrimination 
in Transport Rates and Conditions, 1959-1962 О J Spec. Ed. 60. 
59 SCHUTTE: op. cit., 63. 
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Commission).60 This position is contested by several Member States and 
probably quite rightly.61 
Since the drafters of the Treaty decided to attribute sanctioning powers to 
institutions of the European Community only in the area of competition, the 
Commission cannot claim similar powers in other areas.62 Both international 
and national law require sanctioning power to be explicitly conferred in writing 
on the competent authority by legislation.63 Such powers cannot be inferred 
which is exactly what the Commission seems to claim. Moreover, there is 
ample jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice recognising that punishment 
of breaches of Community law is a matter within the exclusive competence of 
the Member States. This competence is not circumscribed by European 
Community directives and regulations prescribing that Member States shall 
provide for the necessary sanctions to ensure compliance but leaving the 
determination of sanctions, as well as their application, to the Member States. 
Finally, sufficient argument can be drawn from Art. 5 of the Treaty to 
challenge the competence of the Community institutions in this respect. Art. 5 
requires the Member States to take all appropriate general and specific 
measures to ensure compliance with obligations resulting from the Treaty or 
from any acts emanating from Community institutions. The fact that Member 
States are bound, in keeping with the obligations under Art. 5, to certain 
limiting conditions set by Community law (principles of assimilation,64 
proportionality65 and non-discrimination66), does not effect their exclusive 
competence in the area of sanctions. To provide the institutions of the 
Community, in particular the Commission, with additional sanctioning powers 
apart from those already exercised by virtue of Arts. 87 and 79 of the Treaty 
60 Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Checks and Penalties Applicable 
under the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies, OJ 1990, С 137, 10. 
61 KAPTEYN-VERLOREN van THEMAAT: Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, 2nd ed., 1990; OEHLER: op. cit., 1403; ZULEEG: op. cit., 45. 
62 SCHUTTE: op. cit., 64. 
63 The applicable principle is embodied, for example, in the ECHR at Arts. 6-7 . 
64 Case 326/88 Public Prosecutor v Hansen & Sons (Eur.Ct.Just. 10 July 1990); Case 68/88 
Commission v Greece 1989 ECR 2965, [1991] 1 CMLR 31. According to the assimilation 
principle, Member States are supposed to treat violations of Community interests in the same 
manner as they would treat violations of comparable national interests. 
65 Case 299/86 Italy v Drexl, 1988 ECR 1213, [1989] 2 CMLR 241; Case 203/80 In re 
Casati, 1981 ECR 2595, [1982] 1 CMLR 365; Case 157/79 Regina v Pieck, 1980 ECR 2171, 
[1980] 3 CMLR 220; Case 8/77 In re Sagulo 1977 ECR 1495, [1977] 2 CMLR 585. 
66 See Art. 2 of the Treaty. 
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would require amendment of the Treaty and approval by the parliaments of all 
Member States. 
Consequently, a European supranational sanctioning power de facto exists. 
Its nature is similar to that of criminal sanctions; it is neither purely 
administrative, nor criminal. It exists only within the scope of economic 
criminal law and serves the proper fulfilment of the objectives of the Treaty. 
Generally accepted principles of criminal law apply to the imposition of such 
sanctions and the Commission does not have any power to extend the scope of 
sanctions. 
IV. The enforcement of Community law via national criminal law 
Although the Community lacks competence in criminal matters in a narrow 
sense, i.e. responsibility for insuring compliance, as well as for applying 
sanctions in cases of violation, the Community does have power, on the one 
hand, to impose obligations on the Member States to carry out their mandate to 
enforce Community law and, on the other, to oversee and sanction the efforts 
of Member States in tins area.67 These obligations can result in criminal law, 
but this is not necessarily so. 
Many Community instruments explicitly impose obligations upon Member 
States to provide for penalties.68 In some cases it is specified that violations 
should be subject to penalties whether of a criminal or of an administrative 
nature. Construing Art. 5 of the Treaty, the European Court of Justice has 
ruled that Member States are free in their choice of the nature of sanctions but 
have to ensure that violations of European Community law are dealt with and 
punished in a manner analogous to that applied to comparable violations of 
national law and that the applicable sanctions are effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.69 The European Court of Justice underlined that criminal procedure 
67 Art. 7 of the Treaty. 
68 BRIDGE: op. cit., 88; DINE, J.: European Community Criminal Law, Criminl. Law 
Review, 1993, 247; THOMAS, S.: Die Anwendung des europäischen materiellen Rechts im 
Strafverfahren, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1991, 2234. 
69 "Art. 5 of the Treaty requires MS to take all measures necessary to guarantee the 
application and effectiveness of Community law. For that purpose, whilst the choice of 
penalties remains within their discretion, they must ensure in particular that infringements of 
Community law are penalised under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are 
analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of similar nature and 
importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
7 2 Katalin Ligeti 
involving the enforcement of a Community interest must be carried out with 
the same precision and thoroughness as a similar procedure for the protection 
of national interests. Consequently, Community interests were assimilated to 
national interests and the exercise of legally protected positions of a 
Community law nature was recognised. 
It seems that the assimilation with the national law is a minimum 
requirement: it takes second place to the requirement that the penalty be 
effective and proportionate.70 That means that eventually it is for the 
European Court of Justice to assess whether the enforcement of provisions of 
European Community law through the national criminal law is effective and 
proportionate. It might say, for example, that the enforcement level—or any 
aspects thereof—in any national system is too low to be deemed effective and 
proportionate, even if the enforcement level corresponds with the enforcement 
level of national law. Since there are large divergences in the level of 
enforcement of provisions of Community law by die Member States, the 
European Court of Justice might in this manner seek to harmonise and enhance 
the enforcement level of Member States.71 
It is not uncommon for a directive or a regulation to oblige Member States 
to provide for adequate sanctions to guarantee compliance with it. For instance, 
Art. 8 of Council Regulation 729/70, which deals with financing of the common 
agricultural policy, obliges Member States to prevent, and bring actions against, 
irregularities.72 The reference to initiating proceedings may authorise criminal 
proceedings.73 Art. 11 of Council Regulation 2241/87 regarding controls on 
fishing activities, requires national authorities to take criminal or administrative 
sanctions, which according to the relevant provisions of national law, may lead 
to depriving those who are responsible for a violation of any consequential 
profits or to any other result commensurate with the seriousness of the 
violation and sufficient to deter similar future violations.74 More recent instru-
Moreover, the national authorities must proceed, with respect to infringements of Community 
law, with the same diligence as that which they bring to bear in implementing corresponding 
national laws." Case 68/88 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1989] ECR 2965. 
70 LENSING, H.: The Federalization of Europe: Towards a Federal System of Criminal 
Justice, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 1993, vol. 3, 223. 
71 LENSING: ibid, 223. 
72 Art. 5, 155, 169. 
73 SCHUTTE: op. cit., 65. 
74 Council Regulation 2241/87 of 23 July 1987 Establishing Certain Control Measures for 
Fishing Activities, 1987 OJ L 207, 1. 
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ments—regarding insider trading,75 prevention of the use of certain substances 
for the illicit production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances76 and 
money laundering77 impose obligations on the Member States to set sanctions 
sufficient to promote compliance with measures taken pursuant to these 
instruments. In conformity with the assimilation principle proposals for a 
regulation on the Community cultivation rights and for a directive on the 
control of the acquisition and possession of firearms78 contain provisions 
obliging Member States to apply the same sanctions for infringement of these 
provisions of European Community law as for similar infringements of 
domestic law. 
As noted earlier. Member States are generally free to choose the most 
appropriate sanctioning mechanism available under domestic law.79 It is still 
an open question whether the Community can force Member States to sanction 
certain infringements through criminal proceedings only.80 In imposing such 
obligations on Member States, the Community has always been careful to avoid 
unambiguous mandates to introduce or apply criminal sanctions only.81 The 
intention is twofold: to leave discretion in this respect to Member States and, 
equally important, to avoid the impression that European Community law may 
impinge upon domestic criminal law so directly.82 Administrative sanctions 
are, thus, considered appropriate alternatives in all cases. In this regard, the 
75 Council Directive 89/592 of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider 
Trading, 1989 OJ L 334, 30. For more detail see TRIDIMAS: Convention on Insider Trading, 
ELR, 1993, 435. 
76 Council Regulation 3677/90 13 December 1990 Laying down Measures to Discourage the 
Diversion of Certain substances, 1990 О J L 357, 1. 
77 Council Directive 91/308 of 10 June 1991 on Prevention of the Use of Financial System 
for the Purpose of Money Laundering, 1991 OJ L 166, 77. 
78 Council Directive 91/447 of 18 June 1991 on the Control of the Acquisition and 
Possession of Weapons, 1991 О J L 256, 51. 
79 SEVENSTER, H. G.: Criminal Law and EC Law, CMLRev., vol. 29, 1992, 33; 
TIEDEMANN, K.: Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und Strafrecht, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift, 1993, 26. 
80 One possible way of doing it would have been to adopt detailed Directives providing for 
criminal sanctions. Such Directives can become self-executing. The ECJ, however, expressly 
refused the direct effect of Directives that disadvantage citizens. For further details see Case 
14/68 Pretore di Salo v X [1987] ECR 2545. 
81 SCHUTTE: op. cit., 58. 
82 SCHUTTE: ibid. 
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Community goes so far as to avoid using the term punishment, referring instead 
to sanctions.83 
The recent directive on money laundering is no sufficient support for an 
affirmative answer to this question, because it follows form the inter-
governmental declaration, adopted by the Member States when accepting the 
directive that they regard the obligation to criminalise money laundering not 
as an obligation under European Community law but as an obligation resulting 
from their signature of certain conventions of the United Nations and the 
Council of Europe. 
V. Co-operation in criminal justice 
In its decision concerning the draft Convention of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material84 the European 
Court of Justice outlined the division of responsibilities between the 
Community on the one hand and the Member States on the other. With respect 
to provisions of a criminal law nature, especially those dealing with inter-
national co-operation in criminal matters, the European Court of Justice ruled 
that these subjects were undoubtedly within the competence of the Member 
States alone.85 The Member States were obligated to take the necessary 
implementing measures, each for its own territory, regarding deployment of 
police forces, initiation of criminal proceedings and extradition. 
It is clear from that decision that international co-operation in criminal 
matters, even in areas where the Community has normative powers, is outside 
the competence of the Community.86 Therefore, the Council of Europe has 
done most of the work in the area of judicial co-operation in criminal 
matters.87 
83 This latter term does not exclude the possibility of criminal law, but does not infer it 
either. 
84 Ruling of 1 November 1978 pursuant to Art. 103 of the EAEC Treaty, 1978 ECR 2151 
[1979] 1 CMLR 131. 
85 § 31, 36 of Ruling of 1 November 1978 pursuant to Art. 103 of the EAEC Treaty, 1978 
ECR 2151 [1979] 1 CMLR 131. 
86 SCHUTTE: op. cit., 70. 
87 DEN BOER: Europe and the Art of International..., op. cit., 286. 
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1. The reasons 
The reasons for the emergence of a European perspective in international co-
operation in crime control are manifold and lie on different levels.88 As 
regards the international level criminal policy was stimulated by the following 
three factors:89 
1. Firstly, the emergence of the post-industrial information society lead to 
an increased dependence on information and information technology. 
2. Secondly, the emergence of a stake holder society is characterised by 
increased risk in the whole spectrum of life. 
3. Finally, the emergence of a "world society" as the result of the greater 
mobility of persons, capital and information lead to the decreasing importance 
of national borders (both in the world and Europe). 
The post-industrial society is based on the value of information [i.e. 
information society]. Both the state, private undertakings and the individual 
citizen are widely linked to computer systems with data banks and networks 
which make available the rapid transmission of information from any one part 
of the world to another one. International communication systems are of vital 
importance for our society and for modern economy. Therefore, attacks on such 
systems can cause dramatical effects not only for the actual victim but for all 
participants in the network and the individuals affiliated to them who otherwise 
would not be affected by traditional forms of crime. For example, business 
espionage via computer networks might endanger hundreds of working places 
in the affected company. A small manipulation of data—for example—in data 
banks of the stock exchange may endanger millions of people. It does not play 
a role any longer where the offender and the victim are geographically located. 
On several instances the offender and Iiis victim do not meet personally. Illegal 
activities carried out in one country might directly effect computer systems in 
other countries.90 
The worldwide effects [hence world society] of offences do not only occur 
in relation to computer systems but also, for example, in the area of 
environmental protection. The best examples are polluted rivers or radioactive 
waste. An integrated Europe cannot cope with excessive disparities in the field 
88 TITSOUTRA: Faut-il un droit pénal européen?, Povoirs 1990, 133. 
89 SIEBER, U.: Memorandum fúr ein Europäisches Srafgesetzbuch, Juristen Zeitung, 1997, 
issue 8, 369. 
90 SIEBER, U.: The international handbook on computer crime, 1986, 114. 
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of criminal law and criminal justice, since they produce unwanted distortions 
and the so-called "oasis"-effect.91 
As regards the European level there is a pressure flowing from the existence 
of a single European market in which barriers to the movement of persons, of 
goods and of capital have been removed, and from the creation of the concept 
of the European citizen, to remove incompatibilities in national legal systems 
which are discordant with these developments.92 There must be a change away 
from the idea of national jurisdiction founded on territoriality which is 
anachronistic in a time when the majority of economic legislation has its source 
in Brussels and is Community-wide in its effects. There must be drastic 
changes in the procedures which enable prosecutions to be transferred from one 
jurisdiction to another and which provide for a judge in one Member State to 
obtain evidence or other legal assistance from judges in another. 
2. The role of the Council of Europe 
As was already mentioned earlier, the Council of Europe had a decisive role 
in setting up the law and the institutions of co-operation in crime control in 
Europe. Consequently, traditional interstate co-operation in criminal matters 
between judicial authorities (such as extradition and mutual legal assistance) 
is governed, in the mutual relations among the Member States of the 
Community, by a network of treaties most of them elaborated within the 
framework of the Council of Europe. These legal arrangements are now 
generally regarded as the "body of law governing co-operation in criminal 
matters among the Member States of the European Union".93 We should note, 
however, that not only the Member States of the European Union profited from 
these efforts but also all other members of the Council of Europe and states 
who had only an observer status.94 
91 JUNG, H.: Criminal Justice—A European Perspective, Criminal Law Review, 1993, 238. 
92 MOOR, L. de: Commission initiative on the legal protection of the financial interests of 
the Community, in: G. Dannecker (ed.), Combating Subsidy Fraud in the EC area, 1993, 21. 
93 DEN BOER: Europe and the Art of International..., op. cit., in: Legal Issues of the 
Maastricht Treaty (ed. O'Keeffe, D. and Twomey, P. M.), 1994, 286. 
94 Twenty five European States are currently members of the Council of Europe; a large 
number of other states, for example, the USA and Canada enjoy observer status. For further 
details on the organizatorial structure of the Council of Europe see WILKITZKI, P.: 
Development of an Effective Crime and Justice Programme—A European View, in: 
Eser/Lagodny, Principles and Procedures for a New Transnational Criminal Law, 1992, 267 
and SIEBER: Memorandum für ein Europäisches..., op. cit., issue 8, 371. 
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The institutions of the Council of Europe dealt with all aspects of criminal 
law including constitutional law and human rights, substantive criminal law, 
criminal procedure and international legal assistance. Above all, tribute has to 
be paid to the ECHR with the Strasbourg Commission and Court.95 The 
Strasbourg judiciary has established a growing set of precedents from which 
flows a loosely-knit European system of references and guidelines for the 
domestic jurisdictions.96 It guarantees basic procedural rights in the whole of 
Europe. Besides that the Council of Europe has launched many of the 
international treaties which have added to the network of co-ordinated 
interaction.97 Up until now 19 such conventions have been concluded among 
which the Convention on Extradition and the Convention on Legal Assistance 
are of special importance.98 Moreover, the Council of Europe has by way of 
its recommendations spelled out its position on many controversial issues, a 
position which usually arose from the filtered knowledge of its national 
contributors. For example, it has recommended in the field of computer related 
crimes to transpose into national law a list with precisely described minimal 
provisions which are to be supplemented with an additional optional list.99 In 
the field of environmental protection where international co-operation is 
especially complicated and the danger of cross-border criminality is particularly 
high the Council of Europe has recommended the Draft Convention for the 
Protection of the Environment by means of criminal law. The latter aims at the 
95 JUNG: op. cit., 241. 
96 As to their impact on criminal law and criminal policy see BENGOETXEA, J—JUNG, 
H.: Towards a European Criminal Jurisprudence? The Justification of Criminal Law by the 
Strasbourg Court, 1991, 239. 
97 JESCHECK, H.: Möglichkeiten und Probleme eines europäischen Strafrechts, in: 
Festschrift für Jhong Won Kim, Seoul, 1991, 947, at 955. 
98 JESCHECK, IL: in Leipziger Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 11 (ed.) 1992, 
Introduction; Vogler, Die strafrechtliche Konventionen des Europarats, Jura 1992, p. 586. It 
is true that so far no real harmonisation has been reached in a lot of areas and that many of 
the conventions have only insignificant practical use. Since the Council of Europe is an 
international organisation which is based on the co-operation of the participating governments 
the realisation of its conventions is dependent upon its members. At the same time the Council 
of Europe is the only institution in Europe which possesses the necessary organisational and 
legal structure in order to pass provisions for whole Europe. It is specially significant in 
relation to Central and Eastern Europe. 
99 Council of Europe, Computer Related Crime, 1990. 
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setting minimum standards in the member states for the protection of the 
environment through criminal law.100 
The complexity or the putative complexity of existing conventions of the 
Council of Europe has prompted the Member States of the Community to 
explore the possibility of working out more simple intergovernmental 
arrangements for themselves regarding co-operation in criminal matters. In 
1979-1980 the Member States of the Community considered proposals for a 
special extradition treaty. The negotiations held in the framework of the 
European Political Co-operation failed when it became clear that the then nine 
Member States were not able to go beyond the limits of the existing Council 
of Europe extradition treaty.101 
In 1986 the Member States of the Community resumed negotiations regard-
ing international co-operation in criminal matters. These negotiations have 
resulted, among other tilings, in the drafting of separate treaties on the transfer 
of criminal proceedings and on the transfer of enforcement of criminal 
sentences.102 These treaties are, however, not considered to be replacements 
of the corresponding Council of Europe conventions but, rather, as instruments 
that should facilitate their application for states parties to the latter. 
Today these simplified arrangements tailored to be available only for the 
Member States of the Community gained importance. Due to the ever continu-
ing expansion of the Council of Europe to include new members, some of 
which have only limited experience with pluralistic democracy, some Member 
States became query whether the Council continues to be the most appropriate 
forum for the development of instruments promoting international co-operation 
in criminal matters. This cautiousness is mirrored in the Schengen Convention 
which was originally meant as a prelude to the lifting of the border controls of 
persons within the European Community. With regard to traditional inter-
national co-operation on the part of the judiciary, the Schengen Convention 
does not opt for separate, new arrangements but instead builds on existing 
conventions of the Council of Europe and the Benelux union dealing with 
extradition, mutual legal assistance, and the transfer of the enforcement of 
100 Draft Convention for the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, 
21.06.1995 (Doc. Council od Europe DIR/JUR [95] 11). 
101 SCHUTTE: op. cit., 72. 
102 Convention between the Member States of the European Communities on the 
Enforcement of Foreign Criminal Sentences, 13 November 1991; Convention between the 
Member States of the European Communities on the Transfer of Criminal Proceedings, 6 
November 1990. 
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prison sentences. Hence, today Schengen represents the decisive form of co-
operation which is demonstrated by the incorporation of the Schengen Aqui 
into the first pillar of the European Union.103 
Despite any mistrust in the Council of Europe mechanism, the alternative 
offered by the Member States of the Community is not a communitarian decision 
making process of their own but merely a limited intergovernmental type of 
international co-operation. The only result produced so far which seems to be 
superior to those of the council of Europe is the above mentioned incorporation 
of the Schengen Aqui into the Treaty Establishing the European Union. 
3. The Third Pillar and the issue of transfer of sovereignty104 
The European Union was established by the Treaty on European Union which 
was eventually agreed and signed in Maastricht in February 1992 and entered 
into force on 1 November 1993. The most obvious feature of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Union was the institutional change it brought, 
establishing a three pillar structure with the Communities as the first of these 
pillars. The second pillar is the Common Security and Foreign Policy and the 
third one is the Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The insertion 
of the Third Pillar into the Treaty Establishing the European Union marked a 
progression from numerous pre-existing initiatives, structures and frameworks 
in the field of European criminal justice co-operation.105 Title VI was more 
than just symbolic for the increasing political consensus that international crime 
should be dealt with at a supranational level. In particular, its function has been 
to co-ordinate various initiatives in this field. 
Art. К.1. of Title VI essentially demarcates the scope of activities and 
agreements which were included under Justice and Home Affairs. Included in 
the "matters of common interest" were judicial co-operation in criminal and 
civil matters, customs co-operation and police-co-operation "for the purposes 
of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking, and other 
serious forms of international crime, including if necessary certain aspects of 
103 See more details in the next Chapter. 
104 The TEU was modified on 19 June 1997 at the Amsterdam Summit of the IGC. At the 
time of the writing of this paper only a draft Treaty exists that awaits adoption by the Council 
in October. Therefore, this part of the paper is based on the TEU as was adopted in 1993 
taking into account the draft modifications. 
105 DEN BOER, M.: Police Cooperation in the TEU: Tiger in a Trojean Horse, Common 
Market Law Review, 1995, vol. 32, 55. 
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customs co-operation, in connection with the organisation of a Union-wide 
system for exchanging information within a Europol [K.l. (7-9)]." The 
Amsterdam Treaty considerably alters the scope of Art. K.l. Judicial co-
operation in civil matters will pass into the European Community sphere, 
whereas police co-operation and judicial co-operation in criminal matters remain 
under Title VI though their scope is notably to be enhanced. The new Art. K.l, 
aimed at creating "an area of freedom, security and justice", has as its corollary 
the integration of the Schengen Aqui into the framework of the European Union. 
The Schengen Aqui is defined in an Annex as comprising: the Schengen 
Agreement itself of 1985, the implementing Convention of 1990, the various 
Accession Protocols and Agreements, and decisions and declarations adopted by 
the Executive Committee as well as acts adopted by the organs on which the 
Committee has conferred decision making powers. These changes made it 
necessary to rename the Third Pillar as "Provisions on Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters" instead of "Justice and Home Affairs". 
According to the new Art. K.3. common action in judicial co-operation in 
criminal matters shall include, inter alia, facilitating and accelerating co-
operation between competent ministries, facilitating extradition between the 
Member States, preventing conflicts of jurisdiction between the Member States, 
and progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the field of organised 
crime, terrorism and drug trafficking. This provision, however, will not oblige 
as a consequence Member States whose legal system does not provide for 
minimum sentences to adopt them.106 This provision should be welcomed 
since the original text of the Treaty Establishing the European Union provided 
only that Member States should consult with one another within the Council 
with a view of co-ordinating their action. 
One of the changes brought along by the Treaty of Amsterdam is the new 
Art. K.6. replacing the former Art. K.3. According to the new provision the 
Council may adopt, acting unanimously on an initiative of any Member State 
or of the Commission, framework decisions which are binding on the Member 
States as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities 
the choice of form and methods, they shall not entail direct effect.107 
Framework decision is a new term in the Treaty, but the system it establishes 
106 Declaration to the Final Act on Art. K.3(e), Conference of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States, 19 June 1997, CONF/4001/97, 33. 
107 Declaration to the Final Act on Art. K.3(e), Conference of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States, 19 June 1997, CONF/4001/97, 33. 
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simply codifies the case law of the European Court of Justice into the text of 
the Treaty. Member States are free in the future to choose between 
administrative law and criminal law when implementing framework decisions. 
The most important novelty of the new Treaty is that it extends the jurisdiction 
of the European Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on the validity and 
interpretation of framework decisions, on the interpretation of conventions 
established under Title VI and on the validity and interpretation of the 
measures implementing them. However, the jurisdiction of the European Court 
of Justice is subject to a declaration made at the time of the signing of the 
Amsterdam act or any time thereafter by the Member State. This change is 
significant since pursuant to the old Art. K.3. (c) the European Court of Justice 
had jurisdiction only as regards conventions drawn up by the Council and only 
if such convention expressly stipulated it. 
One leitmotif of the Amsterdam Treaty that sounds persistently throughout 
the draft is that closer co-operation cannot any longer be ignored. The novelty 
of the Amsterdam style flexibility lies in the insertion into the common 
provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European Union a practical flexibility 
clause complemented by similar provisions in the European Community Treaty 
and in Title VI. Closer co-operation is expressed in the new Art. K.12. 
replacing the former Art. K.7. 
Art. K.9. (the passerelle provision)108 is also to be changed considerably. 
The old text of Art. K.9. pertained to the competence of the Council to apply 
Art. 100C to areas under Art. K. (1) to (6), "and at the same time determine the 
relevant voting conditions relating to it". Miiller-Graff has interpreted this as 
providing "a way for the Community to act in the areas of the third pillar even 
as far as they are not yet covered by the provisions of the European Community 
Treaty".109 This could be done by a procedure whereby the Council acted 
unanimously on the initiative of the Commission or a Member States. The appli-
cation of Art. K.9. to criminal justice matters was, however, theoretically 
excluded from this transfer, because it only concerned the old Art. K. 1. (1) to 
(6). If the Council decided to change a "matter of common interest" into a 
Community matter, the Member States would have to adopt that "in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements, hence a ratification-like 
procedure similar to that of the enactment of amendments to the Treaties"110 
108 DEN BOER: op. cit. Police Cooperation in the TEU ..., 560. 
109 MÜLLER-GRAFF, P.: The legal basis of the Third Pillar and its position in the 
framework of the Union Treaty, 31 CML Rev. 505. 
110 MÜLLER-GRAFF: op. cit., 508. 
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In other words, Art. K.9. offered the opportunity to avoid the Treaty amendment 
procedure which is set out in Art. N of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Union, but the procedure shows similarities to Art. N in that it requires 
unanimity at Council level followed by unanimous approval of all Member 
States. Some observers, however, saw the bridging provision of Art. K.9. as a 
Trojan horse111: They thought it could mean a hidden trick. 
The passerelle provision had given academic commentators opportunity for 
speculation about the transfer of sovereignty in Justice and Home Affairs 
matters to the Community. Moving criminal justice competence to the First 
Pillar was a dynamic variable of interpretations about the extent to which 
normative authorisation should be given by a nation to a supranational entity.112 
The move towards integrating the field of international co-operation in Justice 
and Home Affairs into the institutional clockwork of the Community could have 
been read as a political manifestation of the growing willingness to link crime 
and criminal justice issues with other issues on the European agenda, such as 
health, education, employment and migration.113 It was along this line of inter-
pretation that the intergovernmental character of the chapter on Justice and Home 
Affairs was characterised as a potentially transitional by several commentators, in 
the sense that these issues could be in the future made into an integral part of the 
European Union.114 This latter remark seems to be false and far too optimistic 
in light of the Amsterdam Treaty. The latter left judicial co-operation in criminal 
matters at an intergovernmental level. This is supported by the new Art. K.9. 
Under the new provision the Council acting unanimously on the initiative of the 
Commission or a Member State may decide that action in areas referred to in Art. 
K.l. shall fall under the Treaty establishing the European Community. Hence, the 
possibility of moving issues of judicial co-operation in criminal matters into the 
First Pillar remains dependent on the unanimous action of the Member States. 
111 The metaphor "Trojean Horse" originates from Mr V. Flynn, Security Liaison Officer of 
the European Commission. 
112 MACCORMICK, D. N.: Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 Modem Law Review, 1-18. 
113 DEN BOER: Europe and the Art of International..., op. cit., 282. 
114 DEN BOER: Europe and the Art of International..., op. cit., 282. Pessimism about this 
process has been expressed by Schutte, who proclaimed that "hardly any new powers" has 
been conferred on Community institutions [SCHUTTE: op. cit., 83]. O'Keeffe who was also 
sombre about this latter possibility believed, that "[0]ne conclusion to be drawn form the 
Union Treaty provisions and from the work programs on immigration and asylum is that one 
may be assisting at the start of a very slowly evolutionary process, whereby there may be a 
gradual transfer of competence to the Community" [O'KEEFFE: The Schengen Convention: 
a Suitable Model for European Integration, Yearbook of European Law, 1991, 216]. 
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When analysing the structure of the Third Pillar it must be considered that the 
concept of transfer of sovereignty is itself controversial. According to Hay, it is 
the question whether the exercise of sovereignty by supranational organisations, 
such as the Community, actually represents a lessening of state sovereignty. 
Apart form characterising the link between the transfer of sovereignty and 
federalism as wholly conceptualistic, Hay admits that supranational organisations 
undoubtedly show "analogies to federal entities and in their supranational 
concentration of powers and powers in their indirect jurisdiction over persons 
living in the other member states".115 The other more profound complication 
with the concept of "transfer of sovereignty" is that the supreme authority of the 
state and the primacy of national law over international law can only be 
considered as a juristic hypothesis,116 or even "a fiction, when measured by the 
degree of actual interstate co-operation, factual interdependence, and reciprocal 
commitment".117 Hence, the core of the problem must lie in the divergent 
interpretations about the extent to which authorisation should reach, and the 
extent to which competencies or new powers (not sovereignty) should be 
transferred or given to the Community.118 As this interpretation is a variable 
of the political consensus that can be achieved between the parties, the concept 
of sovereignty can be considered as dynamic.119 
One of the factors that might significantly influence the political con-
sensus is the fact that as long as the internal market does not correspond 
with a uniform legal space the prosecution of cross-border criminality within 
the Community remains burdensome and ineffective.120 The divergence be-
tween internationally mobile offenders and nationally limited crime prosecution 
questions the role of national states. Traditionally the legitimacy of democratic 
national states relied on the fact that they are able to guarantee individual 
freedoms to their citizens. This made necessary for the state to have the 
monopoly of force in order to protect its citizens from crime and interference 
with their personal freedoms. The sovereignty of national states stops according 
115 HAY: Federalism and Supranational Organisations: Patterns for New Legal Structures, 
1966, 67. 
116 KELSEN, H.: General Theory of Law and State, 1946, p. 383 et seq. 
117 KELSEN: op. cit., 382; GREVE, V.: European Criminal Policy, Towards Universal 
Laws?, de lege, 91. 
118 HAY: op. cit., 65. 
119 HAY: op. cit., 68. 
120 SIEBER: Memorandum fur ein Europäisches..., op. cit., 369. 
84 Katalin Ligeti 
to international law at the national border.121 Hence, the legitimacy of 
national states is newly questioned if these borders does not create any longer 
an obstacle for the commitment of crimes but rather for their prosecution.122 
The partial transfer of sovereign rights did not only enhanced the emergence 
of new sorts of criminal activities but also-which is more important—it made 
more difficult with regard to the opening of the borders and the free movement 
of persons the persecution of traditional crime. More than anyone else, the law 
enforcement professionals throughout Europe would like to see more harmoni-
sation between laws, to remove the legal technical barriers which they encounter 
in international criminal investigation.123 There were several political 
compromises made in an attempt to resolve this situation124 but Member States 
are not ready to consider the European Union as a regional model for the 
development of supranational justice.125 It might sound a paradox; the only 
way to resolve the problems caused by the partial integration of the Community 
is to enter into further integration.126 Even after the Amsterdam Treaty 
remains the quest that issues under Title VI should eventually be lifted into the 
core of the European Union, thereby federalising criminal justice matters that 
traditionally belong to the realm of national government. 
V. Eurocrime 
The Council of Europe has recommended a European Model Criminal Code as 
early as 1971.127 However, at that time the discussion took a negative ending: 
121 For details on the connection between sovereignty and national territory see 
MACCORMICK, D. N.: Sovereignity: Myth or Reality, in: de lege (Yearbook of the Faculty 
of Law of the Uppsala University) 1995, 227, 233. 
122 Not only the national state looses its power but its opponents are becoming stronger: 
Thus, internationally organised offender groups dispose of big financial means and are willing 
to use them in order to draw even more illegal profit. The weakness of the traditional national 
state is further emphasised by its lack of possibilities to control multi-national undertakings. 
Modern jurisprudence and sociology reaches the same conclusion on that topic. For further 
detail see: ARENDT: vita activa, 1960, 331. 
123 DEN BOER: Europe and the Art of International..., op. cit., 286. 
124 SIEBER: Subventionsbetrug und Steuerhinterziehung zum Nachteil der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 1996, 357, 379. 
125 SCHUTTE: op. cit., 83. 
126 SIEBER: Memorandum fiir ein Europäisches..., op. cit., 371. 
127 SIEBER: Memorandum fiir ein Europäisches Srafgesetzbuch..., op. cit., 369. Despite the 
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there was not seen any advantage in the harmonisation of substantive criminal 
law.128 Twenty two years later, in 1993, the Council of Europe put the issue 
of a model criminal code on the agenda again.129 The reasons of an increased 
demand for international co-operation in criminal justice have been already 
elaborated above. However, the requirement of a closer co-operation in Europe 
does not justify automatically any specific form of integration.130 Both 
historical experience and legal comparison demonstrate that cross-border 
criminality can be addressed in different ways.131 There are basically two 
paths open for criminal policy in Europe: harmonisation or unification. The path 
of harmonisation consists either of bringing the existing categories together 
without suppressing the differences in doing so, or else consists of creating new 
categories which merely represent a broad framework and leave to each state a 
national margin of discretion as to how it should be applied. The other path 
available is that of unification. Unification tends to institute identical rules 
across the different countries. This approach is undoubtedly necessary to assure 
an equal respect for certain rights. In this area it will be necessary one day to 
go beyond mere harmonisation in order to arrive at the adoption of single 
criminal offences for which the constituent elements will be identical from one 
country to another. 
fact that the Community lacks competence to set supranational criminal law, both the 
European Parliament and the Commission has been supporting the idea of harmonisation in 
criminal justice matters. As regards the efforts of the Commission see JOHANNES, H.: Neue 
Tendenzen im Strafrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Revue International de Droit 
Pénal, 1971, 82. As to the European Parliament see European Parlaiment, Working Documents 
1976-77, Report Drawn Up on Behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights 
on the Relationship between Community Law and Criminal Law, Rapporteaur: de 
Keersmaeker, Doc. 531/76. 
128 ENSCHEDÉS: Model Penal Code for Europe, Council of Europe, AS/Jur (22) 45 March 
the 23rd 1971: "There is no special virtue of having uniformed penal laws." DANNECKER, 
G.: Strafrecht der Europäische Gemeinschaft, in: Eser/Huber: Strafrechtsentwicklung in 
Europa, 1995, 1991; DIEBLICH, F.: Der strafrechtliche Schutz der Rechtsgüter der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 1985, Diss., 31. 
129 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Motion for a Recommendation on a Model 
European Penal Code, Doc 6851 of 28th May 1993, ADOC6851- 1403-25/5/93-4-E, No. 14 
subs.: 'The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers ... further instructs the 
CDPC to draft a European Model Penal Code and a Model European Code of Criminal 
Procedure...". 
130 For more details see DELMAS-MATY, M.: European Criminal Policy, in: de lege 
(Yearbook of the Faculty of Law of the Uppsala University) 1995, 83 and 86. 
131 SIEBER: Europäische Einigung und Europäisches Strafrecht, op. cit., 957. 
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One example of a communitarian instrument on the interstate co-operation 
in criminal matters is the Convention for the Protection of the Financial Interests 
of the Community. It combines harmonisation in the crime field and unification 
in the administrative field. The Treaty was amended with a view to creating a 
common regime with respect to the criminal protection of the financial interests 
of the Community and the prosecution of infringements of those treaties. The 
Convention aims at, on the one hand, to require the Member States to fight 
infringements of the financial interests of the Community through penal 
measures in the same way as similar infringements of national interests were 
criminalised and, on the other, to regulate two forms of international criminal 
co-operation, namely the transfer of criminal proceedings and mutual assistance 
in criminal matters. The Convention established precise rules concerning the 
definition of fraud, the nature, extent and system of sanctions. Moreover, Art. 
209A was inserted into the text of the Treaty imposing a duty on the Member 
States to take the necessary measures to counter fraud.132 Art. 209A is to be 
altered by the Amsterdam Treaty. According to the draft, now the Council—and 
not only the Member States—should have the right to adopt measures in the field 
of the prevention and fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the 
Community. 
This suggests a move towards uniform criminal laws in Europe. However, 
as it was mentioned earlier, there are several possibilities for achieving it. The 
various models of co-operation differ from each other in the way how they 
distribute legislative functions and norm application between central and local 
bodies.133 There are four basic models represented by the German, the Swiss, 
the US American and the North European systems of criminal justice. Their 
order is set in compliance with their degree of centralisation. 
1. The German model (often seen as the example of uniform laws) shows 
a strong tendency of centralisation both on the level of substantive criminal law 
and on the level of criminal procedure. The priority of uniform federal criminal 
statutes over the criminal provisions of the Länder has been secured since the 
North German Federation.134 Similar centralised systems exist in most of the 
Member States of the Community.135 
2. The second model is the Swiss one which is a combination of uniform 
laws and of co-operation. It operates the same way as the German model as far 
132 MOOR: op. cit., 21. 
133 SIEBER: Memorandum fúr ein Europäisches ... op. cit., 372. 
134 Art. 2 (1) of the constitution of the North German Federation from 1867. 
135 SIEBER: Memorandum fUr ein Europäisches ... op. cit., 372. 
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as substantive criminal law is concerned, because since 1942 the federation has 
the competence to set substantive criminal law. On the contrary, criminal 
procedure is within the realm of the Cantons. 
3. The third model, the US American one, is characterised by an even larger 
emphasis on decentralised elements. The historical background of this system 
goes back to the theory establishing the limited powers of the federation. There-
fore, fifty different substantive criminal laws and criminal procedures are in force. 
The main difference between on the one hand the American system and on the 
other the German or the Swiss system is that in the US federal laws are applied 
by federal courts while the laws of the states are applied by state courts.136 
4. The fourth and the most loose form of co-operation is the model of inter-
governmental co-operation among sovereign states. It co-ordinates the mutual 
recognition of decisions.137 This model is applied in the closely related 
Nordic countries.138 
This brief outline demonstrates that co-operation is not limited to any 
certain model. In the following I will try to outline when and under which 
conditions harmonisation or unification is desirable or at least acceptable. With 
regard to substantive criminal law harmonisation does make sense. Whether it 
is necessary or not depend on the ability of national criminal law systems to 
cope with new types of crime.139 
Harmonisation is indispensable in those areas of the special part where 
national crime control does not function any longer, or where there is a 
discrepancy between offenders operating on a worldwide basis and prosecution 
limited by national borders. It is specially true, for example, in the case of the 
dissemination of pornographic or racist materials in international data systems 
where national control systems are not any longer possible for technical 
reasons.140 Furthermore, harmonisation is also highly desirable in areas where 
activities carried out in one country directly effect other countries and cannot 
be controlled effectively through national borders. This concerns other computer 
related crimes, environment-related crimes, business crimes (especially in the 
sphere of international trade in goods, services and capital), the cross-border 
trade in illicit drugs and finally international terrorism. Furthermore, economic 
136 SCHMIDT: Das Amerikanische Strafverfahren, 1986, 23 and 88. 
137 SIEBER: Memorandum für ein Europäisches ... op. cit., 373. 
138 See Helsinki Agreement Concluded between Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway on 
23 March 1962. 
139 SIEBER: Memorandum fiir ein Europäisches..., op. cit., 374. 
140 SIEBER: Memorandum fiir ein Europäisches..., op. cit., 374. 
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analysis demonstrates that differing standards in criminal law may distort 
competition.141 This has repercussion for example concerning the distribution 
of food where the different national food-related provisions hinder trade.142 
Also with regard to legally protected supranational rights like the financial 
interests of the European Community143 harmonisation is sensible. The reason 
is the same as it is for the prosecution of crimes against humanity. Since the 
offenders are often not prosecuted on the basis of their national laws, inter-
national standards are necessary.144 Fields where the lack of harmonisation 
could lead to the emergence of crime heavens deserve special attention145 as 
we have seen it in relation to multinational enterprises which operate usually 
in countries with a lower niveau of protection.146 
In all of these areas there is need for harmonisation in the near future. 
Therefore, they will become in the long run the pioneers of European 
Community Criminal Law. On the contrary, with regard to other traditional 
crimes like homicide or theft147 harmonisation of substantive laws is not 
pressing. Nevertheless, harmonisation could make international co-operation 
easier. One aspect of the latter is the mobility of lawyers that could be 
promoted through uniform laws. 
On the other hand, it is not desirable to embark on harmonisation in fields 
in which real cultural or historical differences exist. However, it must be 
thoroughly examined whether national differences in criminal law are actually 
based on peculiarities or simply are the result of political contingencies of legal 
development.148 Thus, for example Greve enumerates the following provisions 
141 ZULEEG: op. cit., 41 and 46. 
142 DANNECKER, G.: Strafrecht der Europäische Gemeinschaft, in: Eser-Huber: Strafrecht-
sentwicklung in Europa, 1995, 70; Dir. of 29 June 1992, OJ C228/24. 
143 WEIGEND, R.: Strafrecht durch internationale Vereinbarungen—Verlust an nationaler 
Strafrechtskultur?, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, vol. 105, 1993, 774 and 
798. 
144 SIEBER: Memorandum für ein Europäisches..., op. cit., 375. 
145 JUNG, H.-SCHROTH, H. J.: Das Strafrecht als Gegenstand der Rechtsangleichung in 
Europa, GA 1983, 241, 251. 
146 SIEBER, U.: Der strafrechtliche Schutz der Information, in: Tiedemann, К (ed): Multi-
nationale Unternehmen und Strafrecht, 1980, 155, 172; WEIGEND: op. cit. IIA and 784. 
("Oasen der Straflosigkeit"). 
147 Some scholars are of the opinion that the Member States should achieve a wider 
consensus in this field. See Jung/Schroth, Das Strafrecht als Gegenstand der Rechts-
angleichung in Europa, GA 1983, 241, 255. 
148 GREVE: op. cit., 91 and 93. 
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as culturally different: abortion laws (which are in Scandinavia much more 
liberal than in Germany),149 euthanasia (which is under strict circumstances 
permitted in Holland while in Germany is basically prohibited), laws 
concerning alcohol consumption (which are particularly strict in the Nordic 
countries), drug laws (which are more relaxed in Holland than elsewhere in the 
European Union), bigamy of homosexual partners (what is considered as 
bigamy in Denmark would be unimaginable in Greece), criminalization of the 
so called "Auschwitz Lüge" [i.e. the denial of the Holocaust] (which is a crime 
under German law but is protected in most of the European Community 
countries in the framework of free speech). In culturally such different areas 
any attempt of harmonisation will take much longer, until the integrated 
European Union leads to a closer identity and European culture. However, it 
is clear that the total conformity of national cultures in Europe is neither 
desirable nor expectable. Since criminal law serves only as an ultima ratio and 
ensures an "ethical minimum", it is possible to reach a much wider consensus 
in criminal law than in any other laws. Therefore, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that a European Criminal Code might incorporate even these 
areas.150 
As it has been already mentioned earlier, the emergence of supranational 
criminal law could be promoted by harmonised criminal procedures besides 
harmonised substantive criminal provisions. This is so, since the application of 
the law even that of uniform provisions within the European Community is left 
to the national authorities. With a view to the compulsory authorisation and 
powers in criminal procedure the necessity of harmonisation is great. An 
example of it is the ECHR which guarantees human rights in criminal 
proceedings throughout Europe. 
Such harmonisation may improve the co-operation of authorities involved in 
prosecution, too. It is also a prerequisite for the emergence of a European legal 
space. The traditional way of co-operation among prosecution authorities is 
based on their territorially limited powers and limited effects of their decisions 
which become effective in other sovereign territories only via the mechanism 
149 WEIGEND: op. cit., IIA and 788. 
150 Greve points to the classic distinction within criminal law made between mala in se and 
mala prohibita. There are evil acts that will always be crimes while other acts are forbidden 
for political reasons in certain periods and in some areas, for example, acts included in fiscal 
law, in business law, in traffic law, etc. Greve argues that this classification could make it 
natural to let mala in se crimes to form a part of a common law book, decided upon in 
Brussels. GREVE: op. cit., 98. 
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of mutual recognition. In contrast, the harmonisation of criminal procedure 
could make it possible to extend powers with regard to territory and the 
immediate application of foreign judgements as it is the case in federal 
states.151 On the basis of a uniform European system for the protection of 
legal positions the question emerges whether it is possible to have a Europe 
wide search order so that one can forget the circumstantial legal assistance.152 
On the other hand, there is no need to harmonise solely technical provisions 
of criminal procedure. Criminal prosecution in Europe is tied to cultural and 
historical evolution like e.g. the difference between the continental European 
ex officio persecution and the Anglo-American adversarial system. There are 
serious reasons to retain these features. 
The weight of these arguments would support rejection of common criminal 
legislation in the core areas closely intervened with ethics until a common 
culture has developed. In ethically neutral areas it is desirable to try to remove 
actual differences and create greater compatibility between the national 
legislations.153 
VI. Conclusion 
If one is talking about European Community Criminal Law, there are three 
orders of difficulties which have to be faced; these are political, legal and 
technical. The real issue, however, behind this discussion is what degree of 
convergence can be achieved in respect of a particular subject matter. How 
best can regulation be achieved. Although the Member States face common 
problems and adopt rather similar values, they do not have a harmonised system 
of criminal law. This is partly so because of the constitutional reference to 
sovereignty, and partly because of legal dogma. The most notorious problem 
concerns the criminal liability of enterprises. 
There are essentially two recourses open to protect the interests of the 
Community. One is to try to provide parallel and as nearly as possible identical 
criminal norms or administrative penal norms in each of the Member States. 
In order to resolve any difficulties that might arise one has to rely on co-
151 The need for co-operation in matters of criminal procedure can be used as an additional 
argument for the hannonisation of substantive law. The willingness to give up sovereign rights 
could be increased if the substantive law is similar in the different countries. 
152 SIEBER: Europäische Einigung und Europäisches..., op. cit., 957, 962. 
153 GREVE: op. cit., 111. 
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operation. This is what the Treaty of Amsterdam aims at. The second is, to try 
to develop a European criminal law on a Community wide basis. There is a 
clear but differentiated need for unification of national criminal laws in the 
various areas of law. The development of a legally non-binding model criminal 
code would support all possible forms of co-operation by a rather soft means. 
It would especially allow for the recognition of cultural differences. It would 
also enhance the revision and systemisation of national criminal laws and be 
of great help for states which are newly emerging or which want to turn to a 
more democratic criminal policy. 
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"The incumbent Pope devotes all his lime to the spiritual life of the Church and 
deals with politics only to keep it away."—wrote Baron Apor, the Hungarian 
Envoy to the Vatican on Pope Pius Xllth.1 The same words apply to Jusztinián 
Serédi as well. Cardinal Jusztinián Serédi (whose original name was György 
Szapucsek)2 was born in 1884. He was an outstanding scholar of canon law, 
Primate of Hungary and Archbishop of Esztergom. The comparison with Pope 
Pius Xllth is also meaningful, as they governed the Church at the same time, 
though on different levels. It was a very special time in history, as the Church 
1 The official statement of the Envoy dated of 1 June 1939, see in: Documents of the Relations 
Between the Vatican and the European Fascist Regimes. Compiled by Zs. B. LŐRINCZ, 
Budapest, 1969. (below referred to: The Hungarian Envoy to the Vatican. 1969) 168. Apor 
criticises the former pope, Pius Xllth: "The deceased pope was deeply engaged in politics. Being 
a power-thirsty man, he got involved in affairs not closely related to the Church, and with too 
much vehemence." Concerning Baron Apor, Envoy to the Vatican, see: B. LORINCZ, Zs.: op. 
cit. Preface: 18-19. 
2 MESZLÉNYI, A.: The portraits of Hungarian prince-primates. Budapest, Sz. I. Társ. 1970. 
from 394. The parents of Serédi were Mihály Szapucsek and Júlia Oroszlán, who lived in Deaki 
in Kisalföld. The father's ancestors come from County Árva. György Szapucsek was born on 
23 April 1884 to be the tenth child of the family. His brothers, among them there are a 
Benedictine monk, a railwayman, change the family name for Serédi which sounds more 
Hungarian. György changes his name when he is in the sixth grade of the school. He becomes 
a novice in Pannonhalma on 6 August 1901. His name in the Holy Order is Jusztinián. 
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had already been deprived of its secular power and it was forced to focus on 
its spiritual life. On the other hand, for the sake of the universal Church the 
Pope could not turn from politics, which occasionally involved his necessary 
participation, even if his office was confined to the Vatican. 
In case of Serédi, an inevitable political activity can be mentioned, because 
there seems to be a clear difference between the political activity of János 
Csernoch, the Primate's legal predecessor and Serédi's determined but always 
tactful political steps. Csernoch actively participated in the political stabilisation 
of the new Government from the very beginning of the Horthy era. For 
example, Csernoch persuaded Charles IVth, the former Habsburg Emperor of 
Austria and King of Hungary, to leave the country after that Iiis first attempt 
to return to the throne by way of a coup failed in 1921.3 In comparison, Serédi 
had not been seriously involved in politics till István Horthy, the elder son of 
the Regent, was elected the Vice-Regent of Hungary.4 
This difference between the two successive Primates of Hungary in politi-
cal attitudes and style is explicable, as János Csernoch was enthroned to 
pontificates (Archepiscopal See of Kalocsa, then Esztergom) in the palmy days 
of peace of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy when pontificates were pre-
destined to participate actively in politics according to the contemporary public 
law. 
At the same time, Serédi was appointed to the first pontifical see of the 
State a decade later after the Peace Treaty of Trianon, when a lot had been 
changed in the relations between the State and the Church. Although the public 
lawyers still considered the right of coronation of the Archbishop of Esztergom 
effective, it became obvious after the royal coups that this privilege was just 
a fact of legal history, and not a real authority. 
It must be mentioned the Catholic Church could survive the World War I 
with big losses, which meant significant losses in both the number of believers 
and territory, not to mention its possessions. Among the remaining and maimed 
dioceses, Esztergom became the most affected beside Szatmár and Várad. 
Perhaps it was only for Budapest, subject to Esztergom Archepiscopal See, and 
its increasing number of believers to be ministered that Esztergom did not 
become a vicarship. This situation, as in the above-mentioned case of 
3 CSIZMADIA, A.: Az állam és az egyházak jogi kapcsolatának története a Horthy korszakban. 
Budapest, 1966. 130. footnotes 5; 6. About the Primate's personal account see: ВЕКЕ, M.: 
History of the Hungarian Episcopal Conference and its Protocols. 1919-1944. Volumes I—II, 
Munich-Budapest. 1992. Volume I, 77. 
4 MESZLÉNYI: op. cit., 424-433. 
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Csernoch, could inevitably invite the interest of the Esztergom See. But Serédi, 
and it demonstrates his intellectual calibre if not political talent, resorted to 
steps in inner politics only if it was inevitable. 
Serédi's political career is mostly still unexplored. So far, only general 
historiography has undertaken to publish his memoirs, while his character is 
still a blank spot for church historiography.5 This also implies that up to the 
present, the available archivalia are the most revealing about Serédi's period 
of Primate. Research based on these materials indicate some interest, though. 
I shall not present results of new research here; instead, I would like to 
make a review of the state of the research, encouraged to do this, as a legal 
historian, because Serédi's political steps as a Primate and his general attitude 
are infiltrated with the outlook of a lawyer. 
We grouped Serédi's church and inner political activities around the 
following criteria: 
1. The question of the appointments to pontifical sees and the Intesa 
semplice. 
2. The detached dioceses; ministering the Hungarian flock beyond the 
border. 
3. The Church's legal position after reannexation. 
However arbitrary the above criteria may seem, considering the available 
research, they can be discussed from a legal point of view. It must be admitted, 
though that the conclusion of our paper cannot pretend to be more than what 
Baron Apor (cited in the motto) would often say in his official statements: 
"relata refero"—I tell what I heard from others. 
1. Serédi and the Intesa semplice 
The political career in the church of Jusztinián Serédi, a Benedictine monk 
started when he went to Rome. He built a very good working relationship with 
Cardinal Gasparri, the powerful superior of the Papal Court during the 
codification of Codex Juris Canonici.6 By the end of the war he was back at 
5 The Memoirs of Serédi Jusztinián. 1941-1944. Published by: ORBÁN, S. and VIDA, I., 
Budapest, 1990. 
6 MESZLÉNYI: op. cit., 400-401. The data suggest 10.500 legal sources in 26.000 excerpts 
were processed. He stored up this material till his death, and docketed them at the end of his life. 
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home, and according to certain sources, on 2 January 1919 Primate Csernoch 
called upon Serédi to go to Rome and inform the Holy See about the state of 
affairs in the Hungarian Church.7 No doubt, it was his excellent connections 
with Rome that made the Primate choose Serédi. When the Hungarian Mission 
in the Vatican was established, Serédi soon became the canonist of the 
Mission.8 At the same time, he carried on with the refinement of Codex Juris 
Canonici, and he and Gasparri continuously published that huge pile of 
documents that they collected during the preparation for the codification.9 This 
way Serédi kept up friendly relations with both sides: on the one hand, with the 
Holy See because of the codification; on the other hand, with the Hungarian 
Government for giving legal counsel to the Mission in Rome. 
The Government in power at that time did really need canon law counsel, 
it could even use Serédi 's connections in the Papal Court. It was important 
when the anomalies about the right of patronage became one of the most acute 
church political problems in Hungary. After the Codex Juris Canonici came 
into force in 1918, die Vatican tried to enforce the provisions of Codex Juris 
Canonici, like, for example the centralisation of church power. This endeavour 
is reasonable, as the Church, being confined to the Vatican State, had only 
legal means at its disposal to maintain its universal pretensions. As the Codex 
authorised solely the Pope with the right of appointing bishops, it was only 
reasonable of the Holy See to try to eliminate all legal customs, privileges or 
pacts contradicting this provision of the Codex. 
It should be mentioned that at the beginning of the 1900s, only the 
Spanish10 and the Hungarian Monarchs in Europe were fully authorised to 
practise the power of appointing bishops, beside the German Chancellor who 
had this power only in some parts of the Empire. These exceptions could be 
justified by certain church, or geopolitical concerns, of course. Both the 
Hungarian and the Spanish Kingdom represented a political border and a 
7 The Hungarian Envoy to the Vatican. 1969, 12, footnote 4. Meszlényi does not know about 
this commission. According to him "He did not expect a new invitation from Gasparri, instead he 
travelled home as soon he could." (see in: MESZLÉNYI: op. cit., 403). 
8 MESZLÉNYI: op. cit., 392, 404 and ВЕКЕ: op. cit.. Volume I, 59. From the minutes of the 
Episcopacy dated of 27th October 1920: "Jusztinián Serédi a Benedictine friar was appointed to 
the post of church counsellor. He is a capable of serving as the Agent of the Hungarian Dioceses 
at the different offices of the Holy See ... Serédi is asked to accept this post." 
9 MESZLÉNYI: op. cit., 403. He worked on the sources in 1923-1938. It was published in 
nine volumes in co-operation with Gasparri. After his death he was the sole publisher of the 
Codex Juris Canonici Fontes. 
10 The Hungarian Envoy to the Vatican. 323. 
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defence line towards the two big rival religions. Spain bordered with the 
Muslim World, while Hungary had been the faith defender against Orthodoxy 
for about a thousand years. Obviously, in this exceptional political position 
church was rewarded with these legal privileges. 
The Kingdom of Sicily had its privileges for similar geopolitical reasons 
some time earlier. The King of Sicily, as Monarchia Secula and a secular 
subject, laid claim to a papal legate authority, similar to that of the Archbishop 
of Esztergom. Philip Ilnd of Spain, for example was more than ready to 
practise the highest jurisdiction in church affairs, notwithstanding the protests 
of the Papal Legate." What is more, the court proceeding on his behalf 
consisted of secular and not church lawyers. 
Considering the above, Rome waited only for the opportunity to abolish 
these exceptions. The political instability following World War I came at just 
the right moment, and a general papal right of appointing bishops seemed to 
be desirable for the interest of stability.12 In Hungary, this possibility arose 
at first in 1919-20, in connection with the vacancy in the Episcopal See of 
Vác. Rome, referring to the anomalies concerning the powers of the Head of 
the State and the instability in domestic political life, appointed its own 
candidate to the Vác See without consulting the Hungarian Government. (N.B. 
it is remarkable that Rome was not affected by Primate Csernoch, who advised 
the Legate functioning in Vienna to postpone the appointment.13) This 
precedent shocked, at the same time frightened die Hungarian Government. 
Following this, every Hungarian Government did its best to agree with the 
Vatican on a solution for tire problem of pontifical appointments, which also 
involved the question of the right of patronage. Before a detailed government 
plan could have been drafted, the vacancy in the Kalocsa See brought about a 
new problem. This made the Government resolve to finally settle the question. 
Then, in the conferences with the Holy See, Serédi appears as a mediator 
intermediating between Under-secretary Cardinal Gasparri and the Hungarian 
Mission. 
Beside Csernoch's political talent Serédi's opinion seemed to be 
authoritative in these negotiations in the Vatican. This suggestion is reasonable 
if considering that the debates about the candidates to the Kalocsa See 
sharpened so much that one should have expected the open reprehension of the 
11 KOENIGSBERGER, H.: The Government of Sicily under Philip I ! of Spain. London, 1951 
from 145 and CSIZMADIA: op. cit., 263. 
12 CSIZMADIA: oç. cit.v l34v 268v(ootaol£ 21. 
13 CSIZMADIA: op. cit., 269-270. 
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Vatican. It was well-known that Gasparri sometimes tended to be vehement. 
Nevertheless, whenever the Hungarian Mission excuses for its mistakes, the 
Vatican's reply is always friendly and lenient. This was probably for Serédi's 
mediation, whose opinion in church law after his successful codification was 
authoritative for the Vatican administration.14 Slightly exaggerating, we can 
state that owing to Serédi's popularity the Vatican was more lenient with the 
Hungarian Government, which sometimes had vehement, though compromising 
intentions. 
Other sources also suggest that Serédi's participation in the accomplish-
ment of Intesa semplice (1927), a provisional pact, was determining. This 
document, even if provisionally, regulated the question of appointing prelates 
between the Vatican and Hungary. The benevolence and sympathy of the 
Hungarian Government towards Serédi also suggests Serédi's special role. No 
wonder the Vatican jumps into the false conclusion that Serédi can be 
appointed to the vacant Esztergom See without consulting the Hungarian 
Government.15 Well before Serédi's appointment to archbishop, Count 
Sommsich, the Hungarian Envoy to the Vatican through Gasparri urged the 
Holy See to reward Serédi for his merits in the codification.16 (N.B. Serédi 
was on the Government's list of candidates for the vacant see in the Székes-
fehérvár Episcopal See in 1925.17) 
The creation of Intesa semplice was something to be proud of for Hungarian 
church politics. If one carefully studies the contemporary map of church 
politics in Europe, the following can be noticed. In Germany, at first the 
Vatican made separate concordats with the Lands to regulate pontifical 
appointments. The most important of these are the Bavarian and the Prussian 
concordats which were effective even after the conclusion of the Imperial 
Concordat, resulting in a kind of dual regulation.18 According to the Prussian 
Concordat, collegiates, and not the Chancellor who had a right of appointment, 
had a right of veto against the Vatican candidates to the traditional imperial 
19 
sees. 
14 MESZLÉNYI: op. cit., 405. Serédi's authority was also underlined by the information of 
Envoy Barcza according to which the Vatican asked the Primate canonist to co-operate in the 
codification of the Italian Concordat (1929), created not much later. See in: The Hungarian Envoy 
to the Vatican. 133. 
15 CSIZMADIA: op. cit., from 315; and MESZLÉNYI: op. cit., from 405. 
16 MESZLÉNYI: op. cit., 1970, 404. Gasparri' reply: "Do not worry. You will be rewarded." 
17 CSIZMADIA: op. cit., 304; and MESZLÉNYI: op. cit., 405. 
18 The Hungarian Envoy to the Vatican. 210-212, 214. 
19 The important examples are in: CSIZMADIA: op. cit., 301, footnote 2. 
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The Spanish situation is interesting, too. After the provisional cessation of 
the Monarchy, the Vatican denied the Republic the right of appointment 
practised by the former monarchs, although it recognised the new regime.20 
Later, after long delays the Vatican made a new concordat with Franco. The 
Holy See agreed that the Spanish Head of State presents a suggestion of six 
candidates to prelates. The Vatican selected three of the six candidates, the 
Spanish Government put these names in an order of preference and sent the list 
to Rome for a final decision and appointment. But, as Baron Apor, the 
Hungarian Envoy to the Vatican put it: "this privilege to Spain was a pure 
formality; in reality, the situation was the same as in our county or many other 
countries".21 
Viewing it in its European context, Intesa semplice was a big success. On 
the whole, its rules conform to the similar Vatican pacts. However, among 
others, there is one big difference. In the above-mentioned examples they 
solved the problem with a concordat, while in the case of Hungary, both sides 
agreed on a provisional pact. True, this provisional pact proved to be a better 
solution than some of the concordats. Perhaps, we are not far from truth if we 
suggest that Serédi had his part in realising this modus vivendi, as that largely 
reflects the special circumstances in the Hungarian Church. The Holy See could 
have that kind of information at its disposal only if somebody provided them. 
Among others, one such confidential piece of information from the field of 
church politics was that Hungary was not interested in concluding a final pact. 
(N.B. it is also of interest and suggests a special treatment of Hungary that 
Hungary has not had a single concordat with the Vatican, as contrasted with 
other states.) 
It is important to note that Intesa semplice came into force at about the time 
of Serédi's primacy. At the same time, behind the procedural form of the Pact 
there is a complicated political decision making machinery. According to the 
Pact, the Hungarian Government could select three candidates for nomination 
to vacant prelacies. The Vatican chose from these, but had it chosen someone 
else, the Government could have vetoed against this candidate. In the case of 
nominating army bishops, the Vatican provided further cessions, as the 
Government was entitled to make further complaints beside political 
objections.22 An important achievement was that the Vatican was not entitled 
to complain about political vetoes. 
20 The Hungarian Envoy to the Vatican. 318. 
21 The Hungarian Envoy to the Vatican. 322, 347-352. 
22 CSIZMADIA: op. cit., 305-309. 
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In reality, a whole range of influential persons were involved in the 
nomination of candidates. In case of Sedes vacantia, depending on the 
importance of the see, the Prime Minister or the Minister for the Cultural 
Heritage conferred with the Primate. The Primate consulted the Papal Legate, 
but occasionally the P.M. contacted the Papal Legate. Then, after an agreement 
on the candidates, the Foreign Minister informed the Holy See through the 
Hungarian Envoy. The negotiations in Rome went on in the Mission—Foreign 
Ministry—Primate—Papal Legate circle. 
It is not without significance to write about the legalisation of the above-
mentioned circle. The research of Professor Csizmadia suggests that P.M. 
István Bethlen dealt with the issue in a conference on church politics on 9 July 
1925. Then the spheres of authority were clearly defined. Generally, the 
Foreign Ministry was to initiate negotiations with the Vatican, but the Minister 
for Religion and Education was to decide in church political issues. In the most 
important questions the P.M. was to make decisions. It was also declared that 
the Minister for the Cultural Heritage as a private person is also entitled to 
contact the Papal Legate. The bishops can also contact the Papal Legate, as 
well as the Vatican." 
Neither Intesa semplice, nor the above Government decree on the definition 
of spheres of authority in church politics states that the Primate should be 
involved in negotiations at any level. Oddly enough. Primate Csernoch, who 
participated in the preparation of Intesa semplice at home, noticed this 
deficiency only in the last minutes. He immediately asked the Minister for the 
Cultural Heritage to intervene in Rome in the interest of codifying the primate 
rights.24 However, the Holy See turned down this request. The reasons for the 
denial can only be guessed. As it was only a temporal pact, Rome perhaps did 
not want to cause the Primate inconveniences by prescribing the obligatory 
negotiation. Every soberly thinking government would consult the Primate 
anyway. (N.B. Csernoch refers to the fact that at the time of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy the Monarch consulted the Primate in each pontifical 
appointment.) Another explanation is that Serédi participating in the 
negotiations and refining the text of the Pact with Gasparri did not realise the 
significance of primate powers.25 These questions remain to be answered. The 
fact is that Csernoch's worries about Serédi 's primacy did not prove to be 
23 CSIZMADIA: op. cit., 298. 
24 CSIZMADIA: op. cit., 307-308. 
25 CSIZMADIA: op. cit., 302-303. 
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right, any government in office would always and regularly consult the Primate 
in case of a vacancy.26 
Serédi had a strange routine in episcopal appointments. He was a canonist, 
therefore he might have sympathised with fellow canonists more than 
theologians. It can be observed that in the second half of his primacy there 
were more canonists among candidates to bishops. Even Rome noticed it. 
When the Government again offered Ferenc Luttor, the canonist-lawyer of the 
Hungarian Mission to a prelacy, the Vatican firmly stated that since the 
appointment of Serédi it was decided the Holy See did not want to see any 
more canonists of the Mission in a prelacy.27 However, some canonists 
residing at home were appointed to a bishop, supposedly due to Serédi's good 
diplomacy. Slightly exaggerating we could suggest that this was the practice 
till the inauguration of József Bánk to the Eger, later the Vác Sees. 
2. Serédi and the dioceses of Trianon 
Serédi's appointment to primacy, which took place without consulting the 
Hungarian Government, was commented on by Barcza, the Hungarian Envoy 
to the Vatican: "the Vatican wishes candidates to prelacies who are highly 
disciplined, loyal to the Church and ready to represent the will of the Holy See 
and insist on the regulations of the canon law".28 This latter quality, an 
insistence on canon law is important to note. This was significant not only for 
the implementation of Codex Juris Canonici, but also for the reason that the 
majority of Hungarians residing over the new borders were Catholics. These 
facts and the problems of church organisation related to them resulted in a 
plenty of questions concerning international law. Not to mention the situation 
in the Esztergom diocese where 90% of its territory and a large proportion of 
the assets of the Archiépiscopal See became the property of Slovakia. 
Serédi got involved in these issues even at the time of his staying in Rome. 
He, being good at languages often translated for the new minority Hungarians 
visiting the Vatican. One of his biographers mentioned that once when he 
translated to one such delegation at a papal audience, Pius XHth smiling said 
26 CSIZMADIA: op. cit., 331, quotes Envoy Barcza's opinion about a complicated episcopal 
appointment (1933) which suggests Sercdi's proposal to postpone the appointment should be 
heeded, as "we could not propose any appointment without the Primate's consent". 
27 CSIZMADIA: op. cit., 339. 
28 CSIZMADIA: op. cit., 321. 
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to Serédi: he does not understand that some days before Serédi interpreted for 
a Slovakian pilgrim delegation, the day before for Yugoslavian visitors, and now 
for a Rumanian delegation. "Does everybody speak Hungarian there?"—asked the 
Pope benevolently.29 
Returning home from Rome as Primate and the Head of the Hungarian 
Episcopacy he had to deal with problems following from the new situation. 
At the end of World War I, two Hungarian bishops from Felvidék offered 
their service to the Vatican, still they had to leave their sees. At the 
beginning of Serédi's office, they were still alive in Hungary (N.B. they 
were honorary archbishops).30 Some of the bishops serving over the border 
had a good relationship with the Hungarian hierarchy. For example, the 
saintly Ágost Fischer-Colbrie, Bishop of Kassa; Károly Majláth, Bishop of 
Transylvania; his successor, Áron Márton, to mention a few. Both Rome and 
the Hungarian Government were of the opinion the bishops in service over the 
Trianon borders should not be appointed to the vacant Episcopal Sees in 
Hungary because of concerns for the flock living outside the state. There were 
worries that other prelates would also claim to come home to Hungary. 
The stand of the Hungarian Government is explicable, but Rome's rigidity 
could be explained by the Pope's character. Mr. Barcza, the Hungarian Envoy 
to the Vatican, in his official statement dated of 1931 in detail discusses the 
dawn of republican movement in Spain and the place of the Church in it. He 
mentions, among other things, how much the Vatican was shocked when 
Seguera, Archbishop of Toledo ran away from Spain to the Vatican at the 
beginning of the Revolution. Barcza writes: "When the Soviet troops were at 
the outskirts of Warsaw, Pius Xllth, then the Papal Legate to Warsaw, was the 
only person of the diplomatic corps who did not leave his mission. He really 
got furious when he heard about Seguera's flee ... the Holy See rejects this 
behaviour—continues the Envoy—not only for moral reasons, but because they 
think that the official concerned loses his moral superiority if he does not wait 
until he is forced to leave his mission. Beside Cardinal Seguera there were 
some other bishops who left their mission, probably not because of open 
violence. This did not strengthen the authority of the Church in Spain. The 
Hungarian bishops who did not escape during the Soviet Republic in Hungary 
in 1919 were mentioned as good examples!"31 
29 MESZLÉNYI: op. cit., 404. 
30 ВЕКЕ: op. cit.. Volume I from 39, 44-48, particularly 68. 
31 The Hungarian Envoy to the Vatican. 320-321. 
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The viewpoint of the Vatican in issues like this remained standard. In 1939, 
when the Soviet attacked Poland and the Polish Primate fled from Posen, the 
Holy See sent him back to his diocese despite an invitation by the Polish 
government to Paris. Apor, Hungarian Envoy to the Vatican wrote in his 
official statement: "Cardinal Maglione pronounced that a bishop is to remain 
in his diocese in whatever circumstances".32 
Other envoys in their statements underlined the importance of the Imperial 
Concordat with Germany dated of 1933. Masirevich, German Envoy from 
Berlin emphasises the significant 29th Passage of the Concordat: "...the German 
Government assumes an obligation to guarantee the ethnic minorities of 
Germany a treatment based on the principle of reciprocity in their religious life. 
In the relevant passage of the concluding protocol the Holy See expresses its 
intent to consider a similar protection of German minorities in concordats to 
be concluded in the future". 
Oddly enough, the Hungarian Mission in the Vatican, warning the Foreign 
Ministry referred to the same passage: "The 29th Passage is of special interest 
for Hungary, as that provides the same rights to a minority living in Germany 
as the home state of the given minority guarantees Germans living in its 
territory... The regulations of the Signature Protocol state the Holy See will 
assume an obligation to make sure (Bedacht nehmen), in accordance with the 
principles they respect, that in the interest of the German minorities a similar 
regulation be made in concordats to be concluded with other states. This 
expressed principle of the Vatican will be a feasible point of reference in the 
interest of Hungarian minorities."33 
The above documents seem to support the sayings according to which Primate 
Serédi well before the Vienna Arbitral Award of 1938, made preparations—with 
the help of the Vatican—for an agreement with the Czechoslovak State. This 
agreement would have considered the above—mentioned principles of reciprocity 
in the life of the ex-Hungarian dioceses in Felvidék, and it suggested the 
principles of parity in allocating church offices. The Hitler regime, after it 
became politically strong, would continuously breach the Imperial Concordat. 
This did not influence the Vatican which since that time has considered this 
democratic and modern treatment of ethnic minorities its own. It is very 
probable that Serédi, who had excellent connections with the Vatican, might 
have had the silent consent of the Vatican in his efforts to solve the problems 
32 The Hungarian Envoy to the Vatican. 287. 
33 The Hungarian Envoy to the Vatican: Report of Masirevich 214, Report of Thierry, Agent of 
the Vatican, 212. 
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of the church in the newly-created states of Trianon on the basis of reciprocity. 
It is remarkable, for example, that in the middle of the 1930s, the Vatican, after 
the Hungarian Government intervened, did not confirm the non-Hungarian 
candidates of the Rumanian Government to the Episcopal Sees of Várad and 
Szatmár.34 
This favourable trend was stopped after the unexpected decisions on 
territorial revision in the Vienna Arbitral Awards of 1938 and 1940. The tactful 
and considerate Serédi was not prepared for the changes in church 
administration following the border revisions. Supposedly, he might have 
expected the realisation of the draft he had been preparing, rather than a quick 
political decision which resulted in a late correction of the Treaty of Trianon. 
According to the records from the conferences of the Hungarian Episcopacy, 
one of the biggest problems of Serédi was the normalisation of relationships 
with the formerly detached dioceses. He, characteristically, did his best. One of 
the signs of his good will was that, not long after the implementation of the 
Vienna Arbitral Awards, he invited the bishops of the returned dioceses to the 
conference of the Hungarian Episcopacy.35 The co-operation which at first 
seemed to be peaceful soon ended. 
At the conference of the Hungarian Episcopacy in 1940, the Uniate bishops 
of Transylvania particularly opposed the Primate. The legal arguments motivat-
ing the political-ethnic conflicts are very interesting. The Uniate bishops had 
some legal reservation in the debate concerning the jurisdiction of the Primate. 
They said they regarded their participation at the Hungarian Episcopal 
Conference as a sign of their respect for the Primate, but the canon law does not 
oblige them to do so. They argued the Pope exempted them from the authority 
of the Esztergom Archbishopry at the foundation of the Fogaras-Balázsfalva 
Archbishopry, and subordinated them to himself. In his reply, Serédi, the 
canonist claimed he had the authority of a legate, which implies papal 
authorities, consequently they could not be exempted.36 
Then, during the debate it came to light the Uniates had a lot of real and 
presumed injuries, and the disagreement about the authorities was a symptom 
of the antipathy the governors of the Uniate Church in Transylvania felt about 
the territorial revision. Nevertheless, there was no time to harmonise the 
Hungarian Catholic hierarchy which extended in number out of necessity, in 
34 CSIZMADIA: op. cit., 336 and footnote 31. 
35 ВЕКЕ: op. cit., Volume II, 217, the Primate's announcement of the territorial changes in the 
minutes of the Hungarian Episcopacy. 
36 ВЕКЕ: op. cit.. Volume П. 247, 289, particularly 292-294. 
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a relatively short time. World War II and the unexpected death of Serédi 
stopped the further debates about church authorities.37 
37 MESZLÉNYI: op. cit., 1970, 433-434 and ВЕКЕ: The History of Hungarian Episcopacies and 
its Minutes 1945-48. Cologne-Budapest, 1966, 28, where the presiding Archbishop of Eger, 
Czapik, commemorating Jusztinián Serédi said: "The Lord sent for him on Holy Thursday (29th 
March) at noon." 
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Csaba VARGA Measuring through 
Patterning in Law 
Development of an Idea in Europe 
In the following we will lay particular stress on the development of thoughts 
relating to the ideal of law, throughout which the measure gains full in-
dependence in its use as a legal instrument. Therefore, we will not touch upon 
issues of technical development of the legal instrumentalities, although in a 
number of related cases and cultures compromise-seeking or counter-running 
trends also prevailed, paralysing and compromising the main directions. 
Classical Greek antiquity 
Let us first consider legal development in classical Greece. Thanks to 
archaeological legacy and written sources, we know almost everything about 
classical Greek culture, except for law,1 poorly represented in these traditions. 
One of the reasons for this may be that although ways and laws [nomos] were 
developed to a considerable extent, there was no law proper with the Greeks 
1 On Greek law in general, see JONES, J. W.: The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks: 
An Introduction (Oxford 1956), especially 1-36, as well as GARNER, R.: Law and Society 
in Classical Athens (London and Sydney 1987), especially chs. I and IV. 
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in early classical times, at least in the conceptualised sense of modernity.2 
Instead, what we could find with them was some sort of a diffuse practice, a 
dissipated and fragmented everyday use, hardly measurable by the standards of 
discipline and definiteness, distinction and internal closedness of modern law. 
Greek antiquity might not have been able to develop the media refined enough 
to contribute to the survival of classical Greek culture and sensibility in law in 
European civilisation, the same way that the refinement of thoughts and 
material culture could survive, as revealed by Homer's works. 
In the following we wish to contemplate the pattern represented by early 
Greek legal thought. What and how Aristotle wrote about equity and the lead 
measuring rule of the master builders of Lesbos3 might have been a drop in 
2 It is a later outcome—of Drakon's and Solon's era—that the rules of authority are 
named thesmos, with no regard of the fact as to whether public agreement backed them or 
not; and nomos [nomoi] stands for every rule accepted by (he community independently of 
its origin. Change in the use of words comes forth in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C., as 
originating from the beginning of Kleisthenes' rule (507 B.C.)—see OSTWALD, M.: 
Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy. Oxford, 1969—when the thesmos 
implying a dictatorial rule of law becomes outworn, and the expression nomos spreads 
widely concomitant to the use of psephisma initially having meant 'voting'. The laws of 
Drakon and Solon continue to prevail, and they are called nomos, since there was actually 
no voting on them. Thus, nomos is gradually regarded as more general, more fundamental 
and more constant |nomos = law; nomothe tai = legislator, law-giver] as a normative pattern, 
as opposed to the rather individually shaped, concrete and temporary decree [psephisma, 
psephismata]. Cf. MACDOWELL, D. M.: The Law in Classical Athens. London, 1978, 44-45, 
as well as TODD, S. C.: The Shape of Atheniim Law. Oxford, 1993, 18, which place this 
change of use in words to sometime after 403-402 B.C. 
3 "The puzzle arises because what is decent is just, but is not what is legally just, but a 
rectification of it. The reason is that all law is universal, but in some areas no universal rule 
can be correct; and so where a universal rule has to be made, but cannot be correct, the law 
chooses the (universal rule] that is usually [correct], well aware of the error being made. 
And the law is no less correct on this account; for the source of the error is not the law or 
the legislator, but the nature of the object itself, since that is what the subject-matter of 
actions is bound to be like. 
Hence whenever the law makes a universal rule, but in this particular case what 
happens violates the [intended scope of] the universal rule, here the legislator falls short, 
and has made an error by making an uncodificational rule. Then it is correct to rectify 
the deficiency; this is what the legislator would have said himself if he had been present 
there, and what he would have prescribed, had he known, in the legislation. 
Hence what is decent is just, and better than a certain way of being just—not better than 
what is unconditionally just, but better than the error resulting from the omission of any 
condition [in the rule]. And this is the reason why not everything is guided by law. For on 
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the bucket, and despite the simplistic nature of this device, it signalled an 
available alternative, even if just symbolically, yet decisively for posteriority 
by the offered technique. In every known earlier civilisation (ancient 
Mesopotamia and the Jewish communities prior to their Diaspora), the 
measuring instrument was something solid—firmly built, with a fixed shape, not 
changing its size. It was something concrete that not only symbolised length, 
but incorporated it by its physically identifiable form. Such an instrument 
presupposed the measure to be capable of defining both the framework for and 
the parameters of measuring. In traditional understanding, length is a feature 
measured along a straight line. Accordingly, the measuring instrument was 
constructed along a straight line, capable of being directly used on a flat 
surface without further adaptation or mediation, and the length could be 
determined by simply reading off the result. Well, the characteristic of the lead 
measuring rule was that it could be bent, and thereby easily adapting to curved 
surfaces. It could take the shape of any spatial object when used for measuring 
whatever one pleased to measure. 
We may claim that such a measuring instrument was rather a handy tool 
than any stiff stick. Considering the fact that it meant the only way to measure 
the length of curved, bent or angular surfaces, it certainly must not have been 
invented and used by chance. However, once the idea was applied to law it 
immediately became obvious that it also stood for something more or else. As 
Aristotle observed: by bending the straight, the underlying principle of the 
measuring measure was lost, for the measurement itself was adjusted to what 
it was meant to measure. What was to be applied as a measure was eventually 
broken into the casual and random characteristics of the object to be measured. 
Thereby, the measure itself became a function of the object to be measured. In 
other words, the straight line drawn on a flat surface, and thereby length as 
such, was relativised and the measure became a function of the measured 
object. 
Reconstructions provided by the history of science suggest that most of our 
civilisational abstractions (differentiation, counting, measuring, figurative 
representation, and so on) are rooted in our ancestors' ritual approaches to their 
ancient gods, whom they also contracted with later on. In the centre stood the 
some matters legislation is impossible, and so a decree is needed. For the standard applied 
to what is indefinite is itself indefinite, as the lead standard is in Lesbian building, where 
it is not fixed, but adapts itself to the shape of the stone; likewise, a decree is adapted to fit 
its objects." ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge 199?), 1137b, 144-145. 
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humble being performing the rite, and our modern idea of regarding everything 
as absolute developed in its primitive forms through the subsequent 
generalisation of the most personal equivalents set once by these humans to 
pattern and represent themselves in human sacrifice, a cultural achievement 
ultimately transplanted into lay practice.4 In sum, unmediated directness is the 
ancient condition, the protoform and once existing unity, from which various 
independent ideas, forms and applications have later branched off. 
As soon as we presume the presence of such measuring instrument, we must 
also recognise that law as usually accepted within European culture is 
excluded. For thinking tradition has always presumed law (1) to precondition 
some sort of a measure, and (2) this measure to be available in human 
environment. For, apparently, presumptions of human thinking assume as a 
psychological condition the certainty of having the measure with us, of being 
able to take hold of it and to point at the particular material feature that 
incorporates it. As if it were a sine qua non to have it within the reach of our 
hands. Moreover, we request it to be capable of telling us at any time and 
under any conditions what law is. This is why the archetype of any idea of law 
is a table or a book of laws, as rooted in the fundamental psychological needs 
of mankind. This also explains why the human race was so stubborn in fighting 
for recording the law throughout past millennia. It also provides the explication 
to the culture of customary rites from which the very first legal profession 
originates, that is, the practice devoted to the repetition of the law, by which 
the accepted measurement was publicly announced every year.5 
4 Cf., e.g., from the works of SEIDENBERG, A.: "The Separation of Sky and Earth at 
Creation" Folklore, 70, 1959, 474-^82, and 80, 1960, 188-196; "The Ritual Origin of 
Geometry" Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 1, 1960-61, 188-257; "The Ritual Origin 
of Counting" Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 2, 1962-66, 1—40; "On the Area of a 
Semi-Circle" Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 9, 1972, 171-211; and "The Ritual Origin 
of the Circle and Square" Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 25, 1981, 269-327. 
According to one of his recent works—SEIDENBERG, A. & CASEY, J.: "The Ritual Origin 
of the Balance" Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 23, 1980, 179-220—the origin of 
measurement is rooted in ancient sacrifice: whoever performs the sacrifice provides (by his 
weight or height) the measure itself, and the act of measuring is aimed at defining a symbolic 
value of equivalence, when substituting the personal sacrifice with the variables of whom 
performs the sacrifice. The relative measurement gains independence and claims absoluteness 
only during the slow process of secularisation of the rite (ibid., 211). 
5 Cf., VARGA, Cs.: Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon, Budapest, 1991, Part 
One. 
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The above holds for the higher and more abstract levels of generality too. 
English law presumes an underlying customary order, thought to have always 
existed. Even its naming reflects the prevailing ideology: this is the 
"immemorial custom of the Realm",6 notwithstanding the fact that the whole 
construct is sheer historical fiction.7 Of course, judicial experience may add 
that independently of what the juristic world-concept suggests, deciding what 
the customary order "says" will ultimately be declared by the judge in the 
given case.8 That is to say, whatever the accepted ideology may be, we still 
presume the existence of some measure. Both the deontology inspired by the 
prevailing juristic world-concept and the theoretical reconstruction revealing 
what lies under the ideological veal assure us that there is some measure in law 
and it does not depend on either of us, and certainly not on either of the actual 
actors. It remains independent of us even if it can be actualised by the judge 
deciding in the case. What the judge rules in the given case is his 
responsibility. The role of the judge is to decide the dispute with an authority 
independent from either of the parties. The ideology of Common Law adds one 
more consideration: the judge makes the decision he makes because he has no 
other choice. If he can make this only one as conclusive from the prevailing 
law and order, then it must have been given and must have always existed 
independently of him. 
Concerning the basis of this tradition of thought—presuming that law can 
only be what was already given and previously existed in some shape or form— 
the Civil Law conception is not much different from that of the Common Law. 
6 BLACKSTONE, W.: Commentaries on the Laws of England I, London, 1765, 73. Cf. 
SZLADITS, K., Jr.: Az angol jog kútfői [The sources of English law], Budapest, 1937, paras. 
3-4 , 8-10. 
7 "Blackstone's 'general customs' or 'customs of the realm' are those fundamental 
principles in legal relationships which for the most part are not to be found in any express 
formulation, but are assumed to be inherent in our social arrangements. They are, in short, the 
Common Law itself." ALLEN, C. K.: Law in the Making, Oxford, 1958, 70. Cf. also DAVID, 
R.: Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains: Droit comparé, Paris, 1964, para. 350. 
8 The classic English power of text-interpretation is symbolised by the manner in which 
bishop Benjamin Hoadly expressed (Sermon Preached before the King, 1717) and John 
Chipman Gray commented (The Nature and Sources of the Law, New York, 1948, 102) on 
it: "Bishop Hoadly has said: 'Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written 
or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the Law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the 
person who first wrote or spoke them'; a fortiori, whoever hath an absolute authority not 
only to interpret the Law, but to say what the Law is, is truly the Law-giver." Cf. KELSEN, 
H.: General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge, Mass. 1946, 154. 
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According to the Civil Law ideology prevailing on the European continent, law 
at any given time is embodied in a set of statutes, that is, books of enacted 
laws, and these are always ready-to-take: the law is given. Therefore, the only 
thing a judge is expected to do is to apply the law to individual situations. It 
is exclusively the law that asserts itself through the judge making a decision. 
The human, who happens to be a judge and must apply the law, takes part in 
the process only by chance and without any personal contribution to the 
outcome. For judges are the mere artificial media and mundane symbols of a 
process that will take place "objectively" in any case, that is, independently of 
them. 
To sum up, the legal world-view of the classical Greek antiquity bears the 
presence of the idea of an external measure quite loosely. There is no actual 
principle with the Greeks. What could serve for a principle is already broken 
into the casual, particular and arbitrary features of the event to be measured. 
Thus, the measurement itself becomes a function of the measured. 
Roman legal development 
1. The dilution-period Research aimed at reconstructing the Roman concept of 
law reveals the already established use of strict conceptual distinctions. For, 
according to Roman mentality, we can only imagine and name tilings that are 
unambiguously clear and built upon notions with marked outlines. 
The Roman jurisprudents were practical-minded professionals: it did not 
even occur to them to fall into sheer abstractions or raise theoretical questions 
about the definition of law. Their disciples, the Romanists, were mainly 
interested in unravelling—by systematising—the Roman heritage from a doctrinal 
point of view. Nowadays it might seem a commonplace, but from within a 
socialisation in a legal culture built upon abstract conceptualisations, I have 
been shaken by a realisation I had to face three decades ago. A legal scholar 
from Paris, Michel Villey, who was like a patron-father to me in my early 
scholarly years, presumed for himself rather eccentric views for the time. Being 
a legal philosopher well-learned in Greek, Roman, and mediaeval Latin 
sources, he might have felt an inner conviction to consider the ages after 
classical Roman antiquity the dead-end of errings within voluntarism.9 Tireless 
in argumentation, he proved repeatedly and very consistently that the ideal of 
9 VILLEY, M.: "Essor et décadence du volontarisme juridique" Archives de Philosophie 
du Droit III, Paris, 1958. 
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law prior to modern times had still been a medium for naturalistic discipline, 
supporting the moral world order in its self-assertion. It was not pure invention, 
or the toy for absolutisms, and was not used to enforce momentary ideas. His 
challenging arguments within the topic10 have yet to be disprove by specialists 
of Roman law. (The want for rejection is, of course, far from being a positive 
proof, since it may also happen that students specialised in Roman law are not 
interested in features of the common heritage in the same way he was.) 
According to Villey, Roman law followed the Greek pattern for a long 
period of time. It was the dikaion that served for law. As to its origins, dikaion 
means what is just; or, taking a step further back in origins, the dikaion is what 
is considered just, what is achieved, helping the ones whose task it is to 
achieve it.11 More precisely, dikaion is the individual justness of the 
individual case, what the parties involved have to finally reach, provided they 
search for it relentlessly. Or, dikaion is not simply law, moreover, it expressly 
differs from the ideal of law of modern cultures.12 The only conclusion that 
can be drawn from this realisation is that law as experienced today did not 
exist in early classical antiquity. No trace of it can be found either with the 
Greeks or the Romans prior to the republican era. 
10 Cf. VILLEY, M.: "Questions de logique dans l'histoire de la philosophie du droit" 
Logique et Analyse, 37, 1967, 3-22, reprinted in Etudes de logique juridique IV, Bruxelles, 
1967, 3-22; as well as VILLEY, M.: IM formation de la pensée juridique moderne, Paris n.y. 
11 In its etymological contexture (e.g., based on HOMER: Iliad XVI, 541-542), the 
construction is confirmed by CRUZ, S.: lus Derectum (Directum): Dereito (Derecho, Diritto, 
Droit, Direito, Recht, Right, etc.), Coimbra 1986, 34-35. On the full complexity of its set of 
concepts, cf. LIDELL, H. G. & SCOTT, R.: A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford, 1973, 429. 
GARNER (passim, especially ch. I, para. 2) is extremely critical of such an interpretation; his 
reconstruction of the concept (p. 4, and OSTWALD, M.: "Ancient Greek Ideas of Law" in 
Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies in Selected Pivotal Ideas, New York, 1973, 678) 
is, at the same time, mostly reminding of the world-view of the Chinese Tao. For the 
background also see WESTRUP, С. W.: "Sur la notion du droit et sur le mode primitif de 
formation du droit positif, c'est-à-dire du droit coutumier" Tijdschrift voor Rechts-
geschiedenis XI, 1932, 1-18. 
12 CORNFORD, F. M.—in From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western 
Speculation, New York and Evanston, 1957, para. 97, pp. 172-177—deduces the word dika 
from the concept of the usual order of nature (cf. HOMER: Odyssey XI, 218 and PLATO: 
Laws 904E), immediately relating it to the Buddhist dharma, the Vedic Rta (cf. 
OLDENBERG: Die Relig. des Veda, p. 196), and to the concept of the Persian asha (cf. 
CHANTEPIE DE LA PAUSSAYE: Manuel d'histoire des réligions, Paris, 1904, 467). 
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All through its evolution, law has been a casual and incidental product, 
emerging from within a more or less spontaneous social process. It did by no 
means represent anything given, present or disposable. It was not something 
freely avoidable, or—this being the advantage of constituted things—it could be 
rejected only with a reason, by repelling an otherwise natural continuation. 
Law, in its evolution, is not something exposable as a real object, like a 
Mosaic stone. Neither it is an end-product, like a book of laws. For law is the 
outcome of processes everywhere and at any time, but especially during this 
period. In its classical Greek understanding, law is a result anyone can/could 
arrive at. Only provided, of course, that one is prepared to take part in the 
common shaping of the law as a good judge, sensitive to communitarian 
values, and experienced in finding paths to them. Naturally, finding the path 
presumes a journey, yet journeys done with a given purpose may have several 
ways around. It may happen that we arrive somewhere else than we initially 
meant to. Well, with the dikaion there is no assurance that we will find the 
path or reach the desired result. The only thing we can be sure of is that the 
path can be found; yet there are no guarantees that it will finally be reached. 
Proper media and proper personalities are required: a judge who is able to find 
the path within the given medium. 
As Villey put it: law in the pre-classical ages only served for a spring-board 
to arriving at law proper, that is, dikaion. Any legal proposition the judge 
could make reference to could serve as a starting point at the most in finding 
the concrete justness of the concrete case. For justness was thought to be 
individual, which the parties in the trial had to achieve. To put it another way, 
law was not yet conceptualised. It made its appearance in speech, in the 
sequence of words, but it was not yet forced into clear-cut conceptual schemes 
as elements of a logified system. What was actually regarded as law was used 
to launch the debate, and provide its framework. Still, it was not meant to 
predetermine the outcome thereof. Individual solutions or recipes ready-to-take 
acceptable as law were only available through the judge acting on behalf of the 
community. Titus, it did not serve as a recipe to be applied under any 
conditions. On the other hand, anything that could be regarded as substantially 
contributing to finding this very solution could become its component. 
According to the underlying thought pattern, law built upon the ideal of 
dikaion can be considered open argumentation. A reasoning is open if it allows 
any set of solutions without previous determination. It is open if it may refer 
to or rely on anything the parties recognise as helpful in finding the 
individually just solution. A reasoning is open when it sets the only goal to 
arrive at a decision acceptable for the community. Well, to better understand 
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the issue let us contrast open argumentation to what it negates, closed 
reasoning. Let us imagine a hierarchical relationship with rigid subordination 
schemes, for example, the one established in the army. The service regulation 
in the army provides a one-way commanding chain including the exclusivity 
of closed argumentation. That is to say, whatever event is to be faced, the 
subordinate can communicate only by choosing and applying one from among 
the previously codified set of patterns, and the other way around, the superior 
may respond by choosing from the patterns applicable in the responding 
channel. Be it the case that an enemy broke the lines and is shooting the target, 
or that the subordinate wishes to use the restroom, the communication will 
follow a homogenised pattern. This is perfect closedness itself. In any possible 
situation that may occur, the party entitled to determine the path of 
communication will choose one of the previously established patterns and by 
applying it will decide the issue for good. This response will be definitive and 
of merit. The subordinate cannot contest this response. At the most the superior 
of his superior can do it in a subsequent procedure (e.g., for assessing personal 
achievement), qualifying the case, may be, as missing the point, but only 
posteriorly. In sum, nobody can influence the direct operative force of the 
answer (as the case might be: the inadequacy of the procedure chosen by the 
superior) by any means. On the other hand, in case of open reasoning one can 
take any direction and make reference to anything, since the only goal of the 
procedure is that the discussion (not limited in its sources of inspiration, 
means, or references) should lead to a result accepted by the community, 
through which the chosen procedure will ultimately get justification as well. 
2. Praetorian law After a certain period of time the law as described above 
also had to be restricted and limited. While according to the idea of dikaion 
any reference could be included in the reasoning—with the only restriction 
that the arguments originate from law, or at least be retraceable to legal 
tradition—because the exclusive target was the individual justness of the 
individual case, in the republican era a search started for closing the argu-
mentation. 
As is well known, there are two ways of setting limits to reasoning. On the 
one hand, we can determine procedurally who can participate in the given 
reasoning, in what way and sequence, and within what time frames. We can 
also define the form of procedure, for instance, the way an argument one of the 
parties intends to introduce to the process ought to be presented. (Let us recall 
that a similar procedural formalisation eventually became the fundamental 
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organising means of English law.13 For about a thousand years, the question 
of whether law exists and what it may be for a given subject was determined 
by the availability of a specific judicial procedure, namely a formula instituting 
an action which could ensure the judicial enforcement. For this reason the 
adage "no writ, no right" could become the foundational principle of Common 
Law thinking. For generations of jurists this adage provided the basis for the 
particular understanding that it is not necessary for the law to be recorded in 
books as letter-formulas, neither to assign primary importance to abstractly 
defining what a person's rights are in an imaginary situation, since if proper 
judicial procedure is institutionalised and made available, and, as the case may 
be, the parties recourse to it, the process must ultimately lead to the proper 
declaration of what the law is. That is to say, law is built upon trust, upon the 
continuity of tradition arching over generations: in as much as the due process 
of law is ensured, the proper solution will follow in and of itself.) On the other 
hand, one can select and delimit the sources from which arguments can be 
taken. In such case, independent of the intention (be it that the actor in our 
previous example asks for permission to open fire or to go to the restroom), 
the arguments will be strictly codified both in their merits and in the way they 
can be presented: they can only be from the set of previously established 
patterns. This is comparable to making pigeon-holes for notions, defining the 
number, sequence and order of the holes. Whatever consideration we may hold, 
one can only choose from the given arguments. One can choose either of them 
almost at full discretion, feeling perhaps somewhat restricted in choice by the 
rules of use attached to the set of arguments. Either in the case that the answer 
is delivered under the enormous burden of personal responsibility or with a 
sheer routine concealing the lack of genuine interest, from this point on one 
can proceed only by fitting the opinion into the clothes of previously 
established patterns, the entire argumentation taking the shape of some sort of 
repetition. 
In praetorian jurisdiction the unbound freedom of reasoning was surpassed 
by delimiting the procedures that could be followed and then attaching the 
referable sources of arguments to well-defined authorities. 
One of the key instruments to implementing the above changes was the 
institutionalisation of relevance. Relevancy introduced a new principle of 
selection, as, in opposition to open reasoning, it was built on formal criteria. 
13 On the history, practice and theory of writs, i.e., the Anglo-Saxon formulas in comparison 
with the Roman actio, see, e.g., PETER, 11.: Actio und Writ: Eine vergleichende Darstellung 
römischer und englischer Rechtsbehelfe, Tübingen, 1957. 
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For the sake of conceptual clarification, we must make it clear that no 
relevancy with substantive claims would be relevancy any longer. With 
substantive arguments, we may also reason by referring to something that can 
forward the judgement. Once restrictions are made—be they of procedural 
nature or delimiting the sources or the character of the arguments—we 
unavoidably advance and thereby pre-select certain procedural channels or 
paths. By the force of qualifying them as relevant we make them exclusively 
available, and by introducing these arguments to the procedure we allow the 
case to be brought up, or allow us to join it. All in all, the procedure has been 
transformed into pattern-followance: by having attached any step in procedure 
to a criterion, we have reduced judicial invention to a function of previously 
established patterns. 
Once relevancy is institutionalised it will exclusively depend on the applied 
criteria that when interpretation is required—e.g., in case of a rule saying "Dogs 
are not allowed into the park!"—using the word 'dog' will depend on the 
selected terms whether we mean an animal with brown colour and weighing 
a few pounds, or rather one which usually has an unpleasant odour, dirties the 
place very quickly, suddenly starts biting, barking or running in all directions, 
and whose rushing into the park may disturb those who wish to have a rest, 
and so on. 
No matter what is to be defined (dog, house, fence, car or human being), 
each definition will necessarily display an inexhaustibly rich mine of 
possible traits and aspects from among the ones we can count with. Each of 
them can turn out to be (possibly or exclusively) relevant. All the above 
depends on what criteria we set. Thus, we place relevancy into a position to 
individually pre-select the values to be protected and, in addition, define 
them as well. 
We will see in another context that relevancy's role is not restricted to 
closed reasoning. Everyday thinking and common language use are both built 
upon relevancies.14 We rely on relevance whenever we approach facts in 
either everyday life or scientific reconstruction. To put this in a life-like 
form of expression: we can perceive something only if it is "reminding" of 
something previously perceived. Moreover, in the basic act of perception 
(that is, when using organs of sense or engaging into some sort of 
perception) the stimulus will be interpreted in the neural processes of the 
14 Cf. KENDAL, G. H.: Facts, Toronto, 1980, and, in a wider context, see VARGA, Cs.: 
Theory of the Judicial Process: The Establishment of Facts, Budapest, 1995, ch. 3. 
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organism only in relations to and through some expressly or tacitly acknowl-
edged relevances.15 
As far as law is concerned, as legal development advanced human situations 
became more and more complex, so their immense variety could only be 
expressed if reduced to so-called typical situations. Therefore, since various 
situations may occur, these have to be projected on some previously established 
(codified) typical situations so that they can be processed through law and be 
transformed into a case within the law, making them available to regulation or 
normative patterning. The human process of normative standardisation and 
adjudication is limited due to its very nature, therefore an artificial filter must 
be applied. As a comparison, let us consider a situation in which we face an 
immense body of water, and our only disposable means to drain it is a set of 
pipes of given shape and permeability. Yet, we also need to realise that as soon 
as we start thinking in terms of pipes and procedures, we cannot (and actually 
do not) consider water "in general" any more. 
Once some relevancy surfaces it is no longer the water "in general" that 
will interest us, but exclusively its rather practical procedural aspects, namely, 
the intriguing question of how we can start and efficiently end the work with 
our pipes and procedures. So to speak, from now on the relevance as such and 
relevance only will be directly relevant.16, 17 
15 The so-called Gestalt psychology had a revolutionary realisation, namely that in the 
process of perception the conscious does not build the whole from the parts, on the contrary, 
following the recognition of the inlerpretable whole as reminiscent of some previously 
interpreted, the individual components and their variations are identified afterwards. On the 
classics, see KOFFKA, K.: Principles of Gestalt Psychology, London and New York, 1935, 
and WERTHEIMER, M.: Productive Thinking, London, 1966; in a current elaboration, 
HAMLYN, D. W.: The Psychology of Perception: A Philosophical Examination of Gestalt 
Theory and Derivative Theories of Perception, London, 1957, and KATZ, D.: Gestalt 
Psychology: Its Nature and Significance, London, 1951; for further analysis, see GRICE, H. 
P.: Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass. and London 1989, and JACKSON, F.: 
Perception: A Representative Theory, Aldershot, 1993; for a philosophical summary, 
LANDESMAN, C.: The Eye and the Mind: Refections on Perception and the Problem of 
Knowledge, Dordrecht and London, 1993. 
16 The role of legal advisor lies in revealing the relevant factual circumstances. Legislation 
differs from other curing mechanisms in that its virtue and possibility to fail is primarily not 
in the merit of its answers but in finding adequate relevancies. We may have some good 
advice for how to ease tensions, but purposeful within law can only be the institutionalisation 
of a procedure that successfully combines the selection of relavancies suitable for launching 
a procedure (that is, factual circumstances provable within a trial procedure) with a legally 
operable sanctioning mechanism. On basis of the successive series of English statutes on race 
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3. Justinian's codification In the mature Roman imperial era—culminating in 
Justinian's time^the formal features of law became systematic and exclusive, 
permeating law as a whole. Our historical knowledge ascribes the change and 
the formation of numerous instruments of modern legal arrangements 
(conceptual system and regulatory tools) to Justinian. Yet, closer analysis 
revealed that nothing really new emerged under his reign. Actually, it is the 
conclusion of legal development that was done in Iiis time. May we ask: what 
and how was concluded? The usual answer holds: through codification. Albeit 
in reality the jurisprudents assigned by Justinian—about whom we may find 
classical reference in Titus Livius18 and others—did not do anything but search 
for and choose from various sources of law and, finally select the ones they 
considered suitable. That is to say: they incorporated the selected sources into 
a compilation which the Emperor declared as the only one referable at court. 
The outcome was one single body of laws and it was made exclusively 
referable. So Justinian was the first to combine legal codification with the 
prohibition of interpretation. 
After die sources of law had been consolidated, anyone could tell what the 
law of the empire at any given time was. The only requirement was to verify 
what was formalised as law as having formally been incorporated in the 
compilation. For a contrast, let us recall that not long ago the law was the 
dikaion: some sort of a formless medium, which hardly qualified as worthy of 
being called ius. Well, the mass of such ius constituted the material from 
which the Emperor had to choose. What the jurisprudents compiled into the 
Digesta and Justinian's Codex became the prevailing body of the law to be 
enforced by the imperial power, by promulgating it as parts of imperial edicts, 
that is, by the act of their enactment as law. The imperial lex thereby reduced 
relations promulgated due to various good intentions and idealistic pressures, see VARGA, 
Cs.: "The Law and Its Limits" in his Law and Philosophy: Selected Papers in Legal Theory, 
Budapest, 1994, 91-96. 
17 Type-constraint ascribed to a codified set is characteristic of formalised conceptual 
systems and procedural orders, which may have alienating effects when transferred to fields 
alien to own merits and inherent nature. STEINER, G.—in his Language and Silence, 
Harmondsworth, 1967, especially at 136-137—called the attention upon the merciless 
destructive effects that are to realise when private intimacies (especially sexual habits and 
intimate communication) are publicised by the media: it is not liberating but emptying for 
future generations, since breaking privacies into types degrades the audience into external 
pattern-followers, depriving living individualities of the magic of incomparable uniqueness. 
18 LIVY [Titus Livius Rerum Romanorum ab urbe condita] English translation II, trans. B. 
O. Foster, Cambridge and London, 1967, III, 9-57, especially at 113-195. 
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the idea of ius proper to what was legally posited. Statute became the exclusive 
carrier of the law, making it irrelevant (and even forbidden) to refer to 
anything else as law. (As nowadays, the law can be criticised from an external 
point of view at the most, projecting a value judgement from outside onto the 
values formulated within the law.) 
As seen above, Justinian invented the instrumentality for ensuring the 
enforcement of his code, which later became a well-known tool at Frederick 
the Great. For he created an imperial committee next to him to clarify 
interpretational problems that could occur in the process of application.19 We 
ought to realise that the notion itself thereby became suspicious because a 
negative value judgement stained the original meaning of 'interpretation'. 
Perhaps this is the first instance where the word 'interpretation* disguised 
'lawyering' as 'pettifogging' or 'nit-picking'. It is the first time that a false 
contradiction appears between the allegedly clear meaning of legal provisions 
and the unambiguity of their followance, on the one hand, and the intentional 
ambiguity of the procedural definition of meanings and their burdening with 
possibilities of evasion, on the other.20 For the act of demanding and 
performing 'interpretation' has been made suspicious in and of itself from the 
very beginning. The entire late-Roman thinking in terms of codification is built 
upon the assumption according to which if the emperor wishes to say what the 
law is, he will do so and, by doing so, the issue itself is solved: all subjects of 
the empire will promptly know what the law is, so that they can conform 
themselves to it and avoid sanction. 
Or, one could say that the law has been objectified through its con-
ceptualisation. From now on the law is embodied by conceptually generalised 
norms which can be safely applied to any concrete individual situation in a way 
that the relevant norms offer a decision for the cases in question. 
Indeed, the idea of a code was thereby born. In other words, this is the 
projection of the prevailing pattern onto law, represented in European history 
in its most pure form by Frederick the Great. As is known, he dreamt about 
becoming the progenitor of his empiredom, the exclusive centre of creation 
radiating to and demanding prevalence everywhere.21 This assumes the idea 
19 Cf., VARGA: Codification..., in particular at 37, and notes 31 and 34 at 44-45. 
20 As a modern presentation, we may find the most classic expression with Luther, cf. 
LUTHER, M.: Tischreden (Weimar edition or by Förstemann & Bindseit). 
21 In the most telling form of expression, see MACAULAY, 'Г. В.: "Frederick the Great" in 
(Lord Macaulay's) Essays, London, 1895, 808 and 815, as well as MANN, T.: "Frederick the 
Great and the Grand Coalition: An Abstract for the Day and the Hour" in his Three Essays, 
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that whoever posits the imperial will, will posit society by his act as 
well.22 
Once law is created on the basis of such understanding, it also becomes 
clear that the normative production will necessarily result in positivation, in the 
marshalling sense that further positivations will only be derived from it. It is 
essential to comprehend that within a culture of regulation like this, what 
derives from the leading positivation (or its derivatives) will derive logically 
and linguistically—thai is, unambiguously, out of necessity, allowing no 
varieties and exceptions, by the force of logic. 
Enlightened European absolutisms were laid on this fundamental idea. The 
monarchs assumed that in the political hierarchy of a well-arranged empire it is 
the creator, the sole Ego that truly counts. Therefore, every office and office-
holding beyond this will be sheer application, that is, implementation. This means 
the execution of something that has already been decided in all its details. The 
prevailing opinion of the time expressed a mechanical world-view, as opposed 
to the discretional arbitrariness of feudal absolutisms, according to which the 
judge deciding and resolving social conflicts—reminiscent of Charles de 
Montesquieu's expression—is hardly more than a living mouth that can only 
pronounce the provisions of the law and nothing but the law.23 
Yet, the conviction reducing the judge's role to the living mouth in service 
of the law will necessarily assume the humble realisation that the weight of the 
personal contribution to, and the responsibility to be born for the decisions is 
next to nothing. Obviously, this is not because someone has broken the order 
of society and anarchy is ruling, but because tliis is what derives from the very 
idea of order. Precisely because there is an overall order, the order is an overall 
one—implying that no one has (or can have) any further role in addition to the 
one of the law. If the magisterial decision can only be done within the limits of 
statutory définitions, the responsibility for it will also have to be born by the 
legislator, the sole master of statutory definitions. There is no other player on 
the stage and no further role missing either. 
London, 1932, 156-157. 
22 LUKÁCS, G •—"Solzhenitsyn's Novels" in his Solzhenitsyn, London, 1969, 
52-55—criticises Stalin for the same reason, namely that by this he deprives society of its 
driving forces and subjects it to degeneration into a sheer tool of an external will. 
23 "Mais les juges de la nation ne sont [...] que la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi, 
des êtres inanimés qui n'en peuvent modérer ni la force ni la rigueur." MONTESQUIEU: De 
l'esprit des his book XI, ch. VI in his Oeuvres complètes I, Paris, 1839, 196. 
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Finally, we should recall the structure of the Digesta and the lasting effect 
of the solution it offered. The Digesta—just as all subsequent codes undertaking 
the embodiment of laws in one single corpus (instead of re-enacting them as 
logically inter-related parts constituting a system)24—compiled the chaotic series 
of provisions into one given body, and nothing more. A historical collection was 
thereby accomplished, accumulating (without any arrangement, correction, 
adaptation, hiérarchisation, systématisation or reformulation) largely divergent 
legal opinions and considerations. Still, it marked a crucial milestone in legal 
development, considerably simplifying the chaotic mass of situations as subjects 
to decision. From then on the logic for procedure became feasible as follows: 
the law embodied in a text either includes a passage for the case or not. If it 
does, then the debate—in accordance with the ancient principle of quod dixit 
dixit: by the bare existence of the locutio— is resolved and the decision made, 
since the only job is to apply the provision for the situation, and this will 
already lead to the decision. In the reverse case, when there is no relevant 
passage, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the case does not have 
a legal solution, since there are no provisions for its solution. 
Enlightened absolutism 
Enlightened absolutism usually means the era prior to the bourgeois trans-
formation mainly in Western Europe, and especially in France, Germany and 
other countries of similar historical evolution. Enlightened absolutism also 
means the particular era of legal development when the monarch, by the force 
of his centralised power, becomes capable of asserting Iiis own interests as state 
interests, and initiates a systematic and comprehensive legislation to set an 
organisational framework for their practical implementation. 
The monarch's goal is irrelevant in the above perspective. It is enough to 
learn that there are not just ideas, games and bettering intentions that may lead 
him, but also the constraint of choosing between the prospects of survival and 
destruction. The country and the sovereign's cause cannot survive unless 
feudal division is overcome. To gain predominance, the monarch must establish 
state finances as separate from his own. An impersonal, rational and 
comprehensible order in financing imperial unity has to be established so 
that—as the second precondition—the state army can be set up by replacing the 
24 On the separation of the types of codification as quantitative accumulation and as 
qualitative reformulation of the law, see VARGA: Codification..., ch. XI, para. 2. 
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rivalry between various feudal lords' private armies with a centralised army 
under royal command. In order to be able to dispose of state finances needed 
to equip and maintain the state army the sovereign must interfere—as the third 
preconditioir-in the economy, thereby making separate sources of income 
available for state purposes. 
This is the point where modern development in Europe starts, when the 
monarch dares to intervene with trade, agricultural and industrial affairs, and 
when—only thinking of François Marie Arouet de Voltaire's black journal-
ism25—even the question of uniform measures arises as an issue of state unity. 
It also implies the realisation—and this is the moment for us to see law and legal 
organisation as a sine qua non—that a complex and bureaucratically routinised 
administration is needed to handle the financial and military affairs. For the 
monarch who excels only in superimposing his own will (by force, strategy or 
art) can no longer set the course for the future. Exclusively a monarch who 
creates and organises the financial support of war and peace-by founding and 
bureaucratically operating an institutionalised state machinery—can have hope of 
success in prevailing over the new hegemonies. 
In order to implement these, the ruler must provide for complex and 
comprehensive legislation. An enormous mass of provisions is needed for 
accomplishing a suitable regulation in a way to unify the existing sources of law 
and make them free of contradictions. State offices have to be set up and an 
army of state officials appointed for that an impersonal application of the 
aggregate of new regulations at a mass size to be possible as well as to 
guarantee the proper operation and practical implementation of the law. 
Codification performing the sheer quantitative summation of the law into one 
body of laws (practically exhausted in recording and, occasionally, reforming 
the customary law) did not prove enough for the new job of processing, 
systematising, and also compiling such an enormous quantity of norms. 
Monarchs and jurisprudents went back to an instance as old as the one of 
classical Roman empire, almost forgotten in Europe: Justinian's legislation. 
(We may realise later on how different a perception they had of the Roman-
Byzantine archetype, depending on what formed the basis of their experience: 
the dismembered variety of customary laws on the European Continent, or the 
uniform royal administration of justice on the British Isles. For divergent 
25 VOLTAIRE: Dictionnaire philosophique in his Oeuvres complètes VII (Paris 1876); cf., 
VARGA: Codification..., especially at 95-97 and notes 16-18 at 127-128. 
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experience could see different traditions in the same historical roots, thus giving 
birth to different traditions.26) 
The solution was to design legiferation within the framework of the 
axiomatic ideal of system so that the aggregate of all individual norm-
enactments could be organised into, and applied as relevant parts of, a system. 
The idea of such a system proved to be rather specific from a systemic point of 
view as well, since it could qualify as a system only for the reason that its 
individual provisions were promulgated together as parts of one consolidated 
act. The underlying idea suggests that what in legislation is enacted as a total 
sum of rules is considered a system. Or, both the process and its outcome bear 
an ideological character, independent of actual contents. In the ultimate analysis, 
it is a system because it claims to be, and it operates as a system because the 
legal profession recognises it by operating it as a system. All in all, it qualifies 
as a system since the legal profession actually enforces it through living 
practice. That is to say, the contingency built into the construction and structure 
of such a system is counter-balanced by judicial practice, which, secondarily 
positing—wliile applying—the law, actually forms a real system from it. 
Paradoxically enough, any aggregate will transform into a real system if it is 
applied as a system consistently and recurrently. 
What does the idea of system consist of here? Systemic character is 
embodied, first of all, in that it is applied as if it expressed an internal logical 
consistency and necessity. So, it is applied in a way that it can result in nothing 
but one single decision, exclusively conclusive and fulfilling all requirements 
for justification. And also the operations within the system suggest a formalised 
and logified medium, as if the given result derived therefrom by the force of 
formal logical necessity, that is, in an exclusively justifiable way. 
What is added to the notion of codification by enlightened absolutism is the 
idea of system as such. The pattern offered by Justinian in Iiis Codex 
Justinianus was, however, contingent. For if there is a set within logic which 
is known to be contingent, the elements thereof will also be fully contingent. 
Consequently, the sub-set of elements missing from the set will also be 
contingent. That is to say, in an arbitrary aggregate in which the occurrence of 
the actual components is entirely arbitrary, even the set of missing components 
will be arbitrary. In other words, if the components in the set are called "law", 
26 Referring to the compilation undertaken by Justinian as the synonym for objectifying the 
law by committing it into writing, sec, e.g., BEDE: Hist. Eccl. II, 5 (BEDE: A History of the 
English Church and People, Harmondsworth, 1968, 108) who mentions exempla Romanorum 
when speaking of the barbarian IMWS of Aethelberht (around 731). 
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and the missing ones "gaps in law", both the gaps and their fillings whatever 
way they were born must be arbitrary as well. 
In enlightened absolutism the idea of system transcended the pattern set by 
Justinian only in that it replaced the mere collection of norms into an 
incidental chaos by conscious and foreplanned norm-positing. No doubt that a 
system was thereby created in the sense of provident, thorough planning and 
coherent building, yet the implementation of its axiomatic ideal was only 
crowned by partial success. The doctrinal rigidity of the Prussian Landrecht 
gave birth to a non-viable gnome, and Frederick the Great's attempts at a 
minutely accurate regulation degenerated into genuine casuism.27 It actually 
fulfilled the requirements of an axiomatically built system through elevating 
each individual norm-proposition to the rank of axiom, instead of deducing the 
system from axiomatic premises, breaking it down gradually and consistently. 
In consequence, independently of how much we strive after filling the 
casual gaps, we cannot alter the contingency of the system itself. As soon as 
one gap is filled other gaps may emerge, because no comprehensive principle 
and in-built ground for further arrangement will be provided through filling any 
series of individual gaps. To better understand this issue we will use an 
expressive comparison. Let us suppose that we would like to hit certain circles 
on a target. We may agree to each shoot three times a round and afterwards see 
how many hits each of us had. Yet, in a less fair manner, we may also agree 
to use machine guns, leading even to the possible physical destruction of the 
27 From the tremendous mass of some twenty-two-thousand sections of regulation, quite a 
number apply only for picket- and board-fences respectively, and the instructions for cases 
of child-murder require more than a hundred paragraphs. 
"The editors of the Landrecht, not taking into consideration the fact that the demands of 
life cannot be forced into a predefined framework but must draw their nourishment from the 
enlivening principle of freedom, strove for pushing life conditions into thousands and 
thousands of minute paragraphs, so if one is eventually bound to look into the Prussian 
Landrecht will in any case »miss the wood for the tree«, as Bluntschli makes the appropriate 
remark. And as these thousands and thousands of minute rules compromised the demands of 
life rather than sanctioned them, [...] we may easily see the reason [...] why this Code 
became outdated within barely 20 years." "The ones who prepared the Code had to therefore 
attempt to create rules for every possible case; because it is most impossible to force those 
judges to be exhausted in mechanical activity who while being faced with the thousands and 
thousands of manifestations of life, are destined to untie the most variably complicated knots: 
the untenability of this major principle in the Code is obvious to an extent not to require any 
further proof." DAEMPF, S.: A magánjog és tárgya: különös tekintettel a magyar általános 
magánjog codificatiojára (Private law and its subject: with special emphasis on the 
codification of Hungarian general private law, Pécs, 1877, 175-176 and 177-178. 
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entire target (just like late communist top nomenklatura rank and files in 
Hungary considered it hunting to chase the game in jeeps and shoot at it with 
machine guns). It might be a justified hope that shooting vehemently enough 
will increase the chance of hitting the target despite major dispersion. 
Returning to the pattern by Justinian: no system can actually be revealed from 
his Code. Nevertheless, what it displays is merely a total set of incidentalities. 
In such case we may attempt to completely fill the gaps by destroying the 
target. There are no other alternatives. There is no genuine solution in law in 
particular for law does not even have the clear physical outlines of a target. In 
conclusion, there are no available means of achieving a complete and gapless 
regulation in law. 
In sum, the idea of system of enlightened absolutisms makes an advance 
similar to blowing up the target, instead of shooting at it with individual bullets 
and counting the individual hits. Also the feasibility of gaps in law is thereby 
excluded, for the emergence of the question itself is excluded: did we have a hit 
at all? Obviously, this is a radical solution, requiring radical intervention. 
Instead of a fairly easy (yet unknown for the time) search for a solution in 
principle, the chance of any response is rather excluded by over-securing what 
is attempted as over-execution. 
The codificational ideal of the Code civil 
After exuberant attempts (concluded by Frederick the Great's Preussisches 
Landrecht), for the first time in legal development a systematic completeness 
was achieved by reconstructing the law in a logically coherent structure, 
gradually building up the law's system in a consistent way, starting from the 
general and breaking it down to a series of particulars—that is, as the hierarchical 
summation of fundamental principles, rules, exceptions to the rules and, finally, 
exceptions to the exceptions. 
The axiomatic construction could only result in regulatory completeness, as 
the ideal of regulation proper strove for completeness. 
No wonder that in practice the enacted rules are not complete in and of 
themselves. It often happens. The decisive change is that there is a solution in 
principle and actual gaps are no longer in a position to refute the claim for 
completeness as a reasonable objection. From then on, no matter how true, it is 
useless to mention that, for instance, mining law, labour law, social law and 
other modern fields are missing from the system of the Code civil. 
Notwithstanding that entire fields of regulation are missing from its regulatory 
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system, it still includes tacitly accepted or expressly recorded principles which 
define, through either setting the framework or direct wording, what the 
legislator actually intended to regulate. At the same time the same principles 
guarantee in practice that everything the legislator meant to regulate (that is, 
what is included "in principle" in the regulation) will be enforced through the 
judicial process. 
According to its official understanding, in this new culture of thought the 
legislator did everything he meant to do. The work is perfectly done on his part. 
Therefore, from this point on, it is exclusively the judge's job to draw all the 
conclusions that can be drawn at all from the legislatory enactment and to apply 
them to the case to be decided. (In the reverse sense, the judge may also 
reconstruct the situation as follows: although the legislator did whatever he 
wished to do, the work is still deficient, full of gaps. It is the judge's job to 
complete it by continuing the legislator's work. The question of deciding what 
path to choose for ideological reconstruction concerns the judge alone. Thus, he 
may ideologically substantiate added claims at please alongside the above path 
of reconstruction, yet this will not affect the completeness in principle 
accomplished by legislation.) 
Historically, it is a striking observation that in every legal culture, where the 
demand for and the ideology of a complete regulation was formulated, a second 
consideration was also asserted, namely that the law—not against its generality 
but as a consequence of it—not only "can be applied", but "must be applied" to 
individual situations. So, the initial presumption characteristic of the underlying 
legal culture manifests itself again: on the level of the law and order, the 
completeness in principle of the positive regulation is ideologically presumed, 
accompanied by the further assumption that new laws (entering and also shaping 
the regulation) are issued as additional components to the aggregate of norms 
organised into a system. 
From this concept of system an entirely new choice is derived as well, 
creating some sort of basis for further ideological options in application. It 
concerns the practical consequences of the declaration that there are no gaps in 
law. For the law in its given wording has already provided a full response and 
this is what to rely on when making a decision, perhaps building on the 
exception to the rule, or, as the case may be, on the rule itself. Whenever there 
is no rule directly applicable, one may argue starting from assessing previously 
established general principles. Based on that assumption, we shall also accept 
it as a response of the system that the system does not provide any answer to 
the issue to be decided in law. It complements the formal prohibition of 
"refuting the administration of justice" as sanctioned by the French Code civil. 
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As known, the Code did not prescribe at all that decisions of merit shall be 
made and legal actions admitted in every case, but it provided that the judge 
who rejects to administer justice by the allegation of the law's silence, 
obscurity or insufficiency to be found guilty in the offence of "refuting the 
administration of justice".28 
Parallel to the promulgation of great modern codes, at the end of last 
century, debates revolving around the completeness of regulation and the 
feasibility of filling its gaps arose also in Hungary. As opposed to the 
mainstream view excluding gaps from law, the reverse statement was also 
formulated, saying that the system itself is nothing but an infinite sequence of 
gaps. (This latter realisation formed the ideological basis for the so-called "free 
law" movement, fashionable in Europe around the turn of the century.) At the 
end of his life, George Lukács argued in his Ontology of the Social Being that 
as soon as societal development reaches a given level, denying it and returning 
to any previous stage is possible only on ground of this particular level. That 
is, for example, we cannot return to a Robinsonian way of life without assumed 
cognisance and actual negation of the societal development level we have 
reached up to that point. We simply cannot step backwards in a way as if the 
memories of our past existence were erased. Well, the ideology lies in the 
achievement of modern codes providing regulation which build upon principles. 
Therefore, stating that law is nothing but an aggregate of gaps is far from being 
a denial of systemic completeness, but is an alternative answer derived from the 
same idea of system. One can state that gaps may eventually emerge. On the 
other hand, one can also state that the total system of regulation is basically a 
sequence of gaps comprised by the system only in principle to qualify them as 
its parts. Although, at the moment we admit that the given system of law 
comprises in principle what the law intends to regulate, the recognition of the 
underlying thesis is already accomplished. 
Hans Kelsen's Stufenbautheorie is built on this particular realisation. 
According to him, law-making and law-application cannot be separated from 
one another into two independent entities, notwithstanding that the old paradigm 
built upon the duality and sequence of "construction" and "operation" suggested 
so. Within the system of law—from the fundamental constitutional norm 
[Grundnorm] conferring validity on the entire legal arrangement, through laws, 
decrees, judicial decisions, to the enforcement act of individual decisions by the 
28 "Le juge qui refusera de juger, sous prétexte du silence, de l'obscurité et de 
l'insuffisance de la loi, pourra être poursuivi comme coupable de déni de justice." Code civil 
para. 4. 
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ultimate authority—every intermediate step is double-faceted, qualifying as law-
making (to fill the vacuum in full discretion of particular regulation consecutive 
to the basic settlement through superior principles and norms), on the one hand, 
and law-application (to implement the limitations prescribed by superior norms 
in the reverse direction), on the other. Thus, with the exception of the two 
extreme poles, every intermediate step qualifies firstly as law-application and 
secondly as law-making. 
constitution 
statute 
:
 II decree 
^judicial decision 
II 
act of enforcement 
II = law-application 
4= = law-making 
We were not mistaken much in microphysics when we stated that the air is 
essentially a vacuum somewhat disturbed by material pollution. As a vacuum 
it is void of material substances, although nitrogen and oxygen, as well as the 
various granules of genuine polluting substances constantly mix with it. In the 
same way we might state that the area covered by codificational regulation (e.g., 
the hundreds of rules in Ute Code civil) is a sort of pollution successfully 
challenging the vacuum, the area free of regulations. 
The new achievement of development is the idea of system itself. Hence the 
law offers a response to relevant questions not only through its individual rules 
(or, in case of gaps, remains silent not only through the lack of an individual 
rule) but also through its system proper. In law conceived as a system there can 
be no gaps whatsoever, at least in principle. What may happen is that the parties 
addressed a question to the law which is not its case. 
Turning point in the way of thinking 
Analysing thought patterns we have arrived at a definite turning point. As we 
could see, there was no actual independent measure in case of the lead 
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measuring rule of Lesbos.29 We could realise that, to some extent, the measure 
was created as a result of the act of measuring. Gradual development in the 
West has arrived to ideologically claim the exclusivity for measures. Everything 
initially created for man's service was thereby successfully liberated from him 
even to his detriment. The excessive objectification can turn the measure into 
an independent factor so much that even the person performing the act of 
measuring can become entirely irrelevant. By routinishly using ready-to-take 
measures, the act of their application can lose any creative contribution 
whatsoever. The measure of measuring has become externalised and externally 
identifiable, moreover, tangible in the strict sense of the word. Hence it is freely 
available to anyone, but can easily degenerate into one dominating everyone. At 
any rate, thrusted to the other extreme, the measuring has become a sheer 
function of the measure.30 
29 Cf. VARGA, Cs.: "Pattems of Thought, Patterns of Law" 38. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 
3-4 , 1997, forthcoming. 
30 For a wider context of the issues treated in the paper, see VARGA, Cs.: Előadások a jogi 
gondolkodás paradigmáiról (Lectures on the paradigms of legal thinking), Budapest, 1998, 
in particular ch. 2, 50. 
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KALEIDOSCOPE 
New Legislation on Health Care 
in Hungary 
Introduction—health law in Hungary 
Health law has been put under profound revision recently in Hungary. Since 
the end of the 80*s, intensive debates emerged concerning basic bioethics and 
health law issues.1 During these debates it became apparent that the old 
legislation on health care2—dating back to the beginning of the 70's—despite 
providing comprehensive coverage of several basic health law issues3 hardly 
fits the conditions of the 90's: it reflects the values of the 70's, envisions the 
traditional paternalistic doctor-patient relationship with little or no attention paid 
to patients' rights. 
The major step in the reform process was the adoption of a new act addressing 
basic issues of health care (Act No. CLIV of 1997 on Health Care, adopted by 
1 See more on this topic KOVÁCS, J.: Medical Ethics Activities in Hungary. European 
Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care. 1994, 2, 11-16. 
2 Act No. II of 1972 on Health Care and the numerous related Decrees of the Government 
and the Minister of Welfare. 
3 E.g. public health and the control of infectious diseases, organ and tissue transplantation, 
some basic rules of doctor-patient relationship, confidentiality issues, civil commitment of 
psychiatric patients, the rules governing medical products for human use, including the clinical 
investigation of medicinal products etc. 
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the Parliament on 15th of December 1997, most sections become effective on 
1st of July 1998, some others on 1st of January, 1999). The new Act is aimed 
to cover a wide range of questions, however, despite being very long in extent, 
can only address basic principles and on many topics detailed regulation is 
allocated to decrees of the government or the minister responsible for health care. 
These decrees are currently under preparation, the content of them cannot be 
predicted yet. In the followings we will concentrate on selected topics of the new 
regulation, mainly on those which basically influence the position of the patient 
in the health care system. 
Patient's rights 
Very detailed regulation is devoted to the rights of patients. According to the 
Act the patients are entitled to the following basic rights: 
Right to health care. In case of medical emergency every patient is entitled 
to life saving treatment, to health care which is aimed at preventing permanent 
deterioration of the health of the patient and to pain relief. Access to other health 
care services is bound to health insurance. The level of health care service the 
patient is entitled to depends on the health status of the patient, and the disease 
she/he suffers from. The health services shall be of the highest level on the basis 
of the current level of medicine, the level of technology and of the health care 
system, the currect circumstances and the expected knowledge and professional 
experience of the professional health care staff. Tire patient has the right to choose 
his/her physician and health care institution. The patient also has the right to a 
second medical opinion. Health care services which are not immediately available 
for every patient in need of them (scarce resources) have to be distributed upon 
waiting lists. The selection criteria from the waiting list have to be open to public 
and subject to public control. The patient is entitled to be informed of his/her 
position on the list. 
Right to human dignity. Restricition of the rights of the patient during health 
care is justified if it is adequate and appropriate. Personal freedom of the patient 
can be restricted in case of emergency or for the protection of the health, physical 
integrity and health of the patient itself or of others. Restrictions upon the free 
movement of the patient can be ordered by a qualified physician in writing. 
Right to maintanance of contact. In the course of health care patients are entitled 
to maintain continuous personal contact with their relatives and other persons. Such 
contact may not be limited to a few visits a week as determined by the medical 
institution. However, this right of the patient may not interfere with the operation 
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of the health care facility or the treatment of the patient and other patients. The 
Act enumerates three special groups of patients where further rights are guaranteed: 
patients in bad state of health (i.e. patients not able to care for themselves, patients 
in pains which is out of control by medication, and patients in emotional crisis 
situation) have the right that the person chosen by the patient can stay with them 
all day and night; minors (patient under the age of 14) have the same right; and 
women in labour have the right that the person named by them can stay with 
them during labour and—if it is medically not contraindicated—the newborn baby 
shall be placed in the same room where the mother is. These rights of patients 
sparkled hot debate among physicians, as—knowing the current technical conditions 
of health care institutions—it is very difficult to grant them. 
Right to leave the health care institution. The patient has the right to leave 
the health care institution whenever she/he wishes, if life, health and bodily 
integrity of others is not endangered by it. 
Righ to be informed. The question of informed consent has recently been a 
highly debated issue in Hungary. The act—for the first time in Hungarian 
legislation—spells out the meaning of informed consent: every person has the right 
to determine what will be done to his/her body, and to decide whether or not 
to undergo medical treatment. In order to make proper decision the patient needs 
to be fully informed of all the relevant facts—including the risks—related to the 
treatment considered. The act gives a detailed taxative list of the facts to be 
disclosed to the patient: 
— the health status of the patient, including its medical evaluation; 
— the proposed diagnostic examinations and treatments; 
— the possible benefits and risks of the proposed examinations and treatments; 
— the planned timing of the proposed examinations and treatments; 
— the fact that the patient has the right to ask further questions and to make the 
decision concerning the proposed examination or treatment; 
— alternative treatment methods; 
— the process and possible outcome of the proposed treatment; 
— further treatments; 
— proposed life-style changes; 
— after the completion of the examination or treatment the patient has the right 
to be informed of the result and outcome, and—if the treatment or examination 
was unsuccessful—of the possible reasons of it; 
— the name, position and qualification of the members of health care staff 
providing care for her/him. 
The information has to be understandable to the patient given his/her cultural 
and educational background. 
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The exceptions to the duty of disclosure are limited. In fact, there are only 
three situations in which the physician is permitted not to give full information: 
Firstly, patients who are not legally competent are only entitled to information 
appropriate in the light of their age or mental state. Secondly, if the patient waives 
his/her right to be informed, it has to be respected by the physician. And thirdly, 
in emergency situation the doctor may render treatment without the patient's 
consent and—if it would delay the initiation of the treatment and thus jeopardize 
the well-being of the patient—no disclosure is required. The concept of therapeutic 
privilige—which would permit physicians in selected cases to withhold information 
deemed to be of harmful psychological effect for the patient—is not acknowledged 
by the act. 
Right to autonomy. The term "right to autonomy" in the Act describes the 
fundamental right of the patient to freely decide whether she/he whishes to undergo 
medical treatment or refuses it. As to formal requirements, written form is needed 
if the treatment or examination is an invasive one. In other cases verbal consent 
is enough. 
Incompetent persons cannot validly consent to any kind of medical treatment, 
consequently making medical decisions in this case "has been an area of great 
confusion".4 The Act tries to give clear guidelines who is entitled to make 
decisions on behalf of the legally not competent patient. 
According to the Civil Code5 of Hungary, there are two different grades of 
incompetence. A person is fully incompetent, if she/he is6 a) under the age of 
14, or b) is under full guardianship (adjudicated incompetent), or c) is not able 
to make decisions for himself due to his/her overall condition. 
The Civil Code also distinguishes another grade of incompetence, the so-called 
"limited competence". It has to be clearly distinguished from the—in many 
jurisdictions well-known—term of specific incompetence, where the adjudication 
of incompetence and appointment of a guardian does not render the person 
incompetent for all purposes, just for limited purposes instead, which are indicated 
in the court order. Hungarian civil law does not know this term, both grades of 
incompetence are general in the sense that the person involved suffers legal 
disability in every kind of matters. The difference between incompetence and 
limited competence lies in the extent of the limitations placed on financial matters: 
while the fully incompetent person is not allowed to close a deal, make a legally 
4 APPELBAUM, A. S.-LIDZ, CH. W.-MEISEL, A.: Informed Consent. Legal Theory and 
Clinical Practice. Oxford University Press, 1987, 81. 
5 Act. No. IV of 1959 on the Civil Code. 
6 Civil Code Sec. 15-17. 
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valid statement, the person under limited guardianship has the right to dispose 
over his/her financial matter up to a limit (typically one-month salary), and is 
allowed to make certain legally valid statements in agreement with his/her legal 
representative. Persons under the age of 18, but above 14 have the same legal 
positions as adults placed under limited guardianship.7 
As to the right to consent to treatment the same rules apply to incompetent 
patients and to patients rendered limited competence. In both cases substituted 
decision has to be brought. The Act gives the right of making decisions on behalf 
of the patient to the legal representative and the relatives. If the decisions brought 
by certain relatives are contrary to each other, the act ranks the relatives: closer 
relatives living together with the patient are given priority. The decision-making 
competence of the relatives, however, is limited: it is restricted to the invasive 
procedures and if it would lead to the deterioration of the patient's health it should 
be neglected by the physician. In emergency situations, where the delay of 
initiation of the treatment would harm the patient there is no need of seeking 
the consent of the relatives. 
Right to refuse treatment. The Act gives an unprecedented!y detailed regulation 
on the issue of refusing and withholding life-sustaining treatment, trying to build 
in guaranties by setting up strict procedural rules. This delicate issue, which 
involves the question of euthanasia, sparkled hot debates during the legislative 
process and this chapter underwent major changes during the debate in the 
Parliament. The Act distinguishes between three types of treatment: 
a) "regular treatment", 
b) treatment which if not given to the patient leads to serious or permanent 
deterioration of the health, and finally 
c) life-saving or life-sustaining treatment. 
The refusal of the three types of treatment is bound to different procedural rules 
and varies upon the competence/incompetence of the patient. 
Ad. a. "Regular treatment" [treatment which does not fall under catergories 
b) or c)] can be refused by the patient with only one restriction: if the refusal 
of the treatment would jeopardize the health or life of others (which is the case 
for example with infectious diseases), the refusal is not valid. 
Ad. b. The refusal of treatments which fall under this category is only valid 
if certain formal rules are kept. The refusal needs a written form, also signed by 
two independent persons or made in the presence of a notary. If the person is 
not legally/competent, this category of treatment cannot be refused either by the 
patient or by relatives or legal representative. 
7 Civil Code Sec. 12, 13. 
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Ad. c. Life saving or life sustaining treatment can only be refused under strict 
limitations: the patient has to suffer from a serious, incurable disease, which—even 
with proper medical care—within a short period of time leads to the death of the 
patient. (It means that for example a breast amputation or removal of inflammated 
appendix can not be refused.) If the patient expresses his/her wishes regarding 
the refusal of life sustaining treatment, further procedural steps have to be taken: 
a committee of three physicians has to examine the patient and decide whether 
she/he can be regarded competent, whether she/he suffers from a serious and 
incurable disease. After the decision of the committee a waiting period of three 
more days have to pass and if the patient still expresses his/her wish regarding 
the refusal, the treatment can be withdrawn. If the patient is not competent, and 
the legal representative refuses life saving or life sustaining treatment, the health 
care institution has to initiate a court proceeding. 
The competent person has the possibility to write a so-called "living will", 
in which—for the case if she/he becomes incompetent for some reasons—she/lie 
can specify, which medical treatments she/he wishes to refuse. This declarataion 
is valid only if a psychiatrist declares that the patient is fully competent. The 
declaration has to be renewed every two years. 
Right to access to medical records. The Act states that the patient has the 
right to have insight in his/her medical records, ask for copies of the records—on 
his/her own expense. 
Enforcement of patients' rights 
Patients' rights can be safeguarded in various ways. Formal civil proceedings—dis-
closure malpractice lawsuits—are becoming more and more frequent in Hungary. 
The Act sets up special mechanisms to promote and protect patients' rights: 
a) Complaint procedure. The patient has the option to lodge a complaint with 
the health care institution. Upon complaint the management has to investigate 
the case and inform the patient of the result of the investigation within ten 
workdays. 
b) Patients' rights advocate. In each hospital an independent—i.e. not 
employee of the hospital—person has to serve as patients' rights advocate. She/he 
can help the patient to initiate complaint proceedings, has the right to call the 
attention of the management to deficiencies on the field of patients' right and 
initiate the improvent of these. She/he has access to the medical records of the 
patients. 
Ágnes Dósa 
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PREFACE 
Public Interest, Spending 
and Individual Rights 
Tliis issue of Acta Juridica collects some of the papers presented at a conference 
series at Central European University.1 The series, entitled "Individual versus 
the State" is dedicated to problems of regulation apparently or allegedly 
restricting the rights of individuals.2 
In a welfare state perhaps there is nothing that affects the position of the 
individual more than government spending. This is the more so as individual 
rights are perceived by legislation and courts as well as something provided or 
at least promoted by government services which are determined by the 
understanding of the public interest and which are specified as spending items 
of the budget. Notwithstanding the insufficient constitutional review of the 
spending power and notwithstanding the deliberate uncertainties of the notion 
of public interest both in law and politics, it is obvious that these are key 
concepts blueprints for action. This is the consideration that unites the articles 
of this issue which offers the experience of a number of countries with special 
1 The conferences are sponsored by the Open Society Institute, Budapest. Support by the 
Open Society Institute for the publication of this issue is gratefully acknowledged. 
2 Other publications of the conference series include: SAJÓ, A. and PRICE, M. E. (eds.): 
Rights of Access to the Media, Kluwer Law International (1996); SAJÓ, A. (ed.): Western 
Rights? Post-Communist Application, Kluwer Law International (1996); SAJÓ, A. and 
AVINERI, Sh. (eds.): The Law of Religious Identity: Models for Post-Conununism (1998). 
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emphasis on the difficulties of the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. But 
the new/old concerns of the public good are not only those that are felt in the 
world of post-communist welfarism (a special case of the bankrupt welfare 
state). Several articles of this issue are dedicated to the emerging understanding 
of the public good and its service which emerges under the latest version of the 
"third way". 
Paul R. Verkuirs paper (Understanding the "Public Interest" Justification for 
Government Actions) tells the surprising carrier of "public interest" in the 
United States. Public interest is perhaps the notion probably invoked more than 
any other to justify government action. The ways the concept was used and 
understood has changed over time but never offering enough guidance for the 
judiciary to make the review of government action fully predictable. In a way 
the story is different and the same in France. "The Case of France" is described 
by Guy Carcassonne. The French case is interesting because in not one single 
occasion the French constitution makers used the term public interest, although 
general interest is latently present everywhere, as the disguised God of Pascal 
and Kierkegaard. Gunnar Folke Schuppert (Responsibility Sharing in Public 
Policy: Who Defines the Public Interest in the Cooperative State?) indicates how 
the ancient concept of the Prussian common good is transformed into a core 
idea of "bringing the state back in" in the modern German system which is right 
in the middle of redrawing public/private boundaries. All that takes us to the 
"third way revolution" as is emerging in Great Britain. (See Michael Adler. 
Regulation and the Public Interest.) 
Of course, the understanding of the public interest in the legislation enabling 
social rights has very special consequences not only in public administration but 
in regard to human rights. The related developments in Russia are analysed by 
Marat S. Salikov (Federal Constitutional Court: Human Right's Protection 
Approach and Public Interest). Justice Gadis Gadzhiev in his paper "The 
Interdependence of Economic and Social Rights" offers a critique of the 
understanding of these rights by the Russian Constitutional Court. 
As mentioned above, the practical consequences and the real meaning of the 
concepts of public interest are to be found in government spending which is 
determined in the budget law. The budget is, of course, much more than simply 
the sum total of welfare related expenditure (although most of the public 
spending is welfare related in many countries). The paradox of the public 
interest lies in the contradiction between individual spending items and the 
balance of the budget, wliich itself represents a special public interest as this is 
exemplified in the Blankenagel—Pfersman exchange. (Alexander Blankenagel: 
False Friends and Real Friends in Budget Law, and Otto Pfersmann: Comments 
Preface 139 
on the paper of Alexander Blankenagel.) The public interest as expressed in the 
budget can be undermined both procedurally and substantively. 
Alexander G. Morozov emphasizes the first one in the Russian context (The 
Budget Process in Russia: Problems and Solutions in the Context of Politics) 
while Dejan Popovic's paper on Yugoslavia (Financing Social and Cultural 
Rights in Yugoslavia: Tax Exemptions and Arrears) looks at the problem from 
the perspective of tax expert. Here a new dimension of social rights protection 
is criticised, namely tax exemptions. 
The present issue is intended to be an opportunity to develop a new 
constitutionalist and interdisciplinary approach to a hidden dimension of welfare 
and citizens' rights in Eastern Europe which is becoming intellectually 
reintegrated into "normal scholarship". 
András SAJÓ 
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STUDIES 
Paul R. VERKUIL " Understanding the "Public Interest" 
Justification for Government Actions 
The words "public interest" are probably invoked more than any other to explain 
and justify government action, whether in delegations of legislative authority 
to agencies or in explanations by agency officials to the public. But these 
words are rarely self-actualizing; in some cases they seem virtually devoid of 
meaning. Still their use persists and it is worth asking whether they have been 
or can be interpreted to set some objective standard for evaluating government 
behavior. 
While "public interest" was a favorite expression of New Deal Congresses 
and agencies,1 its use emanates from the mists of time "immemorial".2 How-
ever, it is no mere legislative sport of antiquarian interest. Recently, for 
example, the Federal Trade Commission released a letter sent three years earlier 
* I want to thank my colleague Michael Herz for his many insights on this subject. 
1 The public interest formulation, and its first cousin "just and reasonable" ratemaking, had 
been used earlier in the Federal Trade Commission and Interstate Commerce Acts, but the 
term became entrenched in administrative delegations during the New Deal. 
2 Private property "affected with a public interest" was among the first kind of regulation 
emerging from the common law of England inn keepers, wharfmen and hackmen were 
"common carriers" who through the exercise of monopoly power in their trades became 
subject to public control. See Sir HALE, M.: The History of Common Law of England (C. M. 
Gray, ed.) 1971; See also Maun v. Illinois, 94 LI. S. 113 (1877) (discussing relevance of 
"affected with a public interest" to United States legal development). 
142 Paul R. Verkuil 
that informed Intel's Chairman Andrew S. Grove that the FTC was dropping its 
antitrust investigation of that company, but adding: "the Commission reserves the 
right to take such further action as the public interest may require".3 Of course 
that "further action" occurred when the FTC reversed course and announced that 
it would convene antitrust proceedings against Intel in May 1998. 
One wonders what insights Intel gained into the FTC's enforcement strategy 
based on its (or anyone's) concept of the public interest.4 Could Intel know 
what activities might or might not run afoul of the FTC's mandates? Could Intel 
have avoided future prosecution by complying with the FTC's definition of the 
public interest? On the other hand, what does the FTC gain by adding the term? 
Could not they just have reserved the right to take further action?5 As a 
practical matter, government action, while presumptively based on the public 
interest, is simply action based on the exercise of government power, a 
tautological exercise that raises problems of notice and bureaucratic efficacy. But 
perhaps the emptiness of "public interest" is not inevitable. Did it once have a 
better understood meaning? If so, what has happened to that understanding since 
that time? 
The Public Interest, the New Deal and the Delegation Doctrine 
The setting where the term public interest has been most consistently employed 
and challenged is in legislative grants of powers to administrative agencies. In 
the classic New Deal delegation, federal agencies were admonished to act in 
"the public interest, convenience and necessity".6 Grants of power as agencies 
3 See "Intel and Microsoft Face Differing Antitrust Paths", New York Times, May 29, 
1998. The earlier letter quoted in the text had been sent on July 14, 1993. 
4 The FTC's causal use of public interest reminds one of Justice Robert Jackson's critique 
of the FTC's earlier use of the word "quasi": " 'quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw over 
our confusion as we might use a counterpane to cover a disordered bed". FTC v. Ruberoid 
Co., 343 U. S. 470, 487 (1952) (dissenting). 
5 Some critics have suggested that the FTC sued Intel in reaction to the Department of 
Justice's case against Microsoft in an attempt to stay in the antitrust regulatory game. See 
JENKINS, H. Jr.: "How Intel's Good Deeds Get Punished", Wall Street Journal, June 17 
1998, A17. 
6 See DAVIS, K. C.-PIERCE, R. J.: Administrative Law Treatise § 2.6 (1994) for statutory 
references. It is an intriguing question what, if anything, the words "convenience" and 
"necessity" add to public interest. Surely if they stood by themselves we would worry more, 
not less, whether the "public interest" was being protected, since convenience and necessity 
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in these and similar terms were challenged as impermissibly delegating 
legislative authority to executive agencies. But challenges to the public interest 
standard did not succeed. 
As is well known, the United States' Supreme Court has actually invoked 
the non-delegation doctrine on only two occasions, both in the 1930's.7 But the 
problem of "delegation running riot", as Justice Cardozo phrased it in the 
Schechter Poultry Case, was not one in which the public interest standard was 
involved.8 That standard seems always to have just cleared the bar set to satisfy 
constitutional challenges based on impermissible delegation of powers. The 
reason the public interest standard survived delegation attacks may have had as 
much to do with its administrative settings as with the nature of the delegated 
words. Public interest delegations were usually to independent agencies which 
had procedural protections in place that, coupled with substantial evidence 
judicial review, served to confine the scope of delegation. The NIRA cases, on 
the contrary, were broad discretionary delegations to the Executive and even to 
private parties.9 
The Supreme Court had upheld the "public convenience, interest and necessity" 
standard contained in the Radio Act of 1927 in Federal Radio Commission v. 
Nelson Bros.10 That case, also authored by Chief Justice Hughes, stated that 
"this criterion [public interest] is not to be interpreted as setting up a standard 
so indefinite as to confer unlimited power".11 Later, in National Broadcasting 
Co. v. United States,12 the "public interest, convenience and necessity" standard 
in the Communication Act of 1934 was interpreted in the course of rejecting a 
challenge to chain broadcasting regulations. Justice Frankfurter's majority 
opinion equated the public interest with securing "the maximum benefits of 
imply an offhand or arbitrary dimension to the exercise of government power. 
7 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States. 295 U. S. 495 (1935). 
8 Schechter involved industry codes (for, among others, Kosher butchers) promulgated by 
the Executive branch under the National Industrial Recovery Act, which made no reference 
to public interest. Panama Refining dealt with a section of the NIRA which delegated power 
to the President to deal with "hot oil". In that case, Chief Justice Hughes' majority opinion, 
which condemned the NIRA delegation, also defended the public interest, convenience and 
necessity standard contained in the Radio Act of 1927 (precursor to the FCC Act). 293 U. S. 
at 428. 
9 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U. S. 238 (1936). 
10 289 U. S. 266 (1933). 
11 Id at 285. 
12 319 II. S. 190 (1943). 
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radio to ail the people of the United States".13 The Court rejected a narrower, 
technical and engineering role for the FCC in administering the Act in favor of 
a roving commission to act in the public interest over broadcasting. 
The Communications Act has been the foster child for the public interest 
standard to this day. A few years ago Newton Minow, no naive observer, could 
seriously utter the following proposition: "The heart of the Communications Act 
is its clear emphasis on the public interest. Whatever the temptations to abandon 
this notion—and they are many—the stakes are too high. Without commitment to 
the public interest, all of government action vis-à-vis communications would be 
without meaning."14 Mr. Minow, a New Deal lawyer who served as a powerful 
FCC chair, professes to find some consolation—and protection of the public—in 
the incantation of die public interest standard. 
Obviously, the subjective nature of the standard in today's world makes it 
a less than reassuring justification of FCC action. Critics of the FCC's view of 
the public interest abound15 and the courts are increasingly skeptical as well.16 
But my purpose here is not to argue about the FCC's success or failure applying 
the public interest standard. Rather, I want to ask whether observations of what 
the standard means were initially clear but have been lost in the years since it 
was first employed. Today, the interesting question is whether the public interest 
can ever convey a satisfying meaning given competing views about the role of 
government and the market. 
The New Deal Faith in Government Regulation 
In the 1930's the public interest triggered a largely agreed upon response from 
agency officials. As a result, New Deal Congresses employed the phrase partially 
because they "trusted" agencies to apply it in an enlightened fashion. This faith 
in administration may well explain New Dealer Newton Minow's belief in the 
standard's continued explanatory power. At a time when government officials 
13 Id at 1010. 
14 MINOW, N.: Commemorative Message, in a Legislative History of the Communications 
Act of 1934, at XV (Max D. Paglin, ed.) 1989. 
15 MAYTON, W. T.: "The Illegitimacy of the Public Interest Standard at the FCC", 38 
Emory Law Journal, 715 (1989). 
16 See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. ECC, 512 U. S. 622 (1994) (5 to 4 
decision) and related cases. 
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talked in terms of the "science of administration",17 and regulation was per-
formed by "independent agencies" (allegedly free of political influence), perhaps 
government could operate objectively to solve problems that the market could 
not. In this setting it was not surprising that the public interest held an assumed 
meaning. In cases like FPC v. Hope. Natural Gas, Co.,n agencies were given 
a virtual blank check to create rates that were "just and reasonable".19 Delega-
tion of complicated decisions to talented regulators overseen by the courts was 
clearly seen by those same courts to be part of the calculation that produced the 
public interest. 
In many respects, the New Deal period was driven by the post-Lochner view 
that the legislature should have a free hand in making the social choices 
inherent in the regulatory state. This view, in turn, was inspired by Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis who gave it voice, dignity and direction. Holmes' famous 
dissent in Lochner set the stage for later judicial receptivity to legislative 
delegations that Brandeis explored in cases like Muller v. Oregon20 But 
Holmes and Brandeis, for all their mutual admiration, were an odd pair. While 
they often voted together, Holmes, as a positivist, put no stock in legislative 
wisdom, whereas Brandeis was a true believer in the state as an instrument for 
achieving the highest good.21 Brandeis often identified the public interest as 
part of scientific administration.22 He had an enormous impact on the whole 
generation of New Deal lawyers; indeed Louis Brandeis as a lawyer probably 
became the model for the public interest advocate. The tools he used to 
17 J. M. Landis in The Administrative Process 41 (1938) offers a good example of the 
optimism with which New Deal leaders approached the regulatory state. Dean Landis refers 
to the "science of administration" (a phrase borrowed from Gerald Henderson) as a basis for 
setting standards to guide administrative behavior. He also emphasized his belief in the value 
of expertise, by which he meant smart Harvard-educated lawyers who could puzzle out where 
the public interest lay in any number of regulatory structures. 
18 320 U. S. 591 (1944). 
19 Hope was authored by Justice William O. Douglas, a former New Deal administrator who 
lost several of his colleagues by including that "just and reasonable", like Justice Stewart's 
view of pornography, was in the eye of the FPC as beholder. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, 
concluded: "Expertise is a rational process and a rational process implies expressed reasons 
for judgement." id at 627. 
20 Lochner v. People of State of New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1945), Muller v. State of Oregon, 
208 U. S. 412 (1908). 
21 Alexander Bickel has written perceptively about the Holmes-Brandeis interaction in this 
regard. See BICKEL, A.: Unpublished Opinions of Justice Brandeis, 220-225, 1957. 
22 Brandeis often cited the works of Gerald Henderson, the constitutional-administrative law 
scholar who was the architect for the science of administration approach. Id. at 152-153. 
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construct the public interest were economic analysis, financial acumen, and an 
inherent sense of fair play. It may be that the New Deal faith in the public 
interest stemmed as much from respect for Louis Brandeis as from commitment 
to the ideas of Franklin Roosevelt. 
Moreover, New Deal lawyers in government had a better sense of the 
"public interest" than we do now because they were more firmly rooted in the 
public law tradition. Many of the young law school graduates who participated 
and in some cases created government agencies did so with less thought of 
serving private interest at a later time. The public sector was where the action 
was and they were often committed to a career in government. Moreover, these 
lawyers were produced by a small set of institutions—Harvard, Columbia, Yale 
and to a lesser extent Chicago law schools—and their teachers were mostly legal 
realists who themselves served in government.23 Surely attorneys like Tommy 
Corcoran and Dean Acheson had influential legal careers in private practice, but 
many of the government lawyers stayed in government (either in executive or 
judicial roles).24 They had more occasion than their modern counterparts to 
identify their careers with notions of public service. And in this sense, they 
helped to define the term tlorough then shared understanding. Today the 
revolving door from government to the private sector and back is a far more 
prevalent course.25 
The Meaning of Public Interest Today 
Surely we do not have a shared view of the public interest today. New Dealers 
were motivated by redistribution goals and the utilitarian concept of greatest 
good for the greatest number.26 Today counter concepts like positivism, legal 
23 See IRONS, P. H.: The New Deal Lawyers, 6-7, 1982 (over 60 percent of the more than 
500 lawyers serving in key New Deal agencies and the Justice Department graduated from 
those institutions—most of them from Harvard). 
24 Lawyers like Adolph Berle who served as a member of Roosevelt's "Brains Trust" and 
later returned to an academic career at Columbia, and Felix Frankfurter, who produced many 
New Deal lawyers at the Harvard Law School before serving on the Supreme Court, were 
good examples. See ROSEN, E. A.: Hoover, Roosevelt and the Brains Trust, 1987. 
25 Modern lawyers are public servants only part of the time and they come from much wider 
educational backgrounds. Their views of the "public interest" are in all likelihood conditioned 
by the private clients they have or will serve outside government. Thus, the need for 
complicated ethics laws that set rules of engagement and disengagement. 
26 See TUG WELL, R. G.: In Search of Roosevelt, 1972. 
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realism and public choice provide more nuanced but also more cynical critiques 
of government performance. Public Choice theory, by equating public interest 
with private interest, makes faith in the objectivity of the public interest (even 
in government itself) especially difficult to maintain.27 Once government actions 
are viewed as no less self-interested than private ones, vague concepts like public 
interest cease to receive deference. Concepts of government failure now vie with 
New Deal assumptions about market failure to undermine ambitious government 
programs. Even the Democrats succumbed when President Clinton declared that 
the era of big government was over.28 
But even today, a few positions in government still cling to an independent 
notion of the public interest, in the sense of serving the interests of the general 
public. One bastion of the public interest is the Solicitor General in the Justice 
Department, who has always maintained that fealty to the law (and the rule of 
law) is a responsibility independent of the political interest of the President who 
appointed him or her. Francis Biddle captured this spirit when he commented: 
"The Solicitor General has no master to serve except his country."29 The 
assumption that the rule of law can be derived apolitically is a big one,30 but 
it is deeply entrenched. It demonstrates a view of the public interest that seems 
more to be assumed in the nature of the office than articulated anew each time 
the incumbent changes. In this context, public interest has become a synonym 
for the rule of law, which helps to give the term some content and limits. Surely 
some would still say it simply substitutes one vague phrase for another. But at 
least it narrows the range of doubt. We know generally what the rule of law in 
our society is, and even in Western civilization more generally.31 Its protection 
is a worthy undertaking. An executive branch official who behaves like a 
member of the judiciary in defining the rule of law is a remarkable figure in any 
society. 
27 See, e.g., BUCHANAN, J. M.-TULLOCK, G.: The Calculus of Consent, 1962. 
28 President Clinton speaks of our "post-big government" federal system. Radio Address to 
the Nation (Jan. 27, 1996). 
29 BIDDLE, F.: In Brief Authority, 98, 1962. See also CAPLAN, L.: The Tenth Justice: The 
Solicitor General and the Rule of Law, 1987. 
30 For some counter views see SOLOKA, R. M.: The Solicitor General: The Politics of Law, 
1992. See generally Government Lawyers, The Federal Legal Bureaucracy and President 
Politics (Cornell W. Clayton, ed.), 1995. 
31 The Rule of Law has an agreed upon meaning in Anglo-American jurisprudence. It is 
premised on an independent judiciary and concepts of natural justice. See VERKUIL, P. R.: 
"Cross-Currents in Anglo-American Administrative Law", 27 William <6 Mary Law Review, 
685 (1986). 
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But we are still hard pressed today to define the public interest more broadly. 
A case just decided by the Supreme Court, where the rights of private property 
clashed with an expression of public interest, points out the difficulties. In 
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,32 a Texas Interest on Lawyers Trust 
Account (IOLTA) setup to fund legal aid was challenged as depriving clients of 
a property right in their accounts. It was stipulated that this right was purely 
theoretical since, in absence of the IOLTA program and federal regulatory 
provisions, there would have been no interest paid on these accounts. Neverthe-
less, Chief Justice Rehnquist, for a five member majority, found private property 
principles controlling. He held for the Court that the maxim of English law that 
interest follows principal provided the rule, even if the interest was nonexistent. 
In doing so the majority rejected the argument of the United States (by the 
Solicitor General) that IOLTA accounts were "government created value", not 
private property.33 
The case was remanded to the circuit court to decide whether, once it was 
established that private property existed, a taking under the Fifth Amendment 
had occurred.34 The four dissenters offered two opinions: Justice Souter argued 
for remanding to decide the Takings clause issue and Justice Breyer, joined by 
Souter, questioned the private property analogy in a situation where die state 
(IOLTA) programs were the source of value creation.35 Thus the 5 to 4 split 
in the Court was created by competing conceptions of private versus public 
property, or for my purposes public versus private interest (no pun intended). 
What was at stake in Phillips was the legal aid program itself—whether Texas 
could spend private funds to achieve public goals. Titus, this case nicely raises 
the issue of what the public interest means in today's world. The public purpose 
the IOLTA program sought to serve was to provide legal aid for indigent 
clients. Aggregation of these accounts raised the remarkable sum of $100 
million nationwide to provide subsidized representation. It was defended in 
briefs by 49 State Supreme Court Chief Justices (only Indiana did not have such 
a program), and by the American Bar Association. They all believed that the 
program created a new public value without depriving any individual of private 
property. Titus we have a context for the public interest not simply transferring 
32 1998 WL 309070 (June 15, 1998). 
33 Id at 7. 
34 Under the Fifth Amendment, if "private property" is taken for a "public use" the state 
must provide "just compensation". 
35 Justice Breyer rejected the Chief Justice's use of the interest follows principal maxim as 
too limiting. 
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property from one owner to another but actually creating a new public value—a 
Pareto optimal result.36 
Moreover, if one believes with the Solicitor General that at the minimum the 
public interest equates with the rule of law, then a fund that allows people to 
be represented also supports the rule of law dimension of the public interest 
doctrine. This allows us to give meaning to the ambiguous concept of public 
interest. 
The question is why the majority in Phillips saw a need to protect a purely 
hypothetical private (property) interest in the face of a real and substantial 
public interest. Perhaps the answer lies in what has become a zero sum view of 
the role of government. During the New Deal, public rights such as Social 
Security were seen as being justified by their redistribution effects. Small 
amounts of taxes paid by all could provide a universal social safety net. But if 
it is believed that private funds transferred to the public serve no social purpose, 
there is no inherent benefit to government action. Lester Thurow talks in terms 
of the Zero Sum Society where some must be made worse off to make us more 
competitive in the future.37 In this view, public interest becomes closely aligned 
with the private interest. 
But of course we have not yet reached the point of equating private and 
public interests. Public goods still exist and the market by definition does not 
solve problems of non-transactional costs.38 If the failure to provide access to 
justice for the poor is viewed as a market failure or a social cost, the Phillips 
case could have been decided on a public interest rationale. As Justice Breyer 
noted in his dissent,39 the rights of private property asserted were limited only 
to the "right to keep the clients' principal sterile" (to prevent its use by others). 
That is surely a flimsy property interest when placed against the public interest 
of providing funds to secure legal aid for the poor. It could be viewed as a de 
minimis private property right. The case must still take several steps before a 
constitutional taking is established, so it may yet be possible for a public 
36 Pareto optimality occurs when someone (here legal aid recipients) can be made better off 
without making anyone (here clients' with principal) worse off. 
37 THUROW, L.: The Zero Sum Society, 1980; The Zero Sum Solution, 1985. Professor 
Thurow uses the zero sum approach to explain how we must invest to compete on a global 
basis. He urges the use of public funds to stimulate investment, but does not favor central 
government planning and recognizes that there are inevitably winners and losers in any 
transition to global competitiveness. 
38 See HARRISON, J . -MORGAN, Th.—VERKUIL, P.: Regulation and Deregulation, 
191-209, 1997. 
39 1998 WL 309070, at 14. 
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interest argument to emerge. If it does, a better definition of the public interest 
might emerge as part of the public use dimension of the Takings Clause. 
Conclusion 
All democratic societies must justify government action by reference to some 
concept of the public interest. In the United States, that process has long been 
established. At a time of active or positive government such as the New Deal, 
the "public interest" justification becomes a familiar legislative technique. 
Whether or not its meaning is clearly understood, the courts have accepted it as 
a delegable standard to agencies. In today's setting, "public interest" probably 
gets closer scrutiny than it can withstand, and its survival is less obvious. 
Standing alone die term looks inadequate, but tied to tradition and history it 
takes on sufficient independent meaning to survive delegation challenges. The 
truth is there may be no better way to describe public action. Recent statutes 
that provide detailed legislative guidance to agencies suffer other infirmities.40 
The public interest will always be an elusive concept because government action 
is inherently discretionary and subjective. But we accept that the rule of law (in 
tlie form of judicial review by the courts) is sufficient to "canalize" vagrant 
delegations. Thus in our system the public interest and the rule of law are 
ultimately connected and mutually supporting concepts. Perhaps that is the most 
that can be offered by way of a definition of the term itself. 
40 See DAVIS-PIERCE: supra note 6, at 68-72, for examples such as the Clean Air Act and 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act. 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
1998 39 Nos 3-4, pp. 151 -166 
1216-2574 / 98 / U S D 5.00 
© 1998 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
Guy CARCASSONNE The Case of France 
In France, formally, the general interest1 does not exist. In none of the 87 pa-
ragraphs of the current Constitution, nor in its Preamble, is the expression 
present. 
The current French Constitution took over the Preamble of the previous 
Constitution, that of 27 October 1946; the Preamble also has constitutional 
value. But none of the 18 sections of this text, however, which deals with 
problems considered major after the Second World War, makes the slightest 
allusion to the public interest. 
The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the final 
document in the French constitutional arsenal, and the first one in chronological 
order, is almost silent about the public interest. There one finds, at the most, 
in paragraph 17, a mention of „the legally apprehended public necessity", the 
only one that, with the reservation of a fair and preliminary indemnity, could 
endanger the right of property, presented otherwise as holy and inviolable. 
Seventeen paragraphs of 1789, eighteen of 1946, eighty-seven of 1958, and 
in not a single one of these 122 provisions did the drafters deem it useful to 
mention a notion that is at the heart of public law. 
1 Except in cases where I specify differently, I will use the expressions of "general interest" 
and "public interest" as synonyms. 
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Is this because it was so evident that it was needless to express it? This is 
the first element of the answer. After all, if the general interest does not exist, 
what is a state good for? And if the state is useless, why do we take pains to 
give it those rules, procedures and limits, which are the essence of a consti-
tution? 
In this light, the general interest exists long before the state and the 
constitution of the state. These have no right to bring it into existence, but 
only to draw its limits, which have to be respected, whether it is a question 
of the limits of man's and citizen's rights, or the limits of democratic 
procedures. 
Therefore, the general interest is not lacking in French constitutional texts. 
On the contrary, it is latently present everywhere, as the god of Kierkegaard, 
a disguised presence sometimes easily revealed. 
So, when paragraph 2 of the Declaration of 1789 states that "The goal of 
all political associations is the preservation of Man's natural and imperishable 
rights', one can judge this conception naive, restricted or weak, but one 
cannot deny that "political association" in general refers to a goal, and that 
this goal of the social pact, concluded on this occasion, differs from each 
individual participant's goals. 
The original text hides other signs: it evokes "common utility" in its first 
paragraph, "actions harmful to the society" in paragraph 5, "public order" in 
paragraph 10, "public force" in paragraph 12, "public administrative expenses" 
in paragraph 13, and "public contribution" in paragraph 14. All of these 
expressions imply the existence of obligations which differ from the obli-
gations of individual citizens, even those added later. 
In the end, however, the most tangible source of the notion of public interest 
can be discovered in the turn of the phrase which closes the first point of the 
preamble of the Declaration of 1789 with an unexpected reference to "the welfare 
of all". 
Theoretically, this welfare of all can arise harmoniously from the conjunction 
of the welfare of individuals. Practically, this optimism is denied by the 
Declaration itself: when it envisages, for example, the legal safeguards that each 
individual has to enjoy in the penal procedure, it presupposes deviant beha-
viour—crimes or misdemeanours—the hypothesis of which is sufficient to exclude 
the possibility of men who are naturally good, or intend to become good again 
or want to remain good. 
Furthermore, the welfare of all is not limited to the living. It incorporates 
future generations, whose right to the welfare is the same as that of present 
generations. This notion assigns, therefore, without limits in the continuity of 
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mankind, a goal which goes largely beyond the horizon bounded by the 
ambitions of individuals, which extends even to their children and grand-
children. 
From that moment, implicitly but necessarily, the Declaration of 1789 gives 
a foundation to the notion of the public interest based on at least two pillars: the 
necessity of organizing the present life and preserving future life. 
Once a constitutional source of the general interest is so identified, all that 
we have to do is draw the outlines and define the effects. 
In the French conception, the public interest has a special importance in that 
its pursuit is an element of the legitimacy of administrative activity: this goal 
justifies the existence of the administration and ensures that special means are 
suitable to it; it is obligatory (the administration must pursue the general 
interest); and it is absolute (the administration can pursue only the general 
interest). 
For this reason, to disregard the public interest or to exceed what it requires 
is to make the administration lose its legitimacy, and consequently, to make it 
overstep the bounds of legality: no administrative activity other than that aiming 
at the goal of the general interest is legal. 
That means that the question is rather postponed than solved. Who actually 
defines the general interest, with what competence, according to what criteria? 
In order to answer these questions, we have to leave the realm of the absolute 
and enter that of the relative. 
The notion of public interest, as the French doctrine raises it again,2 has a 
double meaning: political and administrative. In the political sense, the public 
interest is defined first of all by the fact that it arbitrates, in the form of decision 
by a public body, between divergent particular interests of the society. The 
public interest is sometimes determined according to quantitative criteria (the 
interest of those who will be expropriated must yield before the interest of a 
greater number of people who will gain by the existence of a new highway), 
sometimes according to qualitative criteria (the claims of dignity and solidarity 
justify that all people must be taxed in order to finance a minimal income paid 
to a small number). But it follows from this, first and foremost, that "looking 
at different times and countries, we see that quantitative and above all 
qualitative criteria are applied differently. Therefore, the notion of the public 
interest is not invariable in time and space."3 
2 VEDEL, G. -DELVOLVE, P.: Droit administrative. Paris, 1990, Vol. I, 512. 
3 Ibid. 513. 
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And that is how the juridical dimension of the notion of the public interest 
enters into the matter. It determines who is actually competent to enforce the 
decision and consequently to draw the contour lines of the general interest, and, 
if necessary, to re-draw them. It points out who is competent to oversee the 
decision so made and, if necessary, to ensure that it will be respected. 
Three powers are involved: the drafter of the constitution, the legislator and 
the administrator. These are to be found in all democratic countries, but with 
very fine differences, so that the part of each of these powers is reduced or 
expanded according to national traditions and idiosyncrasies. 
These are the three levels to be examined by turn, in the firm understanding 
that, since these three are not equally important in the case of France, their 
treatment is not equal either. 
1. The general interest and the constituent 
The constituent power, as we have seen, always appears to be reticent on the 
matter. In contrast to the others, it chooses to delineate the rights of the citizens 
and keep quiet about their duties. Desirous of expressing freedom, it does 
nothing but imply constraints that draw the borders of liberty. 
This fact was of no great importance until the institution of constitutional 
supervision came into being. The legislator interpreted the Constitution more or 
less in his own way, defended freedoms as he understood them, and assigned 
to them the limits that he himself set, on the basis of his own decision. 
But the creation of the Constitutional Council in 1958, the manner in which 
it began to work in 1971, and the enlarging effect of its functioning in 1974, 
modified the situation profoundly. It very quickly found itself in an ambiguous 
position. On the one hand, it was necessary to guarantee constitutional level 
principles and rules, intended to defend the citizens and expressed in the texts 
that the Council had to apply, against the misapplication of the principle of the 
general interest. On the other hand, it was also necessary to reconcile these 
with other principles and rules, of equally constitutional level, which protected 
the general interest. This second and more thankless task was additionally 
complicated by the reticence of the Constitution on the matter. Because of this, 
the Council sometimes had to interpret certain principles in the light of the 
public interest, which will be called the implicit preserve of the public interest 
(1.1), sometimes even to fill up the hiatus in the texts by formulating a 
principle of Ulis general interest, opposed to a formally sanctified principle, 
which will be called the unwritten public interest (1.2). 
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1.1. The implicit preserve of the general interest 
Two examples will illustrate this notion and measure its scope. 
The first example relates to the principle of equality. It is one of those most 
sanctified by the constitutional texts,4 and, at the same time, one to which the 
French people are most passionately attached. In addition, its violation is the 
grievance most frequently invoked before the constitutional judge. 
This situation led naturally to the specification of the principle's scope and, 
in order to do this, led also to the elaboration of grounds of principle to be 
employed in each case when a decision had to be made. According to this, the 
principle of equality "is not in opposition either to the notion that the legislator 
handles different situations differently, or that he slights equality for the reason 
of the general interest, provided that the difference of treatment resulting in the 
two cases is related to the subject of the law establishing it."5 
So, since 1979,6 the Constitutional Council has admitted that even the 
sacrosanct principle of equality must yield before the general interest. Certainly, 
it assures that the general interest invoked is in fact present and real. Certainly, 
it verifies that the difference of treatment is, in fact, well related to this general 
interest and that it is not excessive in comparison with the goal the legislation 
is designed to reach.7 But it remains true that the current interpretation, as 
indicated by the many various manifestations of it admitted by the Council8 has 
led the Council to accept many sacrifices on the altar of the general interest. 
4 Being proclaimed in the first paragraph of the Declaration of 1789, it can be found again 
in several other dispositions of the same text (paragraphs 4, 6 and 13). It appears again in the 
third, thirteenth and seventeenth sections of the Preamble of 1946. Finally, it is solemnly re-
affirmed in the first paragraph of the Constitution, and mentioned in its third paragraph. 
5 This explanation appears, for example, in Decision CL 87-232 of January 7, 1988. (My 
italics.) 
6 Decision CL 79-107 of July 12, 1979. 
7 As an example of manifestly excessive rupture of equality, even in regard of a legitimate 
objective of the general interest, see decision CL 85-200 of January 16, 1986. 
8 For example, the good functioning of justice (CL 80-127 of January 19 and 20, 1981), 
the continuity of public service (CL 87-229 of July 22, 1987), the defence of the special 
nature of the agricultural bank (CL 87-232 of January 7, 1988), the goal of the fight against 
excessive alcohol-consumption (CL 90-283 of January 8, 1991), the regrouping of electoral 
consultations (CL 93-331 of January 13, 1994), or finally the permanent harmonisation of the 
pension-system (CL 94-348 of August 3, 1994), especially the incitement of certain categories 
of wage earners to take early retirement (CL 96-380 of July 23, 1996). 
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The second example of what is called here the implicit preserve of the 
general interest relates to another fundamental principle, the principle of 
security,9 in the juridical sense of the term, and especially in the case of the 
principle of non-retroactivity. 
In the economic area, it is frequently the case that the legislator, wanting to 
incite actors to a behaviour that he estimates advantageous for the general inter-
est, offers long-term financial benefits. It is in regard to these benefits that the 
actors make their choices. Therefore, they have the right to expect that the state 
will not revoke the promise that it gave when it promised the financial advantage. 
Public power, however, does not hesitate to revoke its promises and 
sometimes to cancel an advantage before the persons to whom it was aimed 
could have the opportunity to profit from it, although the existence of the given 
advantage motivated their choices. 
The Constitutional Council did not raise an insurmountable objection to this. 
At first it asserted dryly that "no principle or rule of constitutional level forbids 
the law to revise an acquired exemption under the aegis of an earlier law, or to 
reduce its duration."10 In a little more nuanced way, it then added that "the 
legislator can, for reasons of the general interest, retroactively modify the rules 
that the fiscal administration and the tax-court are assigned to follow".11 
Certainly, it imposes some limits on the use of this faculty,12 and denies 
that the consideration of financial interest alone constitutes a sufficient motive 
of the general interest,13 but it remains true that in this way the constitutional 
judge admits that, in the name of the general interest, the tax-payers can suffer 
very bad surprises by discovering a posteriori that they must pay over and above 
what had been announced to them legally, and what they legally paid. 
We can see now, through the examples of equality and non-retroactivity, that 
a principle can include an implicit preserve of the general interest which, in the 
eyes of the constitutional judge, allows him to limit or subordinate the principle 
concerned to the general interest, without contradicting it. 
To all of this, which is already no small tiling, jurisprudence added the 
unwritten public interest. 
9 Presented by paragraph 2 of the Declaration of 1789 as one of the "natural and 
imperishable rights", just like freedom, property and resistance to oppression. 
10 Decision CL 83-164 of December 29, 1983. 
11 Decision CL 86-223 of December 29, 1986. (My italics.) 
12 Respect for the object of judgement (ibid.), infringement of rights of property (decision 
CL 91-298 of July 24, 1991). 
13 Decision CL 95-369 of December 30, 1995. 
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1.2. Unwritten public interest 
The question here is not, as in the former case, how to incorporate the public 
interest into the interpretation itself of a principle. The matter is to reconcile a 
principle with a public interest that is external to it. 
This raises no difficulty when this external public interest is represented by 
a formally sanctified constitutional principle. So, for example, the right to strike, 
a constitutional principle,14 must necessarily be reconciled in the name of the 
public interest, with the equally constitutional principle15 of the protection of 
health.16 
A totally different case is when the Council must discover a public interest 
of constitutional value which, though unwritten, must limit the scope of a 
written constitutional principle. 
The first time the judge followed such a procedure was July 25, 1979. In 
that case, after underlying the importance of "safeguarding the general interest 
for which the strike can be of such a nature as to endanger it", he set against 
the right to strike "necessary limitations in order to ensure the continuity of 
public service which, as much as the right to strike, has the character of a 
principle of constitutional value".17 
It is true that paragraph 5 of the Constitution entrusts the President of the 
Republic with ensuring "by his own decision ... the continuity of the state",1* 
but the continuity of public service is nowhere mentioned. 
In the same manner, but in a totally different field, two years later the 
Council observed that "the pursuit of violators of the law and the prevention of 
assaults on public order, namely assaults on the security of persons and goods, 
are necessary for executing the principles and rights that have constitutional 
value. " The Council deduced from this the constitutionality of a procedure for 
identity-verification which does not infringe personal rights, or rather only to a 
limit that is "necessary safeguard to the goals of the general interest having a 
constitutional value, and the pursuit of which motivates the procedure."19 
In this way, the legitimacy of the restriction and of the means to render it 
effective have been raised to the level of a constitutional norm whose existence 
14 Sanctified by the seventh section of the Preamble of 1946. 
15 Sanctified by the eleventh section of the Preamble of 1946. 
16 Namely, this is what the Council affirms in its Decision CL 82-144 of October 22, 1982. 
17 Decision CL 79-105. (My italics.) 
18 Without, however, giving it any particular power to achieve it. 
19 Decision CL 80-127 of January 19 and 20, 1981. (My italics.) 
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can justify that, in the name of an unwritten general interest, some limits should 
be established to the exercise of individual liberties (provided that these 
limitations will not be overly restrictive, which must be verified by the Council). 
Our third example: in the same spirit, the Council underlined with particular 
vigour that "exercising individual liberties and rights cannot excuse financial 
fraud, nor can it obstruct the legitimate repression [of that fraud]".20 
In this way, a public necessity appeared to curb financial fraud, which not 
a single constitutional text envisaged. The Council deduced it from other 
provisions and gave it a value in the hierarchy of norms that puts it on the same 
level with individual liberties and rights, enabling it even to thwart the exercise 
of these. 
In these three examples—the continuity of public service, the requirement of 
maintaining public order, the necessity of combating financial fraud—the 
constitutional judge was led to fill up the silence of fundamental laws. He has 
employed the laws to make them assert, through him, principles drawn from the 
general interest that no one, especially not the legislator, could totally 
misunderstand or sacrifice. 
This procedure was not self-evident, especially in a country that is cautions 
about juridical creations. But one should also recognise that the invocation of 
the genera] interest by the Constitution was made in connection with subjects 
that could call on the help of evidence. Constitutional texts were mainly 
engaged in guaranteeing what was not self-evident without them—the respect of 
liberties and rights—and they were less involved in proclaiming certain requi-
rements of the general interest—maintaining order, curbing fraud... Certainly this 
is not because they were not aware or concerned with these, but rather on the 
contrary, because their existence was self-evident. So, the Council created far 
fewer principles than the number whose evidence it proved. 
Now, after defining certain constitutional restrictions resulting from the 
general interest, it remains yet to examine how they are set in motion by the 
person who is competent to do this, that is to say, the legislator. 
2. The general interest and the legislator 
The Constitution, as interpreted by the Constitutional Council, determines a set 
of principles that the legislator is obliged to respect, reconciling them in case 
of need. But the area so delineated, in which Parliament can move more or less 
20 Decision CL 83-164 of December 29, 1983. (My italics.) 
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as it likes and, in given cases, make its own conception of the general interest 
prevail, remains too large. 
Does it mean that a statement of the pursuit of the general interest alone is 
sufficient to enable Parliament to take whatever steps it likes? Not exactly. If 
it is actually true that Parliament has a very large scope of interpretation (2.1), 
it also must completely assume the responsibility that accompanies its exercise 
(2.2). 
2.1. Interpretation of the public interest 
Over a period of some years, the French Parliament invoked the public interest 
first to nationalise (1982) and then to privatise (1986). So two weighty and 
totally contradictory measures were carried out under the same banner. That is 
to say: rights authorise the most divergent ideological assumptions. 
As it has already been mentioned, the political notion of the general interest 
is actually very fluid. It qualifies not an object—which would have a proper and 
objective existence that could be proved by everyone—but rather a choice, 
contestable by nature, revocable by definition. Therefore, you cannot ask what 
the general interest is unless you immediately ask who is the authority that is 
legitimately able to define and oversee it. 
The part of the legislator appears then very quickly. It is he and he alone, 
at least in the French system, who has in the constitutional framework the right 
to define the general interest. To paraphrase a well-known statement, even 
assuming that there can be a scientific definition of the public interest, it 
remains that the legislator has a monopoly on its valid definition. 
This statement alone suffices to render useless all discussions of the cogency 
of the choices that Parliament carries out, or the question of whether the 
decisions mediating among different interests are or are not wise, satisfactory 
or efficacious. In fact, the authentic interpreter of the general interest is an 
institution elected by universal suffrage, responsible to the electors, and on Ulis 
double title suited to make decisions in their name. 
Anyone has the perfect right to contest the decisions made, the use of the 
notion of the public interest, as well as all other notions. But this dispute has 
no other channels than democratic, especially electoral procedures.21 
21 Л way out that French people seem to use after all with a particular severity, as for nearly 
twenty years all parliamentary majorities, whether of right or left, have been defeated on the 
occasion of each of the general legislative elections. 
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Certain elements of the general interest, as we have already seen, have a 
constitutional value, and Parliament cannot break away from these. But the 
others, all the о titers, correspond to an exclusively legislative definition, and the 
only possible sanction of them is electoral and not juridical. 
This is the position that the Constitutional Council has maintained by 
reproducing a moderate and definitive formula in a number of decisions since 
1975, according to which the Council itself "does not retain a power of 
interpretation and decision identical with that of Parliament'22 
In these conditions, once the constitutional judge verifies that no consti-
tutional principle has been misunderstood and that, in the given case, those 
principles which had to be reconciled were so reconciled, and in a balanced 
manner, the task of the constitutional judge is over. Whatever Iiis own con-
ception of the general interest, even if it radically differs from that of the 
legislator, the constitutional judge cannot substitute his interpretation for that of 
Parliament. 
For this jurisprudence, as it respects the power of Parliament, there is but one 
possible limitation. If the judge does not have the power to substitute his own 
interpretation for that of the legislator, he has the duty to reprehend possible 
"manifest errors of interpretation". The power of Parliament is discretionary. It 
is not sovereign. It can do much but not everything. Accordingly, it cannot 
permit a general interest to be invoked, a necessary juridical ground for the 
measures involved, which would not exist manifestly or would not manifestly be 
what one claims it is. 
Potentially, therefore, the constitutional judge can recover with the one hand 
(control over manifest error) what he gave up with the other hand (power of 
discretionary interpretation of Parliament). But in reality, manifest error is a 
judicially circumscribed hypothesis in cases in which die error is plain, large, 
incontestable, and perceptible even for the most poorly informed. So, while 
mentioning this in several claims in its decisions23 but never pronouncing 
repeal up to now on this basis, the Constitutional Council just took, without 
modifying its jurisprudence, a precaution which permits it to censure the 
eccentric decisions of a foolish legislator. But short of this, the judge abstains 
from rectifying the interpretations of Parliament. This permits us to conclude on 
this point that the foolishness of the legislator would be unconstitutional, but lus 
simple idiocy would not! 
22 Decision CL 74-54 of January 15, 1975. (My italics.) 
23 For example. Decision CL 81-132 of January 16, 1982. 
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2.2. Responsibility of the public interest 
From the moment that it is recognised, with the reservations previously indicated, 
the legislator's wide-ranging competence to interpret the existence, the scope and 
the effects of the public interest is counterbalanced by his obligation to 
completely exercise that competence. 
In a general manner, the Constitutional Council censures all cases in which 
the legislator "falls short of his competence", when he hasn't adopted suffi-
ciently precise rules and has left to the executive power decisions that normally 
belong to Parliament. 
This jurisprudence, called the "negative incompetence"24 is not directly 
attached to the notion of the public interest, insofar as it mainly refers to the 
constitutional provision governing the distribution of competencies between the 
law and the administrative ordinance, and their relative weight. 
However, there are cases in which, implicitly but clearly, the Constitutional 
Council censured Parliament for not having defined precisely the consequences 
attached to the adopted provisions with regard to the satisfaction of the general 
interest.25 
In this way, after admitting that Parliament, in the name of the general 
interest that it determines, has the right to institute a servitude on certain real-
estate, it emphasises that "it was incumbent on the legislator to determine 
himself the nature of necessary guarantees...; that lack of having instituted a 
procedure of information and of claims provided with reasonable dates or any 
other means designed to remove arbitrary risk". Parliament has not exercised the 
competencies that belong only to it.26 
In the same manner, while die legislator can, in the name of "constant and 
particular imperatives of public safety", provide for a geographic extension of 
certain types of police control, he "misunderstood Iiis competence if he 
delegates to the regulation power the task of defining this extension".27 
So, if the public interest is in question, the legislator alone has competence 
to define its nature, content and effects, but he has equally the competence to 
define precisely the whole nature, the whole content and all the effects. 
24 FAVOREU, V. L— PHILIP, L.: Les grandes decisions du Conseil constitutionnel, Paris, 
1997, 211. 
25 For example. Decisions CL 83-162 of July 19, 1983, CL 93-322 of July 28, 1993. 
26 Decision CL 85-198 of December 13, 1985. 
27 Decision CL 93-323 of August 5, 1993. 
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Therefore, if he has significant power, the obligation is incumbent on him 
to assume completely the responsibility for its exercise, without the possibility 
of passing it to someone else. 
From this point, the circle is closed logically: it belongs to the citizens to 
elect their representatives, and it belongs to the representatives alone and 
entirely to define and to impose the public interest. Consequently, they assume 
before the citizens the entire responsibility for the decisions that they make. If 
the citizens disapprove of the choices of the parliamentarians, they can only 
blame themselves for having elected them, and they alone can replace them on 
the first occasion. If, on the contrary, they approve of these choices, they agree 
in advance with the constraints that these choices lay upon their particular 
interests. 
Such a representation can be considered abstract or theoretical. But beyond 
its logic, in France it seems to be preferable to everything else. 
3. The general interest and the administrator 
France has adopted traditionally an encroaching conception of the public 
interest. As the presentation of authority before 1789, as the guarantee of 
equality after 1789, the pursuit of the general interest not only legitimated, but 
even demanded an omnipresent and omnipotent administration, charged, in the 
name of the State, to assure the satisfaction of the general interest against the 
continual siege of particular interests, assumed always as egoistic. 
After several centuries of permanent strengthening, through monarchies, 
empires and republics, it is only since the 1980's that a reverse trend has 
operated. As a result, die public sphere has been divided and contracted. 
It has been divided as an effect of decentralisation, which dates back to 
1982. This reform has not made the notion of the public interest lose its impor-
tance. But it has made the state lose the monopoly of its definition. Henceforth, 
each local collectivity is in part the master of its general interest. And the fact 
that those in positions of responsibility are closer to those they administer than 
the state is, leads them to try to make a more prudent and more circumspect 
usage of tlie power that they have in imposing constraints in the name of the 
general interest. Step by step the power of arbitration has been refined. 
As it was divided, the public sphere was also contracted. The double 
movement of privatisation and of deregulation, induced by both economic and 
European necessities, made the pursuit of the general interest lose in all related 
fields the whole or a part of the primacy that it had earlier enjoyed. To give a 
simple example, the general interest that authorised strict control of prices until 
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1986 has ceased to be perceived as sufficient to justify this governmental action, 
which has disappeared since then. 
In spite of radical changes, the details of which we cannot discuss at present, 
it remains that the administration still possesses considerable power (whether it 
is local or national) which permits it, always in the name of the general interest, 
to lay constraints upon private interests in very different areas. 
From the earlier period, a heritage persists that plays a very important part. 
The importance attributed to the general interest, and hence its primacy, has 
actually assumed such proportions that it has led to the creation of a specific 
law—administrative law—and a specific judge charged to enforce it. Both the 
administrative law (3.1) and the administrative judge (3.2) have gone through 
fine and not always perceptible mutations, which have substantially modified the 
perception and the treatment of the general interest. 
3.1. The mutation of the administrative law 
After the Revolution, as is commonly known, ordinary judges were forbidden 
to interfere with the acts of public actors. The pursuit, or at least the assumed 
pursuit of the general interest, was protected in the most radical way possible, 
while contesting it was absolutely not allowed. 
At the same time, the body secreted its anti-body. The Council of State was 
progressively led to exercise an increasing control upon the administration and 
its use of the exorbitant powers exercised by it and granted to it. 
This single mechanism created administrative law, and then enriched it with 
successive strata. It also explains why this law was chiefly and above all a 
jurisprudential law: it was the Council of State that defined its own methods of 
handling cases, and defined the general principle to which the action of the 
administration was subordinated. 
During several decades, the extreme subtlety of the law that was expanding 
on all sides led the professors charged with analysing and commenting on it to 
the edge of ecstasy, while it led the miserable students condemned to try to 
understand it to the edge of suicide. 
Some dissident voices were trying to explain that the concern of the Council 
of State to protect citizens against an arbitrary invocation of the general interest 
was perhaps not so present as was pretended to be,28 and that the authors of 
the administrative law did not merit the laurels with which they were crowned. 
28 For example, MESTRE, A.: Le Conseil d'Etat, protecteur des prérogatives de 
l'administration. Thèse, LGDJ, Paris, 1974. 
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But these voices were not sufficient to endanger a well-rooted prestige. The 
result was that the change did not happen on this front. 
The change came, not that one would ever have thought it, from the fact that 
the administration ceased to be above all jurisprudential. 
While decentralisation divided the competency of the administration among 
the different levels, at the same time it was necessary to specify the powers of 
each and their conditions of exercise. The same phenomenon repeated itself 
whenever the state had to give ground in whatever area: where earlier the 
administration had a power of decision which could be defined very summarily, 
the disappearance of this power led to the creation of clear rules that could be 
substituted for them. Finally, even though the ascendency of the general interest 
assumed by public persons remained more or less unchanged, in order to render 
it more tolerable the legislator frequently specified the creating conditions to 
which all were to adhere. 
This was communicated by the impressive multiplication of texts, which 
have, from that time, framed the activity of the administrative power. Since 
these texts have to meet the requirements raised by the Constitutional Council, 
they must be more and more precise. 
Since that time, the invocation of the general interest does not suffice to 
legitimate any decision as far as jurisprudential principles of administrative law 
are concerned. This invocation must strictly meet the requirements, conditions, 
forms and procedures of what the law prescribed, frequently in a detailed 
manner. 
Consequently, the part of the administration in the pursuit of the general 
interest, which is defined and specified outside it, is nothing more than residual, 
executive in the proper sense of the term. It no longer attracts the compre-
hension or the indulgence of the administrative judge. It must scrupulously 
respect administrative law, more and more of legislative origin.29 
If it is true that the legislator occasionally takes little notice of even the 
most legitimate private interests, political responsibility leads him not to torture 
them excessively, which either leads him to define the effects of the general 
interest or to establish guarantees, both of which lead to the weakening of Iiis 
power. 
29 To these is added an administrative law arising from public property, taking into account 
as well the number and the importance of applicable European norms. 
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3.2. The evolution of administrative justice 
Certainly, developments in administrative law have not been without con-
sequences in administrative justice. 
First of all, the Conseil d'Etat no longer hinders a legal development which 
in essence operates beyond its control.30 It is rather telling that of those 119 
cases selected in the most recent edition of the famous volume Grands arrets 
de la jurisprudence, administrative française31 more than a hundred cases are 
over thirty years old and only a dozen or less were issued in the last twenty 
years. 
Still, for our purposes, the most important development is that although the 
Conseil d'Etat has not revoked the doctrine under which it reviews 
administrative acts for their legality but not for their reasonableness, since the 
end of the 1960's the Conseil has taken a much more realistic approach towards 
administrative decisions based on public interest considerations. 
In its first major decision in 1971—which is remarkable in the light of its 
previous practice—the Conseil d'Etat affirmed for the first time that "an action 
can lawfully be declared to be for a public purpose only if the infringement of 
private property, financial consequences and eventual social inconveniences 
resulting from the action do not exceed the interest which the action intends to 
serve".32 The doctrine thus created is referred to as the "cost/benefit test". 
Besides the significance of this doctrine on its own,33 the development 
marked, above all, a change in attitudes, and its effects have been felt ever 
since. 
The bitterness of objections, especially economic, and the growing 
opposition of those who consider public interest a mistake (being the persistence 
of selfishness),34 gave a great number of occasions to administrative judges at 
all levels to appear much less cautious than before. The importance of an action, 
30 The decisions of subordinated form, that of the administrative tribunals, and since 1989, 
of the six administrative courts of appeal will not be discussed here. 
31 LONG, M .—WEIL, P.—В RAIBANT, G.-DEVOLVE, P.-GENEVOIS, В.: Les grands 
arrets de la jurisprudence administrative française, Paris, 1966. 
32 Conseil d'Etat, Assemblée, May 28, 1971. "Ville nouvelle Est", Ree. 409. 
33 Even the authors of the Grands arrets admit that the annulations declared on this basis 
were "relatively few ... (and) ... most often challenged operations of limited significance". Op. 
cit., 657. 
34 One faces here the French counterpart of phrases born in Britain, such as NIMBY (Not 
In My Back Yard) or in the US, as BANANA (Build Absolutely Nothing, Anywhere, Near 
Anybody). 
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even if considerable sums have already been spent, is not a challenge any more. 
Without hesitation administrative judges declare annulments, the consequences 
of which would have been avoided a few years ago. 
In doing so, in order to ascertain the appropriateness of an action, to weigh 
its importance, and to approve of its effects, administrative judges apply all 
means available to trace the real consideration of public interest behind the 
standard references made by the administration. 
All this is not to say that the public interest is not needed anymore. What 
it shows simply, yet importantly, is that a new balance has been struck between 
public interest and private interest. Claiming the mere existence of a public 
interest does not suffice anymore. Its legislative origin must be shown and also 
it must be proven that every administrative action is based on it; furthermore, 
it must be demonstrated that the hardships that may occur are proportionate to 
the aims to be achieved. In addition, it must also be established that all formal, 
procedural and substantial requirements which apply to the actions of public 
figures have been observed. 
On the one hand, one may be satisfied with this development because it 
substantially reduces the chances of arbitrary decisions. On the other hand, one 
may also consider an unexpected occurrence: attacked from all directions, 
contested and weakened, by tomorrow the notion of public interest might look 
much more disturbed than disturbing. Those who have always found this notion 
a counterfeit may be glad. Others, however, might suggest organizing a 
conference entitled "Is the disappearance of the public interest in the interest of 
the citizen?". 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
1998 39 Nos 3-4, pp. 167-175 
1216-2574 / 98 / U S D 5.00 
© 1998 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
Gunnar Folke 
SCHUPPERT 
Responsibility Sharing in Public Policy 
Who Defines the Public Interest in the 
Cooperative State? 
I. Introduction: safeguarding the public interest as a solemn undertaking 
of the state 
According to the legal tradition and political thinking in Germany it is the 
obligation of the state to safeguard the public interest: it is the state—and only 
the state—which is obliged and at the same time authorized to formulate and to 
implement the public interest. Non-governmental actors may contribute to the 
well-being of the state but they remain in the sphere of society and are attending 
their private interests. This dichotomy of state and society, of public and private 
interests, of public law and private law, of administrative courts and civil courts, 
of state actors and private actors still characterizes German legal thinking and 
the education and training of legal profession. To understand this principal 
difference of public and private, it is helpful to look at §§ 74 and 75 of the 
"Einleitung zum Allgemeinen Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten von 1794". 
§ 74. Rights and benefits of individual members of the state take second place 
to die common good if a conflict of interest happens. 
§ 75. It is the obligation of the state to make compensation to all individuals 
who have been forced to sacrifice their rights and benefits to the 
common good. 
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This is the traditional understanding of the state as the "born" guarantor of the 
public interest in a world of individuals or organizations pursuing their own 
(i. е., private) interests. 
Today we are observing the process of blurring borderlines between state 
and society, the public and the private sector1 and even of public and private 
law;2 we are observing furthermore a process of overlapping of state and 
society. This process finds its expression in hybrid organizations as halfway 
houses between the public and private sector, in various forms and patterns of 
public-private partnerships and in networks of public and private actors. 
In the sixties and seventies tltis overlapping and crossing over of the public 
and private sectors was discussed in terms of corporatism and neocorpo-
ratism.3 To describe these close, nearly symbiotic relations between state 
administration and organized interests, the successful concept of "Private 
Interest Government" (PIG) was created, referring to the modern state as 
aligning itself with powerful corporate actors and giving up its right to exercise 
guidance and control in respect to society and the economy. Meanwhile the 
perspective changed and the discussion moved from neo-corporatism to topics 
like "retreat of the state"4 or "slimming of the state",5 focusing the interest 
less on control-pessimism than on using the self-regulating powers of the third 
and private sectors to join forces in defining and implementing the public 
interest in a cooperative manner. Such a deliberate retreat of the state—to quote 
another catchword—"from providing to enabling" gives the whole discussion a 
quite different direction: instead of mourning the abdication of the state we 
have to look for a conception of "bringing the state back in" as an actor with 
a specific institutional competence and legitimization in defining the public 
interest in communication with either private actors or ones belonging to the 
third sector. 
1 SCHUPPERT, G. F.: "Zur Anatomie und Analyse des Dritten Sektors." In: Die 
Verwaltung, 1995, 137-200. 
2 Hoffmann-Riem, W— Schmidt-Assmann, E. (eds.): öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht als 
wechselseitige Auffangordnungen, Baden-Baden, 1996. 
3 SCHMITTER, Ph. C—STREECK, W.: "Community, Market, State-and Association?" In: 
the same (eds.), Private Interest Government—Beyond Market and State, London, 1985. 
4 SCHUPPERT, G. F.: "Rückzug des Staates? Zur Rolle des Staates zwischen Legitimations-
krise und politischer Neubestimmung." In: Die öffentliche Verwaltung, 1995, 761-770. 
5 Sachverständigenrat "Schlanker Staat", Abschlussbericht, Bonn, 1998. 
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II. Key concepts in redrawing the boundary between the public and private 
sectors and in redistributing the responsibility for the public interest 
If the state is no longer the one and only actor involved in the process of 
defining and implementing the public interest, we need a conception defining 
the proper role of the different actors in the process of putting the common 
good in concrete terms. It is a typical German approach to choose first the 
perspective of the state and to ask how "its" special contribution to the shaping 
of the public interest should be characterized. If the state—in one way or 
another—has to share its authority in defining the common good with someone 
else—individuals or corporate actors-we need concepts which tell us something 
about the division of authority to determine the public interest. Again it might 
be a typical German approach to translate this "division of labor" as division of 
responsibility because the state's authority to define the public interest can only 
be understood as its genuine responsibility. This responsibility is—for con-
stitutional reasons-not at its disposal, but there may be different grades of 
responsibility to express a different intensity of the state's own part in carrying 
out public purposes. What Ulis paper does is it takes a closer look at conceptions 
of such responsibility sharing in public policy. 
A. Key concept no. 1: Gradings of administrative responsibility 
The conception of responsibility grading measures the intensity of the 
involvement of state bureaucracy in implementing public policies6 or—to put it 
in economic terms—it defines the administrative performance standards in 
carrying out public purposes.7 To determine this allocation of responsibilities 
the concepts is shown below.8 
6 SCHMIDT-ASSMANN, E.: "Zur Reform des Allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts — Reform-
bedarf und Reformansätze." In: W. Hoffmann-Riem—E. Schmidt-Assmann—G. F. Schuppert 
(eds.): Reform des Allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts. Grundfragen, Baden-Baden, 1993, 11 ff.; 
HOFFMANN-RIEM, W.: 'Tendenzen in der Verwaltungsrechtsentwicklung." In: Die 
öffentliche Verwaltung, 1997, 433 ff.; SCHUPPERT, G. F.: "Die Erfüllung öffentlicher 
Aufgaben durch die öffentliche Hand, private Anbieter und Organisationen des Dritten 
Sektors." In: J. Ipsen (ed.): Privatisierung öffentlicher Aufgaben. 1994. 
7 NASCHOLD, F. et al.: Leistungstiefe im öffentlichen Sektor. Erfahrungen, Konzepte, 
Methoden. Berlin, 1996. 
8 HOFFMANN-RIEM: op. cit. 
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Gradings of responsibility, performance standards: 
— performance responsibility 
— guarantee responsibility 
— supervisory responsibility 
— regulatory responsibility 
— standby responsibility. 
These concepts can easily be explained: performance responsibility stands for 
the direct responsibility of the state to perform certain functions using the state 
bureaucracy and state personnel (civil servants); examples are police, tax-
collecting or exercising jurisdiction. Guarantee responsibility stands for the 
responsibility of the state to guarantee that public purposes are carried out not 
necessarily by authorities of state administration but instead by or in cooperation 
with non-state actors like business firms, interest groups or organizations 
belonging to the third sector. In case of performance of public functions by 
private actors, guarantee responsibility shows up as the responsibility to 
supervise and to regulate these activities: the best example of this is the 
correlation between privatization and regulation which is typical for the modern 
regulatory state. Standby responsibility normally sits on the "reserve bench" but 
comes into action when performance by the private actors turns out to be 
unsatisfactory; at this moment the state comes back in. 
Another conception of allocation of responsibilities is a model of different 
phases in putting the public interest into effect9 as the table below shows. 
Phases of public interest relation: 
— standard-setting responsibility 
— preparatory responsibility 
— procedural responsibility 
— implementation responsibility 
— control responsibility 
— realization responsibility 
— result responsibility. 
9 VOSSKUHLE, Л.: "Gesetzgeberische Regelungsstrategien der Verantwortungsteilung 
zwischen öffentlichem und privatem Sektor." In: G. F. Schuppert (ed.): Jenseits von 
Privatisierung und "schlankem Staat": Verantwortungsteilung als Schlüsselbegriff eines sich 
verändernden Verhältnisses von öffentlichem und privatem Sektor, Baden-Baden, 1998 (to be 
published). 
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Both conceptions described are state-centered conceptions defining different 
types and grades of state responsibility in the process of the development and 
implementation of public policies. We will now move to a model of responsi-
bility sharing including different actors playing different roles in public policy. 
B. Key concept no. 2: Responsibility sharing 
If we want to analyze the division of labor and the cooperation between the 
public and private sectors in implementing public policies we need an actor-
specific perspective which helps us determine the proper role of the different 
actors in a certain field of public policy. Taking the example of social policy we 
can describe the model of responsibility sharing as follows: 
performance responsibility in 
the field of social policy 
private actors 
business firms 
performance 
of certain tasks 
This conception of responsibility sharing promises to be a very successful 
conception because it reacts to some popular findings which can be called the 
"increase of the workload of the state", "decrease of the problem solving capacity 
of the state", "decline of guidance and control by law" and—last but not 
least—"retreat of the state". In the discussion about the consequences of these 
semi-state actors 
charity, voluntary 
organizations 
state actors 
social (public) 
administration 
responsibility sharing 
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findings, the concept of responsibility sharing functions as an interdisciplinary 
composite concept10 which connects different disciplinary discourses, a function 
which can be judged as an advantage but—at the same time—as a danger (in 
regard to its lack of dogmatic substance). 
The very heart of this conception is the allocation of roles and functions of 
state, semi-state and private actors in the concert of suppliers of public services. 
The conception of responsibility sharing is an actor-specific conception defining 
and analyzing the contribution of different actors in defining and implementing 
the public interest. Its starting point is the intense discussion about instruments 
and methods of steering (Steuerung): responsibility sharing means stimulating 
the special abilities of certain actors—their knowledge, their skills, their organiza-
tion—to put into effect the common good, not in the way of legal obligation but 
by using their own specific points of reference and rationalities guiding their 
organizational behavior. 
The problem of this conception is putting into effect this type of "job-
sharing" by developing structures which enable a responsible cooperation of 
different actors. This is a central function of the legal order: to provide 
organizational and legal structures as a framework for cooperative actions (see 
below). 
C. Key concept no. 3: Dual responsibility structures 
If we look at our legal order we can find many examples of responsibility 
sharing which give us an idea of possible organizational structures and 
instruments of responsibility sharing. I only want to give two examples for dual 
responsibility structures: environment audit and waste collection. In both cases 
we can study a subtle mechanism: in order to avoid state regulation and 
supervision by state bureaucracy, private actors build up an organization for 
waste collecting and disposal which is called "Duales System"?1 in the case 
of the Öko-Audit12 the private actors make (voluntary) use of an audit system 
10 TRUTE, H.-H.: "Verantwortungsteilung als Schlüsselbegriff eines sich Verhältnisses von 
öffentlichem und privatem Sektor." 1998. In: G. F. Schuppert (ed.): Zur notwendigen 
Neubestimmung der Staatsaufsicht, 1998. 
11 SCHMIDT-PREUSS, M.: "Duale Entsorgungs-Systeme als Spiegelbild dualer 
Verantwortung: Von der Verpackungsverordnung zum Kreislaufwirtschaftsgesetz." 1998. In: 
Schuppert (ed.): Zur notwendigen Neubestimmung der Staatsaufsicht, op. cit. 
12 SCHNEIDER, J.-P.: "Kooperative Verwaltungsverfahren". In: Verwaltungs-Archiv, 1996, 
38 ff. 
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provided by law consisting of a network of independent environmental experts 
who are nominated by a special organization financed and substantially 
influenced by the private economy. 
I do not want to go into details. But the examples show that organizational 
structures that combine the guarantee responsibility of the state and the self-
regulating forces of private actors already exist. It is necessary to rethink and 
redefine the traditional legal instruments: the most striking example is the 
traditional conception of state supervision (Staatsaufsicht) which will be a key 
concept in responsibility sharing.13 
III. Functions of the legal order to enable responsibility sharing in public 
policy 
A. The availability function of law 
Taking an example from the field of public administration, it is the task of the 
legal order (in this case, the administrative law) to provide a framework for 
action for the administrative authorities. The administrative law has to provide 
appropriate procedures for the public administration, appropriate organizational 
structures, and appropriate instruments and modes of acting in order to enable 
the administrative authorities to act both lawfully and efficiently. This function 
of the legal order can be called the availability function of law (Bereitstellungs-
funktion des Rechts, see Schuppert14). 
If we apply fills enabling function to the problem discussed in this paper, it 
would be the function of administrative law to enable the state bureaucracy to 
act in a cooperative spectrum between public and private implementations of 
public policies. If we talk about responsibility sharing in public policy, the 
administrative authorities must have the capacity to practice responsibility 
sharing; i.e., they must have available appropriate organizational arrangements 
and structures (e.g., for public private partnerships) and an appropriate legal 
framework such as appropriate types of treaties and agreements. The German 
legal order and its administrative law are still focused on a public administration 
exercising sovereign tasks by issuing administrative acts and is not prepared to 
13 SCHUPPERT: Zur notwendigen Neubestimmung der Staatsaufsicht, op. cit. 
14 SCHUPPERT: "Verwaltungswissenschaft als Steuerungswissenschaft. Zur Steuerung des 
Verwaltungshandelns durch Verwaltungsrecht." In: Reform des Allgemeinen Verwaltungs-
rechts. op. eil. 
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provide the means and instruments for the public administration which are 
useful and necessary in a cooperative state. 
B. The necessity of an administrative cooperation law 
The task of an administrative cooperation law would be to translate the 
administrative responsibility for the common good into structures of a co-
operation law which provides a framework for the cooperative action of state, 
semi-state and private actors. The legal structuring of responsibility sharing in 
public policy by an administrative cooperation law would require structuring 
achievements in the following respects:15 
1. Guaranteeing quality standards 
To practice responsibility sharing the public authorities need cooperation 
partners of a certain nature and quality. Taking the example of a possible 
cooperation between state police and private security firms, it must be ensured 
that the personnel of the private security firms meet the requirements of a state 
governed by the principle of rule of law. Cooperation law therefore has to 
guarantee quality standards of actors involved in the implementation of sensitive 
public policies. 
2. Providing cooperative administrative procedures 
An important aspect of responsibility sharing is die availability of administrative 
procedures to guarantee the procedural responsibility of the state and the 
appropriate treatment of the different interests involved simultaneously.16 An 
interesting example can be found in the field of town planning and development 
such as the so-called project and site development plans which try to link die 
interests of the private investor with the procedural responsibility of the 
municipality in a construction of agreement, public law treaty and municipal 
ordinance. 
3. Providing institutional arrangements as a framework for cooperative action 
Another important aspect of responsibility sharing is the development of 
appropriate institutional arrangements for cooperation and partnership of the 
public and the private sectors. This not only means providing an organizational 
15 BAUER, H.: "Zur notwendigen Entwicklung eines Verwaltungskooperationsrechts." In 
G. F. Schuppert (ed.): Jenseits von Privatisierung und "Schlankem Staat"..., op. cit. 
16 SCHNEIDER: "Kooperative Verwaltungsverfahren", op. cit. 38 ff. 
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framework for cooperative action like the different patterns of public-private-
partnership and the mushrooming of hybrid and symbiotic organizational 
arrangements,17 but also refers to the systematic rise of organizational law as 
an instrument of guidance and control.18 An interesting example is the use of 
environmental protection enterprises for the improvement of the environment.19 
4. Development of appropriate forms and patterns of administrative action 
The last aspect of responsibility sharing mentioned in this paper is the urgent 
development of a more subtle repertoire of forms of administrative action 
suitable for administrative behavior in cooperative surroundings. To give an 
example: according to §§ 54 ff. of the administrative procedural law (VwVfG), 
the public law treaty has been designed as an alternative to the administrative 
act and authorizes administrative authorities to act by treaty instead of issuing 
an administrative act; what is lacking is the availability of different types of 
public law treaties, like cooperation treaties, as instruments of contact 
management or of regulatory treaties to implement the regulatory responsibility 
of the state as a consequence of large scale privatization. 
Responsibility sharing needs legal and organizational structures. It will be 
the task and function of the science of public administration and public law to 
provide those structures and to ensure that among a variety of interests the 
public interest should have an appropriate place. 
17 ENGELHARDT, G.: "'Symbiotische Arrangements' und die Versorgungs-organisation 
öffentlicher Aufgabenerfüllung." In: J. Kruse—О. G. Mayer (eds.): Festschrift Katzenbach, 
1996, Baden-Baden, 283 ff. 
18 G. F. Schmidt-Assmann—W. Hoffmann-Riem (eds.): Verwaltungsorganisationsrecht als 
Steuerungsresource, Baden-Baden, 1997. 
19 FELDHAUS, G.: "Umweltschutzsichcrnde Betriebsorganisation." In: Neue Verwaltungs-
rechts-Zeitschrift, 1991, 927 ff. 
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Michael ADLER Regulation and the Public Interest 
A Third Way? 
When the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, returned from Washington in 
February 1998, he spoke of his ambition to create an international consensus of 
the centre-left for the 21st century around what he called the "Third Way", a 
new political strategy which differs both from the "Old Left" and from the 
"New Right". However, he was not the first to claim that he had found a Third 
Way—President Bill Clinton made a similar claim in Iiis most recent State of the 
Union address. 
Although Blair's announcement initially met with a frosty reception, par-
ticularly from those who regard Clinton's policies as largely irrelevant in a 
European context, support for his analysis, including support from some 
prominent figures on the left, e.g., the British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook,1 
appears to be growing. In a recent interview,2 Tony Blair developed his theme 
that European social democratic parties have a lot in common with the 
Democratic Party in the US, arguing that they are not only tackling the same 
problems (economic and social change, globalisation, family disintegration, 
1 RICHARDS, S.: "Why is the Left's Voice in the Cabinet Signing Up to Blair's Third 
Way?", New Statesman, 1 May 1998, 22-23. 
2 KETTLE, M.: "Why we can make a Difference", The Guardian, 15 May 1998, 4. 
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community breakdown and social exclusion) but also coming up with many of 
the same solutions. These solutions represent a new synthesis between the 
politics of the Old Left, characterised in terms of state control with everything 
run from the centre, and the politics of the New Right, characterised in terms 
of laissez faire with everything left to markets. However, they should be located 
on the centre-left of the political spectrum in that they embrace the values of the 
left, i.e., social justice, solidarity, community, democracy and liberty, but 
attempt to recast and reshape them to fit the changed circumstances which are 
encountered in the world today. 
In a very insightful analysis,3 A. Giddens contrasted the Third Way with 
social democracy (the Old Left) and neo-liberalism (the New Right) on five 
dimensions: political values, the economy, government, the nation, and the 
welfare state. Tire comparisons are set out schematically in Table 1 below: 
Table 1 
Comparisons between the "Old Left", the "New Right" and the "Third Way" 
The Old Left 
(social democracy) 
The New Right 
(neo- liberalism ) 
The Third Way 
(centre-left) 
class politics of the left class politics of the right modernising movement of 
the centre 
old mixed economy market fundamentalism new mixed economy 
corporatism: state 
dominates over civil 
society 
minimal state new democratic state 
internationalism conservative nation cosmopolitan nation 
strong welfare state, 
protecting population 
"from the cradle to the 
grave" 
welfare safety net social investment state 
3 GIDDENS, A.: "After the Left 's Paralysis", New Statesman, 1 May 1998, 18-21. 
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Political values 
While social democracy was explicitly a class politics of the left, Giddens 
argues that neo-liberalism was, in effect, a class politics of the right. However, 
as he points out, with the rapid shrinkage of the working class, the salience of 
class politics and the traditional polarity between left and right has diminished. 
This change has been taken on board by the Labour Party in Britain and by 
social democratic parties elsewhere—whereas "Old Labour" saw itself as the 
party of the working class, "New Labour" (the name given to the revamped 
Labour Party) seeks to appeal to a much wider constituency for support. 
Although New Labour rejects the old authoritarianism of the left, it equally 
rejects the libertarianism of the right, arguing that individual freedom depends 
on collective resources and entails social justice and that government is essential 
for its realisation. 
The economy 
Although, at first sight, it might appear that there is only "one way", in that 
privatisation and de-regulation are the order of the day and are being pursued 
around the world, this is not the case. Giddens associates the Old Left with the 
mix of state-owned industries (often, as in early post-war Britain, representing 
the "commanding heights" of the economy) and a highly regulated private sector, 
and the New Right with its advocacy of "free markets", referring to the former 
as the "old mixed economy" and to Ute latter as "market fundamentalism". By 
contrast, the "new mixed economy" associated with the Third Way refers to the 
balance between regulation and de-regulation (since de-regulation in one 
economic sector often transfers the need for regulation to another) and between 
the economic and the non-economic in die life of society (since economic 
development is always to be judged in terms of its wider social consequences). 
Government 
While social democrats have, historically, been keen to expand the scope of 
government and state and neo-liberals have been equally keen to contract them, 
the Third Way that argues what is necessary is to reconstruct them, i.e. to go 
beyond those who say that "government is the problem" or that "government is 
the answer", in order to define and create a new, democratic state. Such a state 
would be based on the devolution of power, downwards to localities and regions 
and upwards to transnational agencies. This involves what Giddens calls the 
"democratising of democracy", which combines achieving greater transparency 
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in public affairs, experimenting with non-orthodox forms of democratic 
participation, and aiming for a more fruitful partnership between government 
and the institutions of civil society. 
The nation 
Social democrats have traditionally had little sympathy with nationalism, 
regarding it as a threat to international solidarity. Neo-liberals, on the other 
hand, have often mixed an assertive and isolationist nationalism with their 
advocacy of free markets. According to Giddens, the Third Way adopts a 
different stance here too by attempting to find a new role for the nation in a 
cosmopolitan world. Due to cross-cutting ties with other transnational bodies, 
state borders have become softer and more permeable. Whereas nations in the 
past were, in part, propelled to statehood through antagonism to others, the 
Third Way holds that nation is no longer coterminous with state. 
The welfare state 
While social democrats regard a fully developed welfare system as the corner-
stone of a decent and humane society, neo-liberals regard it as the enemy of 
enterprise and the prime source of the decay of civil society. The former want 
the state to maintain and develop its welfare role while the latter wish to reduce 
the role of the state to the provision of a safety net. By contrast, the Third Way 
offers a very different scenario. It argues that the welfare state is in need of 
reform, not in order to cut it back but, rallier, to modernise it and make it 
relevant to contemporary society. According to Giddens, the new welfare state 
will be a "social investment state" which establishes a new relationship between, 
on the one hand, risk and security and, on the other, individual and collective 
responsibility. The hallmark of the new welfare state will be "wherever possible, 
invest in human capital rather than the direct payment of benefits" or "provide 
a hand-up rather than a hand-out". 
A critique of Giddens 
Giddens' characterisation of the Third Way has been described4 as "political 
fudge" and lampooned as high-sounding rhetoric wliich seeks to legitimate a 
4 Wainwright in: GIDDENS, A.—WAINWRIGHT, H.: "Is there such a Thing as a Third 
Way in Politics?", The Guardian (Saturday Section), 23 May 1998, 2. 
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rather shabby political reality. It has also been criticised5 for getting its 
categories wrong, i.e., for confusing social democracy with democratic socialism, 
and for failing to recognise that Thatcherbe governments in Britain introduced 
a great deal of regulation into the economy in tandem with the privatisation of 
what were formerly known as "public utilities", i.e., electricity, gas, telephones, 
water, etc. While the first point is largely semantic, the second is well taken. 
Gamble's6 (1988) characterisation of the Thatcherite project in terms of its 
attempt to combine "the free economy and the strong state"7 captured its essence 
although it is important to distinguish its New Right political ideology from 
pragmatic politics.8 Regulation was embraced not so much as a virtue but as a 
political necessity intended to smooth the pursuit of privatisation and increase its 
legitimacy. More significantly perhaps, the Third Way itself has been criticised 
for lacking a distinctive economics9 and for failing to address such central 
questions as how a modern market economy should be owned and organised. My 
aim in the remainder of this article is to respond to both these criticisms by 
considering the central role played by regulation in the Third Way. 
Regulation 
By regulation is meant the control of behaviour through the setting and enforc-
ing of standards. Although powerful institutions, e.g., the professions and the 
press, may be entrusted with a degree of self-control and left to regulate 
themselves,10 regulation is normally, as Giddens points out, the province of 
government because, ultimately, only government possesses the sanctioning 
mechanism of law. 
Regulation is typically entrusted to public authorities which are independent 
of, but report to, the relevant minister (for examples drawn from the UK, see 
5 LAPPING, В.: "Get your Categories Right", New Statesman (letter), 15 May 1998, 
36. 
6 GAMBLE, A.: The Free Economy and the Strong Stale: the Politics of Thatcherism, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1988. 
7 Ibid. 
8 PARRY, R.: "Social Policy". In: Henry Drucker, Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble and 
Gillian Peele (eds.) Developments in British Politics 2, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1986. 
9 LEADBEATER, Ch.: "A Hole at the Heart of the Third Way", New Statesman, 8 May 
1998, 32-33. 
10 GRAHAM, C.: "Self-Regulation". In: Genevra Richardson and Hazel Genn (eds.) 
Administrative Law and Government Action, Oxford, 1994, 189-209. 
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Baldwin and McCrudden11 and Bishop, Kay and Mayer.12 The general mandate 
of these regulatory agencies (which is what these public authorities are 
collectively called) and the standards they are expected to enforce are typically 
set out in enabling legislation, but they are often granted extensive rule-making 
powers and given considerable discretion in enforcing the statutory standards. 
Thus, unlike the criminal justice system, where offenders can expect to be 
prosecuted if they are apprehended, prosecutions by regulatory agencies are 
relatively uncommon. 
Comparative and historical perspectives 
There is, of course, nothing parochial and, likewise, nothing new about 
regulation. Modern governments have sought to achieve their economic and 
social objectives either by regulating the private sector or by establishing a rival 
public sector or by a mixture of both strategies. In general, regulation has 
tended to be more important and pervasive in countries like the United States 
of America where the public sector is small. But, even in countries like the 
United Kingdom, which developed a large public sector, regulation has also 
played an important role. In the field of social welfare, regulations, setting 
minimum standards for housing, controlling rents and establishing security of 
tenure for tenants, obliging employers to pay minimum wages, establishing 
standards for health and safety at work, and mandating the provision of 
occupational welfare, took shape during die nineteenth century and the first part 
of the twentieth century.13 In some cases, e.g. rent control, enforcement has 
been left to ordinary people. For a rent to be registered, a tenant or landlord 
must take the initiative and apply to the regulatory agency; otherwise the rent 
will be what the parties have agreed. However, people may not know about their 
legal rights or about the roles of agencies charged with their implementation, or 
may lack the confidence or contacts to initiate and carry through a complaint. 
For these reasons, agencies which rely solely on complaints are usually rather 
ineffective; effective regulation requires agencies to take the initiative and to 
engage in the systematic detection of wrongdoing. But the reality is that 
regulatory agencies tend not to invoke the formal processes of law in many 
cases where breaches are found. This is due, in part, to the legal form of 
11 BALDWIN, R.-McCRUDDEN, Ch. (eds.): Regulation and Public Law, London, 1987. 
12 BISHOP, M . - K A Y , J . -MAYER, C. (eds.): The Regulatory Challenge, Oxford, 1994. 
13 CRANSTON, R.: Legal Foundations of the Welfare State, London, 1985. 
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regulation and the tradition in which legislation is drafted and, in part, to a 
chronic under-funding of regulatory agencies. The courts have held that 
regulatory agencies have a considerable discretion which should be exercised in 
the light of public policy. 
Patterns of regulatory enforcement 
According to Kagan and Scholtz,14 there are three widely held "theories" of 
non-compliance with regulatory standards. Those who violate the regulations 
may be viewed as "amoral calculators" who carefully and accurately assess 
opportunities and risks, as bodies that disobey the law when the anticipated 
penalty and the chance of getting caught are small in relation to the benefits of 
non-compliance. In this case, non-compliance stems from economic calculation. 
Alternatively, they may be seen as "political citizens" who normally comply 
with the law (partly because they think this is right, partly from self-interest) 
although their compliance is contingent on the law being seen as reasonable. 
Where the regulations are regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable, non-compliance 
may be due to principled disagreement. Finally, they may be regarded as 
"organisationally incompetent". In this case, non-compliance may be due to 
organisational failure, e.g., failure to oversee subordinates properly, calculate 
risks intelligently, publicise the regulations, etc. 
Each of these theories is associated with a different regulatory enforcement 
strategy. If the non-compliant organisation is thought to be an amoral cal-
culator, the regulatory agency's goal should be deterrence and the agency 
should act like a policeman. If non-compliance is attributed to the principled 
objections of a political citizen, the goal should be persuasion and the agency 
should act more like a politician. If it is regarded as being due to in-
competence, the goal should be education and the agency should act more like 
a consultant. 
The three "theories" of non-compliance and their associated enforcement 
strategies are summarised in Table 2. 
14 KAGAN, R. A.-SCHOLTZ, J. T.: "The 'Criminology of the Corporation' and 
Regulatory Enforcement Strategies", Jahrbuch fiir Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie, 7, 
1980, 352-377. 
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Table 2 
"Theories" of Corporate Non-compliance 
Image of 
Organisation 
Amoral Calculator Citizen Incompetent 
Reason for non-
compliance 
Benefits of non-
compliance exceed 
costs of 
punishment 
Reasoned 
disagreement with 
the law 
Organisational 
failure 
Key variable Incentives Attitudes Capabilities 
Implicit image of 
regulator 
Policeman Politician Consultant 
Enforcement 
strategies 
Strict enforcement 
of rules, increased 
sanctions 
Flexible en-
forcement of rules, 
increased pressure 
to comply 
Organisational 
change, appoint 
staff responsible 
for compliance 
Problems in 
applying strategy 
Regulatory 
unreasonableness, 
legalistic delays 
Organisational 
capture, equal 
treatment problems 
Organisational 
capture, inter-
vention may make 
matters worse 
Source: derived from Kagan and Scholtz15 
Among the problems associated with the different enforcement strategies, Bardach 
and Kagan16 define "regulatory unreasonableness" in terms of the mismatch 
between uniform rules and diverse circumstances, arguing that it results from the 
imposition of uniform requirements in circumstances where they do not make 
sense, due in part to the failure of regulatory agencies to consider arguments from 
regulated organisations that exceptions should be made. "Organisational capture", 
on the other hand, refers to the failure of regulatory agencies to act independently 
and to their sympathy with the explanations for non-compliance put forward by 
15 Op. cit. 356, Table II. 
16 BARDACH, E . -KAGAN, R.: Going by the Book: the Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness, Philadelphia, 1982. 
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regulated organisations. It is, of course, particularly prevalent where the agency's 
staff are recruited from the organisations regulated by the agency. 
Bardach and Kagan point out that fear of organisational capture leads to 
regulatory agencies adopting a "tougher" and more inflexible stance towards 
non-compliance but argue that this, in due course, leads to an increase in 
regulatory unreasonableness. They advocate a more flexible approach to 
regulation in which regulatory agencies and their staff have more discretion. 
However, the dangers with this approach are that they may offend against the 
principle of equal treatment and that it is open to abuse. However, by the 
increased use of output based performance indicators could avoid some of these 
problems. 
Strict vs. flexible enforcement 
Although one theory of non-compliance may be the dominant theory in any 
regulatory agency, discretion enables regulatory officials to make case by case 
judgements regarding the motives behind non-compliance. The main reasons 
why such a small proportion (typically much less than 1%) of regulatory 
offences result in prosecution are that: 
— regulatory agencies tend to see their task as one of securing compliance with 
regulatory standards—they tend to be pro-active rather than re-active and 
emphasise the promotion of "good" behaviour rather than the sanctioning of 
"bad" behaviour, they are reformative rather than punitive and forward-
looking rather than backward-looking; 
— the agency's dominant theory usually views non-compliance as being due to 
principled disagreement or organisational failure and, where officials have 
discretion, they tend to see non-compliance in this way too; and 
— most regulatory agencies have very few resources and are not in a position 
to carry out large numbers of prosecutions, even if they want to do so. 
Some people regard the small number of prosecutions for regulatory offences 
as a problem, arguing that regulatory offences should be prosecuted in the same 
way as other criminal offences and that the failure to do so is indicative of 
double standards. Others regard it as a virtue and, while accepting the point 
about double standards, argue that fewer criminal offences should be prosecuted 
and advocate large-scale diversion of routine criminal cases away from the 
courts. Thus, while some argue that regulatory enforcement should be more like 
criminal prosecution, others argue that criminal prosecution should be more like 
regulatory enforcement. 
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While this is not the place to debate the strengths and weaknesses of these 
opposing arguments, it is relevant to point out that those who favour the strict 
enforcement of the law frequently fail to recognise and/or value what is 
distinctive about regulation. This contrasts with advocates of the Third Way who 
attach great importance to regulation. According to Giddens17 regulation is 
needed for a variety of reasons: 
— to preserve economic competition when it is threatened by monopoly—regu-
lated competition is seen as a pre-requisite for the development of the "free" 
market; 
— to control natural monopolies—some industries work more efficiently as 
monopolies and regulation is clearly needed in such circumstances; 
— to create and sustain the institutional bases of markets—contrary to neo-
liberal orthodoxy, markets do not spontaneously produce order and this may 
require a degree of regulation; 
— to remove public, political or cultural goods, e.g., professional commitment, 
altruistic service, community feeling and moral obligation, from the 
unwanted intrusion of the market place; 
— to harness markets to medium and long-term goals and to prevent short-term 
gains from preventing the achievement of long-term benefits, e.g., clean 
drinking water, road safety and uncontaminated food; 
— to flatten out market fluctuations on a macro or micro level; 
— to protect the physical and contractual conditions of workers; and 
— to react to and cope with catastrophes, including catastrophes induced by the 
market. 
Most, albeit not all, of the aims listed above refer to the regulation of the 
economy and those that do not are rather limited in scope. A broader set of 
justifications which more explicitly embraces the use of regulation to promote 
social welfare might also include the following: 
— to control the strong and protect the weak; 
— to promote the welfare of the community as a whole; and 
— to enhance the public interest. 
17 GIDDENS: op. cit. 
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The public interest 
The "public interest" is a good example of a contested concept.18 Thus, it is 
almost always the case that a number of competing conceptions of what 
constitutes the "public interest", each of which may be "coherent, plausible and 
attractive",19 will coexist with each other. However, this does not mean that the 
concept is devoid of meaning or that it is merely a rhetorical device which is 
invoked to confer legitimacy on whatever the person using the concept favours. 
According to Brian Barry,20 "the public interest" refers to "those interests 
which people have in common as members of the public". Thus, it can be 
distinguished from individual interests (interests which members of the public 
have as individuals) and common interests (interests which two or more people 
have in common). He suggests21 that there are two kinds of instances in which 
the concept is used. While negative applications of what is said to be in the 
public interest involve preventing someone from doing something, for example 
polluting the atmosphere, which will have adverse effects on "the public", 
positive applications of what is said to be in the public interest involve 
providing something, such as parks or roads, for the public. 
Giving priority to the public interest 
Barry's justification for making a special principle out of the public interest 
involves three steps. He argues that 
— the government acts as a trustee for its citizens—although a long line of 
political philosophers (including Locke and Burke) have endorsed this view, 
it is important to note that there is a tension between trusteeship and 
democracy; 
— the duty of a trustee is to look after his or her client's interests—assuming, 
that is, that the trustee knows what Iiis client's interests are; and it follows 
that 
— the duty of the government is to look after the interests of all its citizens, 
i.e., to do things which are "in the public interest". This would be straight-
18 GALLIE, W. В.: "Essentially Contested Concepts." In: Philosophy and Historical 
Understanding, London, 1964. 
19 MASHAW, J. L.: Bureaucratic Justice, London and New Haven, 1983. 
20 BARRY, В.: Political Argument, London, 1965. 
21 Ibid. 208. 
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forward if the interests of the public coincided but is clearly more 
problematic when, as is almost always the case, they conflict. 
The question of what to do when the interests of members of the public 
conflict is a complex one. Utilitarians argue that "the public interest" is obtained 
by summing up all the interests involved. Bentham, as is well known, described 
"the public interest" in this way. However, Barry is uncomfortable with this 
approach, arguing that governments should concern themselves with and give 
priority to the pursuit of common or shared interests over individual and personal 
interests. His justification for so doing is that unless governments do so, these 
interests will be squeezed out. Thus, lie argues, governments should pay particu-
lar attention to promoting the public interest and the importance that advocates 
of the Third Way attach to regulation needs to be understood in this light. 
Pursuing the public interest through regulation 
There are undoubtedly problems with the strategy outlined above. One task 
which confronts government is that, in specifying the public interest, care is 
taken to ensure that it is expressed in the rules and standards which regulatory 
agencies are empowered to enforce as clearly and unambiguously as possible.22 
Regulatory officials undoubtedly need some discretion but, in the interests of 
procedural fairness, this needs to be "confined, structured and checked"23 and, 
as far as possible, officials should not be left to determine what they think 
constitutes the public interest for themselves. Public officials are not necessarily 
imbued with different virtues from their counterparts who work within the private 
sector—they are neither more nor less to be trusted but, like their private sector 
colleagues, can be enjoined, through training and the existence of appropriate 
incentives, to do a good job and perform to the best of their ability. Thus, two 
further tasks which confront government are those of organisational design and 
staff training, of ensuring that jobs are designed and staff trained in such a way 
as to ensure that organisational aims are met. While success will undoubtedly 
enhance Hie public interest and engender support for the Third Way, failure will 
have potentially disastrous consequences and significantly reduce its prospects. 
22 BALDWIN, R.: "Governing with Rules: the Developing Agenda." In: Gencvra 
Richardson—Hazel Genu (eds.): Administrative Law and Government Action, Oxford, 1994, 
157-188. 
23 DAVIS, K. C.: Discretionary Justice: a Preliminary Inquiry, Chicago, 1971. 
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I. Introduction 
In present-day Russia the problem of the correlation of public and personal 
interest is of particular significance since the country, while getting over 
incredible difficulties of an objective and sometimes subjective nature, is 
nevertheless, moving along the path of democratization. This is manifested both 
in the establishment of completely new state institutions (division of powers, 
constitutional review, alternative elections, multi-party system, etc.) and in 
injecting a practical content into institutes which had existed before but did not 
work (for example, the realization of constitutionally guaranteed human and 
civil rights). The latter were secured in the Constitution but could not be 
realized because of the impossibility of direct application of the Constitution's 
rules. Thus, there was a legislative barrier which blocked the fulfilment of some 
rights and freedoms. Moreover, even if there were no such barrier, the existing 
state regime would not have allowed such rights and freedoms to be fully 
realized as they contradicted the political arrangements upon which the regime 
had been based. 
Rights, freedoms and their realization are an extremely important indicator 
of the development of a civil society and its ability to withstand the usurping 
tendencies of state power. Undivided (or ineffectively divided) state power is 
inclined to trample over individual interest to please public interest, justifying 
this with various specious excuses. 
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The present Russian Constitution, while having absorbed much from the 
positive experience of Western democracies, constitutions and generally 
accepted principles and rules of international law in the sphere of human and 
civil rights, secures a rather extensive array of individual, political, social, 
economic and cultural rights and freedoms.1 It should be noted in particular that 
for the first time both the Constitution itself and rights and freedoms fixed in 
it are proclaimed to have direct effect.2 This means that the Constitution 
becomes in reality a working juridical document with a duty to realize the 
protection of rights and freedoms. 
In this paper an attempt is made to analyze rights "and freedoms" protection 
by means of the courts. Moreover, in this case it is not a matter of a court of 
general jurisdiction which settles cases using existing legislation, but of the 
Constitutional Court, which must ensure the utmost legal protection since in 
settling cases it uses the Fundamental Law, which has superior legal force. The 
choice of this profile for considering the correlation of public interest and the 
interest of the citizen is not accidental. The point is that an individual 
personifying a personal interest applies in the first place to the court when his 
rights, freedoms and legitimate interests are violated, the court being the state 
body (we speak about the rule-of-law state or the state trying to become such). 
This is paradoxical if a public interest is considered to oppose a personal one: 
the state body must abide by the state interest. However, in this case the court 
is set up by society specifically for the protection of its members' interests. The 
Constitutional Court remains separate from other juridical bodies since its tasks 
are specific. It does not try criminal, civil or other cases on their merits. 
II . Russian Constitutional Justice: the first experience 
The Constitutional Court it is not a court of cassation or appeal with regard to 
general jurisdiction courts. As a body of constitutional review, the Constitutional 
Court, in our opinion, deals with a larger-scale task, namely, checking the 
constitutionality of statutory acts adopted in this country. It is this process that 
gives individuals more chance for their interests to be protected because the 
Constitutional Court's work results in reducing both the number of unconsti-
1 Russian Federation Constitution ch. 2, translated in Constitutions of the Countries of the 
World (Albert P. Blaustein—Gisbert H. Flanz eds.), 1994 [hereinafter Russian Const.]. 
2 Russian Const. Art. 18. 
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tutional acts and, therefore, potential possibilities for violations of human and 
civil rights and freedoms. 
The formation of the Constitutional Court in October 1991 meant a radical 
change not only for judicial protection but also for the whole state machinery 
of Russia. On the one hand, the judicial system was being supplemented with 
a specialized constitutional controlling body, and on the other hand, all judicial 
power was penetrating the machinery of power, which produced an important 
counterbalance for the legislative and executive powers. According to the 
Constitution which existed at that time and the Law on the Constitutional Court 
adopted on 12 July 1992,3 the Constitutional Court was proclaimed to be the 
highest judicial body of power dealing with protection of the constitutional 
system and was given full powers. In particular, the Court realized its judicial 
power by means of trying cases on the constitutionality of international treaties 
and statutory acts (laws, presidential decrees, governmental regulations, etc.), the 
activity of political parties and other public associations, law enforcement 
practice, settling disputes about competence among different state bodies and 
giving conclusions in cases prescribed by law. 
During the period from 1992 to 1993 the Constitutional Court examined a 
number of cases on citizens' complaints and found unconstitutional the 
following actions: dismissal from office on the basis of age, which qualifies as 
discrimination; establishment of limits for lodging a complaint against unlawful 
dismissal; imposition of discriminatory penalties upon the workers of the 
prosecutor's offices; eviction from unlawfully occupied accommodation by a 
prosecutor's sanction and no right of lodging a complaint against the sanction, 
which is considered a restriction of the right to judicial and other protection; and 
restrictions on compensation by a specified time of payment when reinstating 
a person unlawfully dismissed. The Constitutional Court confirmed the equality 
principle in contractual relations between the state and a citizen. It acknowl-
edged the constitutionality of citizens' demands for the state to discharge its 
obligations concerning special-purpose cheques for the purchase of cars and 
indexation of citizens' incomes and savings. The Constitutional Court's attitude 
towards the protection of Russian citizens' political freedom and right to 
associate, and of freedom of speech, media and referendum may also be con-
sidered a merit. 
Considering cases on individual complaints of Russian citizens, foreigners 
and stateless persons, the Constitutional Court found unconstitutional the law 
3 Congress of People Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Report. 1991. No. 
19. Art. 621; No. 30. Art. 1016, 1017. 
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enforcement practice but not the corresponding provisions of law or other 
statutory acts. The latter could only be repealed by the bodies which had passed 
them. This order caused considerable trouble for the work of the Constitutional 
Court. For example, the Constitutional Court's decision of 27 January 1993,4  
found unconstitutional the law enforcement practice of a time restriction on 
payment for forced absence from work when a person is unlawfully dismissed. 
This practice was based on provisions of part 2, Art. 213 of the Code of Labour 
of the Russian Federation. However, in the ruling of 15 June 1995, the 
Constitutional Court had to acknowledge that courts should, as usual, confine 
themselves to collecting compensation for one year as envisaged by the given 
rule, because the Russian Parliament had not correspondingly amended the 
labour legislation. 
When describing the first stage of constitutional control development in the 
Russian Federation, it should be noted that mistakes and extremes, which may 
be partly explained by "growing pains", could not be avoided. Constitutional 
control may well have a long tradition in the Western democracies, but it is 
practically a new concept for Russia, not taking into account a short working 
experience of the USSR Committee on Constitutional Supervision.5 The Consti-
tutional Court was at the centre of the conflict between legislative and executive 
powers and failed to take an independent and impartial stand. It was drawn into 
the political confrontation and solved questions of both law and fact. A number 
of judges did not agree with the Court's position as a whole and refused to 
participate in its work until the new Parliament of the Russian Federation—the 
Federal Assembly—had started to function. In this situation, any decision reached 
by the incomplete staff of die Court would not be valid, which is why on 5 
October 1993 the Constitutional Court resigned its duties to check the consti-
tutionality of statutory acts and international treaties. The Constitutional Court's 
activity (with a new staff) resumed only after the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation and Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of 24 
June 19946 were passed. 
4 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1993. No. 2—3. 
5 The first specialized body of constitutional supervision was the USSR Committee on 
Constitutional Supervision, founded in April 1990 according to the Law "On Constitutional 
Supervision in the USSR". (See Congress of People Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR Report. 1988. No. 49. Art. 727.) 
6 Russian Federation Legislation Collection. 1994. No. 13. Art. 1447. 
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III. Constitutional Court as a tool of human rights' protection 
With the beginning of the Constitutional Court's activity according to the new 
Federal Constitutional Law, the number of cases connected with human and 
civil rights' protection considerably increased. The broadening of the Court's 
possibilities in this sphere (from the assessment of law enforcement practice 
constitutionality to the assessment of law) serves as an additional guarantee of 
fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms. 
It should be noted that the Court asserts rights and freedoms of the citizens 
not only in cases of direct complaints and inquiries of courts as part 4, Art. 125 
of the Constitution envisages, but also in cases connected with verification of 
the constitutionality of acts and treaties. For example, the Court's ruling of 18 
January 1996,7 in the case of verifying the constitutionality of an article of the 
Altai Region Charter, found unconstitutional that article of the Charter which 
had envisaged the election of the executive power by a body of representatives. 
This article was acknowledged to violate civil electoral rights. In its ruling of 
4 April 1996,8 in the case of verifying the constitutionality of a number of the 
Russian Federation constituents' acts which regulate citizens' registration, the 
Court declared violations of the civil right to freedom of movement and choice 
of residence. The Court has drawn attention to the violation of this right when 
trying the "Chechen case".9 It should be noted that in all the above decisions, 
not citizens but state bodies applied to the Court. Thus, the Court tries cases 
fully and multifariously not only when analyzing the essence of the disputed 
provisions from the point of view of their constitutionality, but also revealing 
possible violations or restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Cases on civil rights' and freedoms' protection examined by the Constitu-
tional Court can be divided into the following groups: cases connected with 
verifying the constitutionality of criminal and criminal procedure legislation 
rules; with verifying the constitutionality of administrative legislation which 
limits the rights of private property; with verifying the rules of electoral 
legislation; cases considering complaints against violations of labour and social 
rights and freedoms; and cases concerning the restriction of the civil right to 
residence. The Court also has examined cases concerning issues of inheritance, 
Russian citizenship and the legal status of stateless people. 
7 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1996. No. 1. 
8 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1996. No. 2. 
9 The Constitutional Court Ruling on the "Chechen case" was adopted on 31 July 1995. 
(See Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1995. No. 5.) 
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A. Constitutional review of criminal and criminal procedure legislation rules 
The Court ruled on the constitutionality of the criminal procedure legislation 
provisions guaranteeing the civil right of relief (provisions of 3 May and 13 
November 1995,10 2 February and 13 June 1996,11 etc.) and found un-
constitutional a number of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, 
in the case of the complaints of K. M. Kulnev, V. S. Laluyev, Yu. V. Lukashov 
and I. P. Serebrennikov, the possibility of a review process in the exercise of 
supervisory powers was analyzed and the decisions rendered by the highest 
judicial supervisory authority—the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation. In its ruling of 2 February 1996,12 the Court concluded 
that the Code of Criminal Procedure provisions establishing the final judicial 
supervisory powers are constitutional only when restrictions envisaged by them 
do not exclude the possibility of other procedural remedies for the correction of 
judicial error. In particular, the Court considered the possibility of Russian 
citizens' application to the interstate bodies on human rights' and freedoms' 
protection as well as the possibility of repeated consideration by means of the 
procedure for reopening a case. In view of this, the Code of Criminal Procedure 
provision restricting grounds for reopening a case was found unconstitutional. 
The case examined by the Constitutional Court against the complaint of V. 
V. Shchelukhin13 is of interest from the point of view of both civil rights' 
protection and procedural issues of the Court's activity. In its judgement, the 
Court found unconstitutional the Code of Criminal Procedure provision 
envisaging suspension of investigation and custody terms during the period 
allowed for the accused to study Iiis case materials. At the same time, the ruling 
points out that die above provision "loses its force on the expiry of 6 months" 
from the moment the ruling has been proclaimed. Thus, the Court applied a 
procedure of postponing the execution of a judgement. Justice N. V. Vitruk, 
having voiced his dissent, believes that the Court's ruling in this part contradicts 
the general principles of constitutional law and the Law on the Constitutional 
Court, in which, according to Art. 79, sec. 3, "acts or separate provisions found 
unconstitutional lose their force". That is, in the justice's opinion, the Court, 
having once found the rule to be unconstitutional, has no right to acknowledge 
10 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1995. No. 2-3, 6. 
11 Id. No. 6. 
12 Id. 
13 The Constitutional Court ruling on 13 June 1996. (See Russian Federation Constitutional 
Court Review. 1996. No. 4.) 
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its operation within a further period of six months. However, the Court does not 
exceed the limits of the Law, because Art. 79, sec. 3 does not determine definite 
terms of the losing of force of acts or their separate provisions found un-
constitutional. Besides, Art. 80 of the Law envisages the Court's right to 
establish independently the terms of execution of a judgement. 
Citizen V. A. Smirnov's case is of interest because it distinctly reveals 
contradictions between public interest and the interest of the citizen. On the one 
hand is the state's desire to secure itself and its interests, yet on the other hand, 
there are human rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In die case under 
consideration the claimant contested the Criminal Code's provision envisaging 
responsibility for treason in the form of betraying state or military secrets to a 
foreign state in conducting hostile actions. The Court in its ruling of 20 
December 199514 considered constitutional those Criminal Code provisions that 
mediate a betrayal of a state or military secret to a foreign state as well as 
rendering assistance to it in conducting hostile actions against Russia. The 
provisions about escaping abroad and refusal to return from abroad were found 
to be unconstitutional, because the Constitution guarantees the right to leave the 
country and to return freely. Besides, such actions cannot encroach upon the 
state's defence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and defence capacity. 
Issues connected with the possible institution of criminal proceedings against 
judges by the Qualification Collegium of Judges were tried by the Court on the 
basis of complaints by R. I. Mukhametshin and A. I. Barbash. In the Court's 
ruling of 7 May 1996,15 it said that the corresponding Law on the Status of 
Judges cannot be interpreted as excluding the possibility of appeal against the 
Qualification Collegium of Judges' decision, because a legislatively established 
and complicated order of institution of criminal proceedings against a judge is 
a matter of procedural machinery and not of a personal privilege of a citizen 
holding the office of a judge. Therefore, the refusal of the Judges' Collegium 
to institute criminal proceedings with regard to a judge "is not an insuperable 
obstacle". First, tliis decision may be appealed in the Superior Qualification 
Collegium of Judges of the Russian Federation. Secondly, it may be appealed 
in court according to the Law On Appeal Against Actions and Decisions 
Violating Citizens' Rights and Freedoms,16 as such a decision affects the rights 
of both the judge himself and the citizen who suffered from his actions. 
14 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1995. No. 6. 
15 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1996. No. 2. 
16 Congress of People Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Report. 1993. No. 
19. Art. 685; Russian Federation Legislation Collection. 1995. No. 51. Art. 4970. 
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The Court inexorably stood for the constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
freedom •> and, therefore, for the prevalence of the interest of the citizen to the 
detriment of the public interest. This was also demonstrated in the case of 
verifying the constitutionality of the provisions of the Russian Federation Law 
On State Secrets, a case tried in connection with a number of citizens' 
complaints. The problem was that the court of general jurisdiction refused to 
allow participalis in the trial by an attorney at law who had no access to state 
secret data. In its judgement of 27 March 1996,17 the Court ruled that dismissal 
of attorneys from participation in a trial did not conform to the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation and its provisions of the right of every person to receive 
qualified legal assistance and the right to counsel at every stage of a criminal 
proceeding as well as to the principle of competitiveness and equality in judicial 
proceedings. 
In its ruling of 13 November 1995,18 the Court found unconstitutional Art. 
209, sec. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which limits the possibility of 
appeal against the ruling of dismissal of a criminal case. The above rule of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure was mentioned by the Court in its ruling of a year 
later on 28 October 1996,19 in a case of verifying the constitutionality of Art. 
6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to citizen О. V. Sushkov's 
complaint. The latter asked the Court to find the above article unconstitutional, 
because, in his opinion, it "violated the constitutional principle of presumption 
of innocence and did not entitle the accused to object against the dismissal of 
a case and to demand to try it on its merits". Having noted that the criminal 
procedure legislation does not contain a direct prohibition against the dismissal 
of a criminal case to be appealed, because the ruling of 13 November 1995 had 
removed the obstacle which existed at the given moment, the Court found Art. 
6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be constitutional, because "the dismissal 
of a criminal case resulting from a change of circumstances does not mean 
establishing the guilt of a person in the crime committed, does not prevent him 
from the realization of his right to defence, and supposed receiving his 
agreement to dismiss the criminal case on the stated basis". 
In its ruling of 28 November 1996,20 the Constitutional Court again studied 
the constitutionality of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This time 
the Court examined the case of verifying the constitutionality of Art. 418 of the 
17 Supra note 15. 
18 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1995. No. 6. 
19 Id. 1996. No. 5. 
20 Id. 
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Code concerning an inquiry of the Karatuzsky district court of Krasnoyarsk 
region. This court considered unlawful the combining of such court functions 
as institution of criminal proceedings, statement of a charge and administration 
of justice of the same case. The given article of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
regulates criminal proceedings of cases in which pre-trial preparation is 
exercised in the form of a record, i.e., when an inquest body collects materials 
confirming the commission of a crime without having instituted criminal 
proceedings, and draws up a record about circumstances of a crime and directs 
it to a court with the prosecutor's sanction. The latter, in accordance with Art. 
418 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, makes a decision on the institution of 
criminal proceedings where he states the charge identifying a definite article of 
criminal law according to which the accused is liable, and then, in accordance 
with Art. 419 of the Code of Criminal procedure, solves the case. Having 
thoroughly studied the essence of the question, the Constitutional Court 
concluded that the Code's provisions "empowering a judge to institute criminal 
proceedings on the basis of the materials prepared in record form or to refuse 
the institution", as well as envisaging "the judge's duty to state a charge in the 
decision of institution of criminal proceedings" are unconstitutional. The 
reasoning behind this stand, the Court pointed out, is that administering justice 
is the exclusive power of the judiciary and the court cannot perform any 
functions which are not in accordance with its position as a body of justice. 
Performance of these powers in initiating the prosecution and maintaining the 
prosecution before the court must be the charge of special agencies, i.e. pre-trial 
bodies of inquest, pre-trial investigation, and the prosecutor's office. "The court 
must examine the results of their activity, objectively and impartially deciding 
questions of lawfulness and grounds for bringing an accusation, as well as 
considering complaints against actions and decisions of officials exercising 
judicial proceedings at pre-trial stages. As has already been noted, the ruling 
found unconstitutional the provision imposing upon a court the function of 
stating a charge. The Constitutional Court considers that for the judge who has 
instituted criminal proceedings and stated a charge in respect to a definite 
person, an objective analysis and legal assessment of the case is made difficult 
because acquittal or other judgement in favour of the accused may be perceived 
as evidence of his erroneous previous judgement." Thus, the following 
constitutional principles are violated: independent judicial control for securing 
rights of citizens in criminal judicial proceedings, and exercising judicial 
proceedings on the basis of competitiveness as well as the human right of 
consideration of a case by an independent and impartial court. The ruling says 
that "a judge, having received a record and other accompanying materials 
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concerning the crime and having recognized them sufficient, has a right and 
obligation to make a decision solely about the sitting of a court solving only 
those questions which are to be solved in such acts in accordance with the 
general rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure". 
The contradiction between public interest and the interest of the citizens was 
distinctly revealed in one more decision where the Constitutional Court analyzed 
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This was the ruling of 28 January 
1997,21 in a case of verifying the constitutionality of Art. 47, sec. 4 in 
connection with a number of citizens' complaints. The latter applied to the 
Court with individual complaints against violation of their constitutional rights 
under the above provision of the Code according to which only attorneys at law 
and representatives of trade unions and other public associations are admitted 
as defence lawyers in criminal trials. It should be noted that the case was 
examined by the Chamber of the Constitutional Court22 and the decision was 
made by five votes to four. In the Court's ruling it is noted that the 
constitutional "right to choose an attorney (defence counsel) independently does 
not mean choosing any person in the capacity of an attorney at the defendant's 
discretion and does not suppose participation in the criminal procedure of any 
person in the capacity of an attorney". The Court noted the given right to be 
one of the manifestations of a more general right, the right to qualified legal 
assistance. The state guarantees this right and, therefore, has a right to establish 
statutorily the corresponding conditions of these or those persons' admittance 
to render such services. Therefore, the provision of the challenged article of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure envisaging admittance of an attorney in the capacity 
of a defence counsel when a warrant of a legal advice office is presented, was 
found constitutional. Of interest is the Court's reasoning concerning the 
possibility of admittance to defence of a trade union representative or other 
public association only when a corresponding record or identification card is 
presented. The judgement draws attention to the fact that the law does not require 
such a representative to have legal training, professional competence or 
experience. In the Court's opinion, it "makes doubtful the possibility of ensuring 
the defendant the right to receive qualified legal aid". At the same time the Court 
had no right to consider the constitutionality of this provision of the Code 
because this question had not been put the claimants. 
21 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1997. No. 1. 
22 The Federal Constitutional Court consists of two chambers, which include 10 and 9 
justices respectively. 
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In our opinion, this case illustrates public interest prevailing over personal 
because the Court did not answer the question of the lawfulness of striking from 
a defence counsels' list persons other than attorneys and representatives of public 
associations, even if those persons had a license for rendering paid legal services. 
Four dissents were stated in this case. Justice V. 0. Lutchin considers that Art. 
47, sec. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not define the criteria of 
professionalism of legal assistance rendered to defendant: "this article says 
nothing about a defence lawyer's legal qualification or competence, only his 
membership of either the Bar association or a public association is pointed out". 
The justice comes to the conclusion that the above provision of the Code has to 
be found unconstitutional because, in the sense attached to it by law enforcement 
practice, it restricts the suspects' and defendants' right to qualified legal 
assistance rendered by persons who are not members of the Bar association. In 
V. O. Lutchin's opinion, "there are no grounds not to admit, in the capacity of 
defence lawyers, persons with licences for rendering paid legal services and 
officially, on behalf of the state, confirming their compulsory legal training". 
A similar point of view is expressed by the judges E. M. Ametistov, V. I. 
Oleinik and N. T. Vedernikov. In their dissents they point to the difference 
between die terms "attorney" and "defence counsel" used in the text of the 
Constitution. The word "attorney" is narrower in the sphere of its application 
because it only refers to the activity of professional lawyers. The term "defence 
counsel" is wider because it refers to the activity of any person engaged in 
defence or representation of somebody's interests in courts and judicial 
proceedings. Besides, E. M. Ametistov appeals to the materials of the 
Constitutional Conference and proves that the authors of the Constitution 
intended to establish and ensure the right of persons taken into custody and 
charged with committing a crime to an independent and very wide choice of 
defence counsels, including lawyers who practise privately and who are not 
members of the Bar associations. All of these justices agree on a contradiction 
in Art. 47, sec. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in that part which prevents 
the admittance, in the capacity of defence counsels, of persons who are not 
members of the Bar associations. 
B. Constitutional protection of the right of private property 
On 17 December 1996,23 the Constitutional Court examined a case on verify-
ing the constitutionality of Art. 11, sec. 1, items 2 and 3 of the Russian 
23 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1996. No. 5. 
2 0 0 Marat S. Salikov 
Federation Law On Federal Agencies of Tax Police. The inquiry was made by 
promoters and owners of limited liability partnerships and related to the issues 
of lawfulness of the collection of tax arrears by tax police agencies, as well as 
to the amount of penalties deducted from legal entities and other sanctions 
envisaged by legislation. In the claimants' opinion, such collection, violates the 
right of private property and contradicts Art. 35 of the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation.24 The Constitutional Court, having divided all the 
challenged sanctions into two groups, ruled that the legislation provisions 
concerning one of these groups, namely, collection from legal entities of tax 
arrears and fines in the case of late tax payment, does not contradict the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation. However, those provisions that envisage 
collection from legal entities of penalties as well as the whole amount of hidden 
or understated income (profit), incontestably and without their agreement, are 
unconstitutional. In the first case, the Court examined the issue from the point 
of view that the right to private property is not absolute, i.e. in accordance with 
the federal Constitution and a number of rules of international law it may be 
restricted by federal law under certain circumstances (for example, when it is 
necessary for the protection of the fundamentals of the constitutional system, 
morality, health, other persons' rights and lawful interests, securing the country's 
defence and ensuring the state's security). Further, the Court analyzed the nature 
of the constitutional duty to pay lawfully established taxes and dues. In the 
Court's opinion, it is of "a specific, namely, of a public and legal (civil and 
legal) nature, which is due to the public nature of the state and state power ... 
Collection of taxes cannot be considered an arbitrary deprivation of the owner's 
property. This constitutes a lawful taking of a part of the property as a result of 
a constitutional public duty". Legal tax relations are based on one party's legal 
subordination to the other; a tax agency's requirement and a taxpayer's duty 
result not from the contract but from law, and any dispute over failure to fulfil 
a tax duty is in the framework of public (tax, in the given case) and not civil 
law. The Constitutional Court especially noted the right to appeal the decisions 
and actions (inactions) of tax agencies and their officials as envisaged by Art. 
46 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
In the second case, the Court examined the issue from the point of view that 
collection of the whole amount of hidden or understated income (profit) and 
24 Art. 35 of the Constitution, in particular, fixes such provisions as protection by law of the 
right of private property; the right to own property, to possess it, to enjoy it and to dispose 
of it both indnvidually and jointly; the possibility to be deprived of the property only in 
accordance with the court's judgement. (See Russian Const.) 
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different penalties is not in the framework of the tax obligation and is not of a 
restorative nature but of a punitive one, being punishment for tax violation. The 
Constitutional Court noted that a tax police agency indisputably had the right 
to reach a decision of collecting penalties from a legal entity when it detected 
a tax violation. However, a taxpayer, in his turn, has the right to appeal this 
judgement in court and (or) in a higher tax agency. In this case a penalty cannot 
be collected incontestably and collection must be postponed until the court has 
reached a decision concerning the taxpayer's claim. Otherwise, Art. 35, sec. 3 
of the Constitution is being violated as, according to it, a person can only be 
deprived of his property by judgement of a court. 
A similar problem (protection of the right to private property) was being 
analyzed by the Court when it examined the case on verifying the constitu-
tionality of Art. 280 of die Customs Code (ruling of 20 May 199725). This 
article envisages the customs bodies' right to administratively confiscate goods 
and transport facilides because of a customs regulaüons violadon. The 
Novgorod regional court tried the case of citizen A.V. Andreyev to whom die 
above penalty was applied and who had addressed his inquiry to the Consdtu-
donal Court. In this court's opinion, audiorizing the customs bodies with this 
right infringes the right of private property and contradicts Art. 35, sec. 3 of die 
Consdtution according to which "a person can only be deprived of his property 
by judgement of a court". Having studied the submitted material, the Court 
concluded that the customs body's ruling on confiscadng the property in the 
form of a sancdon for a customs violadon did not contradict the requirements 
of the Consdtudon, provided diat there is a guarantee of subsequent judicial 
control as the means of protection of the owner's rights. 
Jusdce A. L. Kononov does not agree widi the Court's judgement in the 
case. He considers impermissible the linking of availability or unavailability of 
a judicial guarantee envisaged by Art. 35, sec. 3 of the Consdtudon only widi 
the declaration of intendon of the person who lodged a complaint. The jusdce 
asserts that "otherwise, a person who has not been duly informed about an 
administradve decision, or has neidier opportunity nor wish to lodge a 
complaint, is automatically deprived of the consdtudonal guarantees of property 
protecdon". Jusdce Kononov draws attention to the divergency in his opinion, 
of the Consdtudonal Court's stand in this case compared with its other 
Chamber's decision of 17 December 1996,26 in the case on verifying the 
consdtudonality of the provisions of Art. 11 of the Russian Federation Law On 
25 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1997. No. 4. 
26 Supra note 23. 
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Federal Tax Police Bodies. The justice reminds us that according to the decision 
reached then, in die case of a taxpayer's disagreement with the administrative 
collection of payments as well as when a penalty is in the form of civil, 
administrative and criminal sanctions according to Art. 35, sec. 3 of the federal 
Constitution, the question may be solved only by means of a trial. As a 
divergency exists in the positions of the Constitutional Court chambers, the case 
should, in A. L. Kononov's opinion, be referred to the plenary meeting. 
C. Constitutional review of the rules of electoral legislation 
In its ruling of 21 June 1996,27 the Constitutional Court found unconstitutional 
two provisions of Art. 20 of the Law of the Republic of Bashkortostan28 On 
Elections of Deputies to the State Assembly of the Republic of Bashkortostan 
of 13 October 1994. The first provision stated that as a necessary condition for 
a candidate to be registered, electors' signatures from the corresponding district 
totalling not less than 5% of the total number of electors must be collected in 
his support. Having stressed that regulation of human and civil rights and 
freedoms (electoral, in the given case) is related by the federal Constitution to 
the powers of the Federation, and that their protection is related to the joint 
competence of the Federation and its constituents, the Court referred to the 
federal Law of 6 December 1994 on Fundamental Guarantees of Electoral 
Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation.29 This Law states that "the 
maximum amount of signatures necessary to register a candidate cannot exceed 
2% of the number of electors of the corresponding electoral district". The 
second provision of the challenged law of the Republic envisaged the following 
for the candidate's registration: the obligatory submission by a group of electors 
to the district electoral commission of the minutes (or extracts from minutes) of 
a general meeting held by the electors at their places of residence, work or 
study; submission of a certified, in accordance with established procedure, list 
of not less than 100 persons having voted for the candidate's nomination, this 
list containing surnames, names, patronymics, addresses, numbers and series of 
passports or other identification cards. The federal Law only fixes the necessity 
to observe the following conditions for the candidate's registration upon Iiis 
introduction by electoral associations and electors who have nominated the 
27 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1996. No. 4. 
28 There are 21 republics in the structure of the Russian Federation. Republic of 
Bashkortostan is one of them. 
29 Russian Federation Legislation Collection. 1994. No. 33. Art. 3406. 
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candidates: availability of the candidates' applications containing their 
agreement to ballot in the given electoral district and the necessary amount of 
electors' signatures in support of the candidate. The Constitutional Court came 
to the conclusion that the law of the Republic of Bashkortostan had introduced 
additional requirements restricting the right of citizens and residents of the 
Republic to elect and to be elected. Besides, the Court has drawn attention to 
the following: that "having increased the amount of electors' registration as well 
as having complicated the procedure of their collection, the republican law has 
put citizens of Bashkortostan in an unequal position with the citizens of other 
Russian Federation constituents when exercising their electoral rights". 
According to the federal Constitution the state must guarantee the equality of 
human and civil rights and freedoms irrespective of the citizens' place of 
residence.30 
D. Constitutional protection of labour, housing and other social rights 
The following rulings were connected with citizens' labour and social rights: the 
ruling of 11 March 1996 (on protection of the rights of citizens who suffered 
exposure to radiation as a result of the Mayak production plant accident in 1957 
and the disposal of radioactive waste products in the Tetcha River31), die ruling 
of 23 May 1995 (on protection of the rights of children whose parents 
underwent political repression and acknowledgement of having been repressed 
and, not only having suffered from repression, the children who were with their 
parents in penal institutions, exile, places of deportation and special 
settlements32), the ruling of 16 October 1995 (on protection of the rights of 
pensioners who were deprived of their pensions owing to suspension of 
payments for the time when they were in penal institutions33), the ruling of 17 
May 1995 (on protection of civil aviation workers' right to strike34), the ruling 
of 6 June 1995 (on protection of the rights of Militia officers discharged on the 
initiative of the corresponding head of the Interior's office, on the basis of 
expiration of the service period wliich concedes the right to pension35). 
30 Russian Const. Art. 19, sec. 2. 
31 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1996. No. 2. 
32 Id. 1995. No. 2-3 . 
33 Id. No. 6. 
34 Supra note 32. 
35 Id. 
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In 1 ">95 the Court examined two cases connected with housing rights of 
citizens, in its ruling of 25 April 1995,36 in the case of verifying the constitu-
tionality u. Art. 54, sec. 1 and 2 of the Russian Federation Housing Code in 
connection with L. N. Sitalova's complaint, the Court found unconstitutional 
the provision on "the established order" as a procedure for moving into an 
accommodation provided the obligations of the residence permit are observed. 
The legislator proceeds from the statement that registration, which has replaced 
the institute of residence permit, or absence of it cannot serve as a ground for 
restriction or as a condition of realization of civil rights and freedoms, 
including the right to housing. 
The reason for examining the other case was not only citizens' complaints 
but also the inquiry of the court of general jurisdiction, which came to a 
conclusion about the contradiction between the norm of the Housing Code and 
the Constitution. The given norm states that accommodation is kept for the 
tenant who is temporarily absent and for the members of his family for a 
period of only 6 months, and then, according to Art. 61 of the Housing Code 
they may be judicially found to lose the right to this accommodation. In its 
ruling of 23 June 1995,37 the Court found unconstitutional those Housing 
Code provisions which restrict the right to use accommodation because the 
citizen's temporary absence, including imprisonment, serve as grounds to 
deprive him of the right to use the accommodation (the claimants were 
deprived of this right because they had been sentenced to imprisonment). 
Dissent was stated in this case. Justice Yu. M. Danilov came to the conclu-
sion that the challenged provisions of the Housing Code did not contradict the 
Constitution. In his opinion, "losing the right to a certain accommodation does 
not entail losing the civil right to housing: a citizen may realize this right at 
any time by means of either concluding a new contract of tenancy (sub-
tenancy) or entering into a civil legal relation. Tire Housing Code contains the 
necessary legal mechanisms to prohibit arbitrary deprivation of housing: the 
grounds on which a citizen may be found to lose Iris right to accommodation 
are clearly stated and judicial remedy of rights and lawful civil interests are 
envisaged (Art. 61)". 
The procedure of inheriting the property of collective farm households 
became a subject of consideration by the Court in a case on verifying the 
constitutionality of Art. 560, sec. 1 and 2 of tire Russian Federation Civil Code 
36 Id. 
37 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1995. No. 2-3. 
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in connection with A. B. Naumov's claim (ruling of 16 January 199638). He 
was denied the relief demanded in his complaint by the court of general 
jurisdiction (on acknowledgement of the property right to the part of a house) 
on the basis of Art. 560, sec. 1 of the Civil Code according to which in the 
case of a collective farm household member's death there is no inheritance of 
the household's property. The Court, supposing that the institution of collective 
farm household has lost its legal grounds both in land legislation and new civil 
legislation, as well as proceeding from the fact that a special procedure of 
opening the inheritance in the collective farm household rendered the subjective 
right of inheritance guaranteed by die Constitution in practical terms un-
realizable, found unconstitutional the challenged rule and the rules connected 
with it. 
Justice N. V. Vitruk, having stated his dissent, considers the above rules of 
the Civil Code to correspond to the Constitution because they "do not disclaim 
and impair the right of inheritance in the collective farm household, and the 
restriction connected with a special procedure of realization is stated by law to 
protect the rights and lawful interests of other collective farm household 
members". The justice also believes that the Court, having not recognized a 
collective farm household as the subject of law, goes beyond the framework of 
its powers as it "virtually undertakes the legislator's function". 
E. Constitutional protection of the right of citizenship 
On 16 May 1996,39 the Constitutional Court passed a ruling which supported 
a man who had gone through all possible judicial levels (of courts of general 
jurisdiction) and asserted his personal interest, personal right, and right of 
citizenship in the given case. The case consisted of verifying the consti-
tutionality of Art. 18, item "g" of the federal Law on Citizenship of the 
Russian Federation in connection with A. B. Smirnov's complaint. The latter 
was born and lived in the Russian Federation, then for a number of years he 
lived in Lithuania and returned as a permanent resident to Russia after 6 
February 1992.40 He was denied a supplementary sheet in his USSR passport 
certifying his Russian citizenship. All courts, including the Supreme Court, 
denied his claim. The Constitutional Court, having studied the materials of the 
case, came to the conclusion that the courts of general jurisdiction on the basis 
38 Id. 1996. No. 1. 
39 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1996. No. 3. 
40 The day when the federal Law On Citizenship of the Russian Federation came into force. 
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of Art. 13, sec. 1 and Art. 18, item "g" of the Law on Citizenship had con-
sidered A. B. Smirnov to have lost Russian citizenship. Thus, in the opinion of 
the bodies of general jurisdiction, he had the right to acquire citizenship only 
through the procedure of registration. The Court stated that the former USSR 
citizen's presence outside the Russian Federation at the moment of the Law on 
Citizenship coming into force could be considered one of the conditions of 
acquisition of Russian citizenship in the procedure of registration only in respect 
to those persons who are not considered to be citizens of the Russian Federation 
by birth. According to Art. 13 of the law, A. B. Smirnov falls into the category 
of persons "who were born after 30 December 192241 and later lost citizenship 
of the former USSR". Such persons are considered to have been citizens of 
Russia by birth if they were born on the territory of the Russian Federation. 
Thus, A. B. Smirnov is a citizen of Russia by birth not only in the past, before 
having lost USSR's citizenship, but also after it until the moment when he 
wishes to change his citizenship. In the reasoning part of the ruling, the Court 
stressed that the category of persons such as A. B. Smirnov did not lose Russian 
citizenship "only by virtue of the fact of residence outside the Russian 
Federation at the moment of the law coming into force, because Art. 4 states 
that residence of a citizen of the Russian Federation outside the country does 
not terminate Russian citizenship". Therefore, the Court found unconstitutional 
the challenged provision of the Law on Citizenship. At the same time it agreed 
with the necessity of the so-called notifying registration of citizens of the 
Russian Federation who have lived outside Russia; this is to confirm that they 
have returned to Russian territory for permanent residence, that they have not 
expressed their wish to terminate their belonging to the Russian citizenship by 
birth, and also to confirm that they do not hold citizenship of another state 
which was part of the former USSR. Notifying registration must he of a 
registering nature and cannot be "a circumstance, on which availability or 
unavailability, acquisition or discontinuation of citizenship of the Russian 
Federation depends". 
F. Constitutional protection of freedom of movement; right to leave the country; 
the right to freedom and personal inviolability of the stateless person 
Let us consider some recent cases from the Constitutional Court's practice. The 
judgements passed in these cases, in our opinion, are especially revealing from 
the point of view of public interest prevailing over the interest of the citizen. 
41 The day when the Soviet Union was established. 
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These cases show how some bureaucratic bodies, which must carry out certain 
functions, explicitly or implicitly have justified their actions (inactions) by 
prevailing public interest. 
A number of provisions of statutory acts of Moscow, and the Moscow and 
Stavropol regions making the realization of the constitutional freedom of 
movement and choice of place of residence dependent on the payment of certain 
dues were found unconstitutional in that part in which they violated the con-
stitutional principles of equality, and restricted fundamental human and civil 
rights and freedoms (the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 4 April 199642). 
On 15 January 1998,43 the Constitutional Court examined a case on verify-
ing the constitutionality of Art. 8, sec. 1 and 3 of the federal Law on Procedure 
of Entry to the Russian Lederation and Departure from the Russian Lederation. 
The ground for considering the case was Russian citizen A. Ya. Avanov's claim 
of violation of Iiis constitutional right to leave Russia freely. Avanov, who had 
a permanent residence permit according to his place of residence in the city of 
Tbilisi (the Republic of Georgia—former constituent part of USSR), in fact 
during many years had been living in Moscow. In 1996 he applied to the 
Department of Visas and Permits of the Moscow's Main Department of Interior 
for a foreign passport. The foreign passport was denied because he lacked a 
place of abode, die availability of which would allow him to be registered in 
Moscow according to his place of residence. The Tver intermunicipal court (the 
lower court of general jurisdiction), where A. Ya. Avanov applied, also denied 
his claim based on Art. 8 of the federal Law on Procedure of Entry to the 
Russian Federation and Departure from the Russian Federation. The court 
pointed out that Avanov has a right to apply for a foreign passport only to the 
authorised bodies according to his place of residence outside the Russian 
Federation, i.e., in the Republic of Georgia. 
In the opinion of the Constitutional Court which delivered its judgement in 
the above case, constitutional rights and freedoms are guaranteed to citizens 
irrespective of their place of residence, including the availability or 
unavailability of their accommodation for permanent or temporary residence, all 
the more so as the state is not bound by the obligation to provide its citizens 
with accommodations in every case. Realization of the civil rights to leave the 
country freely and, correspondingly, to be issued a foreign passport must not 
depend on the availability or unavailability of the citizen's accommodation. The 
Court has drawn attention to the fact that the procedure of issuing a foreign 
42 Russian Federation Constitutional Court Review. 1996. No. 2. 
43 Russian Newspaper. 29 Jan. 1998. 
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passport according only to the place of residence is a sign of discrimination 
which contradicts Art. 19, sec. 1 and 2 of the Constitution, wherein equality of 
human and civil rights and freedoms are guaranteed irrespective of the citizen's 
place of residence, and even more so irrespective of the availability or 
unavailability of registration according to the place of residence. According to 
Art. 3 of the on federal Law on the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation 
to Free Movement, Choice of Place of Residence and Stay within the Borders 
of the Russian Federation, registration or its unavailability cannot serve as 
grounds for restriction or a condition of realization of civil rights and freedoms 
envisaged by the Constitution and laws of the Russian Federation, or 
constitutions and laws of the republics which are constituents of the Russian 
Federation. 
The Russian Constitution is known to admit the possibility of restricting 
civil and human rights and freedoms by federal law only to the extent necessary 
to protect the fundamentals of the constitutional system, morality, health, rights 
and lawful interests of other persons, the country's defence and the state's 
security. Certain restrictions are stated in the federal Law on Procedure of Entry 
to the Russian Federation and Departure from the Russian Federation. It 
contains an exhaustive list of such cases according to which the right of the 
citizen of the Russian Federation to leave the country may be temporarily 
restricted. In particular, restrictions are established for persons with access to 
information considered a state secret, persons drafted for military service, 
suspects, convicts, persons avoiding performance of obligations imposed by 
court and persons who falsely represented information when drawing up papers. 
However, all these restrictions operate irrespective of the citizen's residence and 
are not connected with the availability or unavailability of registration. The 
Constitutional Court found the challenged provisions to be unconstitutional. 
In its judgement in the second case of verifying the constitutionality of the 
provision of Art. 31, sec. 2 of the USSR Law of 24 June 1981 on Legal Status 
of Foreign Citizens in the USSR, in connection with Yakha Dashti Gafur's 
complaint, the Constitutional Court found unconstitutional the challenged 
provision according to which a foreign citizen or a stateless person in respect 
to whom a decision of deportation from the Russian Federation has been taken, 
in case of avoiding deportation, can be apprehended, with die prosecutor's 
sanction, for the amount of time necessary for deportation, without the 
judgement of a court (ruling of 17 February 199844). 
44 Russian Federation Legislation Collection. 1998. No. 9. Art. 1142. 
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The essence of this case was the following: Yakha Dashti Gafur, a stateless 
person, resided in the Russian Federation and was apprehended on 18 February 
1997 on the grounds of the ruling of the Department of Visas and Permits of 
Moscow's Main Department of the Interior, sanctioned by the Prosecutor of 
Moscow, on his escorted expulsion from the Russian Federation. For more than 
2 months he was in custody in the Centre of Social Rehabilitation of Moscow's 
Main Department of the Interior and on 29 April 1997 was forcibly deported 
to Sweden. The ruling on Gafur's deportation from Russia was rendered on the 
basis of Art. 31, sec. 2 of the USSR Law on Legal Status of Foreign Citizens 
in the USSR, according to which a foreign citizen or a stateless person must 
leave the country in the period of time stated in the deportation decision; a 
person avoiding departure, with the prosecutor's sanction, is liable to 
apprehension and forcible expulsion, apprehension being allowed for the period 
of time necessary for expulsion to take place. However, the federal Constitution 
secures the right of every person (including foreign citizens and stateless 
persons) to freedom and personal inviolability; apprehension and custody being 
allowed only in accordance with a judgement. Until the judgement has been 
passed, a person cannot be held in custody for more than 48 hours. Thus, a 
foreign citizen or a stateless person on the territory of the Russian Federation, 
in the case of their forcible expulsion from the country, can be held in custody 
until a judgement is passed for the period of time necessary for expulsion but 
not in excess of 48 hours. A person may be held in custody in excess of 48 
hours only in accordance with a judgement and only under the condition that 
without such action a decision on deportation cannot be executed. The ruling 
stresses that "a judgement must guarantee protection for a person not only from 
arbitrary prolongation of the custody period in excess of 48 hours, but also 
from unlawful apprehension itself, because a court in any case assesses the 
lawfulness and grounds of apprehension of every person". Apprehension for an 
indefinite period of time cannot be considered an admissible restriction of the 
right to freedom and personal inviolability, but rather, in fact, impairment of 
the given right. This is why the challenged provision of the USSR Law on 
apprehension for the period necessary for expulsion must not be considered 
grounds for apprehension for an indefinite period even when solving the issue 
of a stateless person and deportation is delayed by virtue of the fact that no 
state agrees to admit the person being expelled. "Otherwise, apprehension as 
a necessary measure for executing a decision on deportation could turn into an 
independent form of punishment, not envisaged by the Russian Federation 
legislation and contradicting ... the rules of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation". 
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IV. Conclusion 
The analysis of the above cases witnesses that the federal Constitutional Court 
implements rights' and freedoms' protection irrespective of any circumstances 
which may serve (and, unfortunately, have served, when unlawful decisions 
were taken by state bodies before judicial involvement) as a justification for 
impairment of the interest of the citizen in the broadest sense. For example, in 
the two above-mentioned judgements the Constitutional Court took into account 
neither the lack of a permanent place of residence nor the lack of Russian 
citizenship to protect the claimants' rights and, consequently, rights of persons 
having found themselves in similar situations. Here it is important to emphasize 
that, in accordance with the Law on the Constitutional Court, if the Court, as 
a result of examining a case on the constitutionality of laws in claims of 
violations of constitutional rights and freedoms, finds the law applied in a 
certain case to be unconstitutional, this case is liable to review by a competent 
body under common procedure. Besides, the judicial expenses of citizens and 
their associations are subject to reimbursement in the established order. Serious 
guarantees of the realization of human and civil rights and freedoms guaranteed 
in the Constitution are being established. 
The Russian Constitution, as was mentioned above, envisaged the 
possibility of restricting personal rights and freedoms.45 Thus, the Constitution 
defines both spheres where rights and freedoms may be restricted and the form 
of a legal act fixing such restrictions, i.e., federal law. The latter goes through 
a number of stages before coming into force: adoption of the law by the State 
Duma, approval by the Federation Council and, finally, signing and 
promulgation by the President. There are additional guarantees against arbitrary 
and unjustified restriction of rights and freedoms. Art. 56 of the Constitution 
envisages the possibility of rights' and freedoms' restriction in a state of 
emergency. According to this article in a state of emergency certain restrictions 
of rights and freedoms may be established and their limits and terms are stated. 
These restrictions are aimed at ensuring Ute security of citizens and protecting 
the constitutional system and they are in accordance with federal constitutional 
law. As can be seen, here the guarantees are increased owing to the 
introduction of another form of a legal act restricting rights and freedoms. We 
45 Art. 55, sec. 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that such restrictions 
may take place when it is necessary, with the purpose of protection of the fundamentals, of 
the constitutional system morality, health, other persons' rights and lawful interests, securing 
the country's defense and ensuring the stale's security. 
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refer to the federal constitutional law, for which the observance of much 
stricter conditions are required in order for it to come into force. Art. 56, sec. 
3 of the Constitution particularly stresses that under no conditions are the 
following rights and freedoms liable to restriction: right to life, right to 
personal dignity, right of privacy, freedom of conscience and religion, freedom 
of entrepreneurship and other business activities not prohibited by law, the 
right to housing, and the right to compensation. 
Establishing certain limits in the constitutional legislation for restriction of 
personal rights and freedoms is essential for ensuring their free development 
and realization with no threat of suppression by the state. However, as can be 
seen from the foregoing material, public interest still often prevails over the 
interest of the citizen and this manifests itself both in legislation and executive 
regulations and in the practice of their application by state and local bodies. In 
this connection, the activity of the Constitutional Court authorized to verify the 
constitutionality of statutory acts on the basis of citizens' complaints of 
violation of their constitutional rights and freedoms is extremely important. 
This prerogative of the Court and strict compliance with it will undoubtedly 
help to bring Russian society closer to a democratic and rule-of-law state where 
a person and his or her rights and freedoms are of the greatest value. 
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Gadis GADZHIEV The Interdependence of Economic 
and Social Rights 
Chapter 1 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation lists the principles of 
freedom of economic activity (Art. 8) and the social state (Art. 7) among the 
most important constitutional principles forming the foundations of the consti-
tutional order of the Russian Federation. Economic and social rights rest on the 
foundation of these constitutional principles. At the same time, tension exists 
between them in actual constitutional practice, tension which now and then turns 
into real competition. In order to discover the interdependence between economic 
and social rights, it is necessary to first explain exactly what kind of rights we 
are talking about. 
1. Economic rights 
Chapter 2 of the USSR Constitution of 1977 was entitled "Economic System", and 
secured the foundations of the economy (all of which had been made the state 
economy). There is no such chapter in the Russian Constitution of 1993. This 
does not mean at all that the Constitution is indifferent to the foundations of the 
economic order. The current Constitution also defines the bases of the economy, 
but indirectly, that is, through the rights and freedoms of people and citizens. 
The constitutional treatment of entrepreneurial activity has thus changed. If 
prior to this practically all economic spheres were in the hands of the state, now 
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business and the economy are interpreted through the prism of basic economic 
rights, since Arts. 34 and 35 of the Constitution, which secure the right to 
freedom of economic activity and the right to private property, appear in 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution, "Rights and Liberties of Man and Citizen". Now 
in the sphere of economics, private enterprise and private property have priority. 
Therefore, on the constitutional level, the economic sphere is now primarily a 
sphere of private interests and private initiative; that is, the area of regulation 
which traditionally used to belong to private law. 
The Constitution does not grant a state monopoly to domestic trade, nor does 
it provide for legal immunity for the state. The "revolutionary" effect of the 
constitutional principles brings profound change not only in the sphere of 
economic relations. The effect of these principles on social relations is no less 
significant. The constitutional principles which form the basis of the constitu-
tional order are systematically connected. Neither the principle of freedom of 
economic activity nor the principle of the social state are exceptions. The state 
has abandoned the sphere of economics, it does not conduct entrepreneurial 
activity in the previous capacity, and the influence of state property is steadily 
reduced as a result of privatization. 
We cannot expect the social state to be capable of taking upon itself full 
responsibility for providing for all of its citizens' needs. When the socialist 
state acted in the capacity of a general employer, it actively engaged in the 
redistribution of public goods by means of the redistribution of the profits 
obtained by state enterprises. However, the state was not social, because un-
controlled militarization of tire economy and low labor production led to a 
situation in which outlays to the social sphere were realized according to the so-
called residual principle (i.e., first outlays for defense, for the space program, 
and only afterwards for social payments). 
The foundations of a social state are currently being created in Russia. In 
general, these are also redistributive relationships, yet they are fundamentally 
different from the previous relationships. Now, distribution takes place only 
through taxation (and not by direct taking of profits). Moreover, taxation is a 
limitation on the right to private property and thus, according to the Consti-
tution, it must, like other limitations on fundamental rights, submit to general 
rules—in particular, rules about the proportionality of such limitations. In a 
decision of 4 April 1996, in the matter of the registration procedure for citizens, 
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation made this clear: 
Taxation always signifies a certain limitation on the right to property, 
secured in Art. 35 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In 
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connection with this, the provisions of Art. 55.3 of the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation fully extend to the laws of the subjects of the 
Russian Federation regarding taxes and fees. That article states that the 
rights and freedoms of man and citizen may be restricted by federal law 
only to the extent that this is in accordance with defined constitutionally 
significant purposes, i.e., proportionally. Taxation, which paralyzes the 
realization by citizens of their constitutional rights, should be recognized 
as disproportional. Therefore, considering the excesses of taxes and fees, 
the problem of their differentiation in connection with the guarantee of 
the principle of equality and justice acquires special significance.1 
The constitutional principle of freedom of economic activity is influenced 
by the norms of Chapter 2 of the Russian Constitution which secures the rights 
that are characteristic of a society in which a market economy exists. These are 
such fundamental rights as: 
1) The right to choose one's activity or occupation—the freedom to be an owner 
or an employer (Art. 37). 
2) The right to move and to choose one's residence (Art. 27). 
3) The right of associations for joint economic activity—the freedom to choose 
organizational-legal forms of entrepreneurial activity and various entre-
preneurial structures (Art. 34). 
4) The right to have property in one's ownership; to possess, use, and manage 
property as individuals as well as in conjunction with other persons, the 
freedom to possess, use, and manage land and other natural resources—the 
freedom to own real estate (Arts. 34 and 35) and the freedom to own land 
(Art. 36.2); 
5) The right to freedom of contract—the right to enter into civil-legal and other 
agreements (Art. 35.2); 
6) The right to protection from illegal competition (Art. 34.2); 
7) The freedom to engage in any entrepreneurial or other economic activity not 
prohibited by the law and in accordance with the principle "everything is 
permitted that is not prohibited by the law" (Art. 34). 
We consider as fundamental economic rights those rights which predetermine 
the foundations of the economic structure. These include the constitutional right 
to freely use one's abilities and property for entrepreneurial or other economic 
activity not prohibited by law, the right to private property, the right of citizens 
1 Vestnik Konstilulsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federalsii, 1996, No. 2, 53. 
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and their associations to have land in their private ownership and the right to 
protection from illegal competition. 
2. Social rights 
The constitutional protection of social rights is dictated by the necessity to 
guarantee the solidarity of the interests of different members of society. The 
Preamble to the Constitution of the Russian Federation lists civil peace and 
accord as one of the goals of society. Also, Art. 13 of the Constitution prohibits 
the establishment of public associations which incite social strife. The protection 
in the Constitution of social rights has the goal of securing the solidarity of 
interests by means of the creation of those circumstances which would secure 
an adequate life and free development for each person. 
The idea of a human right to an adequate existence was developed by the 
Russian jurist and philosopher Pavel Novgorodtsev at the end of the nineteenth 
century. His brief article "The right to an adequate human existence" became 
the most important initiative in the development of this idea in legal science and 
political theory.2 
Novgorodtsev argued that the formal right to freedom, proclaimed by 
western liberalism, should be supplemented by the right to the guarantee of an 
adequate existence. "The mission and the essence of the right is actually the 
protection of personal freedom, but for the realization of this goal we must also 
take care of the material conditions of freedom; without this, for some people 
freedom remains an empty sound, an unattainable good—provided for them by 
law, but taken away by reality. Thus, in the name of the protection of freedom 
the law should take upon itself responsibility for the material conditions of its 
realization; in the name of the dignity of the individual, the law should take 
upon itself the responsibility for protection of the right to an adequate human 
existence." Novgorodtsev formulated this idea, first propounded by the Russian 
philosopher V. Solov'ev, as a legal problem and first posed it to social 
liberalism, or neo-liberalism, the political theory which replaced classical liberal 
individualism in the twentieth century. 
Article 39.1 of the Constitution guarantees to everyone social security in old 
age, in case of disease, invalidity, loss of breadwinner, to raise children, and in 
other cases established by law. This article lists only part of the largest group 
2 See NOVGORODTSEV, P. I.: Sochineniya. Moscow, 1995, 312-329. 
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of constitutional rights—social rights. Related to these are also rights such as the 
guarantee of a minimum wage (Art. 7.2), the right to security against unemploy-
ment (Art. 37.3), the right to state protection for motherhood, childhood, and the 
family (Art. 38.1), the right to state support for fatherhood, invalids, and elderly 
citizens (Art. 7.2), the right of low-income citizens to receive housing free of 
charge or for an affordable price (Art. 40.3) and the right to health care and 
medical assistance (Art. 41), including free medical assistance in state and 
municipal health institutions (Art. 41). To this list of constitutional social rights 
we can also add rights which are included in Art. 39.1 of the Constitution under 
the words "and in other cases established by law". 
In the time of Stalinism these rights were denied those who were victims of 
political repression. In Russian doctrine social rights are considered spheres of 
refraction of general human values such as equality, social justice, humanism 
and the moral foundations of society. As a result, the whole intention of social 
rights in Russia consists not only in the fact that they address the need to 
provide means of living for elderly and disabled citizens, but also in providing 
for their restitution. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation 
examined the constitutionality of the 1991 Law on the Rehabilitation of Victims 
of Political Repression and ruled that the goal of this law, as proclaimed in its 
preamble, is the rehabilitation of the victims of political repression and the 
guarantee of compensation (to the degree possible in the present time) for 
material and moral damage. Naturally, restitution is limited: property which was 
confiscated from persons who were subjected to repression is not returned; 
instead the persons are paid a relatively small monetary sum. 
In the decision on the constitutionality of the Law on the Social Protection 
of Citizens Exposed to Radiation as a Consequence of the Accident in 1957 at 
the Industrial Union "Mayak", the Court decided that even the constitutional 
right to a favorable environment (Art. 42) can be included among social rights: 
"the guarantee of social protection of citizens as applied to the right to a 
favorable environment and protection of health may include a complex of 
advantages and compensations exceeding the limits of compensation for the 
damage caused to health or property by the ecological offense".3 The above-
mentioned law of 20 May 1993 did not establish criteria for a favorable 
environment and did not establish responsibility for the compensation. The 
compensation for damages which were suffered in the accident at "Mayak", in 
accordance with this law, are fulfilled in a special procedure, without the 
necessity of proving the damage done by the ecological offense. Consequently, 
3 Veslnik Konstitulsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1996, No. 2, 28. 
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the measures provided for in this law, in essence, are measures of social 
protection and, simultaneously, are restitutive measures. Measures of social 
protection are connected to the norms of Art. 7 (which declares that the 
Russian Federation is a social state), and Art. 39 (which guarantees funda-
mental social rights), but not Art. 42 (the right to a favorable environment), as, 
in our view, the Constitutional Court mistakenly held. 
Such a relationship to social rights in Russia is genetically linked to the ideas 
of socialism. As a result, we observe a strange spectacle—a state which declared 
that its goal is the creation of a free market economy using thirty-eight percent 
of the gross domestic product as state funds. Obviously, the degree of recognition 
of social rights is not proportional to the level of economic development. Social 
rights assume a redistributive relationship to society, the creation of a so-called 
fund for public consumption. The realization of social rights means the prosperity 
of equalizing social payments, which makes the creation of an investment budget 
impossible. As a result, the state remains paternalistic. And a paternalistic state 
is not necessarily the same tiling as a legal state. The constitutional right to 
private property in a paternalistic state is in constant danger of being violated. 
Every citizen is required to pay the lawfully established taxes and fees. But can 
we consider excessive taxes lawfully established when they are levied for the 
realization of a wide range of constitutional social rights? 
The term social state also implies one in which state power is limited by 
human rights and in which the established legal order secures general freedom, 
formal equality and the rule of law. These limitations on the powers of 
authorities of the state make it impermissible to realize the social-economic rights 
of one citizen to the detriment of the political, economic and spiritual freedom 
of other members of society. It is also impermissible for the state to interfere in 
the regulation of the economy to the detriment of market relationships. Obser-
vance of diese requirements helps to secure the legal foundations on which a 
democratic legal state can function as a social state as well.4 
3. The relationship between economic and social rights 
The relationship between the fundamental rights examined above is reminiscent 
of the physical law of the equal height of fluid in connected containers. In our 
case, the connected containers are the economic and social policies of the state. 
4 Kommentariy к Konstitutsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii. (Ed. Yu. V. Kudryavtseva), Moscow, 
1996, 43. 
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Ulrich К. Preiss called attention to the fact that social (positive) rights differ 
from negative rights in that for their realization the state has to resort to actions 
which are the result of political decisions subject to public judgement and 
evaluated by the criteria of expediency. The courts, of course, are not competent 
to make these decisions. If social privileges and assistance were simply elements 
of social and economic policy, directed toward the growth of the purchasing 
power of the population, then these social benefits, as one of the results of 
economic and social policies, would be subject to the influence of economic and 
political cycles and, consequently, to great uncertainty and instability. The 
transformation of available favorable economic possibilities into rights imposes 
on the government the responsibility not to change in the distant future the 
already accepted order of allocation. To possess a right, as Preiss correctly 
observed, means that the interest of the right-bearer is immune from the 
uncertainties of economic cycles and economic competition. 
This theoretical conclusion may reinforce and substantiate the reference in 
the decision of the Constitutional Court of 1 December 1997 in the case of the 
constitutionality of a series of articles of the federal law passed in 1995 which 
modified the 1991 Law on the Social Protection of Citizens Who were Exposed 
to Radiation as a Result of the Catastrophe at the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant. This 
decision is noteworthy because, in contrast to the earlier examination of the 
constitutionality of the law regarding those who suffered in the "Mayak" 
incident in 1957, the Constitutional Court did not, despite the title of the law, 
consider the Chernobyl victims' right to payment a social right. The Court came 
to the conclusion that these payments are the compensation for damages caused 
by the state. (Article 53 of the Russian Constitution provides that everyone has 
the right to compensation from the state for damage caused by the unlawful 
action of state organs or their officials.) 
The Constitutional Court ruled that the establishment in the Chernobyl law 
of the duty of the state to compensate for damages by means of monetary and 
other compensations and benefits was caused due to the practical impossibility 
of compensation in the usual judicial order, because the harm was done to 
hundreds of thousands of citizens. Consequently, regardless of what kind of 
indemnities are mentioned in the law—privileges, monetary compensations, 
other kinds of social payments—all of this is compensation on the basis of the 
principle of maximally possible use by the state of the means it possesses for 
securing the adequacy of such indemnity. Also, the legislature has the right to 
change the methods of indemnity and to elaborate the criteria for who is 
eligible for compensation. However, such a decision should not contradict 
constitutionally defined goals or diminish or limit the rights of the citizen, 
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including those established in Art. 42 of the Constitution. From this point of 
view, the Tmount of indemnity should be unconditionally observed by the state. 
One j . the reasons that the Constitutional Court did not regard payment to 
the Chernobyl victims as social payment was because, despite the fact that the 
given payment and compensation were of a clearly redistributive character, the 
goal of this redistribution lies beyond the limits of the idea of a social state. The 
duty to compensate victims is related to the fulfilment of the idea of a legal 
state. The Court stated that the basic content of social rights is determined first 
of all by the so-called political organs of the state—the President, the govern-
ment, and the parliament—not by the courts. 
The uncertainty of the basic content of social rights and their determination 
by political organs does not mean, in our opinion, that the Constitutional Court 
should declare its complete neutrality towards the problem of social rights. On 
the contrary, in many instances constitutional control should be extended to laws 
in which the economic or social policy of the state is incarnated. The difficulty 
of the problem of the limits of the participation of constitutional courts in the 
determination of economic and social policies is explained by the fact that in 
essence this is a problem of in what measure the judges are competent to force 
their concepts on the legislature. 
The government and parliament, as political organs, have the sovereign right 
to make a general evaluation of the economic and social situation in the country 
and work out decisions on a basis conform to the law. The creation of economic 
or social policies by the legislature signifies the determination of priorities of 
public interest and the possibilities of combining these with individual rights and 
freedoms. Consequently, the formulation of the public interest should be 
fulfilled by the political organs in such a way that it does not cross the 
boundaries of the constitutional coordinates. The definition of the latter, in many 
respects, is the prerogative of the Constitutional Court. The problem is that 
sometimes the Constitutional Court may rather freely interpret constitutional 
principles; we can ask whether the discretion of the political organs is thereby 
replaced by the discretion of the court Moreover, different Constitutional Courts 
may understand the applications of the Constitution differently. I refer to the 
possibility that some courts may decide that all of the most important 
relationships that arise in society are regulated in the Constitution, so that 
practically any law can be referred back to constitutional norms. Other courts 
may understand the essence of the Constitution differently, and consequently, 
be less active. 
Article 68 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 
which addresses the possibility of discontinuing proceedings, lists as a basis 
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for the ceasing of execution the situation when the question covered by the 
law is not covered in the Constitution of Russia or, by its nature and im-
portance, is not regarded as a constitutional matter. We can make a statement 
about the activism of the Constitutional Court and about how it understands 
the essence of the Constitution on the basis of an analysis and generalization 
of the application by the courts of the norms analogous with those contained 
in Art. 68. 
It is especially difficult to secure the legitimacy of the interpretation of such 
constitutional principles as freedom of economic activity, the social state, and 
the equality of all before the law and the courts. It is appropriate to mention as 
an example yet one more case examined by the Constitutional Court which 
called forth a great public response. 
In 1997 the Supreme Court of Russia turned to the Constitutional Court with 
an inquiry about the constitutionality of Art. 855 of the Civil Code which 
establishes the sequence for writing off funds from the account of a client of a 
bank in those circumstances when these funds are not sufficient to fulfil the 
needs of various creditors. The state (to which taxes must be paid), employees 
(to whom wages must be paid), and commercial banks which have loaned 
money may all be creditors of the clients of the banks. When many businesses 
began to systematically withhold wage payments, the Parliament made a change 
in Art. 855 of the Civil Code, establishing that in case of insufficient funds in 
the bank account of an organization, it is first necessary to direct funds from the 
account to wage payments. This change meant that payment of taxes takes place 
only after all wage commitments are fulfilled. 
The inquiry of the Supreme Court raised the question about which consti-
tutional obligation has priority^lhe constitutional obligation to pay legally 
established taxes and fees (Art. 57), or the constitutional obligation to pay 
persons for their labor (Art. 37). The Constitutional Court decided that in case 
of a crisis of non-payment, an establishment by the legislature of priority for a 
certain group of citizens, be that employees of commercial organizations or 
employees of the budget sphere, to whom payments should be made only after 
complete fulfillment of all preceding requirements without any kind of pro-
portionality, contradicts the principle of equality before the law. An addendum 
and modification of Art. 855.2 of the Civil Code does not meet the criteria of 
justice, especially in the current situation when insufficient funds in the accounts 
of businesses and organizations are not unusual. Crises in the Russian economy 
and the deficit of financial resources actualized the provision of Art. 855.2, 
intended for comparatively rare situations that increase the need for legislative 
regulation of fixed relations. 
222 Gadis Gadzhiev 
Outwardly renouncing the priority of obligatory budgetary payments, the 
legislature defied the logic of the formation of Art. 855.2, creating not only 
inequality for the realization of rights and legal interests of various groups of 
citizens, but also competition between constitutional obligations to pay wages 
and taxes, since it did not precisely determine an order and conditions for the 
fulfilment of these obligations. The sequence prescribed by this norm may lead 
to the violation of the constitutional obligation to pay legally established taxes 
and fees (Art. 57) and form justifications for lawfully avoiding that obligation. 
Taxes are the most important source of revenue for the budget, at the 
expense of which must be secured the observance and protection of the rights 
and freedoms of the citizen and provisions for the social functions of the state 
(Arts. 2 and 7 of the Constitution). Without the presence of tax payments in the 
budget it would be impossible to finance businesses which carry out state 
orders, institutions of public health and education, the army, law enforcement 
organs, etc. Consequently, it would also be impossible to pay the wages of the 
employees of the budgetary sphere. 
For this reason, constitutional obligations to pay persons for their labor, on 
one hand, and to pay lawful taxes and fees, on the other, should not contradict 
each other. The establishment of a strict priority for one of them signifies the 
impossibility of the realization, and consequently, the belittling, of the equally-
protected rights and legal interests of other groups of citizens, which is not in 
conformity with Art. 55.2 of the Constitution. According to the estimate of the 
Ministry of Finance, the effect of Art. 855 of the Civil Code could result in the 
federal budget not receiving taxes of up to the astronomical sum of fifty billion 
rubles (approximately 10 billion USD at that time). 
The Constitutional Court is an organ which should guarantee the protection 
of tlie foundations of the constitutional order and the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of citizens (Art. 3 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation). In a hypothetical situation, when Parliament passes laws 
that shock society, laws which expand the amount of social payments along with 
the budget deficit, can the Constitutional Court avoid an evaluation of such 
laws, hiding bellind norms that say a court does not decide political questions? 
Or instead should it decide that a court, all the same, should protect the founda-
tions of the constitutional order, including freedom of economic activity and 
private property? 
There is no simple answer to this question. 
In the case regarding Art. 855 of the Civil Code, die Constitutional Court 
took the risk of becoming absorbed in an evaluation of the economic and social 
policy, reasoning that the inviolability of property is a very important consti-
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tutional value. Since monetary resources which are kept in a bank account are 
the property of the bank's client, the Court stated that the client should 
determine for himself whether it is necessary first of all to pay taxes or to pay 
his employees. 
The Constitutional Court, therefore, by means of the evaluation of consti-
tutional laws which embody economic or social policy, becomes an active 
participant in the determination of the constitutional outlines of this policy. In 
such cases, the Court should take into consideration the interdependence of 
economic and social rights-an excessive expansion of the second means an 
impermissible restriction of the first. The extent of social rights should be in 
accordance with the possibilities of the state budget. The Constitutional Court, 
in the process of interpreting the social rights provided for in the Constitution, 
cannot permit the realization of their deconstitutionalization in practice. 
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1. Not talking about money 
Money makes the world go round; lawyers know this and yet they very often 
forget about it, or maybe do not want to know about it, or at least prefer not to 
mention money. If one looks at Western legal opinions on and scholarly 
coverage of the transformation of Uie former socialist states, one will notice that 
all the aspects of the transformation process are covered and that there is, of 
course, an awareness of the fact that the newly emerged states are poor and that 
this limits their possibilities; one will even find publications on tax law and 
projects on taxation systems, but there is practically nothing on the consti-
tutional pattern of budget law and the financing system of the state. So maybe 
it is true that the judge does not count— iudex non calculai—but as far as the legal 
scholars are concerned, they do not even talk about money. As far as German 
legal scholars are concerned this is true for the whole profession and not only 
for the transformation specialists; in fact, there are very few specialists for 
matters of budget law. 
On the other hand, the outcome of the reforms in Central and Eastern 
Europe will largely depend on how these countries manage their economic and 
financial difficulties, how they make their national income transparent and thus 
(hopefully) subject to democratic control, how they (hopefully) redistribute their 
national income, how they finance those institutions which are meant to protect 
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the rights of Citizens and how they manage to feed those who having nothing 
to sell on the new market and in the new market economy. We chose the word 
"outcome" and not the word "success" for the results of the transformation 
process because it is important to be aware of the obvious fact that of course the 
national income has been and is being redistributed all the time, ever since the 
very first days of the transformation process, and that old and new elites are 
desperately trying to get their big piece out of this cake. In other words, while 
very important reforms were executed in all domains of law—constitutional, 
criminal, civil and economic and other branches—that is in those branches of law 
which seemed to be most important for the transformation from socialism to 
market economy, the national wealth was continually being distributed and 
partly redistributed among the old and new elites. It is most significant that the 
legal framework of this distribution and redistribution, be it on the level of 
constitutional law or of ordinary law, was and is either completely non-
existent—like in the case of the Russian Federation—or exists in a very vague 
form. The whole problem seems to be a sort of taboo that nobody likes or at 
least liked to talk about. By "nobody" we mean experts from the Eastern 
European countries and Western experts alike. 
On the other hand, there is a pressing need for "money laws": for good tax 
laws, for laws on the budgetary process and, in federations, for laws on the 
distribution of the state income among the center, the subjects of the federation 
and the municipalities. In many of the Eastern European countries these laws 
are in the process of being drafted or passed or have been passed recently. The 
other, non-monetary legal reforms in these countries have been heavily 
influenced by Western consultants and Western states, or, to put it more 
cautiously, there have been serious attempts to influence the reform legislation 
in these fields, of course on the basis of the opinion that the experience of the 
Western countries is very valuable and worth exporting; it is more than likely 
that the same will happen or is probably happening in budgetary and tax 
legislation. So is the Western experience in fiscal legislation a high quality 
product worth exporting? 
We are not going to insist that tikis is not the case. We are going to explain, 
though, that Western or at least German fiscal legislation has its oddities, 
problems and shortcomings and that East European countries would be well 
advised to at least think twice before adopting certain elements of the German 
fiscal law. It is not that you cannot explain these things historically or 
functionally and it is not that you cannot live with them; the question is whether 
one would adopt such an approach nowadays if one were to regulate the 
problem for the first time. The legal institutes that we are going to present now 
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are examples of traditional approaches to certain problems of budget law which 
cause more and more problems. 
2. Taxation and property 
In Germany taxes get higher and higher, especially now after the reunification 
and in view of the limitation on state debts if one wants to meet the Maastricht 
criteria. So an outside observer may wonder why the constitutional court does 
not put the brakes on this money-hungry state and its functionaries. The answer 
is very easy: if there are—practically^no brakes then you cannot put them on. Of 
course one would presume that excessive taxation somehow infringes upon 
property and that the classic and well protected constitutional basic right of 
property will therefore function as a shield against excessive or, to use the 
German expression, suffocating taxation. This presumption is wrong. The 
constitutional notion of property in the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional 
Court protects any property right (vermögenswertes Recht), but it does not 
protect the wealth (the assets) that a given individual calls his own. At least the 
big taxes the tax debtor has to pay out of his wealth; if he owns a piece of land 
with a house and this property is taxed then he is of course free to pay this tax 
with the money coming from his salary or any other source of income; it does 
not have to be income which comes from the object of property which is being 
taxed. In light of this fact, the German Constitutional Court holds that taxes 
infringe upon wealth, but not upon (pieces of) property and that therefore there 
is no constitutional protection against taxation on the basis of the constitutional 
right of property. So one cannot light taxation with property; one can only fight 
taxation referring to a restriction of a general freedom which will usually, in 
view of the rather spongy and unclear concept of general freedom, result in a 
defeat. 
There were, of course, good reasons for the Constitutional Court to choose 
this narrow interpretation of property in the beginning: a different interpretation 
under which the wealth of a person would have been considered property in the 
sense of the constitution would have seriously hindered the legislator and the 
executive power, which would have been under tire continuous menace of the 
unconstitutionality of their tax laws and other regulations. But this was in the 
days when taxation was fairly low and certainly not excessive and in the days 
when nobody could imagine tire degree of taxation to which European states at 
the end of the 20th century have grown accustomed. In those days one did not 
need a sharp sword against taxation; in our time this may be different. 
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3. Cred'ts as state income 
In every^.y knowledge debts are debts and income is income; in economic 
theory and in budget law this is different. If the state gets money by obtaining 
credits either from banks or via state loans or some other way then this will 
appear as income in the budget despite the fact that it has to be paid back some 
day. It is a fact that all modern states tend, to a growing degree, to get money 
and cover their budget by taking loans. Whether this is legitimate from the 
democratic point of view is very doubtful: if democratic legitimacy means self-
government by elected representatives then it is obvious that those who have to 
pay back the credit have not participated in the elections of those representatives 
which participated in the decision to take up the loan. Of course there are many 
arguments why these decisions are nevertheless legitimate, from "pay as you 
use" to the argument that those generations which will have to pay back the 
loans will benefit from those investments which were financed with these loans. 
But these arguments can hardly hide the fact that these decisions create 
considerable burdens without any democratic control. At least the constituency 
of those who decide to create state income by taking loans will usually not be 
interested in a very strict control of these decisions because they profit from 
them or are at least not burdened by their consequences. Again, if political elites 
were very cautious about financing state spending by loans—in other words, if 
there were a tacit consensus about the "oughts" and "must nots" in budget 
law—this would not be a problem. In Germany this was the case in the fifties 
and sixties when the state was actually accumulating money and not spending 
all its income. (The money, a considerable amount, was said to be piled up in 
the famous "Julius-tower", named after the minister of finance, Julius Schäfer). 
The fact, though, that the Maastricht criteria mostly deal with state deficits and 
their limits shows that politicians and political elites long ago left this consensus 
and have discovered loans as an easy and very convenient alternative to raising 
taxes. 
Admittedly, there is an article in the German Constitution which tries to 
limit state deficits by linking the amount of loans to the amount of investments, 
but due to very vague criteria, a lot of exceptions and a wide scope of discretion 
for the government this has not worked very well. Another reason why it has 
not worked very well may be the fact that a limit on the state deficit in the 
Constitution will only work if there is some institution of control with effective 
powers. At the moment there is no such institution in the German Constitution; 
the Federal Auditing Board, which could be such an institution, does not deal 
with deficit spending and does not have effective powers, and the Federal 
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Central Bank does have effective powers, but does not control this sector of 
government. So everything points towards judicial control of possible violations 
of this article. Courts, though, may not be in a position to control these things; 
it is at least obvious that the German Constitutional Court felt very uneasy in 
the case where it had to decide the question of whether state loans had violated 
Art. 115 of the Constitution, that is, the article which deals with these questions. 
4. The law on the budget and special funds 
Another interesting question is what kinds of income and expenditures are in the 
budget and what kinds of income and expenditures are executed outside the 
budget; in other words, which parts of the income and spending are public and 
therefore (hopefully) controlled by parliament and by the public and which parts 
remain hidden. If we again take the German example, we find two significant 
and intertwined problems. 
Theoretically, one of the basic principles of German budget law is the unity 
and singularity of the budget (Haushaltseinheit): there should only be one 
budget and all the income and all the spending should be in this one budget so 
that the passing of the budget law will imply the all encompassing and 
integrated exercise of the budget rights by parliament. It is another principle of 
budget law that this first principle is not relevant for the budgets of separate 
legal entities under public law, of special funds (Sondervermögen) and of 
economic enterprises of the federation. This means that the federal finances arc 
in fact divided into many separate budgets which may or may not appear in the 
budget law and which can be exempted by federal law from the restrictions of 
Art. 115 of the Constitution concerning loans. The point of interest is the fact 
that this possibility of separate budgets has always existed and that there were 
good reasons for such structures: for example, autonomy for those legal entities 
which organized the integration of certain professions. But again we have to 
note that an instrument of traditionally limited use has become more and more 
popular and has long left behind its once legitimate goals; nowadays these 
special budgets are used for hiding large debts and for giving uncontrolled 
spending power to the government. Let me point out that already in 1991, that 
is before we really started to take a lot of loans, the debts of all these special 
budgets constituted about 460 billion marks. 
A second serious problem is a change in the nature of these special funds. 
Let us first look at some traditional special funds and their financial and asset 
structure. Two typical examples are the Federal German Railways and the 
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Federal Mail. It is logical that the debts of these special funds are not 
considered state debts from the point of view of the budget; Art. 115, which we 
mentioned as limiting state debts, cannot be applied to these types of debts. In 
a way this was acceptable for the traditional type of special funds because, as 
a rule, these special funds had very valuable assets of their own—land, buildings, 
machines, etc.—which could have functioned as security for the commitments 
and liabilities of these special funds in the case of insolvency; in other words, 
the state budget would not have been involved in the coverage of these 
liabilities or at least only to a very limited extent. 
Nowadays, and in the aftermath of the German reunification, the "new" 
special funds are very different. Most of the former GDR liabilities (either 
liabilities of tire GDR itself or liabilities which were generated in the process of 
the privatisation of tire GDR economy—for example, when the Treuhand had to 
sell an economically weak enterprise free of debts and therefore had to transfer 
the debts to itself) have been covered by special out-of-budget funds which are 
therefore not subject to parliamentary or public control. It seems to be the 
combination of two characteristics which makes this fact disquieting. On the one 
hand, we are talking about very large amounts of money: the estimates range 
between DM 350 billion and 500 billion, tire latter figure being much more than 
half of the yearly federal budget. On the other hand, these special out-of-budget 
funds are just liabilities and have no assets at all so they clearly should be a part 
of the budget because they will have to be covered and paid back out of the 
state budget. So again we are confronted with the fact that a traditional 
institution of budget law which used to function maybe not in an ideal, but at 
least in an admissible way is being used out of the context of the silent 
traditional consensus which excluded abuse in the past. Apart from that we have 
the problem of nontransparency (and in a matter of budget law that means that 
the whole affair is doubly nontransparent). 
5. Fiscal domicile 
The point that I want to make now is of great relevance for federal or 
decentralised states and of less relevance for unitarian states, depending in each 
case on the system of tax allocation. If you want to levy taxes in a federal or 
decentralized state you have to decide on a principle which tells you where 
people and legal entities are obliged to pay taxes. As a rule it seems logical to 
say that taxes are paid to the territorial entity where a given citizen or 
corporation lives or is situated. But this simple and logical system creates 
False Friends and Real Friends in Budget Law 231 
certain difficulties. One of them is specific for the German Federation with its 
"city-states" like Berlin and Hamburg where many people work in the city-state, 
but because of lower living costs or better environmental conditions prefer to 
live in the state which lies around this city. In this case the taxes will be earned 
in one state and paid in another state or, in other words, the taxpayer will not 
finance a large amount of the social benefits which he gets at his workplace. 
The other problem is more serious and can probably be found in any 
decentralized state. Corporations are usually free to have the headquarters of 
their firm in one place and production facilities in other places (as far as these 
firms have their headquarters in large cities this is actually what you want 
because of pollution, etc). If you now tax these companies at their headquarters, 
then the regions where the companies produce and which bear the burden of the 
production as far as costs of infrastructure and environment are concerned will 
have only these burdens and no benefits at all (apart from a place of work for 
their inhabitants). Looking east for once, this seems to be a big problem in the 
Russian Federation. Things are even more complicated if you have a de-
centralized taxation system and you allow free competition between the regions 
(or states). The poor regions will tend to create favorable taxation conditions 
and thus try to attract the big companies either just for their headquarters or for 
production as well; the companies will minimize their costs by being mobile and 
nowadays they will do this easily in view of the possibilities of electronic 
communication systems. The competing regions will then proceed to do the 
same: the result is high mobility—this alone will cause certain costs—and an 
obligation of the center to somehow balance the budget problems of the regions 
suffering from this taxation mobility. We do not mean to say that there should 
not be competition in favorable tax conditions between states or regions, but one 
should be aware of the costs and the regions should collect taxes for those costs 
and burdens which occur on their territory. 
6. Special fiscal charges 
Traditional fiscal theory (in Germany) only knows a limited number of types of 
fiscal charges: taxes, fees and duties. In everyday life any fiscal charge has to 
adhere strictly to the typology with the taxes enjoying the least restricted status. 
Theoretically, whenever the state squeezes money out of its citizens this must 
correspond to the structure of one of these charges: if it does not or if the state 
has not chosen the adequate type of fiscal charge for the given purpose then this 
will be illegal and the citizen will get his money back—if he or she is clever 
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enough to sue. In other words, the judicial control will be based on a very 
formalized concept of fiscal charges and not so much on the control of the 
content of the charge; this is especially so with taxes. 
On the one hand it is important to understand the limited possibilities and 
this specific formalized approach of judicial control in fiscal matters, both of 
which are due to the special nature of the subject. On the other hand, it is 
equally important to be aware of the fact that the state will try to get as much 
money as possible from its citizens and that it will, in the process of doing this, 
be very inventive in finding new types of fiscal charges. In the Federal Republic 
of Germany this urge of the leviathan has resulted in the invention of so-called 
"special fiscal charges" (Sonderabgaben) by which we mean charges which are 
not taxes and which are charged only to a specific group with a specific shared 
interest; the group as a whole must either profit from the charge or it must bear 
some special responsibility which this special fiscal charge is meant to balance. 
Apart from that, at least in theory, this special fiscal charge must be limited in 
time and must not be used for the general financing of state expenses. There are 
good reasons to doubt whether these special fiscal charges are a good idea; they 
nevertheless show three interesting characteristics of a rational and flexible 
budget law. On the one hand, they open the possibility of state-initiated social 
solidarity where the money circulation is decentrally channeled between groups 
with a common social interest. On the other hand they introduce a new element 
of control and legitimacy into the legal construction of fiscal charges by the 
very fact that they are limited in time and have to be renewed and therefore to 
be legitimized anew. Last, but not least their fairly clear elements make them 
better suited for judicial control and therefore improve the legality of fiscal 
charges in general. So one conclusion of this new type of fiscal charge may be 
that a multiple and differentiated typology of fiscal charges will improve the 
legal situation of the citizen in the domain of budget and fiscal law, which is 
a very traditional and authoritarian enclave in the more modern legal systems 
of our time. 
7. Financial division of powers 
There are growing doubts about whether the traditional parliamentary system 
with its traditional threefold division of powers is ideally suited for the modern 
state. I do not want to be misunderstood: Lire system is still superior to any other 
system invented so far. On the one hand, there are problems with which—at least 
in Germany—the system is just unable to cope: the best examples are the 
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financing of parliaments and parties where you have an unholy non-neutrality 
on the part of the decision-makers vis-à-vis the subject and where even a change 
of the system would have to be effectuated by those same decision-makers. The 
result is that nothing is changed and you have a ping-pong game between the 
constitutional court, which declares the respective laws to be unconstitutional, 
and parliament, which then again passes a new law in its own favor or in the 
parties favor; this is the one item in which all the deputies have a common 
interest. It is interesting to note that not only the verdicts of the constitutional 
court, but also the rebukes of the Federal Auditing Board are without effect. 
This fruitlessness of the inbuilt mechanisms of control seems to indicate a 
structural problem in matters of money and spending. 
If one searches for more positive features in the area of state finances and 
money one will find these in the institution of the independent Federal Central 
Bank; the independence is, it is again curious to note, only guaranteed by the 
"Law on the Federal Bank" and not by the Constitution. (Interestingly enough, 
the possibility of a transfer of the functions of the Federal Central Bank to the 
European Central Bank, now provided for in the new version of Art. 88 of the 
Constitution, mentions that this European Bank must be independent). So as far 
as the printing of money by the state and creation of money by private banks 
by means of loans is concerned, the power of decision lies with the Federal 
Central Bank only. Tliis outsourcing of decisions on money out of the domain 
of parliament and government has proven to be very valuable and has stopped 
the government's and parliament's urge to get rid of economic difficulties by 
printing more money. It is significant for example that the one-to-one exchange 
of GDR money with the money of the Federal Republic shortly before the 
reunification—undoubtedly one of the reasons for the economic difficulties that 
the FRG is experiencing at the moment—had been declared upon by the Federal 
Central Bank an economically unsound (but maybe politically necessary) 
decision. Apart from that there are many other examples where the Federal 
Central Bank has decided against the government and withstood enormous 
pressure, and history shows that the mere existence of an independent central 
bank has a very disciplinary effect on government actions: the latest example 
is the réévaluation of the FRG gold reserves to meet the Maastricht criteria 
which was torpedoed by the Federal Central Bank. 
We have called this independence of the Central Bank "outsourcing". If one 
wants to express this differently one might say "division of labor" or even better 
"division of powers". In my opinion this is the interesting lesson which one can 
learn by looking at the very unpleasant events in party, government and 
parliament financing on the one hand and the pleasant effects of an independent 
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control of money circulation on the other hand: the division of powers must be 
suited to matters of budget and finances or there must be a financial division of 
powers. Let me just add the aperçu that division of powers began with the 
budgetary control of die king. 
8. Thcit consensus and second generation budget law 
We have tried to show some oddities and some more positive institutions of 
German budget law with the specific good of identifying some preconditions of 
a budget and finance system which would be up to the standard of other areas 
of modern constitutional law, especially basic rights, and which would be worth 
exporting. I would like to point out two aspects which in my opinion are worth 
a second thought (in general and for the creation of a rational budget system in 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe). 
Budget law, maybe even more than other areas of law, is based on tacit pre-
consensus and pre-knowledge about what one should and what one should not 
do. For a long time these shared unexplicit views have functioned as an 
invisible control mechanism preventing abuse where the written law did not 
provide any limits for government and parliament. It seems that some of this 
tacit consensus has faded away and that consequently the "oughts" of budget 
law have to be made explicit in order to find a new and transparent common 
denominator. (For the FRG or for other Western countries this will not solve the 
question of who will be interested in such a regulation and therefore implement 
it. But for Central and Eastern European countries which have to draft a new 
budget law anyway this problem is not so relevant; nevertheless, these countries 
should search for and find their own tacit preconsensus and check its validity.) 
We need a second generation or new type of budget law which does away 
with dear old habits, and we should try to accompany this with a new institu-
tional structure with the objective of having a functioning and well geared 
system of division of powers in matters of finances and budget. In my opinion 
it is important to see that independent institutions of financial control—whatever 
they may look like and whatever objectives they may serve—are a valuable 
addition to the traditional parliamentary system. Of course such a system will 
result in a certain limitation on the powers of parliament and thus limit popular 
sovereignty as a basic element of democracy. Constitutional courts do the same, 
were met with the same critique and are nevertheless now considered to be an 
indispensable element of modern democracies. 
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Otto PFERSMANN Comments on the Paper 
of Alexander Blankenagel 
Not being a specialist on tax law myself, our exchanges during the symposium 
gave me the opportunity to better appreciate the function of the respective 
provisions in our different constitutions. It is not only a technical matter but a 
specification of more general principles: for instance, the democratic idea 
applied to financial, economic and social policy. The differences between our 
constitutions in the treatment of taxation are not mere details of procedure but 
provisions of great importance for the process of transition to democracy or for 
the often painful reform of the welfare state. We indeed have to reflect as 
constitutionalists on the function of norms which contribute to frame economic 
behaviour where economic behaviour may be a condition of institutional 
stability and therefore of democracy itself. It is not sufficient to elaborate on our 
more traditional subjects like elections, legislative procedure, free speech, the 
principal of equality and other fundamental rights as long as we do not 
thoroughly understand the relation of those principles to the rules that are 
intended to govern the way people contribute to the state's budget as well as the 
state's contribution to the citizens' welfare and welfare opportunities. 
The paper of Professor Alexander Blankenagel shows precisely the function 
of provisions concerning taxation in constitutional law and the questions he 
raises are questions about the nature of contemporary constitutional law itself. 
I may begin with seizing this opportunity to say a word about a conceptual 
issue appearing in the title of our conference—"Financing Constitutional 
Identity", not to say something particularly new, but in order to state explicitly 
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the way I understand our proceedings. The problem is whether taxation may be 
an e lemet of the "identity" of the constitution.1 I assume that "identity" in a 
strong seuse exists between any two objects A and В if any property of A is a 
property of B.2 Using "identity" that way means that we are asking ourselves 
whether the elements of a given constitution contain provisions about taxation 
and, if this is the case, no other constitution will be identical unless it contains 
precisely the same elements, concerning taxation or any other questions. In other 
words, any constitution will be different from any other constitution and even 
the slightest change in it makes it different from what it was. This is a narrow, 
not to say trivial, result. I do not think we are gathering here simply to notice 
1 By "constitution" I shall mean, for a given legal system, the set of norms having as its 
object the conditions of validity of personally and circumstantially general norms, i.e., norms, 
the formulation of which contains no proper name and which do not apply to only one 
individually determined set of circumstances ("constitution in a material sense" or "materially 
constitutional"). It is not necessary that such norms be themselves produced in a certain way 
in order to be considered "constitutional"; if, however, the production of at least a subset of 
constitutional norms is submitted to certain particular conditions (e.g., a qualified majority or 
a referendum), the set so determined will be called "formally constitutional". We shall 
concentrate on the material constitution wiiich is a necessary subset of every legal system. The 
German Grundgesetz is of course an example of a formal constitution containing the main part 
of the material constitution. Cf. concerning that distinction: PFERSMANN, O.: "La révision 
constitutionnelle en Autriche et en Allemagne: théorie, pratique et limites." In: La Révision 
de la Constitution, Paris, 1993, 7-65. 
2 The literature on "identity" Fills volumes. What is called "strong identity" is nothing but 
Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles (see for instance LORENZ, К.: "Die 
Begründung des principim identitatis indescernibilium." In: Akten des internationalen Ix'ibniz-
Kongresses Hannover, Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa III, Wiesbaden 1969, 149-159). 
Identity through time has interested philosophers (PRIOR, A. N.: Papers on Time and Tense, 
Oxford, 1968; QUINE, W. V. O.: Word and Object, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960; Amely 
О. Rorty (ed.): The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1976; 
SHOEMAKER, S. -SWINBURNE, R.: Personal Identity, Oxford, 1984; see also the recent 
collection of articles by STRAWSON, P. F.: Entity and Identity and Other Essays, New York, 
1997 and COPELAND, J. В.: "Vague Identity and Fuzzy Logic." In: Journal of Philosophy, 
94, 1997, 514—534, political scientists and political philosophers (see for instance the special 
issue of Philosophical Forum: National Identity as a Philosophical Problem, Fall-Winter 
1997) psychoanalysts (E. E. ERIKSON: Identity and Life Cycle. Three Essays, New York, 
1959) and social scientists (sec the recent anthology by Lewis P. Hinchman, Sandra K. 
Hinchmann (eds.): Memory, Identity, Community: The Idea of Narrative in the Human 
Sciences, Albany, 1997; SEEBRIGHT, M. A.-KURKE, L. В.: "Organizational Ontology and 
the Moral Status of the Corporation." In: Business Ethics Quarterly, 1, 1997, 91-108. Legal 
theory has not until now shown the same interest. 
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that there are different constitutions; I suppose we are interested in "identity" 
in a weak but nevertheless precise sense, which we may call "constitutive 
identity", i.e., those properties that make an object O, during a period P (ti-tk), 
remain this same object, although certain of its properties or elements may have 
been modified. This is, by hypothesis, incompatible with strong identity. The 
problem here is that the intuitively very appealing notion of constitutive identity 
is both subjective and indeterminate. We may indeed consider that some 
properties or elements have to be the same over time for an object to be the 
same, we can restrict strong identity to a pertinent subset, but our choice will 
at best be stipulative. If we cannot find an intrinsically objective criterion, at 
least should we try to propose one that permits a pertinent analysis of an 
"object". If subjectivity in our choice is unavoidable, at least it should be 
plausible that this choice leads to a result. If we can determine a relatively 
precise criterion, then it will be at least extrinsically objective. 
In fact, constitutions can be modified in two ways while preserving some 
strict identity. First, every modern constitution contains rules of different weight. 
The abolition of the monarchy would affect the shape of the British Constitu-
tion3 more than a change in the norms of succession to the crown in absence 
of direct heirs. The transformation of the Federal Republic of Germany into a 
centralised state would evidently be perceived as more important than a modifi-
cation of the distribution of competencies between the Federation and the 
Länder. Identity remains preserved if those provisions we consider essential 
remain unmodified, at least in their very content. The second way concerns 
procedures: some constitutions introduce a weighing of their components and 
every formal constitution determines by definition the conditions of consti-
tutional continuity. In Germany, the federal structure cannot be—constitu-
tionally—abolished, whereas the competencies may be reshaped within certain 
parameters.4 The German Constitution does therefore formalise its "identity": 
certain things cannot be changed without destroying the Grundgesetz. But what 
shapes identity when there is no such explicit and formalised distinction 
between the changeable and the unchangeable? Are we constrained to limit 
ourselves to what these explicit rules say? If there is no constitutionally 
determined content-identity of the constitution, then we cannot tell very much 
about the identity of a constitution CI except that the modification of it without 
respect the rules concerning such a change results in a violation, precisely a 
3 The British Constitution is only material, of course. 
4 See the famous Article 79, Paragraph 3 of the Grundgesetz (on its interpretation 
PFERSMANN: op. cit.). 
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break of constitution. Procedural identity is strictly objective but may be 
considered, at least in most cases, uninstructive. The passage from the fourth 
Republic to the fifth Republic in France was constitutionally a "simple" revision 
of the former constitution, but the content of the constitution of 1946 has little 
similarity to the constitution of 1958; on the other hand, one can hypothesise 
that the reform of 1962 introducing the popular election of the president was a 
violation of the constitution of 1958, but many people consider it to be the 
"perfection" of its architecture. 
Alexander Blankenagel is not only reflecting on what constitutes the tax-
identity of German constitutional law, because then he could only have 
described the provisions pertaining to that domain. He is also asking what this 
tax identity should be, at least pointing to what in his view should be avoided. 
A discussion of this problem of normative identity requires that we elaborate on 
what the principal properties of the tax constitution really are. My thesis will be 
that we should distinguish three levels of investigation. The "classical financial 
constitution" will be compared to its concrete appearance (I), then to the 
contemporary "level-diversified financial constitution" (II). 
I. Classical financial constitutional law 
Since Magna Charta taxation has been perceived as the motive for the in-
troduction of political representation as well as for the démocratisation of 
representative institutions. But the "classical financial constitution" goes back 
to the constitutional revolutions of the end of the 18th century, the American 
and French idea that the people or the nation consents, through elected represen-
tatives, to the financial burdens it will bear and to the actions that will be 
realised in their name with those resources.5 This consent is not given once and 
for all times or as long as it is not abrogated (unlike other legal rules), but has 
to be obtained regularly, i.e., once a year or even more often if corrections are 
necessary. Furthermore, the parliamentary representation does not vote on a 
global unspecified amount, but every resource and every expenditure has to be 
made explicit in the budget law. 
Did this abstract democratic model really work? It did not for different well 
known reasons: 
5 See the Constitution of the United States (1787), Art. 1, Sec. 7, 8, 9, 10 or the French 
Declaration of Rights (1789), Art. 14. 
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— The sovereignty of parliamentary representation in Britain and France 
(until 1958), for instance, gives the majority the possibility to violate 
constitutional rules. The fact that the government is nothing but the executive 
representation of the parliamentary majority means that this very majority has 
no interest in controlling the government. 
— In the case of a strong separation of powers—like, for instance, in the 
United States Constitution—decisions have to be negotiated. The interest of the 
constitutional partners is therefore to get the best outcome for their own 
respective goals, which is not necessarily the interest of the represented citizens. 
— Besides being a normative authority, the state became an entrepreneur, 
even if it is nowadays often considered a bad one and even if most states are 
in reducing their economic commitments. Whereas the predemocratic state was 
largely conceived as the private property of the sovereign, the democratic state 
tends, as far as its economic action is concerned, not to use its public power, but 
to act as one private person among others, obviously with a somewhat 
privileged position. But under private law it often escapes the more severe rules 
of public law as well as parliamentary or state audit office control. 
There are many varieties of economic activities of the state which benefit 
from budgetary expenditures without being submitted to full budgetary control: 
from state owned industries to research centres or social insurance institutions. 
In France for instance, social security is not part of the states budget except for 
the bill of its deficit. A constitutional reform was necessary to give the 
parliament competence to decide the parameters of its budget, but the parliament 
is "still not the master of social finances".6 
Such phenomena can be found in any constitutional democracy. The budget 
is neither truly universal, nor really transparent, nor is it, in any determinate 
sense, the expression of the common interest of the citizens even if the 
constitutions seem to say so. That might still be better than other systems 
without representation and it surely is, but this is not our concern. My point is 
that the traditional picture of classical financial constitutional law is nothing but 
an ideological tale about the legal systems in question, not a precise description 
of their real content. 
Professor Blankenagel shows that in the German case the national represen-
tation does not control many actions taken in the name of the state or at least 
with money coming from its citizens: state loans are legally considered revenues 
6 Cf. the very pessimistic conclusion of Loïc Philip on this topic in: "La révision 
constitutionnelle du 22 février 1996". In: Revue française de droit constitutionnel 27, 1996, 
451—460. 
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but are effectively long term expenditures, special funds (mail, railways) are 
placed outside the budget, but they do affect the state deficit when they are 
themselves in a deficit position. Technically, the problem seems to be a question 
of determination of the relevant domain. If something appears to be outside the 
competencies of the parliament, while it should in principle be part of those 
very competencies, then something has not been formulated in accordance with 
the explicit objective. Once that cause has been identified, the remedy is at least 
juridically simple: a constitutional reform is necessary to make the legal system 
consistent with its aims of parliamentary control of taxation and the state 
budget. Whether or not this is realised is a political, not a legal issue. If the 
politicians do not accept or do not undertake the reform, it is because they do 
not want the system to be consistent with those outspoken objectives. 
But besides this, the picture of classical financial constitutional law is false 
because it does not take into consideration one of the most important properties 
of contemporary constitutional law, namely, that it is hierarchically diversified. 
Furthermore, its provisions may be limited or overruled by norms of international 
law. This is especially the case, as with Germany, for the member states of the 
European Union. Restricted though the respective treaty provisions may appear 
in scope concerning taxation as such,7 the impact on budget law and thus 
indirectly on the whole tax system through regulations concerning monetary and 
economic policy is one of the main aspects of the recent development of the 
European integration. 
II. Level diversified financial constitutional law 
At first glance, some new developments in constitutional law seem to propose 
a remedy for some of the problems mentioned above. If the legal reality of tax 
law contradicts the constitution, then it suffices to introduce a constitutional 
court or at least to give a supreme court competence in constitutional cases. The 
parliament cannot, then, do whatever it likes. It can neither do more than what 
it is permitted to do nor can it do less than it is obliged to do. The latter 
concerns cases of unconstitutional transfer of competencies to the government 
or to persons acting with state money but outside the control of state organs, the 
7 See Part III, Chap. 2 of the Maastricht Treaty, Art. 95-99 becoming Art. 90-93 
Amsterdam Treaty as soon as it comes into force. It concerns non-discrimination through 
V.A.T., elimination of double-taxation and harmonisation in the domain of indirect taxes on 
consumer goods. 
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former concerns cases where the constitution protects the individual against the 
state. 
The problem here is not to decide whether or not judicial review is 
democratic or not. The point is that such courts, with or without direct or 
indirect democratic legitimacy, are entitled to say what exactly the constitution 
really requires. It generally does not exactly require, according to those courts, 
what the ideological picture of classical financial constitutional law is believed 
to prescribe. It appears therefore that all constitutional rules cannot have the 
same weight because the courts have to say—and they actually do say—which 
rules have more weight than the others. Professor Blankenagel gives a very clear 
example of this development when he points to the judgments given by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court concerning the protection of property: the 
court deems that taxation overrules property, at least to a certain extent. 
But again, if this is not what the representatives wanted the court to do, they 
could have simply changed the constitution. Indeed, this is not politically 
realistic in any legal system, because some constitutions like the American one 
are very difficult to modify. But all matters we are discussing here are not of 
such a nature that they would per se make a constitutional reform unconsti-
tutional, i.e., forbidden by an explicit constitutional limitation of the possibility 
to modify the constitution. In Germany there are such explicit limitations, but 
they do not concern taxation—they concern the democratic principle instead—and 
constitutional reform is relatively easy to realise, easier for instance than in 
France but less perhaps than in Austria.8 The point is that it is a political 
problem, not a legal question, whether taxation is deemed so essential to 
constitutional democracy that, if an inconsistency appears in the system, all 
political forces would join in a common effort to amend the situation. If they 
do not, then this means that the constitutional majority is in favour of the status 
quo. 
In fact, really fundamental changes were not introduced in order to better 
protect the citizen against the state—at least not as far as taxation is 
concerned—but in order to protect both the state and its citizens against 
themselves because they are considered abide by long-term decisions once they 
are made. 
The solution was found in Germany with the introduction of an independent 
central bank and the idea was carried over to the European Union by the 
Maastricht treaty and completed by the stability pact. A law that is, an act, 
8 For a comparison of constitutional reform in Germany and Austria cf. PFERSMANN: "La 
révision constitutionnelle en Autriche et en Allemagne..." op. cit. 7 -65 . 
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democratically elaborated and voted by the parliamentary assemblies has 
introduced an independent federal bank in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The European Central Bank has been introduced by an international treaty, i.e., 
an act which, besides going through ail procedures required by international law, 
is ratified democratically by all member states of the European Union, be it by 
parliament alone or by parliament plus popular referendum. But the result of 
this democratically enacted convention was that future decisions would not be 
democratically enacted. 
The design is entirely different from constitutional review because it limits 
the intervention of democratically elected organs to the right to appoint certain 
officers of these new institutions. But unlike in the case of constitutional courts, 
it is not possible for democratically elected officers or for the citizen to address 
any complaint to it or to sue the states or the Union for any rule violation. The 
independence of the federal bank and now of the European Central Bank is 
therefore much stronger than die judicial independence of a constitutional court 
which has to decide when invoked by authorised people and according to the 
terms of the constitutional writ. 
For a very long time however, this legally strong independence was consti-
tutionally weak. The old article 88 said simply: "The Federation establishes a 
money and issuing bank as a federal bank". Thus the point was that the 
Federation had competence to set up the institution by appropriate legislative 
and administrative measures. But the independence from political power was not 
guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Since Maastricht tilings have changed. The Fundamental Law was modified 
in 1992 in order to conform to the treaty. Two new sentences were added which 
read: "Its task and competence may be translated, within the frame of the 
European Union, to the European Central Bank, which is independent and 
committed, as its prime objective, to price stability". The independence of the 
European Central Bank is thus guaranteed not only by the Constitution, but by 
an international treaty wliich can be modified only by a revision of that very 
treaty. When the constitutional court nullifies a law in Germany, tlie parliament 
can modify the Constitution in order to overrule tlie judicial decision (within the 
limits of constitutionally permissible modifications of the Constitution); when 
tlie European Central Bank makes a decision, neither a national nor a European 
organ, whether parliamentary or not, can overrule it, only a new treaty could. 
That seems to be tlie very reason why the legal powers of tlie European Central 
Bank are much more difficult to integrate into democratic theory than even tlie 
introduction of constitutional courts. It goes directly against the basic 
assumptions of classical financial constitutional law. 
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There may be two solutions to this dilemma. One is formal-abstract, the 
other procedural. 
The formal-abstract approach will invoke an analogy with traditional argu-
ments of classical constitutional law as a line of justification. Democratic 
representation, it will be said, does not represent a simple sum of persons, but 
an abstract and ideal entity which is the nation, including the general interests 
of those who cannot vote as well as of future generations. In the same way, the 
European Central Bank has to be conceived of as a supra-national organ 
representing the well considered interests of an emerging supra-national entity, 
precisely the European Union. But this argument recognises candidly that the 
citizens as well as the national organs are unable to act in accordance with 
once decided long-term interests. And this stands in flagrant contradiction to 
principles of classical financial constitutional law and to the principles of 
democracy. 
The procedural approach consists in distinguishing levels of norms and 
therefore levels of producing procedures. As in all legal systems, certain rules 
can be established by the administration, others need a statute and hence the 
intervention of parliamentary representation, others still an amendment to the 
constitution or an international treaty. 
The problem is not one of legal technique but is partly a question of 
perception and acceptance of legal technicality. Of course, this growing stratifi-
cation makes legal phenomena, already perceived as opaque by the citizen, still 
more obscure, because they become more and more technical and complicated. 
But perception and management of complexity is an issue of legal culture. One 
cannot claim a highly developed rule of law and simultaneously regret that the 
law does not consist of a small set of simple rules. A complex society produces 
and needs a complex legal system. Besides this, it certainly is a problem to 
make this acceptable to the persons concerned. It requires that lawyers be on the 
whole honest rather than dishonest, competent rather than incompetent, etc. 
That, unfortunately, is not a problem of law, but a problem of using the law. 
Of course, it is also a problem of democratic legitimacy. The relevant 
principle concerns the possibility of making a hierarchy of procedures of norm-
production. It appears to be a constitutive feature of the distinction between 
constitutional law and legislative law. More generally, a hierarchy allows us to 
differentiate rules according to the weight attributed to each rule. If one accepts 
that principle, it appears not implausible that to enact certain more important 
rules requires a more complicated procedure, entailing a higher degree of 
consensus. The principle of hierarchism goes against the principle of repre-
sentation: if at the lowest level the simplest representation of the citizens is 
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consider id sufficient, a higher level will require more than the common minimal 
consent c-nd so forth. 
If one ./ants to bind oneself for a very long period without any possibility of 
opting-out, this does not seem a priori irrational or unjustifiable if the decision 
is taken in full appreciation and conscience of its weight and consequences. This 
in turn calls for a procedure that makes those very features clear and explicit to 
the citizens or their elected representatives who accept the rule and it calls for a 
procedure that requires a very large consensus. 
The question is then whether it is democratically justifiable to make 
decisions binding for long periods. Let us have a closer look at this recent 
development in constitutional law. The aim of the rules here in question consists 
either in transferring competencies to organs—the members of which, though 
appointed by elected representatives, are neither politically responsible nor 
submitted to instructions by those very nominating powers, or in the obligation 
to maintain certain economic policies, whatever the citizens may think of them 
at any given moment t„ after the treaty came into force and even if a wide 
majority of them would prefer—at ttl—a change in those decisions. If, therefore, 
the political authorities of a member state of the European Union want to 
modify these aspects of economic policy or if they would like to produce a 
certain quantity of money and thus a certain inflation rate exceeding the limits 
imposed by the treaty, they cannot do it, ceteris paribus, in a legally regular 
way. But this does not mean that it is legally impossible. It only means that it 
is forbidden as long as the rules are in force as they presently are and most 
probably will be when the Amsterdam Treaty comes into force. But nothing 
limits the possibility of changing the rules themselves except the difficulty of 
the procedure. What has changed, in respect to previous rules, is not that 
something once permitted is now illicit, but that the level of difficulty 
concerning some of the most important issues is now higher than it was before. 
The long term binding aspect is thus, as for any legal rule, more a consequence 
of the complexity of the procedure of production than of its intrinsic content. 
Nonetheless, constitutional hierarchy and the Europeanisation of budget and tax 
law results in the use of procedural difficulty as a means to forbid short term 
changes in these very domains. 
The other question, then, is whether this hierarchy of production procedures 
is itself democratic or at least compatible with democratic theory. This, of 
course, is nothing but the now classic problem of the democratic deficit of the 
European Union. One can only say that the deficit has been democratically 
enforced, that the ratification of the institutive treaties has been made precisely 
as the national constitutions prescribed it. The content of the treaties, admittedly, 
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restricts democratic control and norm production. But this is a question of 
democratic politics within all of the countries concerned. Either they want more 
democracy, but then they have to transfer more competencies, namely the 
competence that first and second order decisions can be taken by elected 
European representatives without treaty revision, or they want to limit the 
transfer of competencies, but the decisions at the European level will only to a 
minimal extent be taken by elected representatives whereas other organs will, 
without direct control, make policies as the constitutionally enforced treaty 
charges them to do or, more precisely, as they believe the treaty obliges and 
authorises them to do.9 As things presently stand, European democracy is 
nearly nothing but national ratification of treaties transferring powers of norm 
creation to organs with low democratic legitimacy. Whether or not one should 
proceed this way is a question of political choice. For the time being, the 
democratically elected representatives, and, it seems, the citizens of the different 
member states, do not want more European democracy but rather the strictly 
limited growth of community law. 
To conclude, let us go back to "identity". By "identity", we meant consti-
tutive identity which in turn cannot be found but in the highest levels of steering 
principles of the constitution. Hierarchical differentiation thus structures identity. 
But then the European!sation of long-term decision-making is simply constitutive 
of the common identity of the member states of the European Union. Why do 
they fear losing their very identity? 
9 Bert Van Roermund tries to elaborate on the identity-dilemma of the relation of national 
and European law: "Jurisprudential Dilemmas of European Law." In: Law and Philosophy, 
16, 1997, 357-376. 
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Alexander G. MOROZOV* The Budget Process in Russia: 
Problems and Solutions in the 
Context of Politics 
1. Comprehensive approach to the budget process 
An economy can be divided into two broad sectors: private and public. Of course, 
such a division is rather artificial because, first, sometimes a distinction between 
the sectors is not clear (e.g., state shares in joint-stock companies), and 
secondly, there is a close link between the sectors, so that decisions made in one 
of them have direct or indirect consequences for the other (e.g., crowding out 
of private investment by government spending). 
The sphere of public finance in Russia, including extra-budgetary funds, 
accounts for about 40% of the GDP (1996 data). This percentage does not take 
into account a number of fiscal transactions which are currently not classified 
as being part of public finance, such as revenues and expenditures of budget 
sector organizations engaging in commercial activities, nor does it include 
operations of state-owned commercial enterprises. Therefore the issue of 
efficient management of public finance remains as relevant as ever because of 
its strong impact on the whole economy and society. 
What is the current degree of efficiency in the use of public money in Russia? 
In fact, it is very low. There are numerous examples of significant efficiency 
* Findings and views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and should not 
be attributed in any manner to the World Bank. 
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losses resulting from weaknesses of legislation governing the fiscal process, and, 
consequently, the use of arbitrary practices in the attempt to organize that 
process. The issues outlined below represent only a few such examples. 
Although they pertain to the federal budget, they are also characteristic, to a 
varying extent, of regional and municipal budgets: 
— errors in the compilation of revenue and expenditure projections of the 
federal budget for 1996 were subsequently aggravated by the amendments 
introduced during the discussion of the draft budget at the State Duma, 
which rendered the law on the federal budget for 1996 unrealistic. In their 
turn, the increased budgetary spending obligations brought about a growth 
of budgetary arrears to various groups of recipients and discretionary 
financing of expenditures in violation of the original allocations. This 
situation repeated itself in 1997; 
— lack of consistency between the budget law and various other laws and 
regulations determining the nature and amount of government spending 
obligations, such as the Law on the Federal Budget and the Law on the 
Budget of the Pension Fund, makes it impossible in principle to ensure 
timely and full financing of such obligations; 
— lack of a clear regulation governing the spending authority of various 
executive agencies and procedures for the use of budgetary resources 
generates additional spending obligations. For example, the 1996 increase in 
the amount of the Russian Army, which had not been budgeted originally, 
resulted in an increase of military expenditures and wage arrears to the 
military; 
— a discretionary approach demonstrated by the agencies in charge of 
distributing budgetary resources and by recipient entities towards the 
selection of counterparts and contractors in the process of budget-funded 
procurement for the state needs, lack of transparency and competition all 
lead to inflated prices on goods supplied to the state, lower quality of such 
goods, losses of budgetary funds, and corruption in government agencies in 
charge of budget allocations; 
— after budgetary funds have been transferred from Treasury accounts to the 
accounts of distributors and recipients, the actual use of such funds is 
checked on at best only episodically. No ex ante operational control system 
was in place in principle; 
— there are no procedures in place governing sequestration of budgetary funds 
and ensuring that the legislative branch has ways to control the sequestration 
process. As a result, budgetary allocation decisions are made in an arbitrary 
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manner; no reporting is provided on the actual implementation of the budget 
compared to the originally adopted budget law, which effectively renders the 
entire budgetary process meaningless; 
— the system of federal transfers to the regions, including transfers from the 
Fund for Financial Support of the Regions (equalization fund), continues to 
be extremely complicated, which leads to arbitrariness in making decisions 
on the allocation and disbursement of funds to different regions. 
The situation is aggravated by the fact that low efficiency even at one of the 
stages of the budgetary process can neutralize relatively high efficiency at other 
stages. For example, incorrect macroeconomic projections, used as the basis for 
budget formulation and adoption, can make it impossible to execute the budget, 
necessitate sequestration, and generate budgetary disproportions and government 
arrears. At the same time, even timely and full financing of an investment 
project selected on a competitive basis will have zero socioeconomic efficiency 
should it be proven later that the project is actually of no use to anyone, like 
building a school without any teachers available to staff it. 
Because the problem is so complex, resolving it and obtaining any real gains 
is only possible if a comprehensive fiscal reform is carried out that produces an 
impact on all the stages of the budgetary process. For each such stage it is 
necessary to prioritize specific actions and identify the tactics of reforms so that 
the strategic objective can be achieved in the long term. The objective is to 
restore order in the budgetary sphere and ensure the efficiency of the budgetary 
process in its entirety. 
2. Objective and subjective factors slowing down budgetary reform 
Why have not such issues been addressed before? In fact, they have been to 
some extent, like elimination of some extra-budgetary funds, but it was done in 
a stop and go manner and never in full. Was it because of ignorance, lack of 
knowledge about what to do and lack of qualified staff? In the beginning of the 
transition to a market economy all these factors were important, but they are 
much less important now. To a great extent reform was restrained by political 
interests of the acting groups, and this can be called a 'subjective' factor. To a 
lesser extent reform was hindered by technical problems related to the imple-
mentation, which can be called 'objective' factors. 
As far as the former are concerned, until quite recently neither the federal 
government nor the majority of the regions have had a real stake in streamlining 
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the budgetary process, including in the sphere of inter-budgetary relations both 
in the center and at the regional and local level. This lack of interest has been 
due to purely pragmatic considerations. 
The inflated spending obligations of the federal budget, which cannot 
realistically be financed with the budgetary revenues actually available, force the 
federal government to muddle things up when distributing budgetary resources 
and controlling their use. At the same time, at the stage of budget execution this 
practice provides tlie federal government and the Ministry of Finance with real 
leverage in their relations with the distributors of budgetary resources, these 
being regions, sectors, and enterprises. 
In their turn, the regional leaders exploit their regular trips to Moscow for 
wrestling the money out of the federal government as a propaganda ploy to 
prove their ability to deal with tlie center and to get support among the 
population, especially on tlie eve of the upcoming elections of heads of regional 
administrations. At tlie same time, concentration of control over the regional 
budgetary process, lack of real accountability before the local legislatures, and 
growing centralization of regional budgetary resources at the oblast level have 
all contributed to boosting tlie power of regional governors. Under this setup, 
instances of wage arrears in the budget sector and failures to finance spending 
obligations out of tlie regional budgets can always be blamed on underiinancing 
from the federal budget. It goes without saying that regional authorities never 
advertise the fact that the root cause of underiinancing was the failure to 
implement the fundamentally unfeasible but still budgeted collection of tax 
revenue. 
Other distributors of budgetary resources—ministries and departments—have 
their own stakes in preserving the current fiscal confusion. After the hard-won 
money has been transferred from the accounts of the federal Treasury to the 
account of the distributor, tlie latter is effectively free to distribute the money 
among lower distributors and recipients of budgetary funding at its discretion, 
and until recently to decide which commercial banks tlie budgetary money will 
flow through. There are no ways for tlie Ministry of Finance to exercise effi-
cient control over the use of the money. In the final analysis, the volume of 
budgetary flows and the opportunities for manipulating the way the money is 
distributed determine the influence of a particular government agency and fuel 
corruption. 
Finally, the Federal Assembly itself is also interested in preserving the 
system of political bargaining over the adoption of the budget. On the one hand, 
playing into tlie hands of various lobbies, tlie Federal Assembly seeks to 
increase tlie expenditure side of tlie budget; while on the other hand, by making 
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the budget unrealistic it seeks to obtain an instrument with which to continually 
pressure the federal government. In turn, the government reluctantly agrees to 
be influenced by such aspirations of the legislative branch, since procedures 
governing the control of and reporting on budget execution do not exist and the 
government's hands are free when it has to decide which expenditures will have 
priority. 
The above may be referred to as subjective factors determining the lack of 
interest in and slowing down of the fiscal reform at various levels of the 
executive branch. It must be stressed that the situation has recently started to 
change: the Ministry of Finance on the one hand, and some of the donor regions 
on the other hand, have started to look for ways of changing the existing fiscal 
system with a view of making it more transparent, better regulated and more 
efficient. 
Besides subjective factors, there are also objective ones which make it 
impossible to carry out the fiscal reform over a short period of time. For 
instance, the switch of budget execution to the Treasury system requires that an 
extensive system of departments and offices of the federal Treasury should be 
set up in all the subjects of the Federation and their constituent municipal and 
local entities: rayons, okrugs, etc. In addition to the agreement with the member 
of the Federation, the lack of which currently prevents Treasury departments 
from being established in such regions as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, it is also 
necessary to provide technical resources, select and train personnel, and organize 
information flows and document processing in order to enable the Treasury 
system to operate efficiently. This cannot possibly be done within an acceptably 
short time. 
Similar problems of an objective and subjective nature confront the attempts 
to bring all financial flows of the government and government organizations and 
institutions into the budget in order to be consistent with one of the fundamental 
principles of public finance—the principle of integrality. Here we are referring 
to three changes of principal importance: 
— first, the consolidation in the budget of all the extra-budgetary funds, the 
social extra-budgetary funds (Pension Fund, Social Insurance Fund, Health 
Insurance Fund, and Employment Fund), and the road fund. The nature of 
the consolidation may vary from arithmetic addition of revenues and 
expenditures of an extra-budgetary fund to the corresponding revenues and 
expenditures of the budget to full consolidation whereby the administrator 
of the fund becomes a distributor of budgetary resources and resources of 
the fund lose their targeted nature; 
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— second, the compilation by recipients of budgetary resources and govern-
ment-^wned (kazyonnyie) enterprises of consolidated reporting in accordance 
with ь.е budget classification. This reporting would include all budgetary 
and commercial sources and outlays (revenues from the provision of paid 
services, leasing of premises, etc., and their use). The inclusion of that 
reporting into the corresponding budget would make it possible to have a 
realistic picture of the amount of financing available to various budget-
supported sectors, keep revenues and expenditures of budget sector organi-
zations under control, and introduce a corresponding adjustment into the 
fiscal policy; 
— third, the registration of and reporting in the budget document on the tax 
privileges and exemptions at the levels of the budgetary system at which 
such privileges were granted; in the context of the international practice of 
granting tax exemptions, their registration should make it possible to assess 
the real cost of such privileges and exemptions for the budget, and determine 
how efficiently they are used in various sectors of the economy. 
Naturally, the stakeholders—budget sector organizations, the administrators 
of the extra-budgetary funds and commercial banks servicing them, various 
lobbies in legislative and executive agencies—refuse to accept changes aimed at 
increasing the efficiency of the budgetary process and strengthening control over 
the use of budgetary resources. At the same time, the technical work related to 
the changes (compilation of methodological instructions on the use of the budget 
classification, personnel training, assessment of the amount and efficiency of tax 
exemptions, etc.) requires a lot of time and effort. 
What then could be incentives to reform the fiscal system, first and foremost, 
in terms of overcoming the subjective factors? It appears that such incentives 
can be generated both "from above" and "from below". Incentives "from above" 
mean incentives generated by that faction which was brought into the govern-
ment in the spring of 1997, which is interested in the creation of a sound 
economic foundation to promote their own political objectives, and which 
realizes that the collapse of the budget would play into the hands of the political 
opposition. In the efforts to attain its objectives this "strategically thinking" 
faction in the government (which may be called "new bureaucrats") enjoys the 
support of Russia's leading commercial banks, which realize that their strategic 
interests are linked with the preservation of political and economic stability in 
society and which are ready to sacrifice short-term gains (for instance, in 
connection with the transfer of budgetary accounts from commercial banks to 
the offices of the Central Bank and Sberbank) in order to secure strategic ones. 
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Besides, incentives can and must be generated "from below" as a result of 
the evolution of a civil society which is interested in streamlined and transparent 
operations with public finance and expresses its interests through democratic 
election procedures at all levels of power. In the final analysis, civil society is 
both the end and means of reforms carried out in this country. 
It is probably worth thinking about the lack of a proper budget legal base as 
another subset of the objective factors that slow down the reform in the budget 
process. On the one hand, the budget legislation is weak and incomplete with 
many loopholes. On the other hand, there are some clauses in the existing 
legislation that potentially can generate legal and constitutional disputes if the 
budget reform goes forward. For instance, independence of regional budgets is 
interpreted in such a way that the center is not allowed to check regional 
budgets, and federal transfers may not be ear-marked and forwarded to end-
users through the federal Treasury network. It opens a lot of opportunities for 
misuse of public money at the regional level. 
Yet the very existence of ambiguous budget legislation was caused by the 
subjective factors. The core of this legislation appeared at the time of hot 
clashes between the executive and legislative branches, and between the center 
and regions. Thus as a compromise solution many fundamental issues 
intentionally have not been touched in the legislation. 
3. Reforming inter-budgetary relations 
Establishment of a balanced system of inter-budgetary relations is one of the key 
objectives of fiscal policy. Ultimately, political, social and economic stability in 
society will depend on how efficiently tills problem is resolved. The problem 
acquires special urgency in federal states in which emphasis in the process of 
formulation and implementation of economic and social policy is by definition 
shifted towards regions, members of the Federation. That is why the issue of 
reforming the system of inter-budgetary relations is worth a special discussion. 
In principle, there is no readily available recipe for organizing relations 
between budgets at various levels that would apply to ail, or at least to the 
majority of countries. Too much is determined by historical, national and cultural 
factors, as well as by the level of social and economic development of individual 
regions and the country as a whole. 
At the same time, the application of fundamental principles of the theory of 
public finance, which are common to all countries, makes it possible to identify 
how to move towards greater efficiency of the national budgetary system. 
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One of the main principles of public finance is to ensure economic and social 
efficiency of government expenditures. If the federal budget appears to be the 
most efficient source of budgetary financing of a specific type of expenditure, 
then it is the federal budget that should have the obligation to finance that 
expenditure. One of the combined ways would be to finance expenditures from 
one budget level, while financing the delivery of public services to consumers 
from another budget level (delegation of expenditure mandates). In this case the 
upper level budget determines the earmarked allocation of expenditures, while the 
lower budget uses such an allocation as the basis for distributing the money 
among specific recipients. 
The efficiency of various types of public expenditures can be assessed based 
on the following considerations: whether the object of financing was chosen 
correctly; whether the budgeted public services are really delivered to the intended 
recipients; and finally, the significance of the resulting social and economic 
impact. For example, applying tins principle to the education sector means that 
financing really goes to schools (rather than to advanced training courses); that 
the allocated funds really reach the intended schools and are subsequently used 
for the teaching process, winch eventually ensures the required academic standard 
of students determined on the basis of examinations and/or control tests. 
Based on these criteria, as well as on a comparison of international ex-
periences, the tentative picture of expenditure sharing among budgets of various 
levels may look as follows: 
Sources of financing. The central (federal) budget assumes the obligation to 
finance the defense program, foreign policy and international activities, environ-
mental programs, development of inter-regional commercial links, payments to 
immigrants and the unemployed, and operating railways and air lines. Budgets 
at ail three levels have the joint responsibility to finance education, health care, 
social protection, industry and agriculture, the road sector, and production of 
natural resources. The budgets of the medium and lower levels are responsible 
for financing law-enforcement activities. 
Actual delivery of public services to consumers. The central budget transfers 
funds to the two lower budget levels to finance environmental programs and 
functional expenditures financed jointly by budgets of all three levels. In all 
other respects, the breakdown of public service delivery coincides with the 
breakdown of the source of financing. 
Sources of financing must he distributed among budgets of various levels 
with account taken of fiscal obligations to finance specific types of expenditures 
and the role performed by specific sources of financing—federal, regional or local. 
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Revenue sharing. The system of assigning individual taxes to budgets of the 
corresponding level, which was stipulated by the first edition of the law on the 
fundamental principles of the taxation system (specifically, VAT was assigned 
to the federal budget, while the corporate profits tax to the regional ones), has 
never actually worked. In 1992 VAT revenues were shared on the basis of 
bilateral negotiations between the center and individual regions. At the same 
time, the federal budget secured for itself 47% of revenue from the corporate 
profits tax. Although a clear contravention of the theoretical principles, in the 
historical and current Russian context this arrangement helps to ensure the 
sustainability of tax revenues to the central and regional budgets. 
As for the relative importance of tax revenues of different budget levels, it 
must be noted that due to numerous instances when regions refuse to transfer 
to the federal level, fully or partially, the federal share of taxes collected on 
their respective territories, the actual share of tax revenues for the federal budget 
has always been lower than originally envisaged. Since 1994 VAT has been 
shared between the federal and regional budgets in a proportion of three to one, 
with the exception of some regions, which entered into special arrangements 
with the center. After the federal share of the corporate profits tax was reduced 
in 1993 from 47% to 31%, it was raised again to 34% in 1994 and to 37% in 
1995-1997. It was the changes in the sharing of corporate profits tax proceeds, 
as well as the reduction of that tax's role for the budget that determined the 
dynamics of the ratio of overall tax revenues of the center and the regions in 
1992-1996 (see Table I). After the share of tax revenue actually received by the 
federal budget fell sharply from 55% in 1992 to 41% in 1993, it then rose again 
to 46-48% in 1994-1996. 
A comparison with other countries shows that in Russia the degree of tax 
revenue centralization is considerably lower than the average for member-
countries of the European Union and member-countries of the OECD. At the 
same time, it is higher titan in such industrially developed federations as the 
United States, Canada and Germany (see Table 1). The high degree of differ-
entiation among regions in terms of their economic and social development, 
which has become even more pronounced since 1991, requires that a larger 
amount of funds be redistributed among the regions. This shows that, provided 
other conditions are equal, the current level of revenue centralization in Russia 
is approximately consistent with the criteria of long-term equilibrium, although 
in 1995 and especially in 1996 Russia was lagging behind developed economies 
in terms of the overall actual tax burden (see Table J). 
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Table 1 
Assessment of tax burden in Russia 
and OECD countries in 1993 
Tax revenue, 
including 
payrolls, % of 
GDP 
Central 
Government's share 
in tax revenues, % 
Central Government's 
share in tax revenues 
net of transfers to 
regions, % 
Sweden 49.5 44.9 
-
Denmark 50.0 65.1 
-
Finland 46.8 52.8 
-
The Netherlands 48.2 57.4 
-
France 44.0 45.4 
-
Italy 43.2 65.5 
-
Germany 39.7 32.5 
-
Canada 36.1 40.5 
-
Spain 34.7 51.5 
-
United Kingdom 34.4 77.4 
-
United States* 29.4 37.8 
-
Japan* 29.4 41.9 
-
Turkey 22.7 71.3 
-
OECD average* 38.8 58.6 
-
EU average* 41.4 63.8 
-
Russia - 1992 43.6 54.8 49.5 
Russia - 1993 38.8 40.6 29.8 
Russia - 1994 37.3 47.2 34.1 
Russia - 1995 32.1 48.1 38.6 
Russia - 1996 30.3 46.2 36.4 
* 1992 data 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, World Bank staff estimates 
Assignment of expenditure responsibilities. Since 1992 Russia has been 
going through the process of delegation of expenditure responsibilities from the 
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federal level to the regional level. For instance, in 1992 regions were made 
responsible for subsidizing food stuffs and financing individual social benefits 
which had previously been financed by earmarked transfers from the federal 
budget. Later the center also transferred to the regions the responsibility to 
finance social assets divested by enterprises and organizations to local authorities; 
pay additional child allowances; finance the new network of social protection 
offices; pay for health and rest facilities of WWII veterans; finance local 
offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, local military commissariats and fire 
fighting units; pay compensation to members of housing construction coopera-
tives; and finance some other expenditures. Sources of financing of these 
expenditures are transferred to the regions under the regional equalization fund 
arrangements. 
Inter-budgetary transfers. The main innovation in this area was the establish-
ment of the Fund for Financial Support of the Regions (federal equalization fund) 
in the second quarter of 1994. This fund was formed on the basis of a formula 
taking into account indicators of social and economic conditions of individual 
regions and was expected to ensure greater transparency in inter-budgetary 
relations. The objective in setting up the equalization fund was to redistribute 
revenues in favor of objectively poorer regions. 
In the first year of its existence the equalization fund was used to 
provide only 22% of all transfers from the federal budget to the regions. The 
rest of the transfers were executed through informal channels, such as mutual 
settlements and short-term budgetary loans. In 1995 the regional equalization 
fund processed 48% of the transfers, and the very formula on the basis of 
which the fund was formed underwent changes. In 1996-1997 the formula used 
for determining the shares of individual regions was modified once again with 
the main emphasis being shifted from the equalization of the fiscal capacity 
of regions (the category of "needy regions") towards financing current 
expenditures of regions (the category of "most needy regions"). With the 
overall trend towards a reduction of the relative share of tax revenues to the 
federal and regional budgets, which has been observed since 1992, the amount 
of transfers to the regions grew from 1.7% of the GDP in 1992 to 3.6% of the 
GDP in 1994, before going down to 1.8% of the GDP in 1995 and 2.1% of the 
GDP in 1996. 
Main problems of inter-budgetary relations in Russia. In spite of a number 
of positive changes which took place in the area of fiscal federalism in 
1992-1997, there still remain several important problems which need to be 
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solved as soon as possible. The most critical of these problems are the 
following: 
— inequality of the political and fiscal status of different regions. Although the 
practice of applying a customized approach to each region (including special 
bilateral agreements between the center and the region) over the entire 
spectrum of political, social and economic issues appears to be justified 
today, it is creating conditions for future instability of federal relations when 
subjects of the Federation will seek to raise their status to that of more 
fortunate ones; 
— insufficient legal regulation of issues pertaining to fiscal authorities of budgets 
at various levels. For instance, it is not clear whether regional budgets are 
supposed to finance unplanned wage and benefit increases which had not been 
provided for in the original federal or regional budget in case federal 
legislation on such increases should be adopted; 
— continuing lack of transparency in inter-budgetary relations between the 
center and the regions: the practice whereby a significant portion of transfers 
is channeled through mutual settlements between federal and regional budgets 
and short-term federal budgetary loans makes the regions spend all their 
efforts on "wrestling" money out of the central government; 
— the actual pattern of financing of the regions from the equalization fund is 
noticeably different from that stipulated by the budget legislation. The main 
reason for this is the widely used practice of offsetting shortfalls of tax 
revenues to be transferred from the regions to the federal budget against the 
underfinancing of a number of regional programs from the federal budget; 
— the very mechanism on the basis of which the equalization fund is formed has 
serious deficiencies: it is geared towards preserving the inequalities of social 
development of the regions which had developed by 1991; it offers regions 
no incentives for seeking their own sources of financing; the formula is linked 
to the amount of actual expenditures and revenues rather than normative 
criteria; 
— the list of targeted federal programs implemented at the regional level is 
excessive. As a result, there is no real responsibility for implementing such 
programs and no control over the use of resources, which eventually leads to 
considerable expenditure cuts across all the programs; 
— the inefficient expenditure patterns of regional budgets, first and foremost in 
the donor regions, that is, those regions which do not receive federal transfers 
from the equalization fund. Having "excessive" resources, which are as a rule 
accommodated in extra-budgetary funds and, therefore, are outside the 
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controlling authority of the legislative branch, such regions can afford the 
luxury of subsidizing the local economy and engaging in questionable 
investment projects. Thus far a considerable portion of fiscal allocations of 
all regional budgets has been used to subsidize production and the housing 
and utilities sector, which is a result of the 1992-1997 trend towards 
transferring the bulk of subsidization of the economy from tlie federal budget 
to regional budgets. Recent surveys have shown that among regions with the 
same fiscal capacity, tlie higher the relative level of support the region 
receives from the equalization fund, the more it tends to spend on subsidizing 
the regional economy; 
— lack of regulation of inter-budgetary relations in the majority of regions at 
the lower and medium level. While bearing the bulk of responsibility for 
delivering public services, local budgets do not have a sufficient tax base of 
their own and have to rely almost completely on transfers from regional 
budgets; 
— the reliance by a number of regions, rayons and cities on outside sources of 
financing by obtaining loans from commercial banks and issuing subnational 
securities can potentially lead some regions to financial insolvency; there is 
a danger that debt servicing would be possible only if regions were to cut 
all expenditures, including social ones. 
4. Benchmarks for compiling an action program 
What should be tlie strategy and tactics for reforming the fiscal process taking 
into account the above considerations? 
At the stage of the compilation of macroeconomic projections and budget 
drafting: 
— At the federal level it is necessary to ensure coordination of activities between 
the Ministry of Economy, tlie Central Bank and tlie Ministry of Finance in 
order to agree on major parameters of monetary policy being developed by 
the Central Bank, the overall economic and sectoral projections compiled by 
the Ministry of Economy, and the main guidelines of fiscal and taxation 
policies proposed by the Ministry of Finance. In order to overcome the 
existing inter-departmental barriers, the practice of such coordination and 
clearance must be formally legislated specifying the deadlines for the 
submission of draft documents to the corresponding ministries and insti-
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tutioas. In addition to clearing projections for the next fiscal year it is also 
necessary to develop and clear with these same ministries and institutions 
medL. ..-term projections which would serve, inter alia, as targets for 
compiling preliminary projections for the next year. Following formal 
adoption by the government, current and medium-term projections, as well 
as estimated indices of budgetary expenditures, would have to be circulated 
among all subjects of the Federation to be used for information and guidance 
in the process of formulation of regional budgets. 
This could be done by introducing amendments into the current legislation, 
by adopting a new law on tire budget system and budget process, by including 
the description of tire clearance procedure in the annual law on the procedure 
governing the submission, discussion and adoption of the law on the federal 
budget, and/or by subsequently reflecting this procedure in the Budget Code. 
At the stage of budget formulation and adoption: 
— It is necessary to strengthen the responsibility of executive agencies for 
developing realistic budgets, at tire same time reducing the right of bodies 
of legislative power to introduce changes in the proposed draft budgets or 
adopt any other legal enactments that would lead either to an increase in 
expenditures and/or a shrinking of the revenue base of the budget. After the 
budget law has been adopted, it is necessary to make sure that the structure 
and parameters of the budget can only be modified through the adoption of 
a law or the introduction of amendments and additions to the law on the 
budget, with the right of legislative initiative vested exclusively in the 
executive branch (the government). This condition represents an indispensable 
prerequisite for strengthening the requirements for the executive branch to 
strictly adhere to the budget law and to submit full and timely reports on the 
budget to the bodies of legislative power. 
— It is necessary to legislate that in terms of financing fiscal obligations, the 
budget law enjoys priority over any other legal enactments which commit 
the government to undertaking such obligations. An alternative solution 
would be to suspend die corresponding provisions of such enactments, or to 
provide partial financing during the current fiscal year executed in the form 
of a package of amendments to the effective legislation, which, however, 
might be difficult to implement for political reasons. 
— As discussed above, it would be useful to adopt a practice whereby all public 
financial flows would be reflected in the budget. For Ulis purpose, at the first 
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stage it should be possible to mechanically integrate all extra-budgetary 
flows, such as extra-budgetary funds, revenues and expenditures of budget 
sector organizations' commercial activities, with the corresponding parts of 
the budget. At present extra-budgetary funds and budget sector organizations 
submit reports directly to the Ministry of Finance or to regional financial 
departments, which is why from a purely technical standpoint there should be 
no difficulties with collecting and processing the information. A refusal by 
regional or local administrations to compile consolidated financial reports 
with account taken of extra-budgetary flows could be countered with a 
suspension of transfers from the higher budget, a provision that must also be 
legislated as an amendment to the current budget legislation. 
As for tax expenditures resulting from the granting of tax incentives, a 
corresponding flow of information is not yet in place. However, tax authorities 
obtain such information from tax reporting on individual tax payers and 
individual taxes paid. That is why at the second stage, once a system for 
reporting tax incentives is developed, it should also be possible to include tax 
expenditures in the budget. Also, at the second stage it would be feasible to 
introduce changes in the budget classification which would enable bringing extra-
budgetary transactions reflected in the budget in conformity with the generally 
accepted principles of classification and international practices. In turn, tills 
would require that changes be introduced in the accounting and reporting systems 
of budget sector institutions. At the same time, it should be possible to start 
parallel consolidation of financial flows of former extra-budgetary funds with 
budgets at the corresponding levels, for which purpose revenues and expenditures 
would be channeled through budgetary accounts of the Treasury or financial 
department. 
At the stage of determining budgetary allocations and disbursement of budgetary 
funds: 
— It is necessary to clearly define and spell out in a legislative or regulatory act 
the spending authority of distributors of budgetary resources in order that to 
avoid a situation in which the government would be obligated to finance 
contracts entered into by the distributors if budgetary financing for such 
contracts had not been provided (or an application for such financing had not 
been included in the funding limit) by the Ministry of Finance or the financial 
department. 
— It is necessary to expand the practice of executing the federal budget 
(maintenance of revenue and expenditure budgetary accounts) through the 
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Treasury system. In the light of the subjective and objective difficulties 
discussed above, this process should also be a staged one. The process of 
transition to the Treasury system of budget execution should develop along 
two directions: it should deepen, and it should expand. Deepening in this 
sense means a gradual increase in the number of budgetary revenue and 
expenditure accounts maintained by the Treasury as its technical capacity 
and ability to manage budgetary flows develops. Expanding means the 
development of a network of regional and rayon offices of the Treasury. 
— It is important to begin and later expand the use of competitive selection 
procedures in the procurement of goods for the needs of the state (accumu-
lation of stocks, reserves, procurement of military hardware), implementation 
of capital construction projects, and procurement for the needs of budget 
sector organizations (for example, computer equipment and furniture). 
Experience shows that competition among contractors makes it possible to 
save at least 15% of the budgetary resources allocated for a project. 
Unfortunately, the existing budget legislation has considerable gaps in terms 
of development of a regulatory basis for organizing competitive state 
procurement on a non-discriminatory basis. While tenders for individual 
government procurement programs can be introduced by individual govern-
ment resolutions, a competitive procedure governing procurement by all 
budget sector organizations needs to be legislated through adoption of a 
special law on procurement for the needs of the state, or as a separate section 
of the Budget Code. That is why simultaneously with the preparation of a 
draft law to tltis effect, the government could start accepting tenders for major 
state procurement programs, such as procurement of food stuffs for state 
reserves, procurement of uniforms for the military, etc. 
At the stage of controlling budget execution: 
— In the process of transition to the Treasury system of budget implementation 
it is necessary to gradually develop a function allowing ex ante control of 
fiscal expenditures in order to considerably reduce the inappropriate use of 
budgetary resources and strengthen the ex post control once end recipients of 
budgetary resources have submitted reports on the use of the resources 
provided. 
— It is necessary to require executive agencies to submit regular reports on 
budget implementation (and tighten such agencies' administrative responsi-
bilities for failing to provide reports) explaining the reasons of any violations 
of the plan and specifying the corrective actions employed. Corresponding 
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changes would have to be introduced in the law on fundamental principles of 
the budgetary system (the new edition), or in the Budget Code. 
— In addition to the treasury system, it is important to strengthen control over 
budgetary resources by internal supervisory bodies, such as the Control and 
Audit Department of the Ministry of Finance or the Presidential Administra-
tion, and also to carry out independent audits of the use of budgetary 
resources by budget sector organizations and private sector companies. Such 
audits could be carried out by Chamber of Accounting, or by audit firms 
winning contracts in the course of competitive tenders. Since technical 
constraints render blanket control and verification impossible, it is necessary 
to begin with the introduction or strengthening of control over the largest 
budgetary flows. The issues of control and administrative responsibilities for 
budgetary process violations is least developed in the budget legislation, 
which means that a special law or a Budget Code including a related section 
must be enacted to create the legislative framework for this process. 
In the area of budget evaluation: 
— Since this part of the budgetary process is currently not in place at all, at the 
first stage it is necessary to initiate a regular analysis of at least major 
budgetary expenditures, both at the level of sections, subsections and items 
of the budget classification, and at the level of individual recipients of 
budgetary funds. It appears that this could be achieved through the creation 
of new (modification of the existing) analytical divisions at the Ministry of 
Finance and financial departments which would interact with the Treasury 
and controlling entities and have the authority to solicit services of external 
consultants to resolve specific tasks. Analytical materials prepared by such 
divisions and their recommendations on rectifying the shortcomings revealed 
in the functioning of the budgetary process would be taken into account in 
the formulation of subsequent budgets. 
In the area of inter-budgetary relations: 
— As a minimum it is necessary to document the historical and actual expen-
diture sharing between budgets of different levels, all the way to the financing 
of individual items or projects. This could be done in the form of one of the 
amendments to the budget law, which is enacted on an annual basis. Later 
this could form the basis for negotiating certain changes in expenditure 
sharing to be documented in the Budget Code for the medium term. 
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— On the revenue side of the budget it would be useful to redistribute the 
revenue base in favor of local budgets. This could be done by increasing and 
assigning to local budgets on a long-term basis a certain share of the 
republican corporate profits tax, property tax, VAT and personal income tax. 
— It is necessary to continue efforts to restructure the system of inter-budgetary 
transfers: reduction of transfers along non-regulated channels, expansion of 
the mechanism allowing the federal transfers to regions to be channeled 
through the federal Treasury. 
— It is necessary to change the mechanism of the equalization fund with respect 
to the category of "needy regions": assistance should be provided to a 
considerably smaller number of regions focusing on those which really lag 
behind others in terms of their economic and social development. In the long 
term it would be sensible to link the provision of assistance to the region's 
revenue capacity rather than to the amount of revenue collected in the 
previous year (a benchmark that does not take into account regional extra-
budgetary funds and does not generate incentives for regions to seek better 
tax collection) and to federal expenditure standards rather than to actual 
expenditures. 
— The category of "most needy regions" should be eliminated in principle; it 
would be sensible to replace this category with a system of earmarked 
transfers to regions, such transfers being conditional on efficiency gains in the 
use of resources by regional budgets, and channeled through the treasury 
system. Programs that could be suitable for this arrangement are transfers for 
social benefits as part of the implementation of the social sector reform, 
transfers to finance part of the costs related to the maintenance of the housing 
and utilities sector in the context of the housing and utilities reform, and 
transfers to finance education and health. 
— A third element of the transfer system could be the use of development 
programs, financed jointly by the center and the regions in the overall context 
of reduction of targeted federal programs and introduction of a ceiling on the 
number of programs being implemented simultaneously. Financing from the 
federal budget should be channeled through the treasury system on the 
condition that the region must come up with matching funds for program 
implementation in accordance with die approved schedule, as well as on the 
condition that the region should not be in arrears on current expenditures. The 
system of transfers between medium and lower levels of the budgetary system 
could be based on similar principles. 
— In addition, it is necessary to create a legislative framework for regulating 
issues connected with subnational borrowing, stipulating the establishment of 
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a certain ceiling (e.g., as a percentage of the total amount of tax revenue) on 
the amount of borrowing and debt service. In this context borrowing should 
be interpreted in a broad sense, including the issuance of securities, loans 
from commercial banks and other financial and credit institutions, as well as 
budget arrears and conditional liabilities of the budget, such as guarantees. 
Corresponding provisions must be included in the draft legislation on state 
and municipal securities and the law on fundamental principles of the 
budgetary system, or in the Budget Code. 
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Dejan POPOVIC Financing Social and Cultural 
Rights in Yugoslavia: 
Tax Exemptions and Arrears 
The absolute monarch, after having deprived his 
subjects of their rights, should offer them an illusion 
of rights and liberties—iura inania. 
Arnold Clapmarius 
(17th century) 
1. Introduction 
On the wave of the fiscal reforms carried out during the eighties and early 
nineties in the majority of industrialized countries the concept of the "active" 
tax policy, implying the existence of numerous tax reliefs and differentiated 
rates, has been abandoned to a large extent. The prevailing approach was to 
reduce the tax rates (which had reached dramatically high levels), while 
broadening the taxable base. One may quite precisely express the basic idea of 
these reforms by the statement that the best tax incentive is a low rate. It was 
expected that within the tax neutrality approach the horizontal equity would be 
improved, as well as the transparency of the tax system. 
The fiscal systems in the Central and East European countries (hereafter: 
CEECs) on the eve of the collapse of the communist regimes had been generally 
characterized by the presence of numerous tax exemptions and tax holidays, 
special depreciation regimes, differentiation of the rates of turnover, wage and 
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profits ta/es among industries, as well as by discretionary powers of the 
executive .ranch to reduce taxes and customs duties.1 In the early stages of 
transition, ...EECs have carried out comprehensive tax reforms, strongly 
influenced by the recommendations of the 1991 OECD Conference. In short, 
these countries introduced all major taxes which could be found in OECD 
economies: corporation income tax, personal income tax, VAT, social security 
contributions, etc., while eliminating most of the tax reliefs and rate differentials 
within the context of improving tax neutrality. Tanzi's words served as a 
warning: "It would be a major error to accept the movement to a market 
economy while continuing to believe that policymakers can consistently make 
better choices than the market".2 However, one must not risk generalizing 
incorrectly by stating that the tax reliefs in CEECs have been totally eliminated. 
Their presence reflects the desire of the legislators to promote certain sectors or 
regions by the means of tax policy rather than by the means of subsidies.3 
In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia tax reform has hardly been achieved 
at the federal level. It is at the level of the republics (Serbia and Montenegro) 
that quite comprehensive fiscal changes have been carried out so far. Since 1 
January 1992 the personal income tax, the corporation profits tax, the social 
security contributions and the property tax have been introduced, the excises 
having been implemented since mid-1994. The implementation of VAT was 
postponed, while the personal income tax—in spite of the legal provisions which 
prescribe the globalization of income—has retained the features of scheduled 
taxes on various sources of income. 
The idea that the number and scope of tax reliefs, as well as tax rates, 
should be reduced stood behind the fiscal reform projects in both Serbia and 
Montenegro.4 However, in an environment characterized by the soft-budget 
constraint that used to prevail in Yugoslav public finance there existed neither 
genuine pressure on public expenditures to decrease (apart from the January 
1994 cut aimed at curbing hyperinflation), nor serious incentive for the 
government to enforce strict fiscal discipline. Within such a context there is a 
1 JURKOVIC, P.: "Designing a Tax System to Promote Structural Change". In: The Role 
of Tax Reform in Central and Eastern European Economies, Paris, 1991. OECD. 
2 TANZI, V.: "Tax Reform and the Move to a Market Economy: Overview of the Issues". 
In: Ibid. 
3 "Taxation and Investment in Central and East European Countries", Amsterdam: 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. 1996. 
4 Izvrsno vece Skupstine Srbije (1990). "Koncepcija fiskalne reforme и Srbiji", Bcograd: 
Skupstina Srbije. 
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strong tendency to retain quite a number of tax exemptions. It is the objective 
of this paper to investigate the socio-economic causes of the generous fiscal 
policies carried out in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—especially in the 
Republic of Serbia, since the Government of the Republic of Montenegro has 
played a more responsible role in that domain. This paper will also analyze the 
consequences of the refusals to adjust the fiscal outlays adequately—primarily 
those related to the financing of social and cultural rights—to the drastically 
reduced GDP and to enlarge the taxable base and the number of the taxpayers 
by eliminating excessive exemptions. 
2. Fiscal Expenditures in the Post-Hyperinflationary Period 
During 1992, 1993 and in January 1994 budgetary and social security deficits 
were being financed by monetization; such a practice caused hyperinflation 
which at the very beginning of 1994 ran at the pace of 312,000,000% per 
month. On 24 January 1994 the stabilization program ("Avramovic's program") 
came into force: it was truly effective, because the price growth was halted 
overnight. The exchange rate was set at the level of 1 dinar = 1 DEM and 
monetary emission was linked with currency purchases by the National Bank of 
Yugoslavia. It was the incomplete currency board which secured the monetary 
stability. In spite of the fact that fiscal expenditures were significantly reduced 
(from 68% of the GDP to 48%), during the first six-seven months of 1994 a 
fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficit was planned at about 4% of the GDP (due to 
pension and agriculture financing, budget deficits, an increase in the banks' 
liquidity, etc.). However, the actual deficit was smaller than planned, thanks to 
the reverse Tanzi-Olivera effect and a modest income increase. Tlie financing 
of such a deficit came from monetary emission—actually from the post-hyper-
inflation increase in real money balances, without creation of new inflation. In 
the fall of 1994 economic stagnation was generated; the stabilization program 
has actually brought monetary stability, but at a low level of economic activity, 
with per capita GDP of only half of what tlie country had in 1990. The economy 
required meaningful economic reform (privatization, liberalization, strict budget 
constraint), but it was not accomplished till today. In 1995 the monetary policy 
was more relaxed, even permissive, thus causing the increase in inflation rate 
(120.4%). Inflation slowed down in 1996 (59.6%) and was almost halted in the 
first half of 1997 due to the tight money policy that was being conducted. The 
rate of exchange was also stabilized (tlie official rate: 1 DEM = 3.3 dinars; the 
black market rate: 1 DEM = 3.6 dinars), but in the autumn of 1997 the dinar 
again lost part of its value on the black market (1 DEM = 4.3 dinars). The level 
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of economic activity is still low, primarily due to the lack of structural reforms 
and the shortage of foreign credits and direct investments.5 
Within this context the deficits of the federal and republics' budgets, as well 
as that of the social security sector. They represent one of the potentially most 
dangerous threats for the desired stabilization. Further reductions of public 
expenditures have not been accomplished yet: the budgetary and social security 
outlays are not adjusted to the real potential of the Yugoslav economy once its 
GDP is halved. The overall ratio of fiscal expenditures to the GDP is about 
48%; since the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia belongs to the group of lower-
middle-income countries (per capita GDP is USD 1.300), it is supposed that the 
fiscal burden should be much lower. Otherwise, numerous negative economic 
implications appear: unliquidity, crowding out of private savings, recession 
trends, inflationary pressures, price distortions, increase in unemployment (be 
it hidden or open), transfers of funds toward non-formal sectors, etc. However, 
the government (both at the federal and republic level) has not been prepared 
so far to achieve the necessary reductions. This hesitation may be viewed as part 
of the general pro-status-quo policies conducted by the Milosevic regime 
(preserving the domination of the public sector, absolute control over the public 
TV and other major media, political pressures on the judiciary system, etc.). It 
also reflects the conservative attitude of those strata of the population (industrial 
workers, pensioners, farmers) which usually vote for the socialists—both in 
Serbia and in Montenegro. Therefore, the government generally avoids formally 
reducing the social rights previously given to the population: officially the 
statutory replacement rate, defined as the ratio of the pension benefit to the 
pension base (i.e., to the last wage) is very high (85%), health care is still 
almost free, education is being provided free of charge from the elementary to 
the university level, the number of employees in the public sector has not been 
adjusted proportionally either to the dramatical decline of the GDP or to the 
reduction in the national territory and in the number of inhabitants, social 
welfare is still being provided without stringent control, etc. 
It is obvious that the regime is faced with the dilemma of how to finance the 
constitutionally guaranteed social and cultural rights,6 especially if the fact that 
the number of needy people has drastically increased is taken into consideration. 
5 MIJATOVIC, B.-POPOVIC, D.: "A study on Public Finance in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia." Preliminary version. Washington, D. C., 1997. The World Bank. 
6 DIMITRUEVIC, V.-PAUNOVIC, M.: "Ljudska prava". Beograd, 1997. Bcogradski 
centar za ljudska prava. 
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Table 1 
Type of expenditure (1995) Percentage of the total fiscal expenditures 
Pensions 26.1% 
Health care 20.3% 
Unemployment insurance 2.0% 
Social welfare 6.3% 
Education 7.5% 
Total social and cultural expenditures 62.2% 
Source: Federal and republics' laws on the execution of budgets; Federal Payments Agency, "The 
Survey of the Social Security Funds Outlays". 
The data from Table 1 show that around 60% of the total budgetary and 
social security outlays may be functionally classified as expenditures on 
financing social and cultural rights. The fiscal capacity of the economy is 
insufficient to obtain the required tax and social security contributions, while the 
possibilities for issuing government bonds as the means of covering the deficit 
are very poor due to the unsettled problem of the saving deposits that had been 
kept by the household sector in the banking institutions of the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter: ex-Yugoslavia) and which the former 
federal government had guaranteed. These hard-currency deposits were suppos-
edly spent in the years of the disintegration of ex-Yugoslavia. In addition, one 
may recall that the access to foreign credits is still limited. Apart from 
inflationary financing, the remaining solutions would thus be either to augment 
the tax proceeds or to cut more deeply into the fiscal expenditures. 
3. Fiscal Revenue Policies 
The increase of fiscal revenues is hardly a feasible alternative for several reasons. 
First, two major sources of revenues in OECD countries—personal income 
tax and VAT—are still missing in the tax system of the FR Yugoslavia. Actually, 
instead of the global type of personal income tax, a series of scheduled taxes on 
various types of income is being applied.7 These scheduled taxes are levied at 
7 POPOVIC, D.: "Taxation and Investment in Serbia and Montenegro". In: Taxation and 
Investment in Central and East European Countries. Amsterdam, 1996. International Bureau 
of Fiscal Documentation. 
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the flat rate of 20%, with the exception of employment income (wages, salaries 
and fringe benefits), which since 1 January 1997 has been subject to progressive 
rates ranging from 0% to 30%. However, the tax on employment income—which 
contributes over 90% of the proceeds from the income tax—does not make no 
more than 1/8 of the total public revenues. One may identify various ex-
planations for such poor performance: the rather low rate which prevailed in 
1995 and 1996 (16% and 15%, respectively), the introduction of a zero-band 
once the progressive rates were implemented, with a large number of taxpayers 
in that band, the significant size of unreported employment, etc. Actually, the 
practice of failing to report employment or hiding from the tax authorities the 
exact amount of the paid wages may be understood if one takes into consider-
ation the fact that the employment income is subject not only to the tax, but to 
social security contributions as well. Taken together, the taxes and social 
security contributions which are levied on wages make up about two thirds of 
the total fiscal revenues in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The overall 
fiscal burden on wages (which encompasses both levies paid by the employee 
and levies paid by the employer) is truly excessive: in 1996 it was required to 
pay 1.19 dinars of various taxes and contributions on 1 dinar of the net wage; 
in 1997 low wages were privileged to an extent [at the level of 600 dinars (USD 
90), 1 dinar of the net wage implies that 0.92 dinars of taxes should be paid], 
but the effects of the progression show quickly—at the level of 1.80 dinars (USD 
250), 1 dinar of the net wage implies that 1.20 dinars of taxes should be paid, 
while at the level of 4.20 dinars (USD 570) 1 dinar of the net wage implies 
that 1.46 dinars of taxes should be paid.8 If the incompetence of the tax 
administration in assessing and auditing the tax on business income is also taken 
into consideration, one should not expect that, given the present features of the 
tax system, the proceeds from the income tax can increase. The beginning of the 
implementation of the global personal income tax is still uncertain. 
As already indicated, the implementation of VAT has been postponed: 
instead of in 1995, it will not enter into force until 1999. For the time being, a 
retail sales tax is being levied, bringing in about 20% of the total public 
revenues. The standard rate of the retail sales tax on goods in Serbia is 23%, 
while in Montenegro it is 28%. The reduced rates are 13% and 11%, respec-
tively. The rate of the sales tax on services is 10% in Serbia and 7% in 
Montenegro. The exemptions are quite numerous, including equipment, spare 
parts, bread, milk, cooking oil and fat, water, medicines and medical supplies, 
8 POPOVIC, D.: "Nauka о porezirna i poresko pravo". Beograd, 1997. Savremena 
administracija. 
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orthopedic appliances, writing and drawing supplies for schools, textbooks, 
publications of "special importance" in the domain of science, arts, culture and 
education, passenger transport and the majority of the transport of goods, public 
utility services, attorneys' services, life insurance, and health, educational, 
cultural, scientific, social welfare and sport services. In the light of such high 
rates one may understand why the taxpayers are trying to evade the payment of 
the sales tax. On the one hand, there is a permanent lobbying for transferring 
goods into the group which is subject to the reduced rate or exemption. On the 
other, it should be taken into consideration that the suspension effecf under the 
retail sales tax is supposed to be achieved through a written statement issued 
by the buyer to the supplier that the goods purchased will be used only for 
further processing or resale. However, the practice of issuing false statements 
is so widespread that the tax auditors is unable to close these channels of tax 
evasion. 
The second reason which explains why the tax proceeds, at least in the short 
and medium run, cannot be significantly augmented concerns the scope of the 
black economy in the country. It is estimated that over one third of the GDP is 
produced in that sector.10 Unprepared to carry out radical economic reforms, 
which would imply privatization and subsequent sound economic growth, the 
regime is persistently tolerating the black (gray) economy, often carried out by 
employees in the state owned enterprises, where the economic activity has been 
halted for several years. One may label such practice demagoguery: the 
Government of Serbia has actually enacted a prohibition on firing the excessive 
working force, while paying these laborers only guaranteed (minimal) wages. 
On the other hand, they tend to accept such contract social, provided they get 
free hands to engage in moonlighting. However, one must not neglect another 
major source of the black economy—the "concessions" given to the privileged 
members of nomenclatura to import duty free supplies of the goods for which 
there is excess demand on the market. These "concessions" take the form either 
of ad hoc (but formally granted) exemptions from the customs duties or of the 
informal (and illegal) tolerance of importation without customs clearing and 
paying of levies (import duties, excises and sales tax). It is the existence of the 
privileged importers that explains the fact that the rate of collection of excises 
on tobacco products and alcoholic beverages (defined as the ratio between the 
actually collected and the planned revenues) is barely 10-20%, while the 
contraband is flourishing. The "concessions" to smuggle oil or oil derivatives 
9 TERRA, В.: "Sales Taxation". Dcventer, 1988. 
10 BOZOVIC, G.: "Siva ekonomija". Beograd, 1995. Ekonomski institut. 
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into the country are being granted—in the Republic of Serbia, as well as in the 
Republic of Montenegro—to very high ranked members of the nonienclatura, 
such practice providing evidence on the importance of the role of the organized 
crime in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
4. Thx Exemptions and Arrears 
The tax legislator in Serbia tends to display "fiscal generosity" by granting 
various tax exemptions, quite often in the absence of any criteria. One may 
quote a ruling of the Constitutional Court of Serbia that "the legislator is 
entitled to grant tax reliefs and exemptions to certain taxpayers within the 
context of conducting the tax policy".11 Such entitlement effectively means 
arbitrariness: in contrast to the postulate of the 1992 fiscal reform that the tax 
reliefs should be limited in scope and granted only when strict criteria are met, 
the tax concessions are being given to various interest groups—industrial 
workers, farmers, pensioners, small entrepreneurs, even lawyers. The examples 
are numerous: the zero-band in the system of the tax on wages in textile and 
machine industry is twice the size in other sectors, the services rendered by 
attorneys are exempt, too many entrepreneurs are granted the privilege to pay 
the tax on business income according to a lump-sum assessment, a newly 
established taxpayer always enjoys a tax holiday (ranging from one to six 
years), the base for the tax on income from agriculture and forestry-the 
cadastral yield—is being revalued irregularly and by applying indexes which are 
lagging behind the rate of inflation, all the pensions are tax exempt, the tax 
credit when a taxpayer resides in Iiis own house or apartment reaches 80% of 
the property tax liability, etc. 
In general, even where a support to certain sectors or regions is justifiable, 
tax reliefs seem to be preferable to subsidies from the point of view of 
politicians. It is worth mentioning that no calculations about the amount of 
the tax reliefs are required in the budgetary procedure. Being less transparent, 
the tax reliefs enable the government to promote chosen social groups, enter-
prises or industries with a minimal degree of parliamentary control. Thus, in 
a society which is essentially pseudo-democratic, it is simply the relative 
11 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia U 273/94, of 2 February 
1995. 
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strength of various lobbies which determines who will receive certain tax 
reliefs.12 
In addition to the above-mentioned tax reliefs, the Government of Serbia 
applies even more arbitrary exemptions: the National Assembly of Serbia adopted 
legislation which entitles the tax authorities to postpone the payment of the tax 
in cases when the taxpayer "objectively" is unable to fulfil his tax obligation. In 
practice this means that a number of "privileged" taxpayers—usually socially-
owned and public enterprises, but also certain private enterprises owned by the 
prominent members of the nomenclatura—are actually exempt (bearing in mind 
that the rate of interest for late payments used to be lower than the rate of 
inflation). Furthermore, the media have registered examples of the unauthorized 
but tacitly approved tolerance of payments of wages and salaries without tax 
and social security contributions being withheld. 
One may extensively discuss the impact of such "fiscal generosity" on the 
general tax morality in the country, on the horizontal equity or on the 
functioning of the principle of legality. However, it is my intention here to point 
out only the effect on the financing of the social and cultural rights (pensions, 
health care, unemployment benefits, social welfare, education). Having fallen 
into a Procrustean bed of the constitutionally prescribed abundance of human 
rights of this kind and having been deeply involved in the practice of granting 
generous tax exemptions, the regime in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(especially the Government of Serbia)—faced with the dilemma of whether to 
cut expenditures (which could prove to be a politically dangerous move) or to 
raise taxes (which in the above-mentioned circumstances may prove as un-
feasible)—opted for the "third way". The magician's trick is called arrearage. 
The concept is simple: die planned tax proceeds are overestimated and, 
consequently, the budgets are balanced. As the year passes, the payments to the 
recipients of the budgetary funds are permanently being delayed. Therefore, the 
arrears become significant: in mid-June 1997 the Public Pension Fund of Serbia 
was in debt to pensioners for four monthly pensions (USD 500 million). The 
Serbian Health Insurance Fund was in debt to the suppliers for USD 200 
million, the salaries having been paid only up until the first half of April. 
Teachers were paid similarly. The budget of Serbia also owed children's benefits 
(USD 100 million) and was in debt to the farmers for the agricultural products 
delivered in 1996 (USD 80 million). The salaries of university personnel were 
12 POPOVIC, D.: "Tax Incentives and the Need for Tax Neutrality: The Yugoslavian 
Experience". In: The Role of Tax Reform in Central and Eastern European Economies. Paris, 
1991. OECD. 
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paid for the first half of March, thus being late for 2.5 months. The salaries of 
the budgetary beneficiaries—already set very low (e.g., the full professor is 
supposed to receive from the budget less than USD 270 after taxes)—were 
actually halved. Psychologically, the aim of diminishing the budgetary and 
social insurance outlays and not admitting the reduction has been achieved. But 
the chosen way proves to be extremely unjust. The victims of this process those 
who represent the least threat to the regime (children, old people, patients and 
doctors, teachers). As soon as a social group organizes a strike (which is not an 
easy task, because most of the unions are controlled by the government), 
concessions are made and a half salary is usually paid to that group; others are, 
however, exposed to even more severe arrears. The prospect of a general strike 
remains unlikely, since the industrial workers have been quite passive so far and 
the employees in the public sector and the beneficiaries of the social and 
cultural rights quite disunited. 
The legal protection of the monetary dimension of the above-mentioned 
human rights can be viewed in light of several civil law cases where pensioners 
have sued the Public Pension Fund for unpaid pensions. These cases have been 
pending in the courts for months, even years, yet no verdict has gone into 
effect. This fact sheds light on the political pressures facing the judicial system. 
It can be concluded that effective remedies in this domain are lacking. 
In addition, the judicial system may even be characterized as cynical 
considering a verdict of tlie Constitutional Court of Serbia which proclaimed the 
taxation of pension income unconstitutional.13 The Court pointed out that the 
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, while prescribing that the pensions be 
financed by the employees, other insured persons and employers, via the 
pension funds managed by die insured persons and tlie beneficiaries, actually 
prohibited any diminishing of pension benefits, including diminishing by 
taxation. Since 1993, when the decision of the Constitutional Court was 
implemented in the Personal Income Tax Act, neither contributions nor pension 
benefits have been taxed. One may question whether the reasoning of the Court 
is in line with other constitutional provisions, especially with Article 52, 
proclaiming that everyone is obliged to pay taxes, and Article 69, proclaiming 
the ability-to-pay principle. In any case, the point cannot be missed: on one 
hand, the Constitutional Court is defending the "inviolability" of the pension 
rights by revoking the legal provisions on (actually very low) taxation of the 
pension income, thus creating a demagogic illusion that the retired people are 
13 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia of 15 July 1993, The 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 56 of 1993. 
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particularly protected; on the other hand, the Court (as well as the entire judicial 
system in Serbia) has not yet provided judicial protection for the victims of the 
budget arrears. 
5. Conclusions 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers itself legally bound by the 
conventions signed and ratified by ex-Yugoslavia. A legal analysis would show 
that the human rights contained in the U. N. Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, ratified by the Federal Assembly of ex-Yugoslavia, are correctly 
integrated into the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The same 
applies to the U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In my opinion, the 
prohibition-of-discrimination clause from Article 26 of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights is actually being infringed upon by the discriminative arrears 
carried out by the Yugoslavian authorities. The Human Rights Committee 
decided that the infringement of Article 26 existed even in cases when 
discrimination is related to the rights envisaged in the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights—for which the competence of the Committee had not 
been established.14 However, since Yugoslavia has not ratified the Optional 
Protocol, these cases of discrimination cannot be presented to the Human Rights 
Committee. 
The absence of an effective domestic remedy and the closed doors towards 
the Human Rights Committee leave the beneficiaries of social and cultural rights 
in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (especially in Serbia) with poor chances to 
resist the budget arrears. Actually, radical democratic reforms of the society are 
required as a presumption for elimination of the fiscal demagoguery and 
discriminative delays in payments of pensions and salaries. Only then will 
responsible government be established, based on the principle of the rule of law 
and not on providing iura inania. 
14 Zwaan-de Vries vs. The Netherlands, 1987, In: Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee under the Optional Protocol, Vol. II, New York: United Nations. 
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